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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

)
)

Plaintiff/Appellant

)
)
)
vs.
)
JOHN WALL AND
)
NANCY WALL, his wife,
)
)
Defendants/Appellees )

Case No. 960362-CA
940905590CN

Priority No. 15

JURSIDICITON
This appeal is brought by the Plaintiff/Appellant Bear River Mutual
Insurance Company, of Utah pursuant to Rule 3 and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure which provides that an appeal may be taken from a
District Court to the Appellate Court from all Orders and Final Judgment.
The Order and Final Judgment of Judge Glenn Iwasaki was entered by
the District Court of the Third District, for Salt Lake County, Sate of Utah on
March 8, 1996.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
(Not required by Appellee)
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DETERMINATION STATUTES OF RULES

The Appellee believes that the determinative statues necessary to resolve
this case are as follows:
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 31A-22-306
Utah Code Annotated, ? 953, as amended 3JA-22-307
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 31A-22-308
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 31A-22-309
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 31-41-11
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60b
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54b

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:

This action was initiated by Plaintiff Bear River Mutual Insurance, of Utah,
(hereinafter known as "Plaintiff Bear River") on September 2, 1994, in the District
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. A
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment was brought before Judge Glen Iwasaki's
Court, Civil number 940905590CN alleging a need for a court of law to
determine the contractual obligations and rights of Plaintiff Bear River to John
W. Wall and Nancy V. Wall, his wife, (hereinafter known as Defendant). On or
about said time, it was the decision of Plaintiff Bear River to terminate nny rind
all further PIP benefits for the Defendant, until a binding decision of said
obligations and rights could be determined by a Court of Law. Said PIP benefits
were terminated twenty-four (24) months ago, leaving the injured Defendant
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with no medical coverage for her injuries and with medical bills still unpaid.
Said action and alleged need for a "Declaratory Judgment" arose from
an accident involving the Defendant, in Cortez, Colorado, on or about August
6, 1992. At said time, Defendant was insured by Plaintiff Bear River under Policy
Number CI45077, a Utah no-fault Auto Insurance policy. Defendant was in no
way found to be at fault.
Plaintiff Bear River began paying PIP benefits to Defendant's medical
providers. Said payments exceeded the $3,000.00 Utah threshold, as well as the
$5,000.00 Colorado threshold, thereby allowing for an action grounded in tort
against the tort-feasor and her insurer, Hawkeye Security Insurance Company,
of Colorado, for the Personal Liability of the tort-feasor. On or about March 4,
1994, Defendants signed a release of Personal Liability for the tort-feasor Lana D.
Waters and received a tort settlement.

[ROA pgs. 11,52, 70,103, etc.]

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff Bear River terminated all of Defendant's PIP
benefits and drafted a letter to Defendant explaining that Plaintiff Bear River
was going to initiate a Court action - a "Complaint for Declaratory Judgment"
to determine both Plaintiff Bear River's rights and those of the Defendant.
b.

Essential course of proceedings
1.

September 2, 1994, Plaintiff Bear River filed a "Complaint for

Declaratory Judgment" before Judge Iwasaki's Court, in the District Court,
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of the Third District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil
Number 940905590CN.
2.

[ROA pgs. 1 -34]

October 28, 1994, Defendant received a Summons and Complaint,

at 11:10 a.m. from Plaintiff Bear River.
3.

[ROA pgs. 1 -34]

November 17, 1994, Defendant filed an Answer and Counter Claim

denying the allegations of Plaintiff Bear River's Complaint, pursuant to the
Utah Supreme Court Decision, Allstate Insurance Company vs. Ivie,
alleging that:
a.

Plaintiff Bear River was not released from their contractual

obligations to Defendant for PIP benefits.
b.

That

Plaintiff

Bear

River

could

only

receive

their

reimbursement of PIP expenses in Binding Mandatory Arbitration
with the tort-feasor insurer; not by an "equitable lien" upon
Defendant's tort-settlement.
c.

That Defendants no-fault Auto Insurance Policy required that

Defendant's PIP benefits must equal those of Colorado.
[ROA pgs. 41-56]
4.

November 23, 1994, Plaintiff Bear River filed an Answer to said

Counterclaim denying all allegations of said Counterclaim or was
"without sufficient information to admit the same".

[ROA pgs. 57-58]
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5.

December 13, 1994, Defendant filed a motion for Summary

Judgment.
6.

[ROA pgs. 75-79]

December 16, 1994, Plaintiff Bear River filed a Motion for Judgment

On The Pleadings Or In Lieu Thereof Motion for Summary Judgment.
[ROA pgs. 82-83]
7.

December 16, 1994, Plaintiff Bear River filed a Memorandum In

Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Or In Lieu
Thereof Motion For Summary Judgment And Memorandum In Opposition
To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, alleging that Defendant
was attempting double recovery. That because Plaintiff Bear River was a
Utah Company, their auto insurance policy complied with Utah Code
31A-22-308 providing that, because said accident occurred in Colorado,
Defendant had no cause of action and was "barred bv statute in any
event" from making a claim. Said quote is completely and deliberately
misquoted. 31A-22-308 states:
The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection
coverage: (1) The named insured, when injured in an accident
involving any motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident
occurs in this state, the United States, its territories or possessions, or
Canada, except where the injury is the result of the use or
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operation of the named insured's own motor vehicle not actually
insured under the policy.
8.

December 28. 1994 Defendant filed their Memorandum In Support

Of Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment.
9.

[ROA pgs. 84-103]

[ROA pgs. 106-110]

No notice to submit for decision was filed by either Plaintiff Bear

River or Defendant.
10.

June 19. 1995. Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum to

Amend Defendant's Counter Claim pursuant to Rule 15 URCP Amended
and Supplemental Pleadings, to include:
a.

A complaint for Breach of Insurance Contract and of Breach

of good faith and fair dealings.
b.

Consequential damages.

c.

Reservation of Defendant's right to bring a future action in

tort for "Communication Fraud" against Plaintiff Bear River.
[ROA pgs. 266-339]
11.

July 17, 1995. Defendant filed a Notice To Submit For Decision

concerning [ROA pgs. 266-339].
12.

July 18, 1995. Plaintiff Bear River filed a Motion for Rule 16 Motion for

Scheduling Management Conference.
13.

[ROA pgs. 340-341 ]

[ROA pgs. 342-344]

July 18, 1995. Plaintiff Bear River wrote a personal letter to Judge
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Iwasaki.
14.

[ROA pgs. 357-358]

July 21, 1995, Judge Iwasaki's Court ordered a scheduling

conference.
15.

[ROA pgs. 359, 360]

July 25, 1995, Defendant filed a second copy of said Amended

Counter Claim.
16.

[ROA pgs. 365-402]

August 1, 1995, Judge Iwasaki's Court filed a Notice of Scheduled

Hearing for August 24, 1995.
17.

[ROA pgs. 403-404]

August 24, 1995, Judge Iwasaki's Court heard oral arguments from

both Plaintiff Bear River and Defendant. Plaintiff Bear River's motions on
the pleadings were denied. Defendant's motions on the pleadings were
granted:
a.

[ROA pg.534]
Plaintiff

Bear River was ordered

to continue

to

pay

Defendant's PIP benefits per the terms of their insurance contract
with Defendant.
b.

On the Court's own motion. Defendant's Counterclaim was

dismissed because Defendant had intermixed civil matters with
criminal matters.
c.

Defendant's

Amended

Counter

Claim

was

neither

acknowledged nor dismissed.
d.

Plaintiff Bear River's attorney was directed to prepare the
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order.
18.

[ROA pg. 406] (Exhibit "A")

September 20, 1995, Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum

for Reconsideration of Judge Iwasaki's non-final Judgment, pursuant to
Rule 54b of the URCP as provided for in Timm vs. Dewsnup 851 P.2d 1178
at 1185 (Utah 1993), where the Utah Supreme Court states "We have
previously held that Rule 54b permits reconsideration of non-final
judgments 'Since it facilitates a just and speedy resolution of disputes in
the trial court.'" And furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court in Bennion vs.
Hansen 699 P.2d 757 at 760 (Utah 1985) says, "Until a court files its findings
of fact, no decision has been rendered or final ruling made. Any Judge is
free to change his or her mind on the out come of a case until a decision
is formally rendered."
Defendant ask the court to reconsider it's findings based upon
(Exhibit "B") a memorandum filed eighteen (18) months prior to said
"Complaint for Declaratory Judgment" by Plaintiff Bear River and
authored authored by Attorney Thomas A. Duffin. Said memorandum
completely contradicts all of Plaintiff Bear River's allegations in said
"Complaint for Declaratory Judgment."

Said memorandum concurs

exactly with the findings of law made by Judge Iwasaki.
[ROA pgs. 408-419] [ROA pgs. 420-453] (Exhibit "B")
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19.

October 6, 1995, Defendant filed a Notice to Submit For Decision

concerning [ROA pgs. 408-409] [ROA pgs. 420-453].
20.

October 24, 1995, Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration was

denied.
21.

[ROA pgs. 468-469]

[ROA pgs.470-471]

November 20, 1995, Defendant again motioned the Court to

reconsider said non-final Judgment [ROA pgs. 472-473]. [ROA pgs. 474486]
22.

December 12,1995, Defendant filed a Notice To Submit For Decision

concerning [ROA pgs. 472-486].
23.

December

29,

1995, minute

Reconsider was again denied.
24.

[ROA pgs. 518-519]
entry

Defendant's

Motion To

[ROA pgs. 520-521 ]

March 8. 1995, Plaintiff Bear River filed the Order And Final

Judgment in which Defendant's motion to file a Amended Counter Claim
was finally acknowledged by dismissing it without merit. [ROA pg. 534]
25.

April 3, 1996, Plaintiff Bear River filed Notice Of Appeal before Utah

Supreme Court.
26.

[ROA pgs. 536-544]

May 30, 1996, Plaintiff Bear River's appeal was pourover to the

Court at Appeals for disposition.
c.

Disposition by the Court
The proceeding statement of the course of the proceedings outlines all of
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the material procedures and judicial facts in this case. However, Plaintiff Bear
River's version differs substantially from that of the Defendant's and should be
duly noted bv this court. Judge Iwasaki's Court entered it's Order And Final
Judgment on March 8,1996, as follows:
1.

[ROA pg. 534]

That the Defendants, John and Nancy Wall's Motion For Summary

Judgment is granted and Plaintiff is required to pay John and Nancy Wall,
pursuant to the provisions of its policy. Part B, Personal Injury Protection,
those benefits since the time of the release signed by Defendants on
March 4,1994, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the policy.
2.

That Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment on the Pleadings Or Summary

Judgment is denied.
3.

That the Counter Claim filed by Defendants, John Wall and Nancy

Wall, is hereby dismissed, and the Defendant's request to file and
Amended Counter Claim is denied.
The Defendant did not file a cross appeal on this issue, as pointed out by
Plaintiff Bear River, concerning the dismissal of their Request To Amend their
Counter Claim, but has instead filed an Independent Action, "Amended
Complaint For Fraud" before the District Court of the Third District, in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, Civil Number 96094641CV, on July 3, 1996, before
Judge Sandra Pauler.

Said independent action was filed pursuant to the
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provisions of Rule 60b of the URCP providing for the power of the Court to
entertain an independent common law action to set aside a judgment or
decree for fraud, as well as the Utah Supreme Court in St. Pierre vs. Edmonds 645
P2d 615 at 618 (Utah 1982) in which said Court states, the three month limitation
period does "... not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent
common law action to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud or duress after
the three month period has expired."
d.

Statement of Relevant facts:
1.

The Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company of Utah,

(hereinafter known as "Plaintiff Bear River") is an insurance corporation
engaged in the insurance business in the State of Utah, having its principle
place of business at 778 E. Winchester, Murray, Utah 84107.
2.

The Defendant, John W. Wall and Nancy V. Wall, his wife, are

residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and receive all mail at P. O.
Box 540118, North Salt Lake, Utah 84054, and have so resided for the past
five (5) years consecutively.
3.

[ROA pg. 41]

Defendant was properly insured by Plaintiff Bear River under Policy

Number CI45077, a Utah no-fault Auto Insurance Policy, governed by the
laws and codes of the State of Utah, at the time of said accident.
[ROA pg. 2]

n

On or about August 6,1992, Plaintiff Bear River's Insured Defendant Nancy
V. Wall, was involved in an automobile accident in Cortez, Colorado.
Defendant was in no way found to be at fault.
Plaintiff Bear River began paying PIP benefits to Defendant's medical
providers.

Said payments exceeded the $3,000.00 Utah threshold, thereby

allowing for an action grounded in tort against the tort-feasor and her Insurer,
Hawkeye Security Insurance Company, of Colorado, for Personal Liability. On or
about March 4, 1994, Defendant signed a release of Personal Liability in favor
of, the tort-feasor, Lana D. Water and received a tort settlement.
[ROA pg. 11,52,70, 103, etc.]
On or about August 26,1994, Plaintiff Bear River notified Defendant of their
intentions to file an action in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, for a
Declaratory Judgment. In addition to, on or about said time, Plaintiff Bear River
terminated any and all further PIP benefits for Defendant. Said action left the
injured Defendant without any medical coverage for her injuries and with
medical bills still unpaid.
On August 24, 1995, one year later, in Summary Judgment, Judge Glenn
K. Iwasaki ordered Plaintiff Bear River to continue making said PIP payments, for
Defendant, as per the terms of their no-fault Auto Insurance Contract, with
Plaintiff Bear River.

[ROA pg. 534]
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In spite of said order, as of the date of this brief. Plaintiff Bear River has still
refused to honor their Insurance Contract with Defendant and pay said PIP
benefits. Instead, Plaintiff Bear River has claimed that Judge Iwasaki's decision
was "unwarranted" and filed an appeal with the Utah Supreme Court. Said
appeal was "poured over" to the Utah Court of Appeals. For the past (24)
twenty-four months, Plaintiff Bear River has refused to pay any and all PIP claims
or medical payments to Defendants medical providers because of various legal
maneuvers.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Plaintiff Bear River, has asserted three points of alleged error before this
Court in said appeal of Judge Iwasaki's decision. They are as follows:
Point No. 1:

That Judge Iwasaki's Court errored by determining that

Defendant's release of the tort-feasor did not also release Plaintiff Bear River
from any further obligations to Defendant for PIP benefits.
Point No. 2: That Judge Iwasaki's Court errored by determining that Defendant
did not waive or extinguish Plaintiff Bear River's rights in Arbitration Proceedings
for reimbursement of PIP expenses paid to Defendant's medical providers.
Point No. 3: That Judge Iwasaki's Court errored by determining that Defendant
did not contractually waive or extinguish their right for future PIP benefits by
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executing their general release of the tort feasor.
All (3) three of Plaintiff Bear River's allegations of error by Judge Iwasaki's
Court can be simply and completely eliminated by understanding that Judge
Iwasaki ruled that the PIP benefits covered by Plaintiff Bear River's Auto
Insurance Contract with Defendant and Defendant's tort settlement with
attending release are separate and distinct.

Plaintiff Bear River was never

released from their contractual obligations and responsibilities for PIP benefits to
Defendant, at all. Said release applies only to the Personal Liability of the tort
feasor, to Defendant.

(Exhibit "A")

Much like a man who has a first mortgage on his home and also a
second mortgage on the same property; payment of the first mortgage does
not release or extinguish the liability of the second mortgage. The mortgages
are separate and distinct, unless otherwise agreed.

ARGUMENT

Judge Iwasaki determined said separate and distinct nature based upon
two Utah Supreme Court Decisions: The first, is Allstate Insurance Company vs.
Ivie 606 P.2d 1197 at 1203 (Utah 1980); The second is, Allstate Insurance
Company vs. Anderson 608 P.2d 235 at 236 (Utah 1980).
[ROA pg. 75, 76, 80, 107, 133, 174, 175, 200, 270, etc.]
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In Allstate vs. Ivie, at 1203: The Utah Supreme Court states, " . . . the tortfeasor's liability insurer in fulfilling its duty to respond to the claim of the injured
party to the limits of its policy, stands in the shoes of its insured and pays on the
basis of the insured's personal liability to the tort victim; this personal liability
does not include PIP payments.

Thus the tort victim's recovery cannot be

reduced by the PIP payments."
[ROA pg. 75 ,76, 80,107,133,174,175, 200, 270, etc.] (Emphasis Added)
In Allstate vs. Anderson, at 236: Twenty-four days later, on March 3, 1980,
the Utah Supreme Court further clarified their decision in Allstate vs. Ivie, in
Allstate Insurance Company vs. Anderson stating, "I concur on the basis that the
recently decided case of Allstate Insurance Company vs. Ivie is now to be
recognized as the law of this state. However, inasmuch as that case made a
change in our law, I think it appropriate to make some further observations. In
cases such as this, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between the
two classes of claims: First, the personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, which are
to be paid to the claimant (the person who suffers the injuries) by his own insurer,
regardless of fault. Second, there is the possible tort claim against the alleged
wrongdoer, back up by his insurer. If it appears that the wrongdoer is or would
be legally liable to the claimant, then the wrongdoer's insurer must reimburse
the claimant's insurer for PIP payments it has made, this is to be done under the
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procedure provided in section 31-41-11 UCA 1953; and this PIP payment is not to
be considered as part of any settlement between the claimant and the
wrongdoer or his insurer,

(unless the parties clearly understand and agree

otherwise.)"
[ROA pg. 75, 76,80,107,133,174,175, 200, 270, etc.] (emphasis added)
Again in 1980, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision of Ivie, in
Guaranty National Insurance Company vs. Morris, 611 P.2d 725 at 727 (Utah
1980) stating, " . . . the no fault insurer who has paid PIP benefits to its insured is
not entitled, by way of subrogation to reimbursement of those funds from
subsequent recovery by its insurer against the third party tort-feasor or his insurer.
Rather as was explained in that case, any reimbursement claimed by the PIP
insurer is to be sought in arbitration proceedings between the insurance
companies of the respective parties, as provided in Section 31-41-11 UCA 1953.
The gist of the decision was that PIP payment would not be considered as part
of any settlement between the insured party and the third-party tort-feasor or
his insurer."

(emphasis added)

Without a doubt, it can be clearly seen that PIP benefits and the Personal
Liability of the tort-feasor are separate and distinct. Plaintiff Bear River was
never released from their contractual obligations to Defendant for PIP benefits.
PIP benefits are not, in anyway, to be considered as any part of the Personal
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Liability of the tort-feasor.
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Allstate vs. Anderson, the first liability
is personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, to be paid to the injured by the
injured's insurer regardless of fault. The second liability, is the possible tort claim
against the alleged wrongdoer backed up by his insurer. These liabilities are
separate and distinct and PIP payments are not to be considered as any part of
the tort-feasor's Personal Liability, paid in the tort settlement.
The release of liability Defendants signed, released only the tort-feasor of
her Personal Liability to Defendants, (the second liability). Defendants cannot
release the tort-feasor insurer's liability to the no-fault insurer for PIP
reimbursement.

As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Jaramillo vs. Farmers

Insurance Group 669 P.2d 1231 at 1235 (Utah 1980) "Bv what leaal right can a
stranger compromise another's legal liability? Under the Utah No Fault Act and
Ivie and its proaencv the obligation to reimburse the no-fault insurer is solely that
of the liability insurer and the injured person can not compromise that right."
Furthermore: In Ivie, at 1203: The Utah Supreme Court states, "The No-fault
insurer by being subrogated to the rights of the insured as provided by 31-41-11
has a right to collect directly from the tort-feasor's insurer (whether or not the
insured party has filed a tort claim) by way of arbitration pursuant to 31-41-11. If
the insured party files an action against the third party tort-feasor which results in
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a judgment for the insured, the judgment would be given dispositive effect on
the issue of fault and the relative liabilities of the insurance companies in the
arbitration proceedings, for it is in the arbitration proceedings that the no-fault
insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured."
Consequently, Defendant's tort-settlement can and will only aid Plaintiff
Bear River's case in arbitration with the tort-feasor insurer.
Therefore, the release of the tort-feasor's Personal Liability has no affect
on relationship to the contractual obligations of Plaintiff Bear River to
Defendant, for PIP benefits.

Wherefore:
1.

Plaintiff Bear River was never released from their Contractual

Obligations to Defendant and consequently was not released from their
obligation to Defendant for Personal Injury Protection or PIP benefits.
2.

Defendant cannot and did not "waive or extinguish" the liability

owed Plaintiff Bear River by the tort-feasor insurer Hawkeye Security Insurance
Company for reimbursement of PIP expenses, to be recovered in the arbitration
proceedings.
3.

Plaintiff Bear River was never released from their Contractual

obligations to Defendant and therefore Plaintiff Bear River is still contractually
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liable to Defendant for future Personal Injury Protection benefits, as per the
terms of said Auto Insurance Contract.

Plaintiff Bear River further alleges that Defendants "are now attempting to
. . . seek double recover." The Utah Supreme Court has addressed Plaintiff's
allegations of "double recovery" many times in the following decisions:
a.

Allstate Insurance Company vs. Ivie 606 P.2d 1197 at 1203 and 1204

(Utah 1980).
b.

Allstate Insurance Company vs. Anderson 608 P.2d 235 at 236 (Utah

1980).
c.

Street vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange 609 P.2d 1343 at 1346 (Utah

1980).
d.

Transamerica Insurance Company vs. Barnes 505 P.2d 783 at 787

(Utah 1972).
In Ivie, at 1203:"... the result reached by a majority of the Court will not
result in double recovery to an injured person. It will on the other hand, result in
greater efficiency, accuracy and fairness in determining the relative rights of the
interested parties."

(emphasis added)

In Anderson, at 236: "It is important that parties involved in such situations
be aware of those rights and obligations, as now adjudicated under the No-
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fault Act. This is to prevent double recovery and double payment for the same
loss and incidently to avoid increased costs of insurance coverage, in frustration
of the very purpose of the act."
In Street, at 1346: "The right of subrogation, as explained in Ivie, is a right to
be exercised in an arbitration proceeding between Insurance Companies of the
respective parties so that double recovery can be avoided, unnecessary
litigation made less likely and the inherent conflict between the insured and the
insurer avoided."
In Transamerica, at 1204: Should double recovery be suspected by an
insurer, it is a matter which said insurer m u s t " . . . present proof which establishes
that the damages covered by defendant's settlement were the same or
covered those for which defendant has already received indemnity from
(insurer); otherwise the receipt of payment from the tort-feasor does not entitle
(insurer) to return of payment made by it."
It is true, as Plaintiff Bear River has pointed out time and time again that
"double recovery", "double payment", "open end medical funds", "windfall
profits", etc., etc., etc., etc., are prohibited. But NOT ONCE HAS PLAINTIFF Bear
River COMPILED WITH THE UTAH SUPREME COURT REQUIREMENTS WHEREBY SAID
ACCUSATIONS ARE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED. Plaintiff Bear River has only "dirtied
the water" by slinging about irrelevant, pre Ivie, Utah Supreme Court decisions
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and arguments.

Plaintiff Bear River is desperately attempting to infer that

Defendant is a "bad guy" attempting to rip off the system, via double recovery.

As the cornerstone or "nutshell" of Plaintiff Bear River's argument. Plaintiff
has presented the Utah Supreme Court decision, Jones vs. Transamerica
Insurance Company 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979) as identical to the issue at bar.
Said comparison is completely and totally false. Defendant's did receive
a tort-settlement from the tort-feasor insurer. Defendants did release the tortfeasor from any further Personal Liability to Defendant (the second liability).
However, Defendant was only paid PIP benefits (the first liability) by their no-fault
insurer. Plaintiff Bear River. Defendant did not release Plaintiff Bear River from
their liability for PIP benefits, because Plaintiff Bear River has not fulfilled their
contractual obligations to Defendant for PIP benefits. The distinction between
the issue at bar and the "Jones" case is simply

—

the tort-feasor insurer,

Hawkeye Security Insurance Company has paid absolutely no PIP benefits to
Defendant, what-so-ever.

PIP benefits are not the responsibility of the tort-

feasor insurer, they are the contractual responsibility of the no-fault Auto Insurer,
Plaintiff Bear River, as provided in Allstate vs. Ivie and Allstate vs. Anderson.
[ROA pg. 75, 76, 80, 107, 133, 174, 175, 200, 270, etc.]

In "Jones" the injured received all PIP benefits directly from the tort-feasor
insurer rather than his own insurer.

The injured then attempted to collect

additional PIP benefits, from his own insurer, but was refused. Said issue went
before the Utah Supreme Court in Jones vs. Transamerica Insurance Company,
where said injured was again denied. Said Court determined that the injured
had chosen his course of recovery, through and by the tort-feasor insurer, rather
than his own insurer. That the injured had settled with the tort-feasor insurer for
said Personal Injury or PIP benefits. That the injured had thereby extinguished his
insurer's right of subrogation.
In 1980, one year after the 1979 "Jones" case, the Utah Supreme Court
"changed the law" in and by Allstate vs. Ivie and Allstate vs. Anderson,
concerning PIP benefits and the Personal Liability of the tort-feasor. Said Court
determined that PIP benefits and the Personal Liability of the tort feasor, are
separate and distinct. That PIP benefits are to be paid bv the injured's no-fault
Auto Insurer. That if and when damages exceed a $3,000.00 threshold, the
nonliable or not at fault injured, can pursue a claim against the tort-feasor for
the Personal Liability. That when said Personal Liability or tort settlement is paid,
the injured can release the tort-feasor, separately and distinctly, from all
Personal Liability to the injured. That when the Contractual Liability, of the no
fault insurer, for PIP benefits to their injured has been fulfilled, said no-fault Insurer
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can, at that time, pursue their reimbursement of PIP expenses from the tortfeasor insurer, in Binding Mandatory Arbitration.
On page (15) fifteen of Plaintiff Bear River brief before the Utah Court of
Appeals, Plaintiff Bear River states, "Bear River Mutual is not attempting to
recover or claim any interest in the Wall's settlement with Lana D. Waters and
her insurance carrier and their settlement. [ROA pg. 33] The settlement was
within the insurance policy limits of the Water's Insurance Policy.

[ROA pg.

533]". "These are not issues in this appeal, neither were they issues in the trial
court."
By said statements. Plaintiff Bear River has acknowledged that there were
no funds inappropriately paid to Defendant that should have been paid to
Plaintiff Bear River for reimbursement of PIP expenses. Nor has Plaintiff Bear River
demonstrated that the tort-feasor insurer has inappropriately included PIP
benefits within said tort settlement, thereby paying the obligations of the nofault insurer, Plaintiff Bear River for PIP benefits, (the first liability). Therefore, as
the Utah Supreme Court has determined in Allstate vs. Ivie and in Allstate vs.
Anderson - said PIP payments are not and were not any part of the tort
settlement received by Defendant.
If Plaintiff Bear River should suspect that Defendant did collect PIP
benefits from the tort-feasor insurer, then Plaintiff Bear River must prove those
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allegations.

Again, the Utah Supreme Court, in Transamerica Insurance

Company vs. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783 at 787 (Utah 1972) as well as Allstate
Insurance Company vs. Ivie at 1204 (Utah 1980), states that said insurer"... must
present proof which establishes that the damages covered by defendant's
settlement were the same or covered those for which defendant has already
received indemnity from (insurer)..."
Plaintiff Bear River has never once attempted to prove said allegations
but has only inferred double payments would result if Plaintiff Bear River were to
fulfill the terms of their insurance contract with Defendant.

Plaintiff Bear River stated that they filed their "Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment" on October 28, 1994, under authority of the Utah Supreme Court
decision Western Casualty and Surety Co. vs. Marchant 615 P.2d 423 at 427
(Utah 1980), in which said Court states, "It would not comport with our ideas of
either law or justice to prevent any party who entertains bona fide questions
about his legal obligations from seeking adjudication thereon in the courts."
[ROA pg. 422] (emphasis added)
On April 14, 1993, (18) eighteen months prior to initiating said Complaint
for Declaratory Judgment, Plaintiff Bear River, filed a memorandum in Judge
Medley's Court, in the Third District, for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Said
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Memorandum was entitled "Amended Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion to File An Amended Complaint" Civil Number 920905486PD.
[ROA pg. 424-433]
In said Memorandum, Mr. Thomas A. Duffin, representing Plaintiff Bear
River and addressing an Insurance Company's obligations in the State of Utah,
for PIP payments and the recovery of their costs, stated the following:
a.

"The Ivie case makes it unequivocally clear that the personal injury

protection benefits do not become part of the Plaintiff's (claimant's)
negligence against the tort-feasor. They are distinct and separate and
they have nothing to do with the tort-feasor or claimant's cause of
action."
b.

(emphasis added)

". . . the insured contractually has a claim against his insurance

company for payment of these benefits.

Then the reimbursement is

covered by statute pursuant to arbitration."
c.

Mr. Duffin then quotes Utah Code annotated 1953, as amended

31 A-22-309(5) indicating the contractual nature of PIP benefits.
d.

Finally, Mr. Duffin concludes that PIP benefits and the recovery of

their costs is "contractual and statutory".
Beyond any doubt. Plaintiff Bear River has clearly and convincing
demonstrated their knowledge and understanding of the Codes, Laws and
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Utah Supreme Court decisions governing PIP benefits and the recovery of their
costs in the State of Utah.
Yet, in spite of this clear and convincing knowledge, Plaintiff Bear River,
on October 28, 1994, filed said Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Civil
Number 940905590CN alleging the following:
a.

[ROA pgs. 1-34]

that the release of tort-liability Defendant signed in favor of the tort-

feasor also released Plaintiff Bear River of all obligations for any further PIP
benefits to Defendant's Medical Providers.
b. that the only remedy Plaintiff Bear River had for

the recovery of

their Contractual PIP expenses was for the Court to order that Plaintiff
Bear River was entitled to an "equitable lien upon the proceeds of
Defendant's tort settlement".

Plaintiff

[ROA pg. 8]

Bear River's said Memorandum

directly

and

completely

contradicts Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. Plaintiff Bear River's
said Memorandum concurs exactly with

the findings of law made bv

Judae Iwasaki's Court, as follows:
o.

that Defendant's tort settlement and Defendants

(Exhibit "A)
Insurance

Contract with Plaintiff are separate and distinct.
b.

that the recovery of PIP expenses by Plaintiff Bear River was to be
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pursued in Arbitration with the tort-feasor insurer.
c.

that the Utah Supreme Court decision in Allstate Insurance

Company vs. Ivie and its progeny govern said issue.
d.

that Defendant contractually has a claim against their Insurance

Company, Plaintiff Bear River for payment of PIP benefits per

the

terms of said contract.

Now Plaintiff Bear River has appealed the decision of Judge Iwasaki's
Court, in spite of the fact, said Court ruled exactly as Plaintiff Bear River has
explained in their Memorandum.
Clearly, Plaintiff Bear River had no "bonafide" questions of law and
therefore had no need to initiate said Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, at
all.

[ROA pg. 424-433]
Because Plaintiff Bear River had no "bonafide" need for said Complaint

for Declaratory Judgment there was absolutely no need to terminate all of
Defendants legitimate, contractual PIP benefits pending a decision from Judge
Iwasaki's Court - then a decision from that the Utah Supreme Court - and now a
decision from the Utah Court of appeals.

[ROA pgs. 421, 422,423]

Defendant submits that clearly Plaintiff Bear River's actions constitute
fraud. Fraud upon our system of Justice and fraud upon Defendant.
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The Utah Supreme Court, in Crookston vs. Fire Insurance 817 P.2d 789,
(Utah 1991) at 800, states that for fraud to be proven, such an action must
clearly and convincingly demonstrate the following:
a.

"That a representation was made . . . "
Plaintiff Bear River represented to the Court that

because

Defendant had entered into a settlement with the tort-feasor, Defendant
had knowingly and willingly terminated any obligation Plaintiff Bear River
had to continue further PIP benefits for Defendant.
Plaintiff Bear River further represented to said Court, that the
"release" Defendant signed in favor of the tort-feasor had destroyed
Plaintiff Bear River's right of subrogation in the matter and consequently
Plaintiff Bear River was entitled to an "equitable lien" upon the proceeds
of Defendant's tort-settlement.
b.

"concerning a presently existing material f a c t . . . "
There are two existing Utah Supreme Court decisions governing this

very issue. They are specifically, Allstate Insurance Company vs. Ivie, 606
P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980) and Allstate Insurance Company vs. Anderson 608
P.2d 235 (Utah 1980).
[ROA pg. 75, 76, 80, 107, 133, 174, 175, 200, 270, etc.]
There are at least four more Utah Supreme Court decisions
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discussing and reaffirming said Utah Supreme Court findings. They are
specifically:
•

Street vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange 609 P.2d 1343 (Utah
1980)

•

Guaranty National Insurance Company vs. Morris 611 P.2d
725 (Utah 1980)

•

Laub vs. South Central Utah Telephone Association 657 P.2d
1304 (Utah 1982)

•

Jaramillo vs. Farmers Insurance Group 669 P.2d 1231 (Utah
1983)

All of the aforementioned Utah Supreme Court cases decide and
reaffirm the following:
". . . the no-fault insurer who has paid PIP benefits to its
insured

is

not

entitled,

by

way

of

subrogation,

to

reimbursement of those funds from subsequent recovery by
its insured against the third-party tort-feasor or his insurer.
Rather, as was explained in that case, any reimbursement
claimed by the PIP insurer is to be sought in an arbitration
proceeding between the insurance companies of the
respective parties, as provided in section 31-41-11, U.C.A.1953.
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The gist of the decision was that the PIP payment would not
be considered as part of any settlement between the injured
party and the third-party tort-feasor or his insurer." Guaranty
National Insurance Company vs. Morris 611 P.2d 725 (Utah
1980) at 727.
c.

(emphasis added)

"which was false . . . "
It can therefore be clearly seen, that the representations made in

said Complaint for Declaratory Judgment by Plaintiff Bear River are false.
Tort-settlements and PIP benefits are separate and distinct. A release of
the tort-feasor has no effect or relationship to the contractual obligations
of the PIP insurer. Plaintiff Bear River. And subrogation of tort-settlements is
not allowed unless damages are "proven on a record with evidence".
d.

"which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made

recklessly, knowing that he for shel had insufficient knowledge upon
which to base such representation . . . "
Plaintiff Bear River's aforementioned Memorandum, in Civil Case
Number 920905486PD, clearly and convincingly demonstrates that
Plaintiff Bear River, knew beyond any doubt, (18) eighteen months prior to
initiating said Complaint, the Laws, Codes and Utah Supreme Court
Decisions governing this issue. Yet, in spite of this knowledge. Plaintiff Bear
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River and their attorney Mr. Thomas A. Duffin have deliberately
misrepresented their knowledge of those facts to the Court, thereby
blocking the payment of PIP benefits for Defendant.
e.

"for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon i t . . . "
Without any doubt, it can be seen, that Plaintiff Bear River brought

said "Complaint for Declaratory Judgment" before the Court solely for
the purpose of inducing said Court to act upon their arguments. Thereby,
allowing Plaintiff Bear River to deny any further PIP benefits to Defendant
and to obtain their reimbursement of PIP costs directly and illegally from
Defendant's tort-settlement.
f.

"that the other party acting reasonably and in ignorance of its

falsity..."
g.

"did rely upon i t . . . "

h.

"and was thereby induced to a c t . . . "
Said Court accepted Plaintiff Bear River's Complaint as legitimate

and ruled that their Declaratory Action was justified, even though Plaintiff
Bear River was clearly and convincingly aware of the Laws, Codes, and
Utah Supreme Court decisions, at the very least, (18) eighteen months
prior to initiating said Complaint.

Plaintiff Bear River did not need or

require said Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, at all.
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In Pepper vs. Zions First National Bank N.A., 801 P.2d 144 at 148 (Utah 1990),
the Utah Supreme Court states, ". . . that the fraud alleged need only affect
that the basic fairness of the adjudication."
Through Judge Iwasaki's Court ruled against Plaintiff Bear River on every
single issue in Summary Judgment, except one, it is that issue which has
destroyed the total fairness of said adjudication.
Said Court ruled that Plaintiff Bear River's action for Declaratory Judgment
was "fairly debatable and needed to be handled in a declaratory manner."
By said ruling, Judge Iwasaki's Court absolved Plaintiff Bear River of all
allegations of breach of Insurance Contract. Yet, breach of Insurance Contract
is exactly what Plaintiff Bear River has accomplished by said manipulation of our
system of justice. In Beck vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange 701 P.2d 795 at 798
and 801 (Utah 1985) the Utah Supreme Court upheld an Insurer's duty "to
perform a first party insurance Contract in good faith." Failure to do so, is to be
considered a breach of contract.

Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court

maintained that the duty of good faith requires an insurer "to refrain from
actions that will injure the insured's ability to obtain benefits of contract."
Plaintiff

Bear

River's

Complaint

for

Declaratory

Judgment

and

consequential denial of Defendant's PIP benefits have without a doubt injured
Defendants "ability to obtain benefits of contract." Plaintiff Bear River for the
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past (24) twenty-four months has totally eliminated Defendant's PIP benefits, for
no "bonafide" reason, what-so-ever.

Plaintiff Bear River has stated that Defendants, Pro Se, have clouded this
issue, displaying their ignorance with a "donnybrook" of pleadings. In an effort
to correct said "donneybrook" of pleadings, on June 19, 1995 Defendants filed
a "Motion to Amend Defendant's Counter Claim Pursuant to Rule 15 URCP
Amended and Supplemental Pleadings, along with supporting Memorandum.
On July 17,1995, Defendant filed a "Notice to Submit for Decision."
[ROA pgs. 266-268] [ROA pgs. 269-339] [ROA pgs. 340-341]
No pre-trial conference had been scheduled nor had a trial date been
set. Defendant's Motion, Memorandum and Notice to Submit for Decision were
totally and completely ignored for (8) eight months by Judge Iwasaki's Court,
until said Court dismissed them, without Merit, in Plaintiff's version of the Final
Order and Judgment.

[ROA pgs. 533-534]

Judge Iwasaki's (Bench Ruling) never once mentioned Defendant's
motion to their Amended Counter Claim. However, said Amended Counter
Claim was thereby deliberately included within the "Final Order and Judgment
by Plaintiff Bear River and dismissed without merit.
(Exhibit "A")
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As further demonstration of Plaintiff Bear River's intent, motives, and
method Defendant asks this Court to review the following:
[ROA

oa. 84-103]. On December 16, 1994, Plaintiff Bear River filed a

"Memorandum In Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or
In Lieu Thereof, Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
No notice to submit for decision was ever filed on any issue allegedly
brought before this Court by, Plaintiff Bear River.
[ROA pas. 93-941. In said Memorandum Plaintiff. "Bear River deliberately
rewords Utah State Code 31 A-22-308 stating under Point II, Bear River's Policy for
PIP was issued to comply with the Utah Code. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended 31 A-22-308 provides that PIP benefits are payable to covered persons
injured in an automobile accident occurring in the State of Utah. The accident
in this case occurred in Colorado. Therefore, the claim made by Defendants
does not provide for a cause of action unless it occurs in Utah and is, therefore,
barred by statute in any event."
When in fact, Utah Code 31 A-22-308, Persons covered by personal injury
protection states exactly the opposite, as follows: "The following may receive
benefits under personal injury protection coverage:

[ROA pgs. 134,135]

(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any
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motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this
state, the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada,
except where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the
named insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under the
policy:"
fROA pq. 91, 92, 95, 96, 97]. Plaintiff Bear River references the following
cases as current and viable and justification for Plaintiff Bear Rivers actions
against Defendant.
Jamison vs. Utah Home Fire Insurance Company 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977).
Jones vs. Transamerica Insurance Company 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979).
State Farm Mutual vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange 450 P.2d 458 (Utah
1969).
Geetz vs. State Farm Fire and Casualty 451 P.2d 860 (Oregon 1969).
Catmull vs. Medical Integrated Systems Inc. 517 P.2d 1003 (Utah 1974).
All of the a fore-mentioned cases are totally irrelevant and out-dated.
The procedures discussed and indicated were superceeded by those of Allstate
Insurance Company vs. Ivie 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980) and Allstate Insurance
Company vs. Anderson 608 P.2d 235 (Utah 1980). [ROA pg. 75, 76, 80, 107, 133,
174, 175, 200,270, etc.]
[ROA

pg. 9, 82, 83]. Plaintiff Bear River claims that Defendant has
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destroyed Plaintiff Bear River's right to subrogation and recovery of their PIP
expenses. Yet on [ROA pg. 88, 89] Plaintiff Bear River acknowledges that after
all. Plaintiff can settle using ". . . Mandatory Arbitration with the tort-feasor
insurance company, Hawkeye Security Insurance Company."
fROA pa. 1221. Plaintiff Bear River states, "In Colorado there is no right of
reimbursement between insurance companies regardless of the fault of their
insured." When in fact, Colorado State Code, Section 10-4-717, Inter Company
Arbitration, pages 336-337 states that reimbursement between insurers shall be
accomplished via mandatory binding arbitration.

(Exhibit "D")

[ROA pg. 144, 183, 210, 2821. Plaintiff Bear River in a letter to the tort-feasor
insurer, dated July 8, 1993, claims to have paid $5,000.00 for collision coverage.
No such payment was ever made to or received by Defendant.
On September 20, 1995, six (6) months before Judge Iwasaki's decision
became final, Defendant attempted to present Plaintiff Bear River's said
Memorandum to the Court for consideration. Defendant filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration

and

Assessment

of

New

Evidence"

with

supporting

memorandum.

Said Motion for Reconsideration is allowed by the Utah

Supreme Court in Timm vs. Dewsnup 857 P.2d 1178 at 1184 and 1885 (Utah 1993).
Said Court states that should new material facts come ". . . to light between
entry of summary judgment and the subsequent motion to reconsider,..." Rule
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54(b) permits reconsideration of a non-final judgment "since it facilitates the just
and speedy resolution of disputes in the trial court."

[ROA pg. 472-473]

And again the Utah Supreme Court, provides for the re-evaluation of nonfinal decisions in Bennion vs. Hansen 699 P.2d 757 at 760 (Utah 1985) the Utah
Supreme Court states "Until a court files its findings of fact, no decision has been
rendered or final ruling made. Any judge is free to change his or her mind on
the outcome of a case until a decision is formally rendered." [ROA pg. 474-486]
However,

in

spite

of

the

Utah

Supreme

Courts

provisions

for

reconsideration, Defendant's motions were dismissed without merit.
[ROA pgs. 534]

CONCLUSION
There are no excuses for the actions of Plaintiff Bear River. There are no
debatable issues of law in this action. There are no "bonafide" questions in
need of answers by a Court of Law. The only debate that exists, is that which
Plaintiff Bear River has attempted to create - to justify their denial of
Defendants'

legitimate, contractual, PIP benefits and their attempt

subrogate Defendant's tort-settlements with an "equitable lien".

to

Without a

doubt. Plaintiff Bear River knew and understood their obligations as no-fault
Auto Insurance providers, in the State of Utah, affhe very least (18) eighteen
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months prior to initiating said Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, as clearly
and convincingly demonstrated by said Memorandum.

(Exhibit "B")

The Laws, Codes, and Utah Supreme Court decisions involved in this issue
are now (16) sixteen years old. The process of arbitration is a process in which
Plaintiff Bear River has undoubtedly participated in many, many times to
receive their reimbursement of PIP expenses, from other insurer's, of liable tortfeasors. Said arbitration is a practice which provides Plaintiff Bear River with
much of its financial income.
Defendant submits that Plaintiff Bear River has and is fraudulently
manipulating this issue to justify and to avoid paying Defendant's PIP benefits, as
well as to very possibly set a precedent for future denial of legitimate PIP benefits
to other injured policy holders.
The Utah Supreme Court, in McBride vs. Jones 615 P.2d 431 at 433 (Utah
1980) admonishes,"... that the courts should not forsake the interests of justice;
and when it appears that an egregious deception or oppression may have
been practiced, it should neither be condoned nor rewarded. Particularly, that
this should not be done by allowing one to seek refuge in niceties of legal
terminology."

". . . where the contentions make it appear that there is

substantial likelihood that the proof may show that a party was so cheated,
imposed upon or unfairly dealt with that it would shock the conscience of the
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court to allow it to stand, the court should resolve doubts in favor of permitting
the parties to present their evidence and have the issues determined."
This issue is now (2) two years old. The costs to Defendants have been
enormous, specifically:
a.

Defendant has many unpaid medical bills as result of Plaintiff Bear

River's denial of said PIP benefits.
b.

Defendant has been unable to receive Doctor prescribed physical

therapy because Defendant cannot afford said treatments without
insurance reimbursement.
c.

Defendant's credit is slowly being destroyed as a result of this issue.

d.

Defendant has lost their construction loan, on their new home,

because of this issue.
e.

Defendant cannot live in their partially finished new home,

because of this issue.
f.

Defendant's son was expelled from the school district, in which said

home was being constructed, because of unmet residency requirements,
resulting from this issue.
g.

Defendant's new marriage has suffered greatly because of

disharmony and frustration as a result of this fraudulent action.
In a case very similar to the issues at bar, the Utah Supreme Court in
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Crookston vs. Fire Insurance 817 P.2d 789 at 816 (Utah 1991) states, "One may
never know how many of the thousands of claims handled in Utah and
elsewhere by the defendant(plaintiff) have been subject to the same kind of
fraudulent manipulation as occurred in this case, with devastating losses to
those who contracted in good faith. A $4,000,000.00 punitive damage award
can certainly have a salubrious effect in inducing the defendant(plaintiff) to
bring its practices into harmony with common moral conduct and accepted
business ethics to say nothing of the requirements of the law."

Wherefore: Defendant asks this Court to determine:
1.

That the findings of Judge Iwasaki's Court were correct, with one

exception.
2.

That said exception is specifically that there exists no "bonafide"

questions of law in this issue, no debatable points of law justifying Plaintiff
Bear River's "Complaint for Declaratory Judgment" what-so-ever.
3.

That said Complaint was only obstructive and served no other

useful purpose as were the legal maneuvers pursued by Plaintiff Bear
River.
4.

That said Complaint and consequential denial of PIP benefits was

absolutely unnecessary.
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5.

That said Complaint and denial of Defendants PIP benefits, without

any doubt constitutes fraud upon Defendant.
6.

That Plaintiff Bear River's Memorandum, dated April 14, 1993, Civil

Number 920905486PD demonstrates clearly and convincingly Plaintiff's
prior knowledge and understanding of this issue and therefore required
NO explanation or clarification by any Court.
7.

That Plaintiff Bear River knew at

(Exhibit "B")
the very least (18) eighteen

months prior to initiating said Complaint, Plaintiff's rights and obligations as
well as those of Defendant.
8.

That this issue should have never been brought before this Court or

any other Court, at all. Said issues are well settled, now over (16) sixteen
years old. They have been tried, retired and reaffirmed by the Utah
Supreme Court many, many times.
9.

That this issue should be remanded to the Third District Court, Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, to be adjudicated by Judge Sandra Peuler in
Civil Number 960904641 CV, Amended Complaint for Fraud, pursuant to
the opinions of this Court.
9.

All costs to Plaintiff Bear River.
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Dated this

30

day of September 1996.

John W. Wall and Nancy V. Wall, his wife

il. UJiUyC—
in W. Wall
)efendant/ Appellee Pro se

/

f

/2dA

^r^£

Nancy V. Wall
Defendant/ Appellee Pro se
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief to the
following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
Attention Mr. Mendenhal
Bear River Mutual Ins.
778 East Winchester
Murray, UT 84107
Postage prepaid, this ^0

day of September,

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief to the
following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
Thomas A Duffin
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Postage prepaid, this 3>0 day of September, 1994.

THOMAS A. DUFFIN (0927)
DANIEL O. DUFFIN (6530)
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 531-6600

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

]
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN WALL and
NANCY WALL, his wife,

< Civil No. 940905590CN
Defendants.

i

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Comes now the Plaintiff and for a cause of action alleges as follows:
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1.

The Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, (hereinafter

"Bear River") is an insurance corporation engaged in the insurance business in the
state of Utah, is a non-profit corporation and is owned entirely by its policyholders for
the use and benefit of the policyholders, having its principal place of business at 545
East Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
2.

Defendants, John Wall and Nancy Wall, his wife, are residents of

Davis County, State of Utah, and reside at 802 Montague, Bountiful, Utah 84010.
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-23.

This action is brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1 9 5 3 , as

amended § 7 8 - 3 3 - 1 , et.seq. seeking by determination the rights of the parties hereto
under a policy issued by Plaintiff, Policy No. C145077.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
4.

On or about June 5, 1992, and continuing through June 5, 1 9 9 3 ,

Plaintiff had issued its standard automobile Policy No. C 1 4 5 0 7 7 , to John Wall and
Nancy Wall, his wife. A copy of the policy is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and a
copy of the declaration page is attached hereto as Exhibit "B."
5.

That the auto policy, Exhibit w A, n issued to Defendants, provides

under PART B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE, Insuring Agreement,
as follows:
"The Company will pay personal injury protection benefits that are reasonable
and necessary to or on behalf of each eligible injured person for:
(a)
medical expenses
(b)
work loss
(c)
funeral expenses
(d)
survivor loss and
(e)
special damages
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible insured person caused by
an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.
Medical Payments:
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall not exceed
$3,000.00; unless additional medical protection or payments are provided for
on the Declaration page, they must be incurred within three years of the date
of the accident to be payable.
Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of Liability and Special Provisions
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during the policy period
in the United States and Canada, except if an auto accident to which this
policy applies occurs outside of Utah, (but is within the United States and
Canada), our limits of liability under your policy for that accident are as follows: Q Q
+
i* +u^ «»-•-»•<* fmrKMrte ni NtaM nr Canada, has:
I ^

-3a.

a personal injury protection or similar law specifying limits higher
than that in the declarations, your policy will provide the higher
specified limit;

Special Conditions if Law is Declared Invalid
The premium for the policy is based on rates which have been established in
reliance upon the limitations on the right to recover for damages imposed by
the provisions of the Utah Automobile No-Fault insurance Act. In the event a
court of competent jurisdiction declares or enters a judgment, the effect of
which is to render the provisions of such act invalid or unenforceable in whole
or in part, the Company shall have therightto recompute the premium payable
for the policy and the provisions of this endorsement shall be voidable or
subject to amendment at the option of the Company.
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of Other
Insurance Under our Personal Injury Protection
1. No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate benefits for the
same elements of loss under this or any similar insurance/
6.

Under PART G - GENERAL PROVISIONS, APPLYING TO ALL

COVERAGES, Subrogation, it provides:
"In the event of any payment to any person under all coverages:
1•
The Company is subrogated to the rights of the person to whom or for
whose benefit such payments were made, to the extent of such
payments, and such person must execute and deliver instruments and
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. Such
person shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.
a.
If the Insured proceeds or commences an action against a legally
responsible third party, the Company shall be entitled to the
extent of such payment to the proceeds of any settlement or
judgment that may result from the exercise of any rights of
recovery of such person against any person or organization legally
responsible for the bodily injury or property damage because of
which such payment is made and the Company shall have a lien
to the extent of such payment, notice of which may be given to
the person or organization causing such bodily injury, his agent,
his insurer or a court having jurisdiction in the matter; such
person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the Company all rights
of recovery which he shall have against such other person or
organization because of such bodily injury."
7.

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-308 provides:
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-4"The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection
coverage:
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any
motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state,
the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except
where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the named
insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under the policy;"
8.

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-309(6)

provides:
"(6)
Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is
subject to the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom
benefits required under personal injury protection have been paid by
another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah,
the insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall
reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the
amount of damages recoverable;0
9.

On or about August 6, 1992, the Plaintiff's insured, Nancy Wail,

was driving her vehicle carefully and prudently on Colorado State Highway 666 at
Cortez, Colorado, at its intersection with County Road 5, when Lana D. Waters failed
to yield the right-of-way at a stop sign and ran her vehicle into the vehicle being driven
by Nancy Wall. As a direct, proximate result of the collision, the Plaintiff's insured
suffered personal injuries which required medical attention and medical services,
10.

On September 23, 1992, Bear River Mutual's agent, George

Sergakis, drafted a letter to Anthony Thurber, attorney for John & Nancy Wall, with
the provision that he was on notice as to Bear River Mutual's subrogation rights and
with the language:

n

l am looking forward to working with you.n
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On July 8, 1993, Plaintiff's attorney sent to Defendant a copy of

the letter notifying him of the subrogation rights of Bear River Mutual Insurance
Company for the payment of medical benefits pursuant to the Utah Personal Injury
Protection statute as herein set forth, placing them on notice as to Bear River Mutual's
subrogatable interest.
12.

On November 2,1993, Anthony Thurber drafted a letter to George

Sergakis and Bear River Mutual Insurance Company indicating that they were fully
apprised.
13.

On or about March 4,1994, John Wall and Nancy Wall executed

a release of nany and all actions, claims, and demands whatsoever which claimants
now have or may have, whether known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, on
account of or arising out of the accident, casualty or event which happened on or
about the 7th day of August, 1992." A copy of the release is attached as Exhibit C.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(As to the Obligation of Bear River Mutual to pay
PIP benefits to Defendants)
14.

The Defendants, on March 4, 1994, Exhibit C, executed a full

release as to the tortfeasor, Lana Waters, providing a release of n any and all actions,
claims, and demands whatsoever which claimants now have or may have, whether
known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, on account of or arising out of the
accident, casualty or event which happened on or about the 7th day of
1992."

August,

-615.

Bear River Mutual's policy provides under PART B - Non-

Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of Other Insurance Under our
Personal Injury Protection:
"1.

No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or any similar
insurance."
16.

That the Defendants have accepted $16,000-00 from the tort

feasor as additional recovery in lieu of further insurance benefits, to which they may
have been entitled. The agreement expressly releases the tort feasors from all known
or unknown personal injuries, as well as for property damage arising out of the
accident. The Defendants have discharged the tort feasor from all liability related to
no-fault benefits. By doing so the Walls have chosen their recovery and cannot now
successfully assert a claim against their insurer.
17.

That the said release, Exhibit C, is clear, concise and unambiguous.

18.

Plaintiff has no adeauate remedy at law or appropriate means,

other than an action for declaratory judgment, to determine its rights and obligations,
if any, as to the Defendants for future personal injury protection benefits.
19.

If it is proved that the release does not release personal injury

benefits, then the Plaintiff would be liable to pay those and liable for the expenses and
attorney fees as provided for in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22309.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(As to Subrogation of the Plaintiff to the Settlement of Defendants)
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-720.

Plaintiff adopts and by this reference incorporates herein

paragraphs 1 through 13 of the Identification of parties, Jurisdiction and Genera!
Allegations, and paragraphs 14 through 19 of the First Cause of Action as though the
allegations contained therein were fully and completely set forth herein.
21.

That on or about the 4th day of March, 1994, the Defendants

executed a full release as to the tort feasor, Lana Waters, providing a release of "any
and all actions, claims, and demands whatsoever which claimants now have or may
have, whether known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, on account of or
arising out of the accident, casualty or event which happened on or about the 7th day
of August,

199Z"
22.

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company's insurance contract

provides under PART B - Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions
of Other Insurance Under our Personal Injury Protection as follows:
"1.

No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or any similar
insurance."
23.

That the said action on the part of the Defendants has deprived

this Plaintiff of its right to reimbursement from Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. of the
expenses paid to its insureds, as more fully set forth in Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended §31A-22-308, which provides as follows:
"The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection
coverage:
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any
motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state,
the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except
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-8where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the named
insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under the policy;"
and Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-309(6) which states:
n

(6)
Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is
subject to the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom
benefits required under personal injury protection have been paid by
another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the
insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the
other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of
damages recoverable;
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the
insurers."
24.

The Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law or appropriate means,

other than an action for declaratory judgment, to determine its rights and obligations,
if any, as to the Defendants for future personal injury protection benefits and requests
that the above-entitled Court determine whether the release by John & Nancy Wall of
March 4, 1994, has destroyed Bear River Mutual Insurance Company's right of
subrogation in the matter and whether Bear River Mutual Insurance Company is
entitled to an equitable lien upon the proceeds of the funds received by the
Defendants.

f35Z

-9WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendants as
follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(As to the Obligation of Bear River Mutual to pay
PIP benefits to Defendants)
1.

For an order determining the rights and obligations of the parties

under insurance Policy No. C145077.
2.

For an order determining that the Release, Exhibit Cf given by the

Defendants to Lana D. Waters and Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. was a full and
complete release of all claims, demands and causes of action for any obligation of Bear
River Mutual Insurance Company to pay personal injury protection benefits to the
Defendants from the date of the release of March 4, 1994.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(As to Subrogation of the Plaintiff to the Settlement of Defendants)
3.

For an order determining that the Release, Exhibit A, given by the

Defendants to Lana D. Waters and Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. release by John
& Nancy Wall of March 4, 1994, has destroyed Bear River Mutual Insurance
Company's right of subrogation in the matter and whether Bear River Mutual Insurance
Company is entitled to an equitable lien upon the proceeds of the funds received by
the Defendants.

PJ.tt

-10Dated this

day of August, 1994.
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON

Jn&yyr^LSsd

J5^V>

•Thomas A. Duffin
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address:
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company
545 East Third South
P. 0 . Box 11869
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
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BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Non-Assessable Motor Vehicle and Auto Policy

UTAH

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company is the oldest, non-profit mutual insurance company incorporated in die State of Utah.
Please read your policy to make certain you understand the coverage diat it provides. You may call die company to help and
assist you in any questions that you have.

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company
545 East Third South
P.O. Box 11869
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

The contractual obligations of this policy are assumed by insured and by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company named in die
Declarations and Policy.

11/92 Ed
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OF POLICY

PART D - COVERAGE FOR DAMAGE
TO YOUR VEHICLE

DECLARATION PAGE- Your Personal coverage
page is attached to the policy with your
name, address, your auto or trailer, policy
period, coverages and the amount of insurance
based upon the premium paid, and your statements
representations and declarations.
Warranties and Declarations

1

Agreement

1

Definitions

1

PART A - LIABILITY COVERAGE
Insuring Agreement
Supplementary Payments
Exclusions
Limit of Liability
Other Limits of Liability
Out of State Coverage
Financial Responsibility Required
Other Insurance

3
3
3
4
5
5
5
5

PART B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION
COVERAGE
Insuring Agreement
Exclusions
Definitions
Personal Injury Payments and Limits of Liability . . .
Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of
Liability, and Special Provisions
Special Conditions if Law is Declared
Invalid
Non-Duplication of Benefits; Other Insurance

6
6
6
7
7
8
8

PART C2 - UNDERINSURED
MOTORISTS COVERAGE
Insuring Agreement
Definitions
Exclusions
Limits of Liability
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits
of Liability, Other Insurance
Fault, Amount and Arbitration

Insuring Agreement
Dl. Collision Coverage
D2. Comprehensive Coverage
D3. Towing and Emergency Road Service
D4. Expense for Car Rental
Duplication of Benefits
Exclusions
Limit of Liability under Collision and
Comprehensive Coverages
Payment of Loss under Collision and
Comprehensive Coverages
No Benefit to Bailee
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability,
and Conditions of Other Insurance
Appraisal and Arbitration
Additional Duties for Coverage for Damage
to Your Covered Vehicle

13
13
13
13
13
14
14
15
15
15
15
15
16

PART E - SPECIAL CONDITIONS
APPLYING TO ALL
Section I General Conditions
Section II Prohibited Use of Alcohol
and Drugs for All Coverages
Section HI Special Conditions
Applying to All Coverages, Except
A, Arbitration

16
16
17

PART F - DUTIES AFTER AN ACCIDENT
OR LOSS FOR ALL COVERAGES
General Duties

17

PART G - GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLYING
TO ALL COVERAGES

PART CI - UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
Insuring Agreement
Definitions
Exclusions
Limits of Liability
Non-Duplication of Benefits; Other Insurance
Medical Reports; Proof of Claim
Arbitration
Additional Duties for Uninsured Motorists
Coverage

PROVISIOI

8
9
9
9
10
10
10
10

11
11
11
11
12
12

Bankruptcy
Fraud
All Agreements Between You and Us
Legal Action Against Us
Subrogation
Policy Period and Territory
Termination, Cancellation, Non-renewal
by You and Us
Transfer of Your Interest in this Policy
Terms of Policy Cannot be Waived
Except by Endrosement
Punitive and Exemplary- Damages
Policyholders' Vooting Rights and
Contingent Liability
Notice of Annual Meeting

18
18
18
18
18
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
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WARRANTIES AND DECLARATIONS
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY agrees
to insure you according to the terms of this policy based:
1. on your payment of premium for the coverages you
chose; and
2. in reliance on your statements in these declarations.
You agree and further warrant, by acceptance of this policy
that:
1. the statements in these declarations are your
statements and are true; and
2. we insure you on the basis your statements are true;
and
3. this policy contains all of the agreements between you
and us or any of our agents; and
4. that this is a non-alcohol drinkers' policy; and
5. that this policy is for those who do not use illegal
drugs.
Unless otherwise stated in the exceptions space on the
declarations page, your statements are:

1. Ownership. You are the sole owner of your car.
2. Insurance and License History. Neither you nor
any member of your household in the past 3 years has
had:
a. vehicle Insurance canceled by an insurer, unless
it is revealed and appears in the application for
insurance; or
b. a license to drive or vehicle registration
suspended, revoked or refused.
3. Alcohol and Drugs. That neither you, nor any
member of your household, within the past three
years, has used or consumed any alcohol or alcoholic
beverages or has used or consumed any illegal drugs
or has used or consumed any illegal substances.
4. Application. That the statements in your application,
declarations or renewal for insurance are true.

AGREEMENT
In return for payment of the premium and subjea to all die terms of this policy, we agree with you as follows:

DEFINITIONS
The following words and phrases are defined throughout the
policy as follows:
1. Auto Business, means a business or job where the
purpose is to sell, lease, repair, service, transport store
or park land motor vehicles or trailers.
2. Bodily Injury: means bodily injury and/or death to
a person which occurs during die policy period as a
result of the injury.
3. Business: means one engaged in any commercial
activity for gain or livelihood including employees of
their employer, executives and traveling salespersons.
4. Declarations: means the Declaration Page.
5. Family Member means a person related to you by
blood, marriage, guardianship or adoption who is a
resident of your household. This includes a ward, a
foster child, or an unmarried son or daughter while
away at schooL
6. Insured: means the person, persons or organization
defined as insured in the specific coverage, including
you, the named insured shown in the Declarations.

7. Motor Vehicle Auto or Can means a private
passenger auto, or a pickup truck, panel truck or van
which is a land motor vehicle with four or more
wheels, which is designed for use mainly on public
roads. It does not include:
a. any auto or motor vehicle while being used other
than on a temporary basis as a residence;
b. a truck-tractor designed to pull a trailer or
semitrailer, or
c. an auto or vehicle used in any business to haul
materials to or from job sites, deliver goods or
merchandise or for use in construction, or
manufacturing and during any continuous and
regular business use;
& any motor vehicle used to carry persons for
compensation;
e. any vehicle or auto used in the auto business;
f. any recreational vehicle, motorcycle, all-terrain
vehicle, motor home or similar vehicle whether it
has four wheels or not, which is not described on
the declaration page of the policy.
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DEFINITIONS cont'd.
8. Non-Owned Vehicle: means a vehicle not:
a. owned by;
b. registered in the name of, or
c. furnished or available forfrequentuse of: you or
a person living in your household or any family
members;
d. used for the business purposes.
The use has to be within the scope of consent of the
owner or person in lawful possession of it.
9. Occupying: means being in or on a motor vehicle as
a passenger or operator, or being engaged in the
immediate acts of entering, boarding, or alighting
from a motor vehicle.
10. Owned if Leased: for purposes of this policy, a
private passenger type vehicle shall be deemed to be
owned by a person if leased:
a. under a written agreement to that person; and
b. for a continuous period of at least 6 months.
11. Person: means human being.
12. Private Passenger Auto: means an auto:
a. wiii four wheels that simultaneously touch the
ground; and
b. of die private passenger or station wagon type;
and
c. designed solely to carry persons and their
luggage.
13. Reasonable: the word "reasonable" when used in
connection with costs, services, rentals and towing,
means that they are usual and customary charges and
when used in connection with repairs, it means thai
they are necessary, usual and customary charges due
to die loss.
14. Spouse: means your husband or wife while living
with you.
15. Temporary Substitute Auto: means an auto not
owned by you or your spouse, if it replaces your auto
for a short time. Its use has to be with the consent of
the owner. Your auto has to be out of use due to its
breakdown, repair, servicing, damage or loss. A
temporary, substitute auto is not considered a nonowned anto.
16. Trailer: means a vehicle designed to be pulled by a:
a. private passenger auto; or
b. pickup truck, panel truck, or van.
It also means a farm wagon or farm implement while
towed by a vehicle listed in a. or b. above.

17. Utility Vehicle: means a motor vehicle with:
a. a pickup truck, panel or van body; and
b. a Gross Vehicle Weight of 10,000 pounds or less
plus its maximum load capacity.
18. Van: means a four-wheeled land motor vehicle with
a load capacity of not more than 2,000 pounds or
Gross Vehicle Weight of not more than 10,000
pounds. Gross Vehicle Weight is the weight of the
vehicle plus its maximum load capacity.
19. "We", "Us" and "Our" or "Company" refer to
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company.
20. •Tou" or "Your'* means the named insured shown
on the declaration page.
21. Your Covered Vehicle: means:
a. any motor vehicle shown in the Declarations for
which a specific premium has been paid for
coverage;
b. any newly acquired motor vehicle that you
acquire during die policy period provided it is a
private passenger vehicle and we insure all other
private motor vehicles owned by you on the date
of delivery to you or your spouse. This coverage
ends 30 days after you acquire the vehicle, unless
within the 30 days you ask us and we agree to
insure it and you pay any additional premium that
may be due:
(1) If the newly acquired motor vehicle replaces
one shown in die declarations, it will have
the same coverage as the vehicle it replaces;
(2) If the newly acquired motor vehicle is an
additional vehicle, it will have the broadest
coverage we now provide for any motor,
vehicle shown in the declarations. If you
have more than one auto policy with us, you
must tell us which one applies;
c. any trailer you own as to liability and no-fault
coverage, but only those trailers shown on the
Declarations Page for which a specific premium
has been paid for Coverage for Damage to Your
Auto;
d. any auto or trailer you do not own while used as
a temporary substitute for any other auto or
vehicle described in this definition which is out
of normal use because of its:
(1) breakdown;
(2) repair,
(3> servicing;
(4) loss; or
(5) destruction
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e. your Covered Vehicle doe. .M include a motor
vehicle that has been sold or is subject to a
contract to sell oral or written, to a non-family
member or other business entity, provided that

the purchtww-r is in possession of the motor
vehicle. This exclusion applies whether title has
been transferred or the purchase price has been
paid by the purchaser.

PART A - LIABILITY COVERAGE
Insuring Agreement
We will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for
which any covered person becomes legally responsible
because of an auto accident We will settle or defend, as we
consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for these
damages. We have no duty to defend any suit or settle any
claim for "bodily injury" or "property damage" not covered
under this policy.
In addition to our limits of liability, we pay for all defense
costs for attorneys retained and paid by us. Our duty to defend
in any litigation ends when the applicable limits of liability
have been paid as provided for in the policy for the accident
which is the basis of the lawsuit
COVERED PERSON as used in this part means:
1. You or any family member for the ownership,
maintenance or use of any covered motor vehicle or
trailer,
2. Any other person using your covered motor vehicle
if the use is within the scope of consent of you or
your spouse.
3. For your covered motor vehicle, any person or
organization but only with respect to legal
responsibility for acts or omissions of a person for
whom coverage is afforded under this part;
4. For any motor vehicle or trailer, otiier than your
covered motor vehicle, any person or organization
but only with respect to legal responsibility for acts or
omissions of you or any family member for whom
coverage is afforded under this part This provision
applies only if the person or organization does not
own or hire the auto or trailer.

Supplementary Payments
In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay on behalf of a
covered person:
1. Up to $250.00 for the cost of bail bonds required
because of an accident, however, we do not pay for
traffic tickets, violations or citations. The accident
must result in bodily injury or property damage
covered under this policy.

2. Premiums on appeal bonds and bonds to release
attachments in any suit we defend.
3. Interest accruing after a judgment is entered in any
suit we defend. Our duty to pay interest ends when
we tender into court to pay that part of the judgment
which does not exceed our limit of liability for this
coverage.
4. Up to $35.00 a day for loss of earnings, but not other
income, because of attendance at hearings or trials at
our request

Exclusions to Part A
Insuring Agreement

Liability Coverage,

WE DO NOT PROVIDE LIABILITY COVERAGE FOR
ANY PERSON:
1. For property damage and bodily injury which may be
reasonably expected to result from the intentional or
criminal acts of the insured or which, in fact, is
intended by the insured person;
2. For damage to any property owned by, rented to, in
charge of or transported by an insured; but coverage
applies to a rented residence or private rented garage
damaged by a car we insure.
3. For any BODILY INJURY to:
a. A fellow employee, while on the job and arising
from the maintenance or use of a vehicle by
another employee- in the employer's business.
You and your spouse are covered for such injury
to a fellow employee.
b. Any employee of a COVERED PERSON
ARISING OUT OF HIS OR HER
EMPLOYMENT, This does not apply to a
household employee who is not covered or
required to be covered under any Worker's
Compensation Insurance.
c. ANY COVERED PERSON or any member of
a covered person's family residing in the covered
person's household in excess of the Utah Motor
Vehicle Liability Policy Minimum Limits as more
fully set forth in Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
§31A-22-304; providing for minimum limits for
motor vehicle liability coverage.
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4.

For any damages ror wni ctl u i e United States, or its
employees or any of it$ agencies, including their
employees, might be liable for the COVERED
PERSON'S use of any v e hi c le.

5.

For any obligation of a COVERED PERSON or his
or her insurer, under any type of worker's
compensation or disability or similar law.

6.

For liability assumed by the covered person under any
contract or agreement.

7.

For liability arising out of the ownership or operation
of a vehicle while it is be}ng used to carry persons or
" property for any fee or a Charge. This exclusion does
not apply to a share-the-^Xpense car pool.

8.

While employed or odienvise engaged in the business
or occupation of:
a. selling,
b. repairing,
c. servicing,
d. storing,
e. parking
vehicles designed for use mainly on public highways.
This includes road testing and delivery. This
exclusion does not ^pply to the ownership,
maintenance or use of VOUR COVERED AUTO
by:
a. you;
b. any family member, 0 r
c. any partner, agent o r employee of you or any
family member.

9.

Maintaining or using any vehicle while that person is
employed or otherwise Engaged in any business or
occupation not describe in Exclusion 8. This
exclusion does not apply to the maintenance or use
of.
a. a private passenger ^uto;
b. a pickup truck, pane} truck or van that you own;
or
c. a trailer used with a vehicle described in a. or b.
above.

10. Using a vehicle:
a. without the consent <^f you or your spouse;
b. with permission but Consent or the permission or
its use is beyond the scope and consent of you or
your spouse.
11. For bodily injury or proi>erty damage for which that
person:
a. is an insured under a nuclear energy liability
policy; or
b. would be an insur&d under a nuclear energy
liability policy but for its termination upon
exhaustion of its limit of liability.
A nuclear energy liability policy is a policy issued by

any
a.
b.
c.

of the loiiov.-mg or their successors:
Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association;
Mutual Atomic Eneig) Liability Underwriters; or
Nuclear Insurance Association of Canada.

12. Maintaining or using any non-owned or rented vehicle
by an insured in his employment, occupation,
profession, or in any commercial activity engaged in
for gain or livelihood, including employees of their
employer, executives and traveling salespersons who
rent or use vehicles in connection with their work or
livelihood.
13. WE DO NOT PROVIDE LIABILITY COVERAGE
FOR THE OWNERSHIP, maintenance or use of:
a. Any motorized vehicle having less than four
wheels;
b. Any vehicle, other than your covered vehicle,
which is:
1. owned by you; or
2. furnished or available for your regular or
frequent use;
c. Any vehicle, other than your covered auto,
which is:
1. owned by any family member, or
2. furnished or available for the regular or
frequent use of any family member,
however, this exclusion does not apply to your
maintenance or use of any vehicle which is:
1. owned by a family member; or
2. furnished for or available for the regular use
of a family member,
i To a motor vehicle that has been sold or is
subject to a contract to sell, oral or written, to a
non-family member or other business entity,
provided that the purchaser is in possession of the
motor vehicle. This exclusion applies whether
title has been transferred or the purchase price
has been paid by purchaser.

Limit of Liability
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each
person"' for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of
liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one
person in any one auto accident Subject to this limit for "each
person", the limit of liability shown in the Declarations for
"each accident" for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum
limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury resulting
from any one auto accident The limit of liability shown in the
Declarations for "each accident" for Property Damage Liability
is our maximum limit of liability for all damages to all
property resulting from any one auto accident This is the
most we will pay for any auto accident regardless of the
number of:
1. covered persons;

2. claims made;
3. vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or
4. vehicles involved in the auto accident.
We will apply the limit of liability to provide any separate
limits required by law for bodily injury and property damage
liability. However, this provision will not change our total
limit of liability. A motor vehicle and trailer are considered
one unit for the limit of liability

Financial Responsibility Required
When certified under any law as proof of future financial
responsibility, and while required during the policy period, this
policy shall comply with such law to the extent required.

Other Insurance
Other Limits of Liability
We do not provide motor vehicle liability coverage for.
1. bodily injury caused by an insured for any person
using your covered vehicle who is not a family
member to the extent or in excess of die limits of
liability which this coverage exceeds die minimum
liability required by the Utah Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Law. (Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
§31A-22-304 Motor Vehicle Liability Policy
Minimum Limits).
2. For bodily injury to any person who is a family
member or related to an Insured by blood, mairiage
or adoption for whom claim is made to the extent of
any limits of liability of this coverage which exceed
the limits of liability required by the Utah Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, (Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, §31A-22-304 Motor Vehicle
Liability Policy Minimum limits).

Out of State Coverage
If an auto accident to which this policy applies occurs in any
state or Canada other than the one in which your covered
vehicle is principally garaged, we will interpret your policy for
that accident as follows:
If the state or Canada has:
1. a financial responsibility or similar law specifying
limits of liability for bodily injury or property damage
higher than die limit shown in the Declarations, your
policy will provide the higher specified limit;
2- a compulsory insurance or similar law requiring a
nonresident to maintain insurance whenever the
nonresident uses a vehicle in that state or Canada,
your policy will provide at least the required
minimum amounts and types of coverage.

If there is other applicable liability insurance we will pay only
our share of the loss. Our share under this policy is the
amount computed under the applicable paragraph below.
However, any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not
own shall be excess over other collectible insurance.
IF THERE IS OTHER LIABILITY COVERAGE:
1. Policies issued by us to you:
If two or more vehicle liability policies
issued by us to you apply to the same accident,
the total limits of liability under all such policies
shall not exceed that of the policy with the
highest limit of liability.
2. Other overage AvailablefromOther Sources:
If other liability coverage applies, we are liable
only for our share of the damages. Our share is the
percent that the limit of liability of this policy bears
to the total of all liability coverage applicable to die
accident.
3. Temporary Substitute Auto, Non-Owned Auto,
Trailer or Rental Auto:
If a temporary substitute auto, a non-owned
auto or trailer or rental auto designed for use with
a private passenger auto or utility vehicle has other
liability coverage which applies in whole or in part as
primary, excess or contingent coverage, then tins
coverage is excess over other liability coverage. We
do not contribute under this policy to any loss where:
a. the motor vehicle or trailer is owned by any
person or organization in the auto business; and
b. a non-owned or rental vehicle maintained or used
in any business or business pursuits or business
activity, including salesman, employees who are
using or who have rented a car in connection
with their livelihood.
4. Newly-Acquired Vehicle:
This coverage does not apply if there is other
vehicle liability coverage on a .newly-acquired
vehicle.

No one will be entitled to a duplication of payments for the
same elements of loss.
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PART B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE
a.

the named insured and persons related to the
insured by blood, mamage, adoption, or
guardianship who are residents of the insured's
household, including those who usually make
their home in the same household but temporarily
live elsewhere, when injured in an accident
involving any motor vehicle; and
b. any other natural person whose injuries arise out
of an automobde accident occurring while the
person occupies a motor vehicle described in the
policy with the express or implied consent of the
named insured or while a pedestrian if he is
injured in an accident involving the described
motor vehicle.

Insuring Agreement
The Company will pay personal injury protection benefits
that are reasonable and necessary to or on behalf of each
eligible injured person for.
(a) medical expenses
(b) work loss
(c) funeral expenses
(d) survivor loss and
(e) special damages
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible
insured person caused by an accident involving the use of
a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.

Exclusions
This coverage does not apply:
1. for any injury sustained by the Insured while
occupying another motor vehicle owned by the
Insured and not insured under the policy;
2.

for any injury sustained by any person while
opera ting the insured motor vehicle without the
express or implied consent of the insured or while not
in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle; or

3.

to any injured person, if the person's conduct
contributed to his injury:
(a) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(b) while committing a felony;

4.

for any injury sustained by any person arising out of
the use of any motor vehicle while located for use as
a residence or premises;

5.

for any injury due to war, whether or not declared,
civil war, insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to
any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing;
or

6.

for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic,
explosive, or other hazardous properties of nuclear
materials.

Definitions
When used in reference to this coverage:
1. Bodily Injury: means bodily injury to a person and/or
death which occurs during the policy period as a
result of the injury.
2.

3.

Funeral Expenses: means funeral, burial or cremation
expenses incurred;

4.

Insured Motor Vehicle: a motor vehicle with respect
to which:
a. the bodily injury liability insurance of the policy
applies and for which a specific premium is
charged; and
b. the named insured is required to maintain security
under the provisions of the Utah Automobile NoFault Insurance Act; Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Tide 41, Chapter 12a, Financial responsibility of
Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act.

5.

Medical Expenses: the reasonable value of all
expenses for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray,
dental, rehabilitation (which includes prosthetic
devices), ambulance, hospital and nursing services;

6.

Motor Vehicle: means every self-propelled vehicle
which is designed for use upon a highway, including
trailers and semitrailers designed for use with such
vehicles, except traction engines, road rollers, farmtractors, tractor cranes, power shovels, and well
drillers, and every vehicle which is propelled by
electric power obtained from overhead wires but not
operated upon rails and excluding motorcycles;

7.

Named Insured: the person or organization in die
declarations;

8.

Occupying: being in or on a motor vehicle as a
passenger or operator or engaged in the immediate act
of entering, boarding or alighting from a motor
vehicle;

9.

Pedestrian: means any person not occupying or
riding upon a "motor vehicle. "Any person riding,
occupying or upon a motorcycle is not a pedestrian;

Covered and Insured Persons entitled to Personal
Injury Protection:
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10. Survivor Loss: compensation on account of the death
of the eligible injured person;
11. Work Loss: any loss of gross income and loss of
earning capacity per person from inability to work,
for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the
loss, except that this benefit need not be paid for the
first three days of disability, unless the disability
continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after
the date of injury;
12. Special Damage: an allowance for a maximum of
365 days, for services actually rendered or expenses
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the
injury, the injured person would have performed for
his household, except that this benefit need not be
paid for the first three days after the date of injury
unless the person's inability to perform these services
continues for more than two consecutive weeks.

Personal Injury Payments and Limits of Liability
Regardless of the number of persons insured, policies or bonds
applicable, claims made, or insured motor vehicles to which
this coverage applies, the Company's liability for personal
injury protection benefits with respect to bodily injury
sustained by any one eligible injured person in any one motor
vehicle accident, is limited except or unless additional
protection is purchased or provided for by statute as follows:
Medical Payments:
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall
not exceed $3,000.00; unless additional medical protection
or payments are provided for on the Declaration page,
they must be incurred within three years of the date of the
accident to be payable;
Work Loss:
The maximum amount payable for work loss is eighty-five
percent of any loss of gross income and earning capacity,
not to exceed the total of $250.00 per week;
Special Damage:
A special damage allowance not exceeding $20.00 per day
for inability to perform services for his household;
Funeral Expenses:
The maximum amount payable for funeral expenses shall
not exceed $1,500.00;
Survivor Loss:
The amount payable for survivor loss is $3,000.00 and is
payable only to natural persons who are the eligible
injured person's heirs.

Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of
Liability and Special Provisions
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during the
policy period in the United States and Canada, except if an

auto accident to which this policy applies occurs outside of
Utah, (but is within the United States and Canada), our limits
of liability under your policy for that accident are as follows:
1. If the state, (outside of Utah) or Canada, has:
a. a personal injury protection or similar law
specifying limits higher than that in the
declarations, your policy will provide the higher
specified limit;
b. compulsory personal injury protection insurance
or similar law requiring a non-resident to
maintain personal injury protection insurance,
whenever the non-resident uses a vehicle in that
state or Canada, your policy will provide at least
the required minimum amounts and types of
coverage;
c. no compulsory personal injury protection
insurance or similar law requiring a non-resident
to maintain insurance, whenever the insured uses
a vehicle in that state or 0"v"fat your policy
does not provide for any benefits under Part B,
Personal Injury Coverage, to non-residents of the
State of Utah, except for medical expenses under
this section, not to exceed S3,000.00;
d. no compulsory personal injury protection
insurance or similar law requiring a non-resident
to maintain insurance in that state or Canada,
your policy does not provide benefits under this
section to residents of the State of Utah who are
not family members in any amount in excess of
the minimum limits as provided for this type of
coverage in the State of Utah,
2. Any amount payable by the Company under the terms
of this coverage shall be reduced by the amount paid,
payable, or required to be provided on account of
such bodily injury:
a. under any worker's compensation plan or any
similar statutory plan;
b. which that person receives or is entitled to
receive from the United States or any of its
agencies because he is on active duty in the
military service.
3. That where a Covered Person under this policy is or
would be held legally liable for the personal injuries
sustained by any person to whom benefits required
under personal injury protection provisions of this
poiicy have been paid by the injured party's insurance
carrier, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of
Utah, the Company if it would be legally held liable
shall reimburse the insurance company of theother
party for the payments as provided herein, but not in
excess of the amount of damages recoverable; that the
issue of liability for that reimbursement in its amount
shall be mandatory binding arbitration between the
two insurance companies providing for insurance
coverage as herein set forth.
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4.

5.

If the Covered Person incu.. .nedical expenses which
are unreasonable or unnecessary, we may refuse to
pay for those medical expenses and contest them.
Unreasonable medical expenses are fees for medical
services which are higher than the usual and
customary charges for those services; unnecessary
medical expenses are fees for medical services which
are noc usually and customarily performed for
treatment of the injury, including fees for an
excessive number, amount, or duration of medical
services.

this or an> _.milar insurance.
2.

If the Insured sustains bodily injury while occupying
a vehicle not owned by you, your spouse or any
family member, this coverage applies:
a. as cxctss to any personal injury protection
coverage which applies to the use of the vehicle
as primary coverage, but only in an amount
which it exceeds the primary coverage.
If coverage under more than one policy applies as
excess:
a. the total m^xir"»m recovery, liability or benefit
payable shall not exceed die difference between
the limit of liability that applies as primary
insurance, and die maximum recovery, liability or
benefit that applies from any one of the
coverages that apply as excess; and
b. we are liable only for our share of the loss or
damage. Our share is the proportion of damages,
loss, or benefits that the limits of this bear to the
total applicable to all personal injury protection
coverage as excess to die accident We will pay
our share of the loss, damages or benefits.

3.

Except as provided for in the preceding paragraphs, 1
and 2, if the Insured sustains bodily injury as a
pedestrian or sustains bodily injury while occupying
your covered vehicle, and if two or more insurers are
liable to pay no-fault or personal injury coverage
benefits or provide similar coverage involving the use
of an automobile:
a. the total limits of liability or benefits under all
such coverages shall not exceed die coverage or
benefits of die policy with the highest limit of
liability; and
b. we are liable only for our share of the loss or
damage. Our share is that percent of the
damages that the limit of liability of this coverage
bears to the total of all personal injury benefits
coverage applicable to the accident

If the Covered Person is sued by a medical services
provider because we refuse to pay contested medical
expenses, we will pay all defense costs and any
resulting judgment against the Covered Person. We
have the right to choose the counseL The Covered
Person must cooperate with us in the defense of any
claim, demand or lawsuit If the Covered Person is
required to attend any trials or hearings and wages or
salaries are lost as a result, we will pay up to $35.00
per day.

Special Conditions if Law is Declared Invalid
The premium for the policy is based on rates which have
been established in reliance upon the limitations on the
right to recover for damages imposed by the provisions of
the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act In the
event a court of competent jurisdiction declares or enters
a judgment, the effect of which is to render the provisions
of such act invalid or unenforceable in whole or in part,
the Company shall have the right to recompute the
premium payable for the policy and the provisions of this
endorsement shall be voidable or subject to amendment at
the option of the Company.

Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability
and Conditions of Other Insurance Under our
Personal Injury Protection
1. No eligible injured person shall recover or receive
duplicate benefits for the same elements of loss under

PART Cl - UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE
Insuring Agreement
We will pay for bodily injury for damages which a covered
person, as defined in this section are legally entided to recover
from the owner or operator of a motor vehicle:
1. sustained by you and your covered vehicle; and
2. caused by an accident
the owner's or operator's liability for these damages must arise
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured
motor vehicle.

Any judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought
without our written consent is not binding on us.
"Uninsured Motor Vehicle" Means a Land Motor Vehicle
or Trailer of any Type:
1. To which no bodily injury liability bond or policy
applies at the time of the accident
2.

To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy
applies at die time of die accident In diis case its
limit for bodily injury liability must be less than the
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minimum limit for bodily injury liability specified by
the financial responsibility law of the state in which
your covered vehicle is principally garaged
3.

Which is a hit and run vehicle whose operator or
owner cannot be identified and which hits:
a. you or any family member,
b. a vehicle which you or any family member are
occupying; or
c. your covered vehicle.

4.

In accordance widi Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22305, the policy is expanded so that uninsured motorist
also includes any motor vehicle whose operator or
owner cannot be identified which causes an accident,
but does not make physical contact with your covered
vehicle. The existence of this vehicle and motorist
must be demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence odier than the testimony of the covered
person or persons.

5.

To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy
applies at the time of the accident but the bonding or
insuring company:
a. denies coverage; or
b. is or becomes insolvent

However, "Uninsured Motor Vehicle" Does Not Include
Any Vehicle or Equipment
1.

Owned by or furnished or available for the regular
use of you or any family member;

2.

Owned or operated by a self-insurer under any
applicable motor vehicle law;

3.

Owned by any governmental unit or agency;

4.

Operated on rails or crawler treads;

5.

Designed mainly for use off public roads while not on
public roads;

6.

While located for use as a residence or premises.

Definitions
The following phrase and words are defined in this Section as
follows:
L

c.

the same household, but temporarily live
elsewhere;
any person occupying a covered motor vehicle
referred to in the policy;

All other definitions apply.

Exclusions
A. We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for
bodily injury sustained by any person:
1. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor
vehicle owned by you or any family member which
is not insured for this coverage under this policy.
This includes a trailer of any type used with that
vehicle.
2. For any Covered Person who, without written consent
from the Company, settles with any person or
organization who may be liable for bodily injury.
3. While occupying your covered vehicle when it is
being used to carry persons or property for a fee.
This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense
carpooL
4. Using a vehicle without permission or a reasonable
belief that the person is entided to do so or its use is
beyond the consent of you or your spouse.
B. This coverage shall not apply directly or indirectly to
benefit any insurer or self-insurer under any of the
following or similar law:
1. workers' compensation law
2. disability benefits law
3. any government body or agency, including political
subdivisions

Limits of Liability
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each
person" for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum,
Hmit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by
any one person in any one accident Subject to this limit for
"each person", the limit of liability shown in the Declarations
for "each accident" for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our
TTiflTimmn limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury
resulting from any one accident 'This is the most we will pay
regardless of the number of:
a. covered persons
b. claims made
a. vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations
d. vehicles involved in the accident

As used in this section "covered persons" includes:
a. the named insured;
b. persons related to the named insured by blood,
marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who are
residents of the named insured's household,
including those who usually make their home in
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uninsured ni^onst coverage for two or more motor
vehicles be added together or stacked to determine the
limit of coverage available to a covered injured
person for any one accident.

Any amounts otherwise payable iv~ damages under this
coverage shall be reducedfayall sums paid or payable because
of the bodily injury under any of the following or similar law:
a. workers* compensation law; or
b. disabilirv benefits law.

Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability
and Conditions of Other Insurance Under Our
Uninsured Motorist Coverage
1. If the Insured sustains bodily injury while occupying
a vehicle not owned by you, your spouse or any
family member, this coverage applies:
a. as excess to any uninsured motor vehicle
coverage which applies to the vehicle as primary
coverage and only in an amount by which it
exceeds the primary coverage.
If coverage under more than one policy applies as
excess:
a. the total maximum recovery, liability or benefit
payable shall not exceed the difference between
the limit of liability that applies as primary
insurance, and the max^mim recovery, liability or
benefit that applies from any of the coverages
that apply as excess; and
b. we are liable for our share of the loss or damage.
Our share is the proportion of damages that the
limit of liability of this coverage bears to the total
applicable uninsured motorist coverage as excess
to the accident
2.

3.

Except as provided for in the previous paragraph 1, if
the Insured sustains bodily injury as a pedestrian or
sustains bodily injury while occupying your covered
vehicle, and if two or more insurers are liable to pay
uninsured motorist protection as provided by this
coverage:
a. the total limits of liability under all such
coverages shall not exceed that of the coverage
with the highest limit of liability; and
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is
that percent of the damages that the limit of
liability of this coverage bears to the total of all
uninsured motor vehicle coverage applicable to
the accident.
Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 under this part,
Non-duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and
Conditions of Other Insurance Under Our Uninsured
Motorist Coverage, if uninsured motorist coverage is
available to a covered; injured person, under more
than one insurance policy, the covered injured person
may elect the policy under which he desires to collect
the uninsured motorist benefits.

No Insured person can recover duplicate benefits from
the same elements of loss under this, or other similar
insurance.

Medical Reports; Proof of Claim
As soon as practicable the eligible covered person or someone
on his behalf shall give to the Company written proof of
claim, under oath if required, including full particulars of the
nature and extent of the injuries and treatment received and
contemplated, and such other information as may assist the
Company in determining the amount due and payable. The
eligible covered person shall submit to physical and mental
examinations by physicians selected by die Company when and
as often as the Company may reasonably require.

Arbitration
If we and a covered person do not agree:
1. whether that person is legally entitled to recover
damages under this part; or
2. as to the amount of damages;
either party may make a written demand for the matters to be
settled by arbitration. Any matter in dispute between you and
us will be made pursuant to arbitration as provided for in the
arbitration rales of the Arbitration Forums, Inc., a copy of
which is available on request from the Company, which shall
be binding on both you and the Company. The arbitration
award may include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and
may be entered as a judgment in any court of proper
jurisdiction. Such arbitration shall be in compliance with the
"Utah Arbitration Act" (Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code
Annotated) or the applicable arbitration provisions in force and
effect in Utah at the time.

Additional Duties for Uninsured Motorists
Coverage
A person seeking Uninsured Motorists Coverage must also:
1.

promptly notify the police if a hit and run driver is
involved;

2.

promptly send us copies of the legal papers if a suit
is brought.

However, in no event will the limit of liability for
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PART C2 - UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE
Insuring Agreement
We will pay for bodily injury for damages which a covered
person, as defined in this part is legally entitied to recover
from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle
because of bodily injury, sickness, disease or death:
L sustained by you and your covered vehicle; and
2. caused by an accident.
The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must
arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the
underinsured motor vehicle.
Any judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought
without our written consent is not binding on us.
"Underinsured Motor Vehicle" means a Land Motor
Vehicle or Trailer of any Type:
1. The ownership, maintenance or use of which is
insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at the
time of the accident; but
a. whose limits of liability for bodily injury liability
are insufficient to compensate fully the insured
for all special and general damages;
b. have been reduced by payments to persons other
than die insured to less than the amount of the
insured's damages.
However, "Underinsured Motor Vehicle" Does Not Include
any Vehicle or Equipment
1. Owned by, furnished or available for die regular use
of the insured, a resident spouse or resident relative of
the insured, unless die motor vehicle is described in
the Declarations and for which a specific premium
has been paid, or if the motor vehicle is a newly
acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the
terms of the policy;
2. Owned or operated by a self-insurer under any
applicable motor vehicle law;
3. Owned by any governmental unit, political
subdivision or agency;
4. Operated on rails or crawler treads;
5. Designed mainly for use off public roads while not on
public roads;
6. While located for use as a residence or premises;
7. Defined as more fully set forth in Part CI, Uninsured
Motorist Coverage in your policy;
8. To which a bodily, injury liability bond or policy
applies at die time of the accident but its limit for
bodily injury liability is less than the minimum limit
for bodily injury liability specified by die Utah Safety
Responsibility Act;
9. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy
applies at the time of the accident but the bonding or
insuring company:

a. denies coverage: or
b. is or becomes insolvent.

Definitions
As used in this section "covered persons" includes:
a. the named insured;
b. persons related to the named insured by blood,
marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who are residents
of the named insured's household, including those
who usually make their home in the same household
but temporarily live elsewhere;
c. any person occupying a covered motor vehicle
referred to in the policy,
All other definitions apply.

Exclusions
A. We do not provide Underinsured Motorists Coverage for
bodily injury sustained by any person:
1. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor
vehicle owned by you or any family member which
is not insured for this coverage under this policy.
This includes a trailer of any type used widi that
vehicle.
2. For any Covered Person who, without written consent
from the Company, settles with any person or
organization who may be liable for bodfly injury.
3. While occupying your covered vehicle when it is
being used to cany persons or property for a fee.
This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense
car pool
4. Use of a vehicle widiout permission, or the use with
permission is beyond the consent of you or your
pouse.
B. There is no coverage until die limits of liability of all
bodily injury liability bonds and policies tiiat apply have
been used up by payment of judgments or setdements to
other persons.

Limits of Liability
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each
person" for Underinsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum
limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by
any one person in any one accident Subject to this limit for
"each person", the limit of liability shown in the Declarations
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payabv $' jy one vehicle under the polil%y with
the highest possible dollar limit;
b. subject to paragraph a, above, any insurance we
provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own
shall be txctss over any other collectible
insurance;
c. we will pay our share of the loss. Our share is
the proportion of damages that the limit of
liability of this coverage bears to the total
applicable underinsured motorist limits.

for "each accident" for Underinsureu
*sts Coverage is our
maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury
resulting from any one accident, This is the most we will pay
regardless of the number of:
a. covered Persons
b. claims made
c. vehicles or premiums shown on the Declarations
d. vehicles involved in the accident.
Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this
coverage shall be reduced by all sums paid or payable because
of the bodily injury under any of the following or similar law:
a. workers' compensation law; or
b. disability benefits law.

Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability
and Conditions of Other Insurance Under Our
Underinsured Motorist Coverage
1.

A covered person injured in a vehicle described in an
insurance policy that includes underinsured motorist
benefits may not elect to collect underinsured motorist
coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle
insurance policy under which he is a named insured
except:
a. if a named insured is injured as a pedestrian or
while occupying a vehicle not described in this
part, (C2, Underinsured Motorist Coverage) and
is covered by more than one policy including
underinsured motorist coverage, the injured
person may elect the policy under which he
collects underinsured motorist benefits.
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The limits of liability for underinsured motorist
coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be
added together, combined, or stacked to determine the
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured
person for any one accident.

3.

If there is other applicable or similar insurance under
more than one insurance policy or provision of
coverage:
a. die mflxiTmiTn recovery under all policies
combined will not exceed the maximum amount
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4.

No eligible injured person shall recover duplicate
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or
any similar insurance.

Fault, Amount and Arbitration
The following two questions for the coverage under
underinsured motorist protection must be decided by agreement
pursuant to the provisions of the policy as follows:
1. is the insured legally entitled to collect for bodily
injury for damages from the owner or driver of an
underinsured motor vehicle; and
2. if so, in what amount?
If we and a covered person do not agree:
1. whether that person is legally entitled to recover
damages under this part; or
2.

as to the amount of damages;

either party may make a written demand for the matters to be
settled by arbitration. Any matter in dispute between you and
us will be made pursuant to arbitration as provided for in the
arbitration rales of the Arbitration Forums, Inc., a copy of
which is available on request from the Company, which shall
be binding on both you and the Company. The arbitration
award may include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and
may be entered as a judgment in any court of proper
jurisdiction. Such arbitration shall be in compliance with the.
"Utah Arbitration Act" (Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code
Annotated) or the applicable arbitration provisions in force and
effect in Utah at the time.
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PART D - COVERAGE FOR DAMAGE TO YOUR VEHICLE
Insuring Agreement

a.

We will pay as follows:
1. for any direct and accidental loss or damage to your
covered vehicle,
a. for which a premium is charged for each
coverage, including its equipment,
b. provided it is common to your vehicle,
minus any deductible[s] and subject to the limits of
liability or as set forth on the Declaration page under
Dl and D2;

b.

2.

for the perils and coverage under D3 and D4 for
which a premium is charged for each coverage, minus
any deductible[s], subject to the limits of liability as
set forth on die Declaration page under D3 and D4
because of a loss;

The amounts payable under D2 are subject to the
deductible and limits of liability as set forth in the
Declaration page.
D3. TOWING AND EMERGENCY ROAD SERVICE:
We will pay the reasonable costs you incur for your
covered vehicle due to loss:
1. For a mechanic and the reasonable cost for his
services at the place of breakdown, not to exceed- one
hour.
2.

DL COLLISION COVERAGE:
"Collision" means the upset, or collision with another
object by your covered or non-owned vehicle. However,
loss caused by the following arc not considered
"collision":
1. Missiles or falling objects;
2. Fire;
3. Theft or larceny;
4. Explosion or earthquake;
5. Windstorm;
6. Hail, water or flood;
7. Malicious mischief or vandalism;
8. Riot or civil commotion;
9. Contact with bird or animal; or
10. Breakage of glass, except if part of a collision.
The amounts payable under Dl are subject to the
deductible and limits of liability as set forth on the
Declaration page.

D2. COMPREHENSIVE COVERAGE:
"Comprehensive" means loss arising from any cause other
than collision, including die breakage of glass, or loss
caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft, larceny,
explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water, flood,
malicious mischief, or vandalism, riot or civil commotion,
and contact with a bird or an animal is payable under this
coverage.
If your covered vehicle is stolen, we will pay your
incurred transportation costs at the rate of up to $14.00 per
day, with a maximum amount of $420.00 for each loss.
This coverage begins 48 hours after you notify the police
and us of the theft and ends when:

your covered vehicle is returned to you if it is
driveable or in a repaired condition; or
we offer to pay you the actual cash value of the
vehicle.

3.

4.

The reasonable cost of towing your vehicle to a
necessary place where repairs can be made if the
vehicle will not run.
The reasonable cost of towing your covered vehicle if
it is stuck.
The reasonable cost of delivery for gas, oil or a
battery and change of a tire, but we do not pay for
the cost of these items.

The amounts payable under D3 are subject to the
deductible[s] and limits of liability as set forth in the
Declaration page.

D4. EXPENSE FOR CAR RENTAL:
We will pay you, not to exceed, $14.00 per day for rental
expenses incurred for a covered loss:
1. if you rent a vehicle from a car rental agency or
garage because your covered vehicle will not run due
to a loss;
2. when your covered vehicle runs and when you leave
it at a repair establishment for agreed and necessary
repairs pursuant to a written contract or agreement for
repairs;
Ending when
1. the repairs have been made or completed;
2. when we offer to pay for the loss; or
3. the repair costs exceed die fair market value of the
vehicle and we offer to pay for the loss; or
4. the rental time has exceeded 30 days,
whichever comes first
Any rent payable under coverage D4 is reduced by any
amount payable under the comprehensive.
We will not pay rental time:
1. while your covered vehicle is being repaired,
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2.

3.

serviced, or Deing used b, ^iy person wane that
person is working in any car business;
while used in any other business or occupation. This
does not apply to a private passenger car driven or
occupied by the insured, his spouse or family
member,
for any covered vehicle while subject to any lien,
rental or sales agreement not shown in the
Declarations.

The amounts payable under D4 are subject to the
deductible and limits of liability as set forth in the
Declaration page.

e. radar < ctors;
f. compact disc players;
g. stereos; or
h. televisions.
This exclusion does not apply if the equipment is
permanently installed in the opening normally used by
the auto manufacturer for the installation of this
equipment, however, we do not pay in excess of
S500.00 unless an extra premium has been charged
for each item.
5.

Loss to tapes, records or other devices for use with
equipment designed for the reproduction of sound.

6.

Loss to a camper body or trailer not shown in the
Declarations. This exclusion does not apply to a
camper body or trailer that you:
a. acquire during die policy period; and
b. ask us to insure within 30 days after you become
die owner.

7.

Loss to:
a. TV antennas;
b. awnings or cabanas; or
c. equipment designed to create additional living
facilities.

8.

Loss to any custom furnishings or equipment in or
upon any motor vehicle. Custom furnishings or
equipment include but are not limited to:
a. special carpeting and insulation, furniture, bars or
television receivers;
b. facilities for cooking and sleeping;
c. height-extending roofs;
d. custom murals, paintings or other decals or
graphics;
e. radar and telephones.
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We do not pay for loss to motor homes, campers,
trailers and recreational vehicles owned or non-owned
for which coverage is not purchased;

iplication of Benefits
ere is no duplication of benefits under Dl, D2, D3 and D4
the same elements of loss under this, or any similar
urance.

elusions
will not pay for.
1. Loss to your covered vehicle or non-owned vehicle
which occurs while it is used to carry persons or
property for a fee. This exclusion does not apply to
a share-the-expense car pooL
2.

Damage due and confined to:
a. wear and tear;
b. freezing;
c. mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure; or
d. road damage to tires.
This exclusion does not apply if the damage results
from the total theft of your covered vehicle.
Loss due to or as a consequence of:
a. radioactive contamination;
b. discharge of any nuclear weapon (even if
accidental);
c. war, declared or undeclared, civil war,
insurrection, rebellion or revolution;
d. taking by any governmental authority or political
subdivision;
e. embezzlement, conversion, repossession by any
person who has the vehicie.due to any lien, rental
or sales agreement.
Loss to equipment designed for the reproduction of
sound, including, but not limited to loss to any of the
following or their accessories:
a. citizens band radio;
b. two-way mobile radio;
c. telephone;
d. scanning monitor receiver;

10. Separate coverage may be purchased waiving
paragraph 4 for accessories and customized
furnishings, paragraph 8, if a separate premium is
paid, but said waiver of customized furnishings shall
not include custom murals, paintings or other decals
or graphics.
11. We do not pay for any loss or damage to your
covered or non-owned . vehicle because* of
embezzlement, conversion or repossession by any
person who has taken possession of the vehicle due to
anv lien, rental or sales agreement.
12. We do not pay for any loss or damage on a covered
vehicle if it is newly acquired and there is similar
coverage on your newly acquired vehicle.
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13. We do not pay for any loss or damage on a covered
or non-owned vehicle for tires unless they are
damaged by fire, vandalism or they are stolen, unless
they are covered by other provisions of this section.

computed under the applicable paragraph below.
However, any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not
own shall be excess over other collectible insurance.
IF THERE IS OTHER LIABILITY COVERAGE:

Limit of Liability under
Comprehensive Coverages

Collision

and

Our limit of liability for loss will be the lesser of the:
1. actual cash value of the stolen or damaged property;
or
2. amount necessary to repair or replace the property.
Cash value of damaged or stolen property is the fair market
value of the property, taking into consideration its age,
condition as of the date of the loss. Fair market value does
not include any value for antique or sentimental value. The
deductible will then be subtracted from the amount of die
determined loss.

Payment of Loss under
Comprehensive Coverages

Collision

1. Policies Issued by Us to You:
If two or more vehicle liability policies issued by us
to you apply to the same accident, the total limits of
liability under all such policies shall not exceed that of the
policy with the highest limit of liability.
2.

Other Liability Coverage Available from Other
Sources:
If other liability coverage applies, we are liable only
for our share of the damages. Our share is the percent
that the limit of liability of this policy bears to the total of
all liability coverage applicable to the accident.

3.

Temporary Substitute Auto, Non-Owned Auto, Trailer
or Rental Auto:
If a temporary substitute auto, a non-owned auto
or trailer or rental auto designed for use with a private
passenger auto or utility vehicle has other liability
coverage which applies in whole or in part as primary,
excess or contingent coverage, then our coverage is excess
over other liability coverage. We do not contribute under
this policy to any loss where:
a. the motor vehicle or trailer is owned by any person or
organization in the auto business; and
b. a non-owned or rental vehicle maintained or used in
any business or business pursuits or business activity,
including salespersons, employees who are using or
who have rented a car in connection with their
livelihood;

4.

Newly-Acquired Vehicle:
Our coverage does not apply if there is other vehicle
liability coverage on a newly-acquired vehicle.

and

We have the option to pay you for a loss of the property in
one of the following manners:
1. we may pay you for the fair market value of the
property in money; or
2.

we may repair or replace the damaged or stolen
property; if die repair or replacement results in an
improvement to the condition, kind or quality, you
must pay for the amount of the improvement.

3.

we may, at our expense, return any stolen property to:
a. you; or
b. the address shown in this policy
but you cannot abandon the property to us.

4.

if we return stolen property, we will pay for any
damage resulting from the theft; or we may keep all
or part of the property at an agreed or appraised
value.

Appraisal and Arbitration
If we and a covered person do not agree:
1.

whether that person is legally entided to recover
damages under this part; or

2.

as to the amount of damages;

No Benefit to Bailee
This insurance shall not directly or indirectly benefit any
carrier or other bailee for hire.

Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability
and Conditions of Other Insurance
If there is other applicable liability we will pay only our share
of the loss. Our share under this policy is the amount

the parties may agree in writing to have the loss
determined by competent appraisals, as set forth in
paragraph A.
If you or we do not desire to proceed with the appraisal
process, as set forth in paragraph A, either party may
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demand arbitration, as set forth i** ^dragraph B.
A. APPRAISAL: If we and you do not agree on the
amount of the loss, in this event each party will select
a competent appraiser. The two appraisers will select
an umpire. The appraisers will state separately the
actual cash value and the amount of loss. If they fail
to agree, they will submit their differences to the
umpire. A decision agreed to by any two will be
binding. Each party will:
1. pay its chosen appraiser, and
2. bear the expenses of the appraisal and umpire
equally.
We do not waive any of our rights under this policy
by agreeing to an appraisal
B. ARBITRATION: If we and the covered person do
not agree to settle the matter by appraisal, or in the
event that you do not desire to proceed by selecting
competent appraisers, either party may make a written
demand for arbitration. Any matter in dispute
between you and us will be made pursuant to
arbitration as provided for in the arbitration rules of

die Arbitral.. Forums, Inc., a copy of which -is
available on request from the Company, which shall
be binding on both you and the Company. The
arbitration award may include attorney's fees if
allowed by state law and may be entered as a
judgment in any court of proper jurisdiction. Such
arbitration shall be in compliance with the "Utah
Arbitration Act" (Tide 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code
Annotated) or the applicable arbitration provisions in
force and effect in Utah at the time.

Additional Duties for Coverage for Damage to
Your Covered Vehicle
A person seeking Coverage for Damage to Your Covered
Vehicle must also:
1. Take reasonable steps after loss to protect your
covered vehicle and its equipment from further loss.
We will pay reasonable expenses incurred to do this.
2. Prompdy notify the police if your covered vehicle is
stolen or damaged.
3. Permit us to inspect and appraise the damaged
property before its repair or disposal.

PART E - SPECIAL CONDITIONS APPLYING TO ALL COVERAGES
Section I - General Conditions
jL

Action Against Company. No action shall lie
against the Company unless as a condition precedent
thereto, there shall have been full compliance with all
die terms of this coverage.

B. Notice. In the event of an accident, notice containing
particulars sufficient to identify the eligible covered
person, and also reasonably obtainable information
respecting the time, place and circumstances of die
accident shall be given by or on behalf of each
eligible covered person to die Company at the home
office as soon as practicable. If any eligible covered
person, his legal representative or his survivors shall
institute legal action to recover damages for bodily
injury against a person or organization who is or may
be liable in tort therefor, a copy of the summons and
complaint or other process served in connection with
such legal action shall be forwarded as soon as
practicable to the Company by such eligible person,
his legal representative, or his survivors.

Section II - Prohibited Use of Alcohol and Drags
for All Coverages
You understand and agree as follows:

A. That we do not issue policies to persons who
consume any alcohol or alcoholic beverages or who
use or consume any illegal drugs or who use or
consume illegal substances, or who will operate any
motor vehicle after having consumed alcoholic
beverages of any kind or in any amount whatsoever
or who allow the insured vehicle to be operated by
anyone who consumes any alcohol or alcoholic
beverages or who uses or consumes any illegal drugs
or illegal substances or who operate the insured
vehicle after consuming alcohol or alcoholic
beverages of any kind or in any amount, or after
using or consuming any illegal drugs or illegal
substances.
B. The named insured further understands that the
premiums charged for coverage under this policy
reflect the reduced risk present with insured who do
not consume any alcohol, or alcoholic beverages, or
who do not use or consume any illegal drugs or
illegal substances, or operate a motor vehicle after
having consumed alcohol or alcoholic beverages of
any kind or in any amount, or who have used or
consumed any illegal drugs or illegal substances, and
who do not allow the insured motor vehicles to be
operated by anyone who consumes alcohol or
alcoholic beverages or has consumed an alcoholic
beverage of any kind or in any amount, or who has
used or consumed any illegal drugs or illegal
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substances, and that the company would not issue a
policy to the named insured except upon this
representation and agreement.

vehicle, if any, applicable in the state in which the
vehicle is being operated and not the amount stated in
the declarations if greater.

For any loss incurred under this policy when the
insured motor vehicle is being operated by someone
who has consumed any alcohol or alcoholic beverages
of any kind or in any amount whatsoever, or who has
used or consumed any illegal drugs or illegal
substances of any kind or in any amount whatsoever
then the coverage under Part A, Part B, Pan CI, Part
C2 and Pan D of this policy shall apply only for the
minimum limits of motor vehicle liability coverage as
provided for in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, including §3lA-22-304, §3lA-22-30S and
§31A-22-307 providing for bodily injury and property
damage, personal injury protection, uninsured motorist
coverage and underinsured motorist coverage and
damage to your vehicle because of injury or
destruction of property not the amounts set forth in
the Declaration, if greater. If the motor vehicle is
being operated by an Insured as applied in this
section, outside of the state of Utah, then this policy
only provides the minimum limits of bodily injury
and property damage, personal injury protection,
uninsured motorist coverage and underinsured
motorist coverage and damage to your

D. This provision providing for minimum limits of motor
vehicle liability coverage for bodily injury and
property damage as applied in this section applies to
all motor vehicles, whether owned or non-owned and
to all coverages.

_

Section m - Special Conditions Applying to All
Coverages, Except A, Arbitration
The Company and any Insured or Covered Person agree that
on any matter in dispute between the Insured or Covered
Person and the Company, that any of the above have die right
to make a written demand for all marten to be settled by
arbitration. Any matter in dispute between You and Us will be
tnade pursuant to arbitration as provided for in the arbitration
rules of the Arbitration Forums, Inc., a copy of which is
available on requestfromthe Company, which shall be binding
on both You and the Company. The arbitration award may
include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and may b$
entered as a judgment in any court of proper jurisdiction. Such
arbitration shall be in compliance with the "Utah Arbitration
Act" (Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code Annotated) or th$
applicable arbitration provisions in force and effect in Utah at
the time.

PART F - DUTIES AFTER AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS FOR ALL
COVERAGES
General Duties
We must be notified promptly of how, when and where the
accident or loss happened. Notice should also include the
names and addresses of any injured persons and of any
witnesses.

4.

Authorize us to obtain:
a. medical reports; and
b. other pertinent records.

5.

Furnish us with a proof of claim in particularity as to
any damages or loss under oath and properly verified
if requested by us for damage to your covered or nonowned vehicle, medical expenses, medical treatment,
and all losses and damages in any form which you
clshn you are entitled to under the policy and such
other and further information that may assist thfc
company in determining the amount due because of
the loss.

6.

Submit to examinations under oath as reasonably
required by us.

A covered person seeking any coverage must
1- Cooperate with us in the investigation, settlement or
defense of any claim or suit
2.

Promptly send us copies of any notices or legal
papers received in connection with the accident or
loss.

3.

Submit, as often as we reasonably require, to physical
exams by physicians we select. We will pay for these
exams.
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PART G - GENERAL PROVISIONS, APPLYING TO ALL COVERAGES
Bankruptcy

after loss to prejudice such rights.
If the Insured proceeds or commences an
action against a legally responsible third party,
the Company shall be entitled to the extent of
such payment to the proceeds of any settlement
or judgment that may result from the exercise of
any rights of recovery of such person against any
person or organization legally responsible for the
bodily injury or property damage because of
which such payment is made and the Company
shall have a lien to the extent of such payment,
notice of which may be given to the person or
organization causing such bodily injury, his agent,
his insurer or a court having jurisdiction in the
matter; such person shall hold in trust for the
benefit of the Company all rights of recovery
which he shall have against such other person or
organization because of such bodily injury.
b. If the Company proceeds or commences an
action against a legally responsible third party,
the Company may, at its option, and has the right
to proceed or commence against any third party,
which may be liable for damages to the Insured
for bodily injury, medical expenses, property
damages or other payments. The Insured agrees
in consideration of the payments made under this
policy to subrogate the said Company to all rights
and causes of action the Insured has against any
persons or corporations whomsoever, arising out
of or incident to the bodily injury, medical
expenses or property damage or other payments,
authorizes the Company to sue and commence an
action in the name of the Insured, but at the
expense of the Company against any third party
pledging full cooperation in the action for his
deductible. The Insured assigns his deductible, if
any, to the Company and authorizes the Company
to sue in the name of the Insured as part of the
overall cause of action. In the event of any
reimbursement, collection or payment by a third
party, from the payment or proceeds the
Company will be paid and reimbursed first for
any costs of litigation and reasonable attorney
fees necessarily incurred.
The remaining
payments or proceeds will be distributed in direct
proportion to each interest (the amount of the
Insured's deductible) in proportion to- the
Company's payments pursuant to the provisions
of this policy for which it has a suhrogatable
interest

a.
Bankruptcy or insolvency of the covered person shall not
relieve us of any obligations under this policy.

Fraud
We do not provide coverage for any "Insured" who has made
fraudulent statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct in
connection with any accident or loss for which coverage is
sought under this policy.

All Agreements Between You and Us
This policy contains all the agreements between you and us.
Its terms may not be changed or waived except by
endorsement issued by us. If a change requires a premium
adjustment, we win adjust the premium as of the effective date
of change.
We may revise this policy form to provide more coverage
without additional premium charge. If we do this your policy
will automatically provide the additional coverage as of the
date the revision is effective in Utah.

Legal Action Against Us
No legal action may be brought against us until there has been
full compliance with all the terms of this policy. In addition,
under Part A» no legal action may be brought against us until;
1. we agree in writing that the covered person has an
obligation to pay, or
2- the amount of that obligation has been determined by
arbitration or judgment after a trial, as applicable
under die various coverages of this policy.
No person or organization has any right under this policy to
bring us into any action to detennine the liability of a covered
person.

Subrogation
In the event of any payment to any person under all coverages:
1. The Company is subrogated to the rights of the
person to whom or for whose benefit such payments
were made, to the extent of such payments, and such
person must execute and deliver instruments and
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure
such rights. Such person shall do nothing

The benefits and provisions of subrogation, as herein provided,
are subject to the provisions of Utah Code
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Annotated, 1953. §31A-22-3U, _Amits, Exclusions and
Conditions to Personal Injury Protection and providing for
mandatory binding arbitration between insurers; and the
provision for that reimbursement and the amount decided by
mandatory binding arbitration between the insurers is not part
of the subrogation rights as provided herein.

Policy Period and Territory
1. This policy applies only to accidents and losses which
occur during the policy period as shown in the
Declarations and within the policy territory. The
policy territory is the United States of America, its
territories or possessions, Puerto Rico or Canada.
This policy also applies to loss to, or accidents
involving, your covered vehicle while being
transported between their ports.
2. The policy term is shown on die Declaration page and
is for successive periods of time if renewed for which
you pay a renewal premium.
3. The policy begins and ends at 12:01 a.m. standard
time at the address shown on the Declaration page.

Termination Cancellation, Non-renewal by You
and Us
A- Cancellation by You.
You may cancel this policy during any policy period
by returning it to us or by letting us know in writing
of the date cancellation is to take effect, but the date
of cancellation must be prospectively after the date
that you let us know you intend to cancel.
B. Cancellation by Us.
We may cancel this policy only for the reasons stated
below by letting you know in writing of the date
cancellation takes effect in the following manner
1. When you have not paid the premium, we may
cancel at any time by letting you know at least 10
days before the date cancellation takes effect
2. When this policy has been in effect for less than
60 days and is nor a renewal with us, we may
cancel for any reason by letting you know at least
10 days before the date of the cancellation. If the
notice of cancellation is by mail, it will be sent
first class, postage prepaid and die 10 days takes
effect three days after the date of mailing.

a.

if mere has been material misrepresentation
of fact which if known to us would have
caused us not to issue the policy; or
b. if the risk has changed substantially since the
policy was issued;
c. if there have been substantial breaches of
contractual duties, conditions and warranties;
d. if there has been a revocation or suspension
of the driver's license of the named insured,
or any other person who customarily drives
the car.
This can be done by letting you know at least 30
days before the date cancellation takes effect
4. When this policy is written for a period of more
than one year, we may cancel for any reason at
anniversary by letting you know at least 30 days
before die date cancellation takes effect:
a. when this policy is canceled, the premium
for the period from the date of cancellation
to the expiration date will be refunded pro
rata;
b. if the return premium is not refunded with
the notice of cancellation or when this policy
is returned to us, we will refund it within a
reasonable time after the date cancellation
takes effect
5. If your policy is canceled or not renewed you
have the right by First Class Mail to request the
reasons for the cancellation and non-renewal of
your policy. This will be sent to you within ten
working days after written request
6. Any cancellation, termination or non-renewal
notices as required herein, under the provisions of
this paragraph and the provisions of Part G,
Termination - Cancellation, Non-renewal by Us,
paragraphs 1 through 5, may be delivered to you
or mailed to you at your mailing address shown
in the declarations and proof of mailing will be
sufficient proof of notice.
C. Automatic Termination.
If we offer to renew or continue your policy and you
or your representative do not accept, this policy will
automatically terminate at the end of the current
policy period. Failure to pay the required renewal or
continuation premium when due shall mean that you
have not accepted our offer.
If you obtain other insurance on your covered vehicle,
any similar insurance provided by this policy will
terminate as to the covered date on the effective date
of the other insurance.

3. When this policy has been in effect for 60 days
or more, or at anytimeif it is a renewal with us,
we may cancel:
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D. Other Termination Prov^n/ns.
1. If the Jaw in effect in Utah at the time of this
policy is issued, renewed or continued:
a. requires a longer notice period; or
b. requires a special form of, or procedure for,
giving notice; or
c. modifies any of the stated termination
reasons;
we will comply with those requirements.
2.

3.

We may deliver any notice instead of mailing it.
Proof of mailing of any notice shall be sufficient
proof of notice.
If this policy is canceled, you may be entitled to
a premium refund. If so, we will send you the
refund. The premium refund, if any, will be
computed according to our manuals. However,
making or offering to make the refund is not a
condition of cancellation.

Punitive and Exemplary Damages
We do not pay for punitive or exemplary damages for bodily
injury or property damage for which any covered person
becomes legally responsible because of an automobile accident,
including costs and attorney fees.

POLICYHOLDERS5 VOTING RIGHTS AND
CONTINGENT LIABILITY
1.

While this policy is in force and effect, die named
insured, by purchasing this policy is a member of
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, a non-profit
corporation, governed by and subject to the Articles
of Incorporation and Bylaws and is entided to vote at
all meetings of the members.

2.

No Contingent Liability.
assessable.

This policy is non-

4. The effective date of cancellation stated in die
notice shall Become the end of die policy period.

NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING
Transfer of Your Interest in This Policy
Your rights and duties under this policy may not be assigned
without our written consent. However, if a named insured
shown in die Declarations dies, coverage will be provided for.
1. The surviving spouse if resident in the same
household at the time of death. Coverage applies to
die spouse as if a named insured shown in the
Declararions; or
2.

The legalrepresentativeof the deceased person as if
a named insured shown in the Declarations. This
applies only with respect to therepresentative'slegal
responsibility to maintain or use your covered vehicle.

Coverage will only be provided until the end of the policy
period.

THE INSURED IS FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT BY
VIRTUE OF THE POLICY AS A MEMBER OF BEAR
RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, A NONPROFIT CORPORATION, THAT THE ANNUAL MEETING
IS HELD IN THE HOME OFFICE IN SALT LAKE CTTY,
UTAli, ON THE FIRST SATURDAY IN MARCH EACH
YEAR AT 11:00 AM. FOR THE PURPOSE OF
TRANSACTING THE GENERAL BUSINESS OF THE
COMPANY AND FOR THE ELECTION OF DIRECTORS.
AS A POLICYHOLDER YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VOTE
IN PERSON AT THE MEETING OR BY PROXY. THIS
NOTICE SHALL BE DEEMED FULL NOTICE OF THE
ANNUAL MEETING.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Company has caused this policy
to be signed by its president and secretary, but this policy shall
not be valid unless completed by the attachment hereto of the
Declaration Page.

Terms of Policy Cannot be Waived Except by
Endorsement
Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by any agent or
by any other person shall not effect a waiver or a change in
any part of this policy or estop the company from asserting
anyrightunder the terms of this policy; nor shall the terms of
this policy be waived or changed, except by endorsement
issued to form a part of this policy, signed by a duly
authorized representative of the company.

Secretary

Resident
President

v/
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J o h n W a l l and Nancv Wall

JBE IT REMEMBERED That

Address

1269 West C a l i f o r n i a ,

(hereinafter referred to as the Claimant

S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84104

s

J for and in consideration of the sum of S i x t e e n Thousand and no/lOOs
Dollars(S 1 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0

the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do

we

)

hereby REMISE, RELEASE AND FOREVER DISCHARGE

D a v i d W a t e r s d / b / a D & L C o n s t r u c t i o n and Lana W a t e r s
(ImfX « n n ruti H*mm at *rux\u

Thieir
(His, ««r, Tn«ic, its)

Corporation* or P«nnifWiot To dm ft«m<c)

*«efn5 and wy—its and *il «**•«• persors. firms, and corporations yhcmsceyer of md fron: cr.y 2nd 2il scscns.

daims, and demands whatsoever which da.imzrrz s

now have

or may have, whether known or unknown, developed or un«

(H4&, H4¥«J

developed, on account* of or arising out of the accident, casualty or event which happened on or about the

As a further consideration for said Sum Claimant s
been made to Claimant s

warrant

7 th

day of

tnat no promise or agreement not nerein expressed has

; that in executing this Release Claimant s

a r e not relying upon any statement or representation
(U, Art)

made by the party or parties hereby released or said party's or parries' agents, servants or physicians concerning the nature.
extent, or duration of the injuries and/or damages, or concerning any other thing or matter, but
their

own judgment; that the above mentioned sum Is received by Claimants^

(mtk. m«t, Tft«4r. its)

a r e relying solely upon
rUTAnti
in full settlement and satisfaction

"
™

of all the aforesaid daims and demands whatsoever: that Claimants

? r o legally competent to execute this Release; and that be(IU Aral

fore signing and sealing this Release, Claimant c

V> 3 V A

fully informed

(Htt, navt)

have

***

rha^c oWoc

of its contents and meaning

(Himsott, H«rs«rt, Tn«ms*tv«s)

executed it with full knowledge thereof. It is further undersiood and agreed that the payment of said amount is

not to be construed as an admission of liability, but is a compromise of a disputed claim.

HAVE BEAD T H E FOREGQ1N& RELEASE AND F Q U T H N D E S S T A H D - I X ^ ^
Signed, sealed and delivered this
at

>r^6

^&*~s'

^J^^tA^

Lj Tr/

day of

'~7Yl

(XJCJLJ^C

i»2£.

<rf

ln the presence of
Witness:

n^Cb^=Ja^ I

IjJf

Witness:

(/NOTARY PUBUC
MAIIHEWU. WHITE

Witness:

2*7 Hawthorne Or.
Layton.UT 840*1
Mi' Cowwm<i«in Cwgirn

pCf JJ Seal)

r.;x

THOMAS A. DUFFIN (0927)
DANIEL O. DUFFIN (6530)
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3 1 1 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 5 3 1 - 6 6 0 0

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

I

ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT

)

Civil No. 940905590CN

i

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN WALL and
NANCY WALL, his wife,
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing before the
above-entitled Court on the 24th day of August, 1995, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding, Thomas A. Duffin appearing for and on behalf
of Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, and John and Nancy Wall
appearing per se, whereupon the Court heard the respective argument of the parties,
pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or in lieu thereof, Motion
for Summary Judgment, and Defendants' counter Motion for Summary Judgment, and
pursuant to the pleadings, the following facts are not in dispute:
1.

The Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, (hereinafter

"Bear River") is an insurance corporation engaged in the insurance business in the

-2-

state of Utah, is a non-profit corporation and is owned entirely by its policyholders for
the use and benefit of the policyholders, having its principal place of business at 778
Winchester, Murray, Utah. Bear River Mutual only issues insurance policies in the
state of Utah.
2.

Defendants, John Wal! and Nancy Wall, his wife, are residents of

Davis County, State of Utah, and reside at 802 Montague, Bountiful, Utah 8 4 0 1 0 .
3.

This action is brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as

amended § 7 8 - 3 3 - 1 , et.seq. seeking by determination the rights of the parties hereto
under a policy issued by Plaintiff, Policy No. C145077.
4.

On or about June 5, 1992, and continuing through June 5, 1993,

Plaintiff had issued its standard automobile Policy No. C 1 4 5 0 7 7 , to John Wall and
Nancy Wall, his wife. A copy of the policy is attached as Exhibit " A " and a copy of
the declaration page is attached as Exhibit " B " to Plaintiff's Complaint.
5.

That the auto policy issued to Defendants, provides under PART

B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE, Insuring Agreement, as follows:
"The Company will pay personal injury protection benefits that are reasonable
and necessary to or on behalf of each eligible injured person for:
(a)
medical expenses
(b)
work loss
(c)
funeral expenses
(d)
survivor loss and
(e)
special damages
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible insured person caused by
an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.
Medical Payments:
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall not exceed
$3,000.00; unless additional medical protection or payments are provided for

p9 i°i
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on the Declaration page, they must be incurred within three years of the date
of the accident to be payable.
Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of Liability and Special Provisions
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during the policy period in
the United States and Canada, except if an auto accident to which this policy
applies occurs outside of Utah, (but is within the United States and Canada),
our limits of liability under your policy for that accident are as follows:
1.
If the state, (outside of Utah) CJ Canada, has:
a.
a personal injury protection or similar law specifying limits higher
than that in the declarations, your policy will provide the higher
specified limit;
Special Conditions if Law is Declared Invalid
The premium for the policy is based on rates which have been established in
reliance upon the limitations on the right to recover for damages imposed by the
provisions of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance A c t . In the event a court
of competent jurisdiction declares or enters a judgment, the effect of w h i c h is
to render the provisions of such act invalid or unenforceable in whole or in part,
the Company shall have the right to recompute the premium payable for the
policy and the provisions of this endorsement shall be voidable or subject to
amendment at the option of the Company.
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of
Insurance Under our Personal Injury Protection

Other

1. No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate benefits for the
same elements of loss under this or any similar insurance."
6.

U n d e r PART G - GENERAL P R O V I S I O N S , A P P L Y I N G T O

C O V E R A G E S , S u b r o g a t i o n , it p r o v i d e s :
"In the event of any payment to any person under all coverages:
1.
The Company is subrogated to the rights of the person to w h o m or for
whose benefit such payments were made, to the extent of such
payments, and such person must execute and deliver instruments and
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. Such
person shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.
a.
If the Insured proceeds or commences an action against a legally
responsible third party, the Company shall be entitled to the
extent of such payment to the proceeds of any settlement or
judgment that may result from the exercise of any rights of
recovery of such person against any person or organization

ALL

-4-

legally responsible for the bodily injury or property damage
because of which such payment is made and the Company shall
have a lien to the extent of such payment, notice of which may
be given to the person or organization causing such bodily injury,
his agent, his insurer or a court having jurisdiction in the matter;
such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the Company all
rights of recovery which he shall have against such other person
or organization because of such bodily injury."
7.

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-308 provides:

"The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection
coverage:
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any
motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state,
the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except
where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the named
insured's o w n motor vehicle not actually insured under the policy;"
8.

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended

§31 A-22-309(6)

provides:
"(6)
Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is
subject to the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to w h o m
benefits required under personal injury protection have been paid by
another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah,
the insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall
reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the
amount of damages recoverable;"
9.

On or about August 6, 1992, the Plaintiff's insured, Nancy Wall,

while a resident of Utah, was involved in an automobile accident on Colorado State
Highway 666 at Cortez, Colorado.
10.

That on or about March 4, 1994, John Wall and Nancy Wall

executed a release of "any and all actions, claims, and demands whatsoever
claimants

now

have

or may have,

whether

known

or unknown,

which

developed,

or

PS */
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undevelopedf

on account

of or arising out of the accident,

happened on or about the 7th day of August

1992."

casualty or event

which

A copy of the release to the tort

feasors, David & Lana Waters, is attached as Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Complaint, and
the release was less than the insurance limits of the tort feasors.
11.

Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment for the interpretation

of its policy provisions and whether Plaintiff is under an obligation pursuant to Utah
law to make further personal injury protection benefit payments as provided for in Part
B of its policy providing for personal injury protection benefits to Defendants was filed
promptly and commenced in good faith by Plaintiff after receiving knowledge of the
general release of the tort feasors by Defendants, jointly and severally. There were
legal, debatable, questions of law and there exists a reasonable question as to the
issues of law for denial of the claim of Defendants by Plaintiff.
12.

The Court examined the briefs of the Plaintiff and Defendants and

the cases and authorities cited by both, and finds that that the Plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings or for summary judgment, should be denied, and that
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted and that Plaintiff should
be required to pay further personal injury protection claims to Defendants, John Wall
and Nancy Wall, pursuant to Part B of its policy under the personal injury protection
benefits.
13.

The Court hereby dismisses the Counterclaim of the Defendants

on the basis that it attempts to include a criminal action w i t h a civil action and,
therefore, is an improper counterclaim; the Court further denies the Defendants'

-6-

Motion to amend their Counterclaim based upon the settlement of the issues herein
set f o r t h .
NOW,

THEREFORE, IT

IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED:
1.

That the Defendants, John and Nancy Wall's Motion for Summary

Judgment is granted and Plaintiff is required to pay to John and Nancy Wall, pursuant
to the provisions of its policy, Part B, Personal Injury Protection, those benefits since
the time of the release signed by Defendants on March 4 , 1994, pursuant to the terms
and conditions of the policy.
2.

That Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for

Summary Judgment is denied.
3.

That the counterclaim filed by Defendants, John Wall and Nancy

Wall, is hereby dismissed, and the Defendants' request to file an
counterclaim is denied.
Dated this %/

amended

^-£)/.
day of March, 1996.

P<? R3
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Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Judgment to
the following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
John Wall and
Nancy Wall
P.O. Box 5 4 0 1 1 8
No. Salt Lake, Utah 8 4 0 5 4

postage prepaid, this

;>>

day of March, 1996.

pq m
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(DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL): Mr.
Jensen at this time is willing to plead
guilty to the probation violation with the
understanding, and because of the situation that has been presented to us, that
he still denies that he ever made the
unauthorized calls to A and M Mowers.
He is without a defense because we cannot get a hold of Douglas Russell, but he
has violated the rules and regulations of
the Halfway House as indicated by that
representative in the matters that he indicated he would have just let go unnoticed if it had not been for the phone
calls, and that's the only way we can
handle it, your honor, because of him
being incarcerated, so that's how we have
to handle it.
THE COURT: Mr. Jensen, does that
conform to what your opinion is, and has
your attorney stated your position accurately?
MR. JENSEN: Yeah.
The defendant should be permitted to
withdraw his plea of guilty because, I believe, in no way could it be deemed to be a
free, voluntary, understanding, and intelligent plea.
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of WILKINS, J.

paid to its insured following a settlement
between insured and insurance carrier of
third-party tort-feasor. The First District
Court, Cache County, Ted S. Perry, J. pro
tern., entered judgment in favor of insured,
and insurer appealed. The Supreme Court,
Stewart, J., held that insurer was not entitled to recover no-fault payments made to
its insured out of proceeds of a settlement
with third-party tort-feasor.
Judgment affirmed.
Crockett, C. J., filed concurring opinion
in which Hall, J., concurred.

Insurance <£=> 601.25
Automobile liability insurer was not entitled to recover no-fault payments made to
its insured out of proceeds of settlement
with third-party tort-feasor. U.C.A.1953,
31-41-11.

L. E. Midgley, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
N. George Daines of Daines & Daines,
Logan, for defendant and respondent.
STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company,
brought this action to recover no-fault insurance benefits paid to its insured, the
defendant, following a settlement between
the defendant and the insurance carrier of
a third-party tortfeasor.

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Richard Bruce ANDERSON, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 16411.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 3, 1980.
Automobile liability insurer brought action to recover no-fault insurance benefits

In January 1976 defendant, a passenger
in a vehicle insured by Allstate, was injured
in an automobile accident. Pursuant to his
claim, Allstate paid defendant $2,000 in nofault medical benefits. Subsequently, defendant filed suit against the tortfeasor,
who was insured by State Farm Mutual
Insurance Company. Defendant entered
into a settlement agreement with State
Farm. On settlement of that suit defendant executed a release, and State Farm
agreed to pay a settlement amount of $10,000. Two thousand dollars of this amount
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was made payable jointly to defendant and
Allstate. Defendant refused to deliver the
draft, and Allstate initiated this action.
The issue is whether Allstate is entitled,
because of a right of subrogation, to recover the no-fault payments made to its insured out of proceeds of a settlement with a
third-party tortfeasor.
We hold that Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 (1980), is dispositive of this case.

prevent double recovery, and double payment for the same loss, and incidentally, to
avoid increased costs of insurance coverage,
in frustration of the very purpose of that
act.
HALL, J., concurs in the views expressed
in the concurring opinion of CROCKETT, C.
J.

The judgment in favor of defendant is
affirmed. Costs to Respondent
MAUGHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur.
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (concurring
with comments):
I concur on the basis that the recently
decided case of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie1 is
now to be recognized as the law of this
state. However, inasmuch as that case
made a change in our law,21 think it appropriate to make some further observations.
In cases such as this, it is important to
keep in mind the distinction between the
two classes of claims: first, the personal
injury protection (PIP) benefits, which are
paid to the claimant (the person who suffers injuries) by his own insurer, regardless
of fault. Second, there is the possible tort
claim against the alleged wrongdoer,
backed up by his insurer. If it appears that
the wrongdoer "is or would be legally liable" to the claimant, then the wrongdoer's
insurer must reimburse the claimant's insurer for its PIP payments it has made, this
to be done under the procedure provided in
Section 31-41-11, U.C.A.1953; and this PIP
payment is not to be considered as part of
any settlement between the claimant and
the wrongdoer or his insurer. (Unless the
parties clearly understand and agree otherwise.)
It is important that parties involved in
such situations be aware of these rights and
obligations, as now adjudicated, under the
No-Fault Insurance Act. This, in order to
1. Utah. 606 P.2d 1197 (1980).

J. Elmer WISCOMBE and Naomi B.
Wiscombe, his wife, Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v.
The LOCKHART CO., Defendant
and Appellant
The LOCKHART CO., Third-Party
Plaintiff,
v.
Neil J. BEARDALL et a!., Third-Party
Defendants.
No. 16304.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 3, 1980.
Assignee of uniform real estate contract appealed from judgment of the
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Allen
B. Sorensen, J., quieting title to certain real
property in vendors as ^gainst assignee.
The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that
contract between vendor and purchaser was
properly foreclosed by vendor in accordance
with terms of contract after purchaser defaulted by missing one installment payment; title to property thereafter remained
in vendor no longer subject to contract, and
contract assignee's tender of payment,
2. See dissenting opinions in Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Ivie. supra, note 1.
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of the institution to carrv o n j t s operations
in secret. Accordingly,
e. dgment that
the plaintiff and other members of the public are entitled to it is affirmed.12 No costs
awarded.
MAUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur.
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur in
result.

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Louise IVIE and Travelers Insurance
Companies, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 15983.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 7, 1980.

Cause remandpH
Stewart, J., . ,<SG concurring opinion.
Hall, J., filed dissenting opinion, in
which Crockett, C. J., concurred.
Crockett, C. J., filed dissenting opinion
in which Hall, J., concurred.

1. Automobiles <$=> 251.11

No-Fault Insurance Act confers two
privileges on party who has either insurance
or other accrued security: first, he is granted partial tort immunity, and second, he is
not personally liable for no-fault insurance
benefits paid by insurer; he does, however,
remain liable for customary tort claims not
compensated by such benefits. U.C.A.1953,
3 1 ^ 1 - 5 , 31-^1-6.
2. Automobiles <$=>251.11

Where tort-feasor has complied with
security provisions of No-Fault Insurance
Act, injured party, if entitled to maintain
claim for personal injuries, should plead
only for those damages for which he has not
received reparation under his first-party insurance benefits. U.C.A.1953, 31-41-5, 3 1 41-6, 31-41-9(1).
3. Automobiles <*=> 251.11

Passenger who sustained severe personal injuries in motor vehicle accident appealed decision of the Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, David K. Winder, J., granting
summary judgment in favor of no-fault insurance carrier for car in which passenger
was riding in the amount of personal injury
protection benefits paid by it to passenger.
The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that
No-Fault Insurance Act does not confer on
no-fault insurer right of subrogation to
funds received by its insured for personal
injuries in subsequent legal action, but
rather grants the no-fault insurer a limited,
equitable right to seek reimbursement in
arbitration proceeding against the liability
insurer.

Under No-Fault Insurance Act, tortfeasor has partial immunity for general
damages until threshold provisions of injured party's damages are met and no personal liability for payment of the benefits
provided by no-fault insurance company, if
he has complied with security requirements
of the Act. U.C.A.1953, 31-41-6, 31-419(2).

12. We so decide this case on the record as
presented to the district court, and on the basis
of our statutory law We have taken judicial
notice of the subsequently enacted Chap. 113.
S.L.U.1979, Sec. 5 of which provides that per-

sonally identifiable salary data of employees of
institutions of higher education is "private information" and subject to disclosure only to
the extent provided by the Utah Information
Practices Act

4. Insurance <s=»601.25
No-Fault Insurance Act does not confer
on no-fault insurer right of subrogation to
funds received by its insured for personal
injuries in subsequent legal action, but
rather grants no-fault insurer*a limited,
equitable right to seek reimbursement in

P? ?7
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arbitration proceeding against the liability
insurer.
5, Subrogation <§=*1
Subrogation is creature of equity, purpose of which is to work out equitable adjustment between parties by securing ultimate discharge of debt by person who, in
equity and in good conscience, ought to pay
it.
6. Insurance ^512.1(1)
In action for damages against tort-feasor brought by claimant who has collected
benefits from its no-fault insurer, tort-feasor's liability insurer, in fulfilling its duty to
respond to claims of the injured party to
limits of its policy, stands in shoes of its
insured and pays on the basis of its insured's personal liability to injured party,
and such personal liability does not include
personal injury protection benefits paid under no fault insurance; therefore, tort victim's recovery from the liability insurer
cannot be reduced by personal injury protection benefits. U.C.A.1953, 31-41-6, 3 1 41-9(1, 2).

L. Rich Humpherys of Christensen, Gardiner, Jensen & Evans, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
L. E. Midgley, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
Before us is a matter involving our "nofault" insurance act. It was resolved, by
summary judgment, in favor of plaintiff
Allstate Insurance Company. We reverse
and remand. Costs awarded to defendant
Ivie.
Defendant, hereinafter "Ivie," sustained
severe personal injuries in a motor vehicle
accident. Allstate Insurance Company, the
plaintiff herein, was the "no-fault" insurance carrier for the vehicle in which Ivie
was a passenger. In compliance with the
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act,
Section 41, Title 31, U.C.A.1953, as enacted
1973, Allstate paid Ivie PIP (personal injury
protection) benefits amounting to the sum

i,.

£S

of $7,394.00. Thereafter, Ivie filed an action for damages against James Salisbury,
the driver of the other motor vehicle involved in the accident. Salisbury's liability
insurer was Travelers Insurance Company.
Allstate declined to join in or participate in
the lawsuit, although it asserted it had subrogation rights to the extent of the PIP
benefits it had paid.
The trial of the negligence action was set
for April 11, 1978. In March 1978, Travelers offered to settle for $44,000. Travelers'
liability was limited to $50,000 under the
policy. Ivie's counsel was employed under a
contingency fee arrangement, viz., twentyfive percent prior to actual trial preparation
and one third if the case were settled immediately before or during the trial, or went
to judgment. Additionally, Ivie was responsible for all costs and expenses incurred
in the prosecution of her claim. After reviewing the deposition of tort-feasor Salisbury, and further investigation, Ivie determined there would be a limited opportunity
to collect a judgment in excess of the liability policy limit of $50,000, although Ivie
claimed $150,000 in damages. Under these
circumstances, Ivie accepted a settlement of
$44,000; thus she limited her attorney's
fees to twenty-five percent. Travelers issued two drafts: one was made payable
jointly to Allstate and Ivie in the sum of
$7,394.00; the other was for the balance of
the $44,000 settlement. Ivie refused to deliver the check for $7,394.00 to Allstate, and
the present action was filed.
In its complaint, Allstate pleaded in the
alternative that it was entitled to subrogation under the contractual terms of the
policy issued on the vehicle in which Ivie
was a passenger to the extent it had paid
the PIP benefits, or it was entitled to reimbursement under Section 31-41-11, U.C.A.
1953, enacted in 1973. Allstate further
pleaded for a declaration of its rights in
regard to Ivie's recovery as a result of the
settlement of her tort action. Allstate
moved for summary judgment.
Ivie opposed the summary judgment on
the ground there were triable issuesof fact.
Ivie urged equitable principles applp-Wysu^
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rotation, and the insured i a ed to be
made whole before the insurer is entitled to
any portion of the recovery from the tortfeasor. Ivie argued she sustained severe
injuries and was compelled to settle for a
sum totally inadequate to compensate her
for the total damages sustained. According
to her argument, to prevail Allstate must
prove it has a greater equity than Ivie,
which, in effect, would require proof Ivie
had received double payment for her medical expenses.1

These laws are of
pes: first, the
add-on statutes; and second, the partial
tort exemption statutes. The add-on statutes merely add to the negligence system of
reparations with some kind of no-fault benefits to an injured person, without regard to
fault. All tort claims are preserved under
these statutes, although some provide for
subrogation or offset to avoid jkuikle recovery for an jtem of loss. These add-on laws
are not regarded as true "no-fault" legislation.

Ivie further urged, if Allstate were entitled to its subrogation claim, it should contribute to the costs and attorney's fees incurred by Ivie in collecting the claim. Ivie
cites the principle that in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary as set forth by
the terms in a policy of insurance, the insured, who is successful in the recovery of
funds which include money payable by the
insured to an insurance company, is entitled
to deduct attorney fees and other expenses
reasonably and necessarily incurred in making such a recovery from the amount payable to the insurance company.2

The true "no-fault" insurance is a type of
compensation system which couples the
payment of benefits on a no-fault basis
with the partial elimination of fault-based
tort actions for both economic losses and
pain and suffering. This system generally
continues to permit fault-based claims for
pain and suffering in the more serious cases
and for economic losses above no-fault benefits. A system which has no tort exemption at all is not a "no-fault" insurance.
The Utah no-fault statute is a compulsory,
partial tort exemption law coupling nofault insurance benefits, Section 6, with a
partial elimination bf tort claims for bodily
injury.

The trial court granted Allstate's motion
for summary judgment. Specifically, the
court granted Allstate judgment against
Ivie and Travelers jointly and severally in
the sum of $7,394.00. The court declared
Travelers was bound by the provisions of
Section 31-41-11, and Ivie was not entitled
to an attorney's fee from Allstate.

Section 2 of the act provides:
The purpose of this act is to require the
payment of certain prescribed benefits in
respect to motor vehicle accidents
through either insurance or other approved security, but on the basis of no
fault, preserving, however, the right of
an injured person to pursue the customary tort claims where the most serious
type of injuries occur
(1) No person for whom direct benefit coverage is provided for in this act
shall be allowed to maintain a cause of
action for general damages arising out
of personal injuries alleged to have
been caused by an automobile accident
except where there has been caused by
this accident any one or more of the
following:

To resolve the issues between the parties,
it is essential to construe Section 31-41-11;
however, this section cannot be construed in
isolation, but must be correlated with other
pertinent provisions in Chapter 41 of Title
31, Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance
Act. As an aid to the proper construction
of this act, reference to an article by Robert
E. Keeton in the 1973 Utah Law Review is
beneficial, Compensation Systems
and
Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973 ULR 383.
Therein, it is explained that twenty-one
states have enacted "no-fault" legislation.
1.

Transamehca Insurance Company v. Barnes,
29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972); Lyon v.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 25
Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971).

2.

State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance
Company v. Clinton, 267 Or. 653, 518 P.2d 645
(1974).

nn
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(a) Death;
(b) Dismemberment or fracture;
(c) Permanent disability;
(d) Permanent disfigurement; or
(e) Medical expenses to a person in excess of $500.
(2) The owner of a motor vehicle
with respect to which security is required by this act who fails to have
such security in effect at the time of an
accident shall have no immunity from
tort liability and shall be personally
liable for the payment of the benefits
provided for under Section
31-^1-6.
[Emphasis supplied].
[1] Under this statutory plan, first party PIP benefits up to the amoun* - provided
in Section 6 are paid to an inju ^d person
without regard to fault. Furthermore, the
injured party is precluded from maintaining
an action to recover general damages (all
damages other than those awarded for economic losses),3 except where the threshold
requirements of Section 9(1) are met. Under Section 9(2), there are two consequences
to the owner of a motor vehicle who fails to
have the security required by Section 5:
first, he has no immunity from tort liability; second, he is personally liable for the
benefits provided under Section 6. The
only logical inference is that if a party has
the security required under Section 5, the
no-fault insurance act confers two privileges: first, he is granted partial tort immunity; second, he is not personally liable for
the benefits provided under Section 6. He
does, however, remain liable for customary
tort claims, viz., general damages and economic losses not compensated by the benefits paid under Section 6, where the threshold provisions of Section 9(1) are met.
[2] There is no provision in the statutory scheme to indicate the tort-feasor who
ha.s complied with the security provisions of
the act, becomes personally liable for the
PIP benefits provided in Section 6, when
the injured party is entitled under the
threshold pro\isions of Section 9(1) to maintain a claim for personal injuries. In such a
3.

situation, the injured party should plead
only for those damages for *hich he has not
received reparation under his first party
insurance benefits. In order to present a
completely factual picture to the jury, the
injured party may wish to present evidence
of all his medical bills or other economic
losses. The court, by an appropriate instruction, could explain to the jury that
these economic losses have not been included in the prayer for damages, because the
injured party has previously received reparation under his own no-fault insurance
coverage.
The foregoing interpretation is the only
one consistent with the provisions in Section
9(2). The obvious legislative intent was to
encourage compliance with the security provisions of the act. The design to compel
compliance included not only partial tort
exemption, but immunity from personal liability for payment of the benefits provided
for under Section 6,
When Section 9(2) is construed in conjunction with Section 9(1), the legislative
intent emerges.
No person for whom direct benefit coverage is provided for in this act shall be
allowed to maintain a cause of action for
general damages . . . except wThere
Until the threshold requirements are met,
the injured party is limited to his direct
benefit coverage. If his injuries meet the
threshold requirements, then he may maintain a claim for general damages.
The
term "general damages" is explained as follows:
Another interesting feature of the
Utah law is its distinctive phrasing of the
tort exemption provision, which declares:
"No person for whom direct benefit coverage is provided for in this act shall be
allowed to maintain a cause of action for
general damages unless one of the threshold requirements is met." The term
"general damages" is not defined in the
statute. The tort exemption pro\isions
of other statutes, rather than referring to

1973 ULR 383, 392.
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"general damages" have used phrases
such as "pain and suffering" or "pain,
suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience," or have used especially defined
term such as noneconomic detriment.
The term "general damages" was often
used, in public discussion of no-fault proposals, as a comprehensive term for elements of tort damages other than economic losses, which were often referred
to as "specials." In view of that usage, it
would seem that "general damages" as
used in the Utah statute includes damages for pain and suffering. It may reasonably be argued that "general damages" refers more broadly to all damages
other than those awarded for economic
losses and that preclusion of "general
damages" precludes also any award for
disability as such (including for example,
disability to play golf), as distinguished
from an award reimbursing economic
losses resulting from the disability.4

(b) That the issue of liability for
such reimbursement and the amount of
same shall be decided by mandatory,
binding arbitration between the insurers.
Section 11 is not a model of clarity. A
degree of confusion has been generated by
the subtitle to this section supplied by the
publisher of the Utah Code Annotated, The
Allen Smith Company. The subtitle reads:
"Subrogation rights and arbitration between insurers." In contrast, the subtitle
in the session laws, Laws of Utah, 1973,
Regular Session, Chapter 55, reads: "Conditions insurers to abide by."

Section 11 must be construed in connection with the other relevant provisions.
Section 31-41-11 provides:
(1) Every insurer authorized to write
the insurance required by this act shall
agree as a condition to being allowed to
continue to write insurance in the State
of Utah;
(a) That where its insured is or
would be legally liable for the personal
injuries sustained by any person to
whom benefits required under this act
have been paid by another insurer, including the state insurance fund, it will
reimburse such other insurer for the
payment of such benefits, but not in
excess of the amount of damages so
recoverable, and

In reference to Section 11, Keeton
states: 5
The Utah law preserves subrogationlike rights of reimbursement among nofault insurers. That is, after an insurer
pays no-fault benefits, it is entitled to
reimbursement from the insurer of a negligent driver who would have been liable
in tort to the injured person but for the
partial tort exemption. These claims for
reimbursement are declared to be subject
to mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. This would appear to
be an undesirable preservation of fault
based claims among insurers. It may
happen, however, that the provision will
fall into disuse in practice. For example,
two insurers with a large volume of
claims against each other may agree to
square accounts periodically on an actuarial basis, or even to forego these reimbursement claims against each other altogether, because it wrould be cheaper for
both to do so.
The state of Oregon has a provision similar to Section 11, viz., ORS 743.825. It
should be emphasized that Oregon has an
add-on statute with no partial tort exemption.6 Oregon further requires the injured
person to include in his claim or legal action
the benefits furnished by the insurer, ORS
743.828(3)(b). By a separate statute, there
is a provision in Oregon for subrogation.
ORS 743.830 provides:

4.

6.

[3] Thus, under Section 9(1) and (2), the
tort-feasor has partial immunity for general
damages until the threshold provisions are
met and no personal liability for the payment of the benefits provided under Section
6, if he has complied with the security requirements of the act.

Id. p 392.

Id. p. 386.

5. Id. at pp. 392-393.
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If a motor vehicle liability insurer has
furnished personal injury protection benefits
(1) The insurer is entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that
may result from the exercise of any
rights of recovery of the injured person
against any person legally responsible for
the accident, to the extent of such benefits furnished by the insurer less the insurer's share of expenses, costs and attorney fees incurred by the injured person in
connection with such recovery.
(2) The injured person shall hold in
trust for the benefit of the insurer all
such rights of recovery which he has, but
only to the extent of such benefits furnished.
(3) The injured person shall do whatever is proper to secure, and shall do nothing after loss to prejudice, such rights.
(4) If requested in writing by the insurer, the injured person shall take,
through any representative not in conflict
in interest wTith him designated by the
insurer, such action as may be necessary
or appropriate to recover such benefits
furnished as damages from such responsible person, such action to be taken in the
name of the injured person, but only to
the extent of the benefits furnished by
the insurer. In the event of a recovery,
the insurer shall also be reimbursed out
of such recovery for the injured person's
share of expenses, costs and attorney fees
incurred by the insurer in connection
with the recovery.
(5) In calculating respective shares of
expenses, costs and attorney fees under
this section, the basis of allocation shall
be the respective proportions borne to the
total recovery by:
(a) Such benefits furnished by the insurer; and
(b) The total recovery less (a).
(6) The injured person ^hall execute
and deliver to the insurer such instruments and papers as may be appropriate
to secure the rights and obligations of the
insurer and him as established by this
section.
7.

(7) Any provisions in a motor vehicle
liability insurance policy or health insurance policy giving rights to the insurer
relating to subrogation or the subject
matter of this section shall be construed
and applied in accordance with the provisions of this section.
[4] This latter section would be a redundancy if Section 743.825 of the Oregon code
provided for subrogation by the no-fault
insurer to its insured, when such insured
received a settlement or judgment for personal injuries. Similarly, Section 11 in the
Utah No-Fault Insurance Act cannot be
interpreted as conferring on the no-fault
insurer a right of subrogation to the funds
received by its insured for personal injuries.
Section 11 grants the no-fault insurer a
limited, equitable right to seek reimbursement in arbitration proceeding against the
liability insurer. Section 11 cannot be
deemed as conferring subrogation rights on
the no-fault insurer, vis-a-vis its insured as
to his recovery in a settlement or legal
action.
[5] The nature and purpose of subrogation should be reviewed. Subrogation is a
creature of equity, its purpose is to work
out an equitable adjustment between the
parties by securing the ultimate discharge
of a debt by the person who, in equity and
in good conscience, ought to pay it. Subrogation has a dual basis—".
when
the insurer has made payment for the loss
caused by a third party, it is only equitable
and just that the insurer should be reimbursed for his payment to the insured, because otherwise either the insured would be
unjustly enriched by virtue of a recovery
from both the insurer and the third party,
or in the absence of such double recovery by
the insured, the third party would go free
notwithstanding the fact that he has a legal
obligation in connection with the damage. 7 "
[6] Under the Utah No-Fault Insurance
Act, the tort-feasor who has the required
security, is not personally liable to the in-

16 Couch on Insurance 2d, Sec. 61.18, pp. 248^-249.
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jured person for payme* oi ^cjction 6 benefits, Section 9(2); therefore, the tort-feasor
has no personal legal obligation to reimburse the injured party's insurer. On the
other hand, the tort-feasor's liability insurer, in fulfilling its duty to respond to the
claims of the injured party to the limits of
its policy, stands in the shoes of its insured
and pays on the basis of its insured's personal liability to the tort victim; this personal liability does not include PIP payments. Thus, the tort victim's recovery
from the liability insurer cannot be reduced
by the PIP payments. If the victim's recovery be reduced by the amount of the
PIP payments by granting his no-fault insurer a right of subrogation, it is the nofault insurer who receives double recovery,
This is so because the insurer receives a
premium for the benefits, and then receives
full reimbursement, while the liability insurance available to recompense the victim
is depleted by payments for which the liability insurer is not responsible to the victim.
In the instant action, Allstate has no
right of subrogation to the recovery of Ivie,
and the trial court erred in its ruling. The
cause is remanded with an order to enter
judgment in favor of Ivie in the amount of
$7,394.00, the sum representing Ithe PIP
payments. However, Allstate is not precluded from claiming reimbursement from
Travelers in an arbitration proceeding.
WILKINS, J., concurs.
STEWART, Justice (concurring):
I concur in the opinion of Justice Maughan and add the following comments in
explanation of my position.
The Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, § 31-41-1, et seq., U.C.A. (1953),
as amended, is neither clear nor specific
with respect to the relative rights of a
no-fault insurer in an insured's recovery
from a third-party tortfeasor. Accordingly,
it is our obligation to construe the Act to
effectuate the purposes set out in §
31-41-2. That provision, in part, provides:
The intention of the legislature is hereby
to possibly stabilize, if not effectuate cer-
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tain savings in, the rising costs of automobile accident insurance and to effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of
handling the greater bulk of the personal
injury claims that arise out of automobile
accidents, these being those not involving
great amounts of damages.
Contrary to the view of the dissenting
opinion in this case, the result reached by a
majority of the Court will not result in
double recovery to an injured person. It
will, on the other hand, result in greater
efficiency, accuracy and fairness in determining the relative rights of the interested
parties. Also, it will have the beneficial
effect of reducing the possibilities for controversy and litigation between no-fault insurers and their insureds.
Pursuant to the majority opinion, a nofault insured in an action against a tortfeasor may not recover from the tortfeasor
any sums already paid by the no-fault insurer. Thus, double recovery by an insured
is in fact barred. The no-fault insurer, by
being subrogated to the rights of the insured as provided by § 31-41-11, has a
right to collect directly from the tortfeasor^ insurer (whether or not the insured
party has filed a tort claim) by way of
arbitration pursuant to § 31-41-11. If the
injured party files an action against the
third-party tortfeasor which results in a
judgment for the insured, the judgment
would be given dispositive effect on the
issue of fault and the relative liabilities of
the insurance companies in the arbitration
proceedings,^orJt_js in the arbitration proceedings that the no-fault insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured. Because
the insurance company stands in privity
with its insured, principles of res judicata
and collateral estoppel dictate as much. In
cases which do not go to judgment because
of a settlement, the no-fault insurer and the
tortfeasor's insurer may be able to use the
settlement agreement and amount as a
guide in settling liability for the no-fault
payments. If no voluntary settlement is
recorded, the arbitration apparatus may be
used to settle the dispute. No doubt the
insurance companies will be able in most
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cases to settle the accounts between themselves without resort to formal proceedings.
This procedure comports with the language
and intent of § 31-41-11.
On the other hand, a construction of the
Act which subrogates the insurer to the
rights of the insured in a judicial proceeding would render meaningless the arbitration provisions of the Act, lead to insuperable practical difficulties in making an equitable allocation between the insurance company and its insured, and increased litigation and its attendant costs.
In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Barnes,
29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972), this
Court held that an insurer's claim under a
right of subrogation to a portion of the
proceeds from a settlement made by the
insured with a third-party tortfeasor was a
matter which had to be proved on a record
with evidence showing that the item of
damage sought to be recovered was in fact
included in the settlement sum. The court
stated that the insurer must:
present proof which establishes
that the damages covered by defendant's
settlement were the same or cover those
for which defendant has already received
indemnity from [insurer]; otherwise, the
receipt of payment from the tort-feasor
does not entitle the [insurer] to the return of the payments made by it. [29
Utah 2d at 106-07, 505 P.2d at 787.]
If the no-fault insurer were accorded a
right of subrogation in amounts recovered
in its insured's tort action against a thirdparty tortfeasor, insuperable problems
would arise. The most conspicuous problem
would arise with respect to the settlements
of an action by an insured against the tortfeasor and the allocation of the settlement
among the insured and his no-fault insurer.
Settlements are almost always compromises, and they are often negotiated on a
lump-sum basis without particular damage
items being dealt with individually. Reference to particular damage items may not be
made in the course of settlement discussions, and if each particular damage item is
discussed, the value, if any, accorded a particular damage item in the ultimate sum

P
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reached is often unascertainable. The problem is even more difficult when dealing
with a general verdict because it is impossible to determine what damage factors are
included in a general verdict. Because of
the failure to segregate and identify damage items, subrogation may not be an effective remedy to prevent double recovery on
the one hand, and to insure the victim the
full value of his lawsuit on the other.
These difficulties are avoided if the personal injury protection payments made to
the insured are not a recoverable damage
item in an action by the insured against the
tortfeasor—whether the action results in a
settlement or a judgment.
The interpretation of the Act adopted by
a majority of the Court has the further
merit of avoiding serious problems with respect to legal representation of the insured
and the insurance company. If the same
counsel represents both parties in settlement negotiations, conflicts of interest may
well arise in determining, for example,
whether or not to .settle a lawsuit or to
press for a larger recovery by way of a jury
verdict and, of course, run the risk of no
recovery at all. On the other hand, if both
the insurance company and the insured are
to be represented by independent counsel in
pressing the claim against the third-party
tortfeasor, conflict in many cases is likely.
In sum, the most effective and least costly way of dealing with the relative rights of
the insured and the no-fault insurer in a
recovery from a third party is to require
each party to pursue its own remedy. The
insured may sue for all damages less the
amount paid by the no-fault insurer. The
no-fault insurer has a right to protect its
interests in an arbitration proceeding if
that be necessary. To prevent double recovery, the no-fault amounts are not recoverable by the victim either in a settlement
or in a litigated judgment. This approach
will have the effect of reducing litigation,
attorney's fees, and the cost of automobile
accident insurance.
HALL, Justice (dissenting):
There is nothing about this case that warrants a departure from long-established

PQ

m

i t , t i i **~> M. A~X, A. *~d

JLJ.\KJ»

V/V>«

l^UU

Cite as, Utah, 606 P^d 1197

pnnciples of subrogation.
a iopting a
contrary view, the majority not only ignores the language of the Utah Automobile
No-Fault Act l which specifically preserves
subrogation rights, but also ignores the
recent unanimous ruling of this Court in
Jones v. Transamerica Insurance Co.}
wherein we specifically recognized that the
Act 3 preserved subrogation rights between
insurers whenever no-fault benefits are
paid.
The pure and simple facts of this case are
wholly supportive of the summary judgment appealed from. Ivie chose to compromise her claim against the tortfeasor by
accepting the sum of $44,000 in full settlement thereof. Prior to the settlement,
Travelers duly advised Ivie of its intention
to include Allstate on its settlement draft
and thereby satisfy its statutory obligation
to reimburse Allstate for its advance of
$7,394 in PIP payments. Indeed, at the
time of settlement, it issued a separate
draft for the exact sum of said PIP payments ($7,394), payable jointly to Ivie and
Allstate.
Travelers is not a party to this appeal and
Ivie makes no further claim against it, conceding that the only matter in dispute is her
entitlement to the said $7,394. Hence, for
this Court to award said sum to her and
then to cavalierly suggest that Travelers is
obligated to pay over an additional sum of
$7,394 to Allstate by way of reimbursement,
constitutes a grave injustice. Such a result
was not sought, nor even contemplated, by
the parties, least of all by Travelers, which
is not present to defend its interests.
Notwithstanding the assertion of the majority to the contrary, the net effect of its
holding is to afford Ivie a double recovery
of PIP payments at the unbargained for
expense of Travelers. In addition, it deprives Travelers of the benefit of its bargain struck with Ivie and increases its obligation from $44,000 to $51,394, by judicial
fiat.
1.

U.C.A., 1953, 3 1 - 4 1 - 1 , et seq.

2.

Utah. 592 P.2d 609 (1979).

3.

U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-11.

I have no p a r t i a l ^ LAA>rehension as to
the application of the new rule of law to
future cases since its practical, dollars and
cents effect would appear to be no different
than if the doctrine of subrogation were
adhered to. In a judicial proceeding, the
court will simply no longer make an award
for damages already compensated by PIP
payments, and, similarly, in negotiating a
settlement of a lawsuit, an insurer will no
doubt "short" his settlement offer by a sum
adequate to cover its reimbursement obligation for PIP payments advanced by the
insurer of the injured party.
On the other hand, applying the new rule
of law in the present case causes me considerable concern for it effects a highly
unjust and harsh result. The majority
would be better advised to abide by the
so-called "Sunburst Doctrine"4 and thereby
make the change in the law prospective
only.
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (supplemental
dissent):
I join in Justice Hall's dissent and would
affirm the decision of the trial court.
The main objective of insurance is to
provide a fair and honest recoupment of
losses suffered, and not to provide a basis
for parlaying the loss into a double recovery
for all or part of the damages thus suffered.
The purpose of the No-Fault Insurance
Act is to effectuate a more efficient method
of handling minor claims arising from automobile accidents which do not involve great
amounts of damages; and to provide a
means for the prompt payment of certain
minimal losses without regard to fault and
thus without litigation, in order to effectuate certain savings in the rising costs of
automobile accident insurance.1 It should
be realized that if the double recovery per4.

Laid down in the case of Great Northern
Ry.
Co. v. Sunburst Oil Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct.
145, 77 L.Ed. 360, cited in Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389.

1.

See statements in Sec. 3 1 - 4 1 - 2 . U.C.A.1953.
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mitted by the main opinion is allowed, it
could not do other than increase, rather
than decrease, the total costs of insurance.
It requires little reflection to see that the
majority decision results in an injustice to
defendant Travelers. In treating a similar
situation in the case of Transamerica Ins.
Co. v. Barnes,2 this Court stated that "If
the settlement were intended to include
plaintiff's prior medical expenses, two
drafts should have been issued, one to plaintiff and defendant jointly and one to defendant alone." 3 That is the exact procedure followed by Travelers in this instance.
It cannot fairly be questioned that the negotiations between Mrs. Ivie and Travelers
were made in awareness that Travelers was
obligated to reimburse Allstate for the
$7,394 PIP payments which Mrs. Ivie had
already received; nor that she agreed to
accept $44,000 from Travelers to discharge
its total liability. This is confirmed by two
facts: first, Travelers' policy limit was $50,000; and it would make no sense to agree
to pay $44,000, plus the obligation to reimburse Allstate for the $7,394 PIP payments,
which would thus exceed Travelers' policy
limits. Second, by the fact that Travelers
issued the two separate drafts, one for the
$7,394 payable to Allstate and Mrs. Ivie and
the other for $36,606 to Mrs. Ivie, just as
this Court directed in the Barnes case, supra.
Under the facts as they appear in this
case, it is discordant to my ideas of law and
justice to require Travelers to pay the $44,000 to satisfy the claims of Mrs. Ivie and of
Allstate, then also be required to pay the
$7,394 to Allstate to reimburse it for that
portion Allstate had already paid of Mrs.
Ivie's damages. That plainly and simply
results in injustice: it increases Travelers'
obligation by $7,394 more than it agreed to
pay; and it allows Mrs. Ivie double recovery
by awarding her that much more than she
had agreed to accept.

parties had negotiated their settlement
with an understanding that Travelers was
to reimburse Allstate for the PIP benefits it
had paid, and that any settlement arrived
at was in addition thereto, no unfairness or
injustice would result. But that does not
appear to be the facts here. If such an
understanding is to be the condition of negotiations, it should be so understood by the
parties, and effective on only a prospective
basis by applying the "Sunburst Doctrine,"
referred to by Justice Hall.
HALL, J., also concurs in the supplemental dissent of CROCKETT, C. J.

ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE,
Defendant and Respondent
No. 16080.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 8, 1980.

There would seem to be no problem with
the proposition espoused in the main opinion if the facts had been different. If the

Commercial automobile liability policy
insurer brought declaratory judgment action to determine extent of liability incurred by it and by comprehensive general
liability policy insurer arising out of the
death of employee of construction company
and each party also sought declaration that
coverage afforded by policy of other was
primary coverage.
The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J.,
granted comprehensive policy insurer's motion for summary judgment and adjudged
that policy issued by plaintiff provided primary coverage, and plaintiff appealed. The

2. 29 Utah 2d 101. 505 P.2d 783 (1972).

3. Id at 787
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rogation, and the insured
e. titled to be
made whole before the insurer is entitled to
any portion of the recovery from the tortfeasor. Ivie argued she sustained severe
injuries and was compelled to settle for a
sum totally inadequate to compensate her
for the total damages sustained. According
to her argument, to prevail Allstate must
prove it has a greater equity than Ivie,
which, in effect, would require proof Ivie
had received double payment for her medical expenses. 1

These laws are of two cypes: first, the
add-on statutes; and second, the partial
tort exemption statutes. The add-on statutes merely add to the negligence system of
reparations with some kind of no-fault benefits to an injured person, without regard to
fault. All tort claims are preserved under
these statutes, although some provide for
subrogation or offset to avoid jiouhie recovery for an jtem of loss. These add-on laws
are not regarded as true "no-fault" legislation.

Ivie further urged, if Allstate were entitled to its subrogation claim, it should contribute to the costs and attorney's fees incurred by Ivie in collecting the claim. Ivie
cites the principle that in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary as set forth by
the terms in a policy of insurance, the insured, who is successful in the recovery of
funds which include money payable by the
insured to an insurance company, is entitled
to deduct attorney fees and other expenses
reasonably and necessarily incurred in making such a recovery from the amount payable to the insurance company.2

The true "no-fault" insurance is a type of
compensation system which couples the
payment of benefits on a no-fault basis
with the partial elimination of fault-based
tort actions for both economic losses and
pain and suffering. This system generally
continues to permit fault-based claims for
pain and suffering in the more serious cases
and for economic losses above no-fault benefits. A system which has no tort exemption at all is not a "no-fault" insurance.
The Utah no-fault statute is a compulsory,
partial tort exemption law coupling nofault insurance benefits, Section 6, with a
partial elimination t>f tort claims for bodily
injury.

The trial court granted Allstate's motion
for summary judgment. Specifically, the
court granted Allstate judgment against
Ivie and Travelers jointly and severally in
the sum of $7,394.00. The court declared
Travelers was bound by the provisions of
Section 31-41-11, and Ivie was not entitled
to an attorney's fee from Allstate.

Section 2 of the act provides:
The purpose of this act is to require the
payment of certain prescribed benefits in
respect to motor vehicle accidents
through either insurance or other approved security, but on the basis of no
fault, preserving, however, the right of
an injured person to pursue the customary tort claims where the most serious
type of injuries occur
(1) No person for whom direct benefit coverage is provided for in this act
shall be allowed to maintain a cause of
action for general damages arising out
of personal injuries alleged to have
been caused by an automobile accident
except where there has been caused by
this accident any one or more of the
following:

To resolve the issues between the parties,
it is essential to construe Section 31-41-11;
however, this section cannot be construed in
isolation, but must be correlated with other
pertinent provisions in Chapter 41 of Title
31, Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance
Act. As an aid to the proper construction
of this act, reference to an article by Robert
E. Keeton in the 1973 Utah Law Review is
beneficial, Compensation
Systems
and
Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973 ULR 383.
Therein, it is explained that twenty-one
states have enacted "no-fault" legislation.
1.

Transamerica Insurance Company v. Barnes,
29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972); Lyon v.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 25
Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971).

2.

Scare Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance
Company v. Clinton, 267 Or. 653, 518 P.2d 645
(1974).
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rogation, and the insurec
*/ jtled to be
made whole before the insurer is entitled to
any portion of the recovery from the tortfeasor. Ivie argued she sustained severe
injuries and was compelled to settle for a
sum totally inadequate to compensate her
for the total damages sustained. According
to her argument, to prevail Allstate must
prove it has a greater equity than Ivie,
which, in effect, would require proof Ivie
had received double payment for her medical expenses.1

These laws are oi vWo types: first, the
add-on statutes; and second, the partial
tort exemption statutes. The add-on statutes merely add to the negligence system of
reparations with some kind of no-fault benefits to an injured person, without regard to
fault. All tort claims are preserved under
these statutes, although some provide for
subrogation or offset to avoid jiauble recovery for an item of loss. These add-on laws
are not regarded as true "no-fault" legislation.

Ivie further urged, if Allstate were entitled to its subrogation claim, it should contribute to the costs and attorney's fees incurred by Ivie in collecting the claim. Ivie
cites the principle that in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary as set forth by
the terms in a policy of insurance, the insured, who is successful in the recovery of
funds which include money payable by the
insured to an insurance company, is entitled
to deduct attorney fees and other expenses
reasonably and necessarily incurred in making such a recovery from the amount payable to the insurance company.2

The true "no-fault" insurance is a type of
compensation system which couples the
payment of benefits on a no-fault basis
with the partial elimination of fault-based
tort actions for both economic losses and
pain and suffering. This system generally
continues to permit fault-based claims for
pain and suffering in the more serious cases
and for economic losses above no-fault benefits. A system which has no tort exemption at all is not a "no-fault" insurance.
The Utah no-fault statute is a compulsory,
partial tort exemption law coupling nofault insurance benefits, Section 6, with a
partial elimination t>f tort claims for bodily
injury.

The trial court granted Allstate's motion
for summary judgment. Specifically, the
court granted Allstate judgment against
Ivie and Travelers jointly and severally in
the sum of $7,394.00. The court declared
Travelers was bound by the provisions of
Section 31-41-11, and Ivie was not entitled
to an attorney's fee from Allstate.

Section 2 of the act provides:
The purpose of this act is to require the
payment of certain prescribed benefits in
respect to motor vehicle accidents
through either insurance or other approved security, but on the basis of no
fault, preserving, however, the right of
an injured person to pursue the customary tort claims where the most serious
type of injuries occur
(1) No person for whom direct benefit coverage is provided for in this act
shall be allowed to maintain a cause of
action for general damages arising out
oi personal injuries alleged to have
been caused by an automobile accident
except where there has been caused by
this accident any one or more of the
following:

To resolve the issues between the parties,
it is essential to construe Section 31-41-11;
however, this section cannot be construed in
isolation, but must be correlated with other
pertinent provisions in Chapter 41 of Title
31, Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance
Act. As an aid to the proper construction
of this act, reference to an article by Robert
E. Keeton in the 1973 Utah Law Review is
beneficial, Compensation Systems
and
Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973 ULR 383.
Therein, it is explained that twenty-one
states have enacted "no-fault" legislation.
1.
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29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972); Lyon v.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 25
Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971).

2.

Stare Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance
Company v. Clinton, 267 Or. 653. 518 P.2d 645
(1974).
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Wayne BECK, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 18926.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 12, 1985.
Insured brought action against insurer
for alleged bad-faith refusal to settle a
claim for insured motorist benefits. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Philip P. Fishier, J., entered summary judgment for insurer, and insured appealed.
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held
that: (1) in a first-party relationship between an insurer and its insured, the duties
and obligations of the parties are contractual rather than fiduciary in nature and,
without more, a breach of those implied or
express duties can give rise only to a cause
of action in contract, not one in tort, and (2)
question whether insurer breached its duty
of good faith in rejecting insured's claim
for uninsured motorist benefits without explanation and in failing to further investigate matter, such that insured was damaged when it was forced to accept settlement offered by insurer because of financial pressure caused by delay in resolving
matter, was question of fact precluding
summary judgment on contractual theory
of failure to fulfill implied contractual duty
to deal in good faith.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Insurance <3=>602.1
The good-faith duty to bargain or settle under an insurance contract is only one
aspect of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing implied in all contracts and is a
duty which upon violation may give rise to
a claim for breach of contract
2. Insurance <£=>602.2(1)
Refusal to bargain or settle under an
insurance contract may, standing alone, be

sufficient to prove a breach under appropriate circumstances.
3. Insurance <2=>602.1
Practical end of providing a strong incentive for insurers to fulfill their contractual obligations to their insureds can be
accomplished as well through a contract
cause of action upon a failure to bargain in
good faith without analytical straining necessitated by the tort approach and with
far less potential for unforeseen consequences to the law of contracts.
4. Insurance e=*602.1
A tort cause of action does not arise in
a first-party insurance contract situation by
reason of a failure to bargain in good faith
because the relationship between the insurer and its insured is fundamentally different than in a third-party context.
5. Insurance <3=»602.1
In a first-party relationship between an
insurer and its insured, the duties and obligations of the parties are contractual rather than fiduciary in nature and, without
more, a breach of those implied or express
duties can give rise only to a cause of
action in contract, not one in tort,
6. Insurance <3=>156(1)
As parties to a contract, the insured
and the insurer have parallel obligations to
perform the contract in good faith, obligations that inhere in every contractual
relationship.
7. Insurance <^563
The implied contractual obligation of
good-faith performance contemplates, at
the very least, that the insurer will diligently investigate these acts to enable it to
determine whether a claim filed by its insured is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim,
and will thereafter act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim,
and also requires the insurer to deal with
laymen as laymen and not as experts in the
subtleties of law and underwriting and to
refrain from actions that will injure the
insured's ability to obtain the benefits of
the contract.
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8. Insurance <£=>602.2(1)
Performance of the implied contractual
obligation of good faith is the essence of
Vhat "One msrarer Yias "bargained and paid
for and, if breached, will render insurer
liable for damages suffered in consequence
thereof
9. Insurance <3=>602.10(1)
Damages recoverable against an insurer for breach of its implied contractual
obligation of good faith toward insured include both general damages, those flowing
naturally from breach, and consequential
damages, those reasonably within contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by,
parties at time contract was made
10. Insurance <3=602.10(1)
In an action against an insurer for
breach of a duty to bargain m good faith,
given that insured frequently faces catastrophic consequences if funds are not
available within a reasonable period of time
to cover an insured loss, damages for a loss
well m excess of policy limits, such as for a
home or a business, may be foreseeable
and provable
11. Damages <s=56.10
In unusual cases concerned with an
insurer's breach of a duty to bargain in
good faith, damages for mental anguish to
insured might be provable, but foreseeabillty of any such damages will always hmge
upon nature and language of contract and
reasonable expectations of parties
12. Judgment <®=*181(23)
Question whether insurer breached its
claim for uninsured motorist benefits without explanation and in failing to further
investigate matter, such that insured was
damaged when it was forced to accept settlement offered by insurer because of financial pressure caused by delay in resolving matter, was question of fact precluding
summary judgment on contractual theory
of failure to fulfill implied contractual duty
to deal in good faith

Robert J Debry, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant
Don J Hanson, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent
ZIMMERMAN, Justice
Plaintiff Wayne Beck appeals from a
summary judgment dismissing his claim
against Farmers Insurance Exchange, his
automobile insurance carrier, alleging that
Farmers had refused m bad faith to settle
a claim for uninsured motorist benefits
We hold that on the record before us, Beck
Stated a claim for relief and a summary
judgment was inappropriate We reverse
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Beck injured his knee in a hit-and-run
accident on January 16, 1982, when his car
was struck by a car owned by Ann Kirkland Ms Kirkland asserted that her car
of or responsibility for the accident Beck
filed a claim with Kirkland's insurer, but
liability was denied on April 20, 1982.
At the time of the accident, Beck earned
automobile insurance with Farmers Under that policy, Beck was provided with
both no-fault and uninsured motorist insurance benefits On February 23, 1982, while
his claim against Kirkland was pending,
Beck filed a claim with Farmers for nofault benefits Sometime prior to May 26,
1982, Farmers paid Beck $5,000 for medical
expenses (the no-fault policy limit) and
$1,299 43 for lost wages.
On June 23, 1982, Beck's counsel filed a
claim with Farmers for uninsured motorist
benefits, demanding the policy limit, $20,000, for general damages suffered as a
result of the accident His counsel alleges
that the brochure documenting Beck's damages, submitted to Farmers with the June
23rd settlement offer, established that his
claim was worth substantially more than
$20,000 Farmers' adjuster rejected the
settlement offer without explanation on
July 1, 1982
Beck filed this lawsuit one month later,
on August 2, 1982, alleging three causes of
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action: first, that by refusing to pay his
uninsured motorist claim, Farmers had
breached its contract of insurance with
him; second, that by acting in bad faith in
refusing to investigate the claim, bargain
with Beck, or settle the claim, Farmers had
breached an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; and third, that Farmers
had acted oppressively and maliciously toward Beck with the intention of, or in reckless disregard of the likelihood of, causing
emotional distress. Under the first claim,
Beck sought damages for breach of contract in the amount of the policy limits;
under the second, he asked for compensatory damages in excess of the policy limits
for additional injuries, including mental anguish; and under the third, he sought punitive damages of $500,000.
Sometime in August of 1982, Beck's
counsel contacted Farmers' counsel and offered to settle the whole matter for $20,000. This offer was rejected. Farmers
filed an answer on September 1, 1982, and
at the same time, moved to strike the prayer for punitive damages on the ground that
they were unavailable for a breach of contract. Farmers' motion was granted. On
September 29th, the trial court bifurcated
the case and agreed to try the claim for
failure to pay uninsured motorist benefits
independent of Beck's claim alleging
breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
Immediately after the trial judge bifurcated the case, Beck's counsel expressly
revoked the previously rejected offer to
settle the whole matter for $20,000. Instead, Beck offered to settle only the failure to pay the uninsured motorist benefits
claim for $20,000, reserving the implied
covenant or "bad faith" claim for separate
resolution.
On October 20, 1982, Farmers apparently
counteroffered. Negotiations proceeded,
and sometime in late November, the parties
agreed to settle the uninsured motorist
claim for $15,000. On December 6, 1982,
the parties stipulated to dismissal of that
claim and specifically reserved the bad
faith claim for later disposition.

In mid-December, Farmers moved to dismiss the reserved bad faith claim on two
theories. First, Farmers asserted that under Lyon v, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739
(1971), it "had no duty to bargain with or
settle plaintiffs uninsured motorist claim
and, therefore, [could not] be held liable"
for breach of contract or bad faith. Second, Farmers argued that even if it had
some duty to bargain or to settle the claim,
the facts set forth in the pleadings on file
did not establish that it had breached the
duty. No memoranda or factual affidavits
supported this motion.
Farmers' motion was opposed by affidavits of Beck, his counsel, and a former
insurance adjuster who worked for Beck's
counsel as a paralegal. In his affidavit,
Beck's counsel recited the dates and terms
of the various settlement offers and the
fact that they had been rejected without
counteroffer. Beck's affidavit stated that
he had accepted the $15,000 offer only because of financial pressures caused by the
substantial expenses he had incurred in the
ten months since the accident. The paralegal's affidavit stated that he had been an
insurance adjuster for 19 years and that he
had reviewed the settlement documentation
submitted to Farmers in June when the
claim was first filed. He expressed the
opinion that a reasonable and prudent insurance company would have valued the
claim at between $30,000 and $40,000 and
attempted to settle the matter within
weeks after the initial offer. The paralegal
charged that the "only reason for such a
substantial delay in settling this claim
would be to put Mr. Beck in a situation of
financial need and stress so that he would
accept the first settlement offer," a tactic
he characterized as acting in bad faith.
Farmers filed no rebuttal affidavits, and
the trial court granted Farmers' motion
without specifying the basis for its holding.
Beck asks this Court to overrule Lyon
and permit an insured to sue for an insurer's bad faith refusal to bargain or settle.
He points out that many states now allow a
tort action for breach of an insurer's duty
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to deal fairly and in good faith with its
insured. Assuming that we abandon Lyon,
Beck argues that the affidavits submitted
m oggositioa 6a Farmers' motion for summary judgment were sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Farmers breached an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.
Farmers does not now contend, as it did
below, that it had no duty to bargain or
settle. Instead, it argues that under Lyon,
an insurer cannot be held liable for bad
faith simply because it refused to bargain
or to settle a claim; rather, it argues, to
sustain such a claim a plaintiff must produce evidence of bad faith wholly apart
from the "mere failure" to bargain or settle.
Our ruling in Lyon left an insured without any effective remedy against an insurer that refuses to bargain or settle in good
faith with the insured. An insured who
has suffered a loss and is pressed financially is at a marked disadvantage when bargaining with an insurer over payment for
that loss. Failure to accept a proffered
settlement, although less than fair, can
lead to catastrophic consequences for an
insured who, as a direct consequence of the
loss, may be peculiarly vulnerable, both
economically and emotionally. The temptation for an insurer to delay settlement
while pressures build on the insured is
great, especially if the insurer's exposure
cannot exceed the policy limits. See Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance
Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576, 579 (1978);
Harvey & Wiseman, First Party Bad
Faith: Common Law Remedies and a
Proposed Legislative Solution, 72 Ky.LJ.
141, 146, 167-69 (1983-84) (hereinafter cited as "First Party Bad Faith"); Note, The
Availability
of Excess Damages for
Wrongful Refusal to Honor First Party
1. The Court in Lyon considered only the question of whether a claim of bad faith gave rise to
a tort cause of action; however, to the extent
that Lyon is philosophically inconsistent with
our recognition today of a cause of action in
contract, it is overruled.
2. We use the term "first-party" to refer to an
insurance agreement where the insurer agrees

Insurance Claims—An Emerging Trend,
45 Fordham L.Rev. 164, 164-67 (Oct. 1976)
(hereinafter cited as "Availability of Excess
•Damages").
[1, 2] In light of these considerations,
tye now conclude that an insured should be
Provided with a remedy. However, we do
*lot agree with plaintiff that a tort action is
Appropriate. Instead, we hold that the
good faith duty to bargain or settle under
An insurance contract is only one aspect of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing
implied in all contracts and that a violation
of that duty gives rise to a claim for breach
of contract.1 In addition, we do not adopt
the limitation suggested by Farmers, but
hold that the refusal to bargain or settle,
standing alone, may, under appropriate circumstances, be sufficient to prove a
breach.
We recognize that a majority of states
Permit an insured to institute a tort action
Against an insurer who fails to bargain in
%ood faith in a "first-party" situation,2
Adopting the approach first announced by
the California Supreme Court in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 9 Cal.3d 566,
SlO P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.Rptr. 480 (1973).
See, e.g., Bibeault v. Hanover Insurance
Co., R.I., 417 A.2d 313 (1980); Craft v.
Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d
565 (7th Cir.1978) (applying Indiana law);
bfFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. Flint,
^enn., 574 S.W.2d 718 (1978). Apparently,
these courts have taken this step as a matter of policy in order to provide what they
Perceive to be an adequate remedy for an
kisured wronged by an insurer's recalcitrance. These courts have reasoned that
Under contract law principles, an insurer
tyho improperly refuses to settle a firstRarty claim may be liable only for damages
Measured by the maximum dollar amount
to pay claims submitted to it by the insured for
losses suffered by the insured. The present case
involves such a first-party situation. In contrast, a "third-party" situation is one where the
insurer contracts to defend the insured against
claims made by third parties against the insured
and to pay any resulting liability, up to the
specified dollar limit.
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of the insurance provided by the policy, and
such a damage measure provides little or
no incentive to an insurer to promptly and
faithfully fulfill its contractual obligations.
Accordingly, these courts have adopted a
tort approach in order to allow an insured
to recover extensive consequential and punitive damages, which they consider to be
unavailable in an action based solely on a
breach of contract. See Availability of
Excess Damages, supra, at 168-77; First
Party Bad Faith, supra, at 158.
[3] We conclude that the tort approach
adopted by these courts is without a sound
theoretical foundation and has the potential
for distorting well-established principles of
contract law. Moreover, the practical end
of providing a strong incentive for insurers
to fulfill their contractual obligations can
be accomplished as well through a contract
cause of action, without the analytical
straining necessitated by the tort approach
and with far less potential for unforeseen
consequences to the law of contracts.
The analytical weaknesses of the tort
approach are easily seen. In Gruenberg,
the California court held that an insurer
has a duty to deal in good faith with its
insured and that an insured can bring an
action in tort, rather than contract, for
breach of that duty because the duty is
imposed by law and, being nonconsensual,
does not arise out of the contract Glossing over any distinctions between first- and
third-party situations, the court concluded
that the duty imposed upon the insurer
when bargaining with its insured in a firstparty situation is merely another aspect of
the fiduciary duty owed in the third-party
context. Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance
Co., 9 Cal.3d at 573-74, 510 P.2d at 1037,
108 Cal.Rptr. at 485.
Although this Court, in Ammerman v.
Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 19 Utah 2d
261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967), recognized a tort
cause of action for breach of an insurer's
obligation to bargain in a third-party context, we cannot agree with the Gruenberg
court that the considerations which compel
the recognition of a tort cause of action in
a third-party context are present in the

first-party situation. In Ammerman, we
stated that because a third-party insurance
contract obligates the insurer to defend the
insured, the insurer incurs a fiduciary duty
to its insured to protect the insured's interests as zealously as it would its own; consequently, a tort cause of action is recognized to remedy a violation of that duty.
19 Utah 2d at 265-66, 430 P.2d at 578-79.
[4] However, in Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indeinnity Co., we held that a
tort cause of action did not arise in a firstparty insurance contract situation because
the relationship between the insurer and its
insured is fundamentally different than in
a third-party context:
In the [third-party] situation, the insurer
must act in good faith and be as zealous
in protecting the interests of the insured
as it would be in regard to its own. In
the [first-party] situation, the insured
and the insurer are, in effect and practically speaking, adversaries.
25 Utah 2d at 319, 480 P.2d at 745 (citations omitted). See also Lawton v. Great
Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 392 A.2d at
580-81.
This distinction is of no small consequence. In a third-party situation, the insurer controls the disposition of claims
against its insured, who relinquishes any
right to negotiate on his own behalf.
Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co.,
572 F.2d at 569. An insurer's failure to act
in good faith exposes its insured to a judgment and personal liability in excess of the
policy limits. Santilli v. State Farm Life
Insurance Co., 278 Or. 53, 61-62, 562 P.2d
965, 969 (1977). In essence, the contract
itself creates a fiduciary relationship because of the trust and reliance placed in the
insurer by its insured. Cf Hal Taylor
Associates v. UnionAmerica, Inc., Utah,
657 P.2d 743, 748-49 (1982). The insured is
wholly dependent upon the insurer to see
that, in dealing with claims by third parties, the insured's best interests are protected. In addition, when dealing with
third parties, the insurer acts as an agent
for the insured with respect to the disputed
claim. Wholly apart from the contractual
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obligations undertaken by the parties, the
law imposes upon all agents a fiduciary
obligation to their principals with respect to
matters faffing wit/uh the scope of tfieir
agency. Id. at 748; see generally 3 Am.
Jur.2d Agency § 199 (1962).
In the first-party situation, on the other
hand, the reasons for finding a fiduciary
relationship and imposing a corresponding
duty are absent No relationship of trust
and reliance is created by the contract; it
simply obligates the insurer to pay claims
submitted by the insured in accordance
with the contract. Santilli v. State Farm
Life Insurance Co., 278 Or. at 61-62, 562
P.2d at 969. Furthermore, none of the
indicia of agency are present. See generally Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual Insurance Co., Mo.App., 665 S.W.2d 13, 1820 (1984).
Clearly, then, it is difficult to find a
theoretically sound basis for analogizing
the duty owed in a third-party context to
that owed in a first-party context And
wholly apart from any theoretical problems, tailoring the tort analysis to first-party insurance contract cases has proven difficult The pragmatic reason for adopting
the tort approach is that it exposes insurers
to consequential and punitive damages
awards in excess of the policy limits. However, the courts appear to have had difficulty in developing a sound rationale for limiting the tort approach to insurance contract
cases. This may be because there is no
sound theoretical difference between a
first-party insurance contract and any other contract, at least no difference that justifies permitting punitive damages for the
breach of one and not the other. In any
event, the tort approach and the accompa3. We recognize that in some cases the acts constituting a breach of contract may also result in
breaches of duty that are independent of the
contract and may give rise to causes of action in
tort. Hal Taylor Assoc, v. UnionAmerica, 657
P.2d at 750; Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Co., 392 A.2d at 580. For example, the law of
this state recognizes a duty to refrain from intentionally causing severe emotional distress to
others. Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358
P.2d 344 (1961). Thus, intentional and outrageous conduct by an insurer against an insured, coupled with a failure to bargain, could

nying punitive damages have moved rather
quickly into areas far afield from insurance. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying
Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36
Cal.3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166-67. 206
Cal.Rptr. 354, 362-63 (1984); Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal.App.3d 1109, 207
Cal.Rptr. 123, 127-29 (1984); Gates v. Life
of Montana Insurance Co., Mont, 668
P.2d 213, 214-16 (1983).
Furthermore, the courts adopting the
tort approach have had some difficulty in
determining what degree of bad faith is
necessary to sustain a claim. E.g., Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co., 85
Wis.2d 675, 692-94, 271 N.W.2d 368, 37677 (1978). From a practical standpoint, the
state of mind of the insurer is irrelevant;
even an inadvertent breach of the covenant
of good faith implied in an insurance contract can substantially harm the insured
ana7 warrants a remecfy.
[5,6] We therefore hold that in a firstparty relationship between an insurer and
its insured, the duties and obligations of
the parties are contractual rather than fiduciary. Without more, a breach of those
implied or express duties can give rise only
to a cause of action in contract, not one in
tort.3 This position has not been widely
adopted by other courts, although a "respectable body of authority,, is developing.
See Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual
Insurance Co., 665 S.W.2d at 18-19, and
cases cited therein; Lawton v. Great
Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 118 N.H.
607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 409
Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980); Availconceivably result in tort liability independent
of (and concurrent with) liability for breach of
contract. Additionally, the facts that give rise to
a breach of the duty to bargain in good faith
could also amount to fraudulent activity, rendering an insurer independently liable for damages flowing from the fraud. See Wetherbee v.
United Ins. Co., 265 Cal.App.2d 921, 71 Cal.Rptr.
764 (1968). Also, under various unfair practices
acts, there may be statutory requirements that
give rise to independent causes of action. E.g.,
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 31-27-1 to -24.
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ability of Excess Damages, supra p. 4, at
168-71. We further hold that as parties to
a contract, the insured and the insurer have
parallel obligations to perform the contract
in good faith, obligations that inhere in
every contractual relationship.
State
Automobile & Casualty Underwriters v.
Salisbury, 27 Utah 2d 229, 232, 494 P.2d
529, 531 (1972); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, Utah, 657 P.2d 293, 306
(1982).4
[7,8] Few cases define the implied contractual obligation to perform a first-party
insurance contract in good faith. However, because the considerations are similar, we freely look to the tort cases that
have described the incidents of the duty of
good faith in the context of first-party insurance contracts. From those cases and
from our own analysis of the obligations
undertaken by the parties, we conclude
that the implied obligation of good faith
performance contemplates, at the very
least, that the insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it to determine
whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate
the claim, and will thereafter act promptly
and reasonably in rejecting or settling the
claim. See Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co., 85 Wis.2d at 692-93, 271
N.W.2d at 377; Egan v. Mutual of Omaha
Insurance Co., 24 Cal.3d 809, 818-19, 620
P.2d 141, 145-46, 169 Cal.Rptr. 691, 695-96
(1979). The duty of good faith also requires the insurer to "deal with laymen as
laymen and not as experts in the subtleties
of law and underwriting" and to refrain
from actions that will injure the insured's
ability to obtain the benefits of the contract. MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Flint, 574 S.W.2d at 720, quoting Merchants Indemnity Corp. v. Eggleston, 37
N.J. 114, 122, 179 A.2d 505, 509 (1962);
accord Bowler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co,,
53 N.J. 313, 327, 250 A.2d 580, 587 (1969).
These performances are the essence of
what the insured has bargained and paid
4. The duty to perform the contract in good faith
cannot, by definition, be waived by either party
to the agreement.

for, and
perform
breached
suffered

the insurer has the obligation to
them. When an insurer has
this duty, it is liable for damages
in consequence of that breach.

In adopting the contract approach, we
are not ignoring the principal reason for
the adoption of the tort approach—to provide damage exposure in excess of the policy limits and thus remove any incentive for
breaching the duty of good faith. Despite
what some courts have suggested, e.g.,
Santilli v. State Farm Insurance Co., 562
P.2d at 969, and what some commentators
have asserted, e.g., J. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 8878.15 at 424-26
(1981), there is no reason to limit damages
recoverable for breach of a duty to investigate, bargain, and settle claims in good
faith to the amount specified in the insurance policy.5 Nothing inherent in the contract law approach mandates this narrow
definition of recoverable damages. Although the policy limits define the amount
for which the insurer may be held responsible in performing the contract, they do
not define the amount for which it may be
liable upon a breach. Lawton v. Great
Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 392 A.2d at
579.
[9] Damages recoverable for breach of
contract include both general damages, i.e.,
those flowing naturally from the breach,
and consequential damages, i.e., those reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the
time the contract was made. Pacific Coast
Title Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 379, 325
P.2d 906, 907 (1958), citing Hadley v. Boxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng.Rep. 145
(1854). We have repeatedly recognized
that consequential damages for breach of
contract may reach beyond the bare contract terms. See, e.g., Pacific Coast Title
Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident &
Idemnity, 7 Utah 2d at 379, 325 P.2d at 908
5. In Ammerman, we suggested in dicta that in
an action for breach of an insurance policy, the
damages could not exceed the policy limits. 19
Utah 2d at 264, 430 P.2d at 578. We expressly
disavow this dicta.
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(attorney fees incurred for settling and defending claims were foreseeable result of
contractor's default); Bevan v. J.H. Construction Co., Utah, 669 P.2d 442, 444
(1983) (home purchasers entitled to damages for loss of favorable mortgage interest rate resulting from builder's breach of
contract).
[10,11] In an action for breach of a
duty to bargain in good faith, a broad
range of recoverable damages is conceivable, particularly given the unique nature
and purpose of an insurance contract. An
insured frequently faces catastrophic consequences if funds are not available within
a reasonable period of time to cover an
insured loss; damages for losses well in
excess of the policy limits, such as for a
home or a business, may therefore be foreseeable and provable. See, e.g., Reichert v.
General Insurance Co., 59 Cal.Rptr. 724,
728, 428 P.2d 860, 864 (1967), vacated on
other grounds, 68 Cal.2d 822, 442 P.2d 377,
69 Cal.Rptr. 321 (1968) (because bankruptcy was a foreseeable consequence of fire
insurer's failure to pay, insurer was liable
for consequential damages flowing from
bankruptcy). Furthermore, it is axiomatic
that insurance frequently is purchased not
only to provide funds in case of loss, but to
provide peace of mind for the insured or his
beneficiaries. Therefore, although other
courts adopting the contract approach have
been reluctant to allow such an award,
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co.f 392 A.2d at 581-82, we find no
difficulty with the proposition that, in unusual cases, damages for mental anguish
might be provable.6 See Kewin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 409
Mich, at 440-55, 295 N.W.2d at 64-72 (Williams, J., dissenting); cf. Lambert v. Sine,
123 Utah 145, 150, 256 P.2d 241, 244 (1953).
The foreseeability of any such damages
will always hinge upon the nature and language of the contract and the reasonable
expectations of the parties. J. Calamari &
6. Clearly, damages will not be available for the
mere disappointment, frustration, or anxiety
normally experienced in the process of filing an

J. Perillo, Contracts § 14-5 at 523-25 (2d
ed. 1977).
With the foregoing principles in mind, we
return to a consideration of the present
case. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the insurer in the face of
affidavits of the insured, his counsel, and a
paralegal who had been an adjuster for
many years. In the absence of any responsive affidavits, we take the assertions of
the affidavits as true and view all unexplained facts in a light most favorable to
Beck. It appears that the insurer was
served with Beck's claim on June 23, 1982.
On July 1st, the claim was rejected without
explanation and without any request for
additional facts. The insured heard nothing more from the insurer until after August 2d, when this suit was filed. The
affidavits state that the insured accepted
the settlement offered by the insurer in
late October because of the financial pressure caused by the delay in resolving the
matter. The affidavits also offer the opinion of the expert adjuster turned paralegal
that the delay was in bad faith.
From January until late June, Beck was
apparently negotiating with the car owner's carrier and not with Farmers, for no
claim was filed with Fanners until June
23rd. Therefore, none of the delay between January and June 23rd can be attributed to Farmers. The unexplained delay
thereafter, however, together with a flat
rejection of plaintiffs offer, provides a factual basis for this cause of action sufficient
to withstand summary judgment. Farmers
had an obligation to diligently investigate
and evaluate Beck's claim. It rejected the
claim in one week, and we must infer that
the insurer did nothing to investigate or
evaluate the claim during the following
month.
[12] Under these circumstances and resolving all doubts in Beck's favor, we cannot say that a jury could not find that
Farmers breached its duty of good faith in
rejecting Beck's claim without explanation
insurance claim and negotiating a settlement
with an insurer.
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and in failing to further investigate the
matter. Therefore, we remand the matter
to the trial court for further proceedings.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, J J , concur.

Claron D. BAILEY, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 18961.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 19, 1985.
Assignee of second deed of trust filed
action requesting that he be awarded excess sale proceeds over amount due holder
of first deed of trust The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J., found for assignee, and holder of
first deed of trust appealed. The Supreme
Court, Durham, J., held that affidavit of
attorney representing assignee of second
deed of trust establishing that bankruptcy
judge dismissed assignee's complaint seeking to stay trustee's sale because of secured claims on debtor's property and because bankruptcy court had no interest in
funds, and that bankruptcy judge had earlier favorably responded to statement that
assignee would prefer to go to state court,
demonstrated that bankruptcy court did
not make adjudication on merits, and thus,
bankruptcy court's dismissal was not res
judicata so as to bar state court action by
assignee seeking to recover excess sale
proceeds over amount due holder of first
deed of trust.

Affirmed.
Stewart, J., concurred in result.
1. Appeal and Error <3=>204(4)
In action brought by assignee of second deed of trust seeking to be awarded
excess sale proceeds over amount due holder of first deed of trust, holder of first
deed of trust, by failing to interpose any
objection at trial to use of affidavit of
plaintiffs attorney, waived objection on basis of allegation that such affidavit was
hearsay, and could not raise such issue for
first time on appeal.
2. Judgment <&=>654
Finding that court does not have jurisdiction is not the sort of adjudication that
can serve as basis for res judicata on merits.
3. Judgment <s=>829(3)
Affidavit of attorney representing assignee of second deed of trust establishing
that bankruptcy judge dismissed assignee's
complaint seeking to stay trustee's sale
because of secured claims on debtor's property and because bankruptcy court had no
interest in funds, and that bankruptcy
judge had earlier favorably responded to
statement that assignee would prefer to go
to state court, demonstrated that bankruptcy court did not make adjudication on merits, and thus, bankruptcy court's dismissal
was not res judicata so as to bar state
court action by assignee seeking to recover
excess sale proceeds over amount due holder of first deed of trust.
Edward M. Garrett, Joseph E. Hatch,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
J. Steven Newton, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent.
DURHAM, Justice:
The plaintiff, a mechanic's lien holder
and assignee of a second position trust
deed, filed a complaint with the federal
bankruptcy court asking the court to stay a
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David Allen BENNION, Donald Dean
Bennion, and Dennis Layne
Bennion, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v,
Lloyd HANSEN and John J. Van Leeuwen, as Trustees of the Grover A. Hansen Trust, Defendants and Respondents.
No, 18925.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 5, 1985.
Grandchildren sued trustees seeking to
enforce terms of declaration of trust executed by their grandfather. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Scott Daniels, J., entered judgment in favor of trustees, and grandchildren appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: (1)
trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying trial to grandchildren whose only
excuse for failure to file jury demand on
time was that deadline for filing notice fell
on Sunday, and where notice was filed on
following Tuesday, four days late, and (2)
trial court's findings had adequate evidentiary support.
Affirmed.
1. Jury e=>25(6)
To avail oneself of right to jury trial,
one's demand must be timely and in accordance with applicable rule or statute.
Const. Art. 1, § 10.
2. Jury <&=>25(6)
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying jury trial to plaintiffs whose
only excuse for failure to file jury demand
on time was that deadline for filing notice
fell on Sunday, and where notice was filed
on following Tuesday, four days late.
Const. Art. 1, § 10.
3. Appeal and Error <S=>1010.1(6)
On appeal, findings of trial court will
not be disturbed unless there is no substantial record evidence to support them.

4. Appeal and Error <3=>931(1)
l n reviewing evidence, Supreme Court
views it in light most favorable to trial
court.
5. Trusts <S=>37V2
Creation of a trust requires delivery of
property into the trust.
t. D: jds <3=>56(2, 3)
Delivery of deed requires that grantor
either relinquish physical control of deed or
have present intent to permanently divest
himself of title to the property.
7. Trusts <&=>372(1)
Party challenging validity of delivery
bears burden of proof; where grantor retains possession of or the right to recall
deed, burden shifts to party claiming under
deed.
8. Trusts <s=*372(3)
Ample evidence supported trial court's
finding that grandchildren who sued trustee seeking to enforce terms of declaration
of trust as executed by their grandfather
did not meet their burden of proving that
their grandfather placed the deed and trust
declaration in a safety deposit box in 1972
with intention of relinquishing control over
both documents, and thus that there had
been no delivery as required for creation of
trust, prior to amendment.
9. Trial ®=>403
Until a court files its findings of fact,
no decision has been rendered or final ruling made.
10. Judges <s=>24
Any judge is free to change his or her
mind on the outcome of a case until a
decision is formally rendered.

James A. Mcintosh, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs and appellants.
Craig G. Adamson, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and respondents.
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ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
This is an appeal from a judgment affirming the disposition of an estate in accordance with an amended trust instrument. The appellants seek reversal on
grounds that the trust instrument, which
by its terms was irrevocable and unamendable, took effect before it was amended
and, therefore, the amendment should have
been ignored. We affirm the trial court.

modified by the 1974 amendment The
court granted judgment for the defendants.
In this Court, the Bennion brothers seek
reversal, claiming that the trial court erred
in denying their request for a jury, that the
1974 amendment was ineffective because in
1972 there was valid delivery of both the
declaration of irrevocable trust and a deed
conveying the condominium into the trust,
and that the trial court erred when it entered findings and conclusions inconsistent
with its own earlier oral statements.

Plaintiffs Layne, David, and Donald
Bennion ("the Bennion brothers") sued
Lloyd Hansen and John Van Leeuwen in
their capacities as trustees of the Grover
A. Hansen Trust, seeking to enforce the
terms of a 1972 declaration of trust executed by their grandfather, Grover A. Hansen. Under the terms of the 1972 declaration, plaintiffs were to receive approximately one-third of Mr. Hansen's estate on the
death of their mother, Mr. Hansen's daughter. The estate consisted almost entirely
of a condominium and its furnishings.
Rather than following the 1972 instrument's provisions, upon the death of the
Bennion brothers' mother, the trustees distributed the estate in accordance with the
terms of a 1974 amendment to the 1972
declaration of trust. This amendment reduced the brothers' share of the estate to
the lump sum of $4,500 to be shared equally among them.

[1] The facts with respect to the brothers' first claim are simple. They filed a
request for a jury eight days before the
trial date. Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Practice in the district courts of this state requires that such a request be made ten
days before trial. The trustees objected to
the notice, and the Jaw and motion judge
sustained the objection. The brothers argue that this ruling denied them their constitutional right to a jury trial. Their argument is without merit. The Utah Constitution, article I, section 10, provides that in
civil cases the right to a jury trial is
"waived unless demanded." To avail oneself of this right, one's demand must be
timely and in accordance with applicable
rule or statute. Board of Education v.
West, 55 Utah 357, 362-63, 186 P. 114, 116
(1919). Nothing more was required by the
court below.

After the brothers' request for a jury
was denied for untimeliness, the trial court
heard testimony and held that the 1974
amendment was effective. It found as a
matter of fact that Grover Hansen had no
present intent to create a trust in 1972 and
had not delivered any property into the
trust prior to executing the 1974 amendment. It therefore concluded that the irrevocable trust was not actually created
until 1974 and that its terms were those set
forth in the declaration signed in 1972, as

[2] The brothers further contend that,
under Board of Education, the trial court
had the discretion to relieve them of their
default upon a showing of good cause and
that the court abused its discretion by not
permitting them a jury. However, there is
absolutely no factual basis for finding that
the lower court abused its discretion. The
only excuse offered for the failure to file
the demand on time is that the deadline for
filing the notice fell on a Sunday. The
notice, however, was filed on the following
Tuesday, four days late.1 It is hard to

1. Rule 4.2, Utah R. Practice, states that a written
demand for a jury trial "must be filed at least
ten (10) days prior to trial or at such other time
as the trial judge may order." (Emphasis added.) Rule 6, Utah R.Civ.P., in delineating how
time limits shall be computed, states that the

day of the event from which the designated time
period runs, here the trial date, is not included
in the computation. The last day of the period
is included unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or
a legal holiday. In that case, the time period
runs "until the end of the next day which is not
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understand how this fact alone would warrant our finding that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying the brothers' request for a jury.
With respect to the second point, the
brothers contend that in 1972 the trust
declaration and the deed conveying the condominium to the trust were properly delivered and, therefore, that this property was
beyond the reach of the 1974 amendment.
This argument runs directly contrary to the
trial court's explicit finding of fact that
although the grantor executed these instruments in 1972, he did not deliver either
instrument and had no intention of making
such delivery. The court found that these
instruments were not delivered and did not
become effective until 1974 when the
grantor executed the amendment and then
had all three instruments simultaneously
recorded.
[3,4] On appeal, the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed unless there
is no substantial record evidence to support
them. See, e.g., Litho Sales, Inc. v. Cutrubus, Utah, 636 P.2d 487, 488 (1981). In
reviewing the evidence, we view it in the
light most favorable to the trial court.
See, e.g., Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah
2d 251, 254, 495 P.2d 28, 29 (1972). The
brothers' counsel has not approached this
appeal with these standards in mind. His
brief ignores the trial court's findings and
invites this Court to reweigh all the evidence on the issue and independently find
the facts. That is not this Court's role, and
we firmly decline the brothers' invitation.
Considering the evidence under the appropriate standards, we conclude that the trial
court's findings have adequate evidentiary
support and should not be disturbed.
[5-7] Creation of a trust requires delivery of property into the trust. Delivery of
a deed requires that the grantor either
a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday." (Emphasis added.) Reading these two rules together, the minimum ten-day period is counted back
from the day before the trial is scheduled.
Should the tenth day fall on a Sunday, as here,
the time period must be counted back to the
next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a

relinquish physical control of the deed or
have a present intent to permanently divest
himself of title to the property. See Wiggill v. Cheney, Utah, 597 P.2d 1351, 1352
(1979); Hanns v. Hanns, 246 Or. 282, 423
P.2d 499, 507 (1967). The general rule is
that the party challenging the validity of
delivery bears the burden of proof. Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17
Utah 2d 420, 423, 413 P.2d 807, 809 (1966).
However, where the grantor retains possession of or the right to recall the deed,
the burden shifts to the party claiming
under the deed. Hanns v. Hanns, 423
P.2d at 508.
[8] In the present case, both parties
conceded that actual physical delivery of
the deed to the condominium did not occur.
The brothers' claim rests on the contention
that Grover Hansen placed the deed and
the trust declaration in a safety deposit box
in 1972 with the intention of relinquishing
control over both documents. For this
proposition, the brothers rely on the fact
that one of the trustees had a key to the
box. See Agrelius v. Mohesky, 208 Kan.
790, 494 P.2d 1095 (1972). However, there
was ample evidence to support the trial
court's finding that the brothers had not
carried their burden of proof on this point.
First, there was conflicting testimony as
to whether Grover Hansen had put the
deed in the safety deposit box. Second,
even if he did put the deed in the box, there
was evidence that he did not do so with an
intention to relinquish control over it and to
effect delivery into the trust. The evidence
was undisputed that Grover maintained
control over the deed from 1972 until 1974.
No one saw either the trust declaration or
the deed from 1972 until Grover produced
the documents in 1974 when the amendment was executed and all documents were
recorded.
legal holiday. Thus, the jury demand would be
due on the prior Friday. A Friday filing would
comply with the demands of both Rule 4.2 and
Rule 6, while to allow a Monday filing would
directly contravene the ten-day minimum required by Rule 4.2.
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[9,10] The final argument of the brothers is also without merit. At the close of
trial, after telling the parties he would take
the matter under advisement and would
further consider their trial briefs, the judge
commented on his understanding of the
evidence and gave some indication of his
leanings. The brothers complain that the
findings of fact finally signed by the judge
do not agree with his post-trial comments.
Until a court files its findings of fact, no
decision has been rendered or final ruling
made. Any judge is free to change his or
her mind on the outcome of a case until a
decision is formally rendered. McCollum
v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 320, 241 P.2d
468, 472 (1952); Chapman v. Jesco, Inc., 98
N.M. 707, 709, 652 P.2d 257, 259 (1982);
Johnson v. Whitman, 1 Wash.App. 540,
541, 463 P.2d 207, 209 (1969). The rule
suggested by the brothers would mean that
a judge would have to refrain from expressing any views he or she might have on
a matter for fear that those comments
might be found to control the later disposition of the case. It would be most unwise
to adopt any rule that might discourage
judges from frankly discussing the merits
of cases before them with attorneys for
both sides; such discussion is often valuable to the court and counsel, both in focusing on the pivotal issues and in clarifying
points that the court might otherwise have
misunderstood.
The decision below is affirmed. Costs to
respondents.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.

Rosemary J. BONWICH, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Christopher BONWICH, Defendant
and Appellant.
Nos. 19592, 19804.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 8, 1985.
In divorce action, the Second District
Court, Weber County, John F. Wahlquist,
J., granted custody of child to adoptive
mother, rather than biological father, and
father appealed. The Supreme Court,
Howe, J., held that: (1) presumption favoring natural parent over nonparent was inapplicable in the case of adoption; (2)
award of custody of child to adoptive mother was proper where based on best interest
of child, and absent sexist biases or prejudices; and (3) property award was presumed proper absent any showing of inequity.
Affirmed.

1. Adoption <3=>25
Judgment of adoption under Florida
law which created same relationship between adoptive parent and child that would
have existed had child been adoptive parent's legitimate blood descendant was entitled to full faith and credit for purposes of
determining adoptive parent's right to custody of child in Utah divorce proceeding
with child's biological father.
West's
F.S.A. § 63.172(l)(c).
2. Children Out-of-wedlock <®=>12
Adoption by acknowledgement conferred on illegitimate child civil and social
status of legitimate child of his natural
father. U.C.A.1953, 78-30-12.
3. Adoption <3=>20
Relationship of adoptive parent and
child is the same legally as that of natural
parent and child, with all rights and duties

( J K O O K b l U i \ v. i ii^jLi * . > o . ^ . ^
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viction. To ask the trial coi
o address
the admissibility question now would be to
tempt it to reach a post hoc rationalization
for the admission of this pivotal evidence.
Such a mode of proceeding holds too much
potential for abuse. The only fair way to
proceed is to vacate defendant's conviction
and remand the matter for retrial. This
will permit a trial judge to address properly
the constitutional admissibility question
and enter appropriate findings and conclusions. We therefore vacate the conviction
and remand for a new trial.
We have considered Ramirez's other
claims and have found them to be without
merit.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and
DURHAM, J., concur.
STEWART, J., dissents; opinion to
follow.
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S. Larry CROOKSTON, Randi L. Crookston, and Anna W. Drake, Trustee of
the Estate of Spencer Larry Crookston
and Randi Lynn Crookston, Plaintiffs
and Appellees,
v,
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 880034.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 28, 1991.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 12, 1991.

Insureds and trustee of insureds' estate brought action against property insurer for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, inten-

tional infliction of en "lal distress,
fraud, and against bank, wnich was loss
payee, for breach of covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty,
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Insurer and bank crossclaimed against each other, asserting
rights of contribution. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., entered judgment for plaintiffs pursuant to jury verdict against insurer,
awarded attorney fees and costs to plaintiffs, and granted summary judgment for
bank on insurer's cross claim. Insurer appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman,
J., held that: (1) any error in proceeding to
consider bank's inadequately noticed motion for summary judgment was harmless;
(2) limitations period in policy was inapplicable to insureds' tort causes of action; (3)
evidence was sufficient to support finding
that insurer had engaged in fraud; (4) trial
judge reasonably denied new trial on question of "soft" compensatory damages; and
(5) remand was necessary for trial court to
reconsider whether award of $4 million in
punitive damages was excessive.
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part.
Howe, Associate C.J., filed opinion concurring with reservations.
Stewart, J., filed opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part.
1. Judgment <3=*184
Violation of notice requirement for
hearing on motion for summary judgment
does not divest court of jurisdiction to
grant summary judgment. Rules Civ.
Proc, Rule 56(c).
2. Judgment <3=>189
Violation of notice requirement for
hearing on motion for summary judgment
will avoid grant of motion unless violation
amounts to harmless error. Rules Civ.
Proc, Rule 56(c).
3. Appeal and Error <s=>1026
Error is "harmful" only if likelihood of
different outcome is sufficiently high as to
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undermine Supreme Court's confidence in
verdict Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 61.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Appeal and Error <S=>1073(1)
When insufficient notice was given for
hearing on motion for summary judgment,
task of Supreme Court on appeal from
grant of motion was to determine whether
different outcome on motion could have
had reasonable probability of affecting outcome of case. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c).
5. Appeal and Error ^1073(1)
Reasonable likelihood did not exist that
jury would have found that bank, as loss
payee under policy, would have owed contribution to property insurer with respect
to insureds' claims for damages arising out
of insurer's failure to pay claim in full, and
therefore any error committed by trial
court in granting summary judgment for
bank when bank failed to provide sufficient
notice of hearing to insurer was harmless,
where jury was instructed that it could
award to insureds only such damages as
insurer proximately caused, and jury was
not told that it could award any damages to
be paid by insurer for which bank was
responsible. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 56(c),
61; U.C.A.1953, 78-27-39.

9. Appeal and Error <S=>215(1)
Supreme Court would not exercise discretionary review, in interest of justice, to
determine whether jury instruction, to
which no objection was raised at trial, omitted or misstated elements of fraud in action
brought by insureds against property insurer. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 51.
10. Appeal and Error <3=>215(1)
Supreme Court may review instructional errors in interest of justice despite lack
of trial objection. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 51.
11. Appeal and Error <3=>215(1)
Rule allowing Supreme Court to review instructional errors in interest of justice despite lack of trial objection embodies
concept of "plain error." Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 51.
12. Appeal and Error <£*977(3)
New Trial <&>&
In deciding whether to grant new trial,
the trial court has some discretion, and
Supreme Court will reverse only for abuse
of that discretion.
13. Judgment <S=>199(1)
In passing on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, trial court has no
latitude and must be correct.

14. New Trial <s=>72(5)
Trial court cannot grant new trial if
there
is sufficient evidence to support ver6. Insurance <3=>602.2(1)
dict for other party and judge merely disStandard form clauses limiting time
agrees with judgment of jury; rather, trial
for insureds to bring action against insurer
judge may properly grant new trial when
only bar actions on contract, and do not bar
he or she can reasonably conclude that
suits for tortious conduct.
verdict is clearly against weight of evidence or there is insufficient evidence to
7. Insurance <3=>602.2(1)
justify verdict. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
Provision of property policy stating 59(a)(6).
that no suit or action on policy for recovery
of any claim shall be sustainable unless 15. Appeal and Error <3=>933(1), 1005(2)
commenced within 12 months after incepAppellate review of trial court's denial
tion of loss did not bar insureds' tort of either motion for new trial or motion for
causes of action against insurer.
judgment notwithstanding the verdict
based on claim of insufficiency of evidence
8. Insurance <s=>602.1
is governed by standard that Supreme
Covenant of good faith and fair deal- Court reverses only if, viewing evidence in
ing owed by insurer to insured is implied light most favorable to prevailing party,
contractual provision, and cause of action the evidence is insufficient to support verfor its breach sounds in contract.
dict. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(6).
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16. Appeal and Error <s=>757U,
To demonstrate that evidence is insufficient to support jury verdict, the one challenging verdict must marshal evidence in
support of verdict and then demonstrate
that evidence is insufficient when viewed in
light most favorable to verdict
17. Appeal and Error <s=»766
Supreme Court would reject property
insureds attack on-jury's finding that insurer had engaged in fraud, where insurer
made no attempt to marshal evidence in
support of jury finding of fraud, but instead only argued selected evidence favorable to its position.
18. Fraud 0=58(2)
Evidence supported insureds' claims
that adjustor misrepresented to insureds'
attorney that property insurer was not yet
in position to settle claims and that he
would include insureds in any settlement
negotiation, and that adjustor made such
representations knowing that he was prepared to settle with bank, which was loss
payee, that very day.
19. Fraud <®=>64(5)
Jury could have found by clear and
convincing evidence that insureds relied on
adjuster's representation that property insurer was not yet ready to settle and were
induced to inaction thereby, with result
that insurer was able to settle matter with
bank, which was loss payee, without insureds' participation for unfairly low
amount.
20. Appeal and Error <S=>170(2)
Property insurer waived any right to
present claims on appeal that award of
compensatory and punitive damages to insureds violated ban on excessive fines and
due process provision of State Constitution,
where insurer did not raise such arguments
before trial court. Const. Art. 1, §§ 7, 9.
21. Constitutional Law <s=>303
Damages <3=>87(1)
Utah's standards for avoiding punitive
damages and reviewing punitive damages
awards are adequate and do not violate due
process requirements of Federal Constitution. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.

22. New Trial <s=>7
General rule governing the grant of
new trial is that trial court must find at
least one of the seven grounds listed in rule
to be met. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a).
23. New Trial <^161(1)
If court finds that new trial on amount
of damages award is warranted on grounds
of either excessive damages or insufficient
evidence, it may encourage parties to come
to some mutually agreeable solution rather
than incur time and expense of new trial.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5, 6).
24. New Trial ®=>74
In context of new trial motion attacking amount of jury verdict on grounds of
excessiveness of damages or insufficiency
of evidence, trial court has responsibility to
review amount of award to ensure that
jury has acted within its proper bounds.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5, 6).
25. New Trial <s=>74
Trial judge is free to grant or deny
motion for new trial if it is reasonable to
conclude that jury erred. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 59(a).
26. New Trial <®=>65
Trial court cannot grant new trial
merely because it disagrees with jury's
judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a).
27. New Trial <®»159
If trial court determines that new trial
is warranted and grants motion, it should
describe basis for its decision in record
such that appellate court can have benefit
of those reasons. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
59(a).
28. New Trial <s=*72(5), 77(1)
In passing on motion for new trial on
amount of damages, trial court should deny
motion if it cannot reasonably find that
jury erred; however, if trial court can reasonably conclude that there was insufficient evidence to justify verdict or it was
manifestly against weight of evidence, or
that jury acted with passion or prejudice, it
may grant motion and order new trial.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5, 6).
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29. Appeal and Error ^979(5)
In reviewing trial judge's ultimate decision to grant or deny new trial on amount
of damages, Supreme Court will reverse
only if there is no reasonable basis for the
decision. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 59(a).
30. Appeal and Error <s=>1072
Trial judge's reliance, as preliminary
matter prior to ultimate determination of
motion for new trial, on legal principles
which are erroneous or facts which are
wholly without record support may constitute grounds for reversal of grant of motion. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a).
31. Appeal and Error <s=>979(5)
Order granting new trial on amount of
damages will be upheld on appeal, even if
jury's award appears supported by substantial evidence on appeal, if trial judge
could reasonably conclude that jury's
award was excessive or unsupported by
evidence. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5, 6).
32. Damages <s=>32
"Soft compensatory damages," in other words, damages for pain and suffering,
must be awarded with caution.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
33. Appeal and Error <£=>1004.3
When reviewing jury's award of soft
compensatory damages, deliberate action
of trial court in denying motion for new
trial should prevail in case of doubt.
34. Damages <S=>130(1)
Insurance <s=>602.11
Trial court properly denied new trial
with respect to jury's award of $492,427 in
soft compensatory damages to insureds for
emotional and mental distress and loss of
financial reputation arising out of insurer's
failure to pay in full a claim for property
damage caused by collapse of insureds'
home while under construction.
35. New Trial e=>74
Any motion for new trial on question
of punitive damages requires that trial
court engage in two-part inquiry: whether
punitive damages are appropriate at all, in
other words, whether evidence is sufficient

to support lawful jury finding of defendant's requisite mental state; and whether
amount of punitive damages is excessive or
inadequate, appearing to have been given
under influence of passion or prejudice.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5, 6).
36. Insurance <3=>602.10(1)
Property insurer acted with mental
state necessary for imposition of punitive
damages, where substantial evidence supported jury's determinations of reckless
disregard of insureds' rights and intentional fraud arising out of insurer's failure to
pay in full a claim for property damage
caused by collapse of insureds' home while
under construction and insurer's misrepresentation that claim was not about to be
settled when, in fact, insurer was about to
settle claim with bank, which was the loss
payee. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5, 6).
37. New Trial <s=>159
Trial court may assume that punitive
damages award is not excessive, and need
not give any detailed explanation for its
decision to deny motion for new trial, if
punitive damages fall within general rule
that where punitive damages are well below $100,000, punitive damages awards beyond three-to-one ratio to actual damages
will not be upheld, and that where award is
in excess of $100,000, awards having ratios
of less than three-to-one may be overturned. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5).
38. Damages <s=»94
Trial court is not bound to reduce punitive damages award if it does not fall within general rule that where punitive damages are well below $100,000, awards beyond three-to-one ratio to actual damages
are seldom upheld, and that where award is
in excess of $100,000, there is some inclination to overturn awards having ratios of
less than three-to-one; however, if such
award is upheld, trial judge must make
detailed and reasoned articulation of
grounds for concluding that award is not
excessive in light of the law and the facts.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5). n , , ^
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39. New Trial <3=»159
Trial court should explain its action in
reducing or enlarging award of punitive
damages by way of remittitur or additur.
40. Damages <s=>94
Factors that may justify remittitur of
punitive damages award can include fact
that award exceeded proper ratio to actual
damages, lack of intent or low degree of
malice, benign nature of act, fact that substantial portion of actual damages is
"soft," thus making ratio analysis suspect,
or substantial risk of bankrupting defendant
41. Appeal and Error <3=>1177(8)
Remand was necessary for trial judge
to explain reasons for denial of motion for
new trial with respect to award of $4 million in punitive damages against property
insurer which had failed to pay in full a
claim for property damage caused by collapse of insureds' home while under construction, given that large proportion of
$815,826 in compensatory damages was arguably attributable to emotional distress or
loss of financial reputation, and fact that
ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages appeared to be much higher than
in any case in which Supreme Court had
upheld punitive damage award. Rules Civ.
Proc, Rule 59(a)(5).
42. New Trial <3=*74
Motion for new trial challenging
amount of punitive damages award is most
appropriately brought on grounds of excessiveness of award. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
59(a)(5).
43. New Trial <s=>74
Motion for new trial challenging award
of "hard" actual damages is most appropriately brought on grounds of insufficiency
of evidence. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(6).
44. Appeal and Error <s=>932(2)
Any challenge to award of punitive
damages based on its excessiveness that is
brought before appellate court will be considered under same standard for reviewing
trial court decisions on motions for new
trial; if no new trial motion was filed below, Supreme Court will assume that trial

court considered such m m sua sponte
and denied it. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
59(a)(5), (d).
45. Jury <s=>37
Allowing trial court to consider in the
first instance the propriety of jury's award
of punitive damages and to reduce or increase that award if it deems appropriate
does not violate plaintiff's right to trial by
jury; if plaintiff does not want to accept
trial court's proposed remittitur, plaintiff
may elect to retry matter. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 7.
L. Rich Humphreys, M. Douglas Bayly,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellees.
Philip R. Fishier, Stephen J. Trayner,
Salt Lake City, and Frank A. Roybal, Bountiful, for defendant and appellant.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Fire Insurance Exchange ("Fire Insurance") appeals a jury verdict awarding
Spencer Larry Crookston and Randi Lynn
Crookston (collectively referred to as "the
Crookstons") and Anna W. Drake, trustee
of the Crookstons' estate, compensatory
damages of $815,826 and punitive damages
of $4,000,000 on various theories arising
out of Fire Insurance's failure to pay in
full a claim for property damage caused by
the collapse of the Crookstons' home while
under construction. Fire Insurance also
appeals the trial court's award of $175,000
in attorney fees and $11,126 in costs to the
Crookstons.
The jury found that Fire Insurance
breached its contract of insurance, including the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing recognized in Beck v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon
the Crookstons; committed fraud and misrepresentation in its handling of the Crookstons' claims; and was the proximate cause
of the damages suffered by the Crookstons. Fire Insurance argues that myriad
substantive and procedural errors were
committed which require reversal of the
verdict and/or the damage awards. We
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find no reason to reverse on the issue of enced. The new adjuster, Alan Clapperton,
Fire Insurance's liability. We also uphold commissioned an engineer to do an analysis
the trial court's determination that the limited to structural damage. The engicompensatory damages are supported by neer was not informed by Clapperton that
the evidence and well within the discretion his report would be the basis for a bid to
of the jury. However, we vacate the trial reconstruct the house. Clapperton then recourt's denial of a motion for a new trial on quested a bid to rebuild the home from an
grounds that the punitive damage award inexperienced contractor. Clapperton prowas excessive and remand for further con- vided this contractor with a copy of the
sideration consistent with this opinion.
engineer's analysis, representing that the
On appeal, we recite the facts in the light engineer's limited analysis encompassed
most favorable to the jury's verdict. E.g., the entire damage to be repaired. On June
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 14, 1982, the contractor bid $27,830.60 to
1989); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, repair the home. Clapperton immediately
769 (Utah 1985). Larry and Randi Crook- made an appointment to meet with a bank
ston owned a vacant lot in Davis County, officer on June 16th to discuss settlement.
Utah, on which they wanted to build an On the morning of the 16th, Clapperton
"earth" home, i.e., a house constructed par- received a call from Ralph Klemm, the
tially underground to take advantage of Crookstons' attorney, asking about the stathe natural heating and cooling effects of tus of any settlement Clapperton toJd
the earth. In December of 1980, they ap- Klemm that he needed a little more time
proached Rocky Mountain State Bank for a and would be getting back to him soon with
construction loan in the amount of $60,000. a settlement proposal. Clapperton said
The bank approved the loan with the stipu- nothing about the bid he had received two
lation that the Crookstons obtain insurance days earlier or of the meeting he had
naming the bank as the loss payee. The scheduled with the bank for later that same
Crookstons obtained such a policy from day.
Fire Insurance with a maximum coverage
At the meeting with the bank, Clapperof $67,000. The policy named the Crookton
did not disclose the fact that three
stons as the insureds and the bank as the
other bids, all substantially higher, had
loss payee.
been
obtained, nor did he reveal that the
In December of 1981, the home, which
$27,830.60
bid was based on an engineer's
was 90 percent completed, collapsed. The
Crookstons filed a claim with Fire Insur- appraisal limited to structural damage
ance that month, and an adjuster was as- only. The bank officer agreed to settle for
signed the claim. A few months passed slightly more than $32,000, the amount of
during which no progress was made on the the low bid plus an approximation of the
c)aim. The Crookstons then hired an attor- interest that had accrued on the Crookston
ney, Ralph Klemm, to represent them in loan since the collapse. Knowing full well
the claim adjustment. Klemm assisted that the $27,830.60 bid was substantially
Fire Insurance in obtaining bids to have the lower than any other bid, Clapperton insisthome repaired. By the end of March of ed that the bank accept a settlement check
1982, Fire Insurance had received bids made out only to the bank, not jointly to
from two contractors: one in the amount of the bank and the Crookstons, and that the
$50,951, and another in the amount of $49,- bank execute a proof of loss form releasing
600. In April of 1982, Fire Insurance's Fire Insurance from any further liability on
regional office extended settlement author- the claim. The settlement was effected
ity in the amount of $49,443. In May of that same day, and all necessary doc1982, the adjuster obtained another bid uments were signed and exchanged.
from an architect in the amount of $74,000.
The Crookstons' attorney called the bank
Later in May, Fire Insurance replaced later on June 16th. At that time, Klemm
the original adjuster with one more experi- was told that the bank had just settled the
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claim with Fire Insurance. Klemm immediately called Clapperton, who affirmed that
Fire Insurance had settled all claims under
the policy with the sole loss payee, the
bank. Clapperton also stated that the insureds, the Crookstons, did not have to be
included in the settlement, that nothing
more was owing, and that he was closing
his file.
Klemm called the bank and discussed the
Crookstons' situation. He learned that the
bank intended to pursue a deficiency claim
against the Crookstons for the balance due
on the $60,000 loan that was not paid by
the insurance settlement. Because the
Crookstons lacked the means to pay off the
loan, the bank threatened foreclosure. In
order to avoid additional interest, attorney
fees, and costs, the Crookstons deeded the
property on which the earth home stood to
the bank in lieu of foreclosure and then
declared bankruptcy.
In February of 1983, the Crookstons filed
a suit against the bank and Fire Insurance.
As the pleadings ultimately stood, the
Crookstons alleged causes of action against
Fire Insurance for breach of contract,
breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and misrepresentation and
fraud. Against the bank, the Crookstons
asserted claims for breach of a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation and fraud,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. They sought actual and punitive
damages against both Fire Insurance and
the bank. Fire Insurance and the bank
cross-claimed against each other, asserting
rights of contribution.
In January of 1987, Fire Insurance
moved for summary judgment based on a
clause in the insurance contract requiring
that any actions against the company be
brought within one year of the date of loss.
Fire Insurance argued that because the
date of loss was December of 1981, when
the house collapsed, and the action was
brought fourteen months later, in February
of 1983, the action should have been
barred. The trial court denied the motion.
Fire Insurance also moved to bifurcate the

proceedings, requesting t
the cause of
action for breach of contract be separated
from the remaining causes of action, which
motion the trial court also denied.
Five days before trial, on a Thursday
afternoon, the Crookstons agreed to settle
with the bank. The afternoon of the next
day, a stipulation regarding the settlement
was executed, and the bank served and
filed a motion for summary judgment,
seeking its dismissal from the action. This
motion was granted.
The case then proceeded to trial against
Fire Insurance. After a six-day trial, the
jury awarded $815,826 in compensatory
damages and $4,000,000 in punitive damages. Although the jury's award of compensatory damages was not broken down
further, testimony at trial attributed $323,399 of the $815,826 to economic loss, making the remaining $492,427 apparently attributable to emotional distress and loss of
financial reputation. Fire Insurance filed a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, new trial, or remittitur, which the
court denied on December 30, 1987. On
January 11, 1988, the court entered an additional judgment against Fire Insurance
awarding the Crookstons attorney fees of
$175,000 and expenses of $11,126. Fire
Insurance then filed this appeal.
Fire Insurance claims as follows: (i) the
trial court erred in granting the bank's
summary judgment motion, which was both
procedurally and substantively flawed; (ii)
the trial court erred in refusing to hold the
action barred by the one-year limitation
period in the policy; (iii) the jury instructions regarding fraud were erroneous; (iv)
the evidence is insufficient to support a
finding of either intentional infliction of
emotional distress or fraud; (v) attorney
fees should not have been awarded; and
(vi) the compensatory and punitive damages were excessive under Utah law and
also violated constitutional notions of due
process and the prohibition of excessive
fines. We will address only the dispositive
issues.
Initially, we consider the claim that the
trial court erred in granting the bank summary judgment on Fire Insurance's cross-
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claim for contribution. As noted earlier,
after settling with the Crookstons, the
bank filed a summary judgment motion
four days prior to trial. In support of the
motion, the bank made several arguments:
(i) it should be dismissed from the case
because it had settled with the Crookstons;
(ii) it was abandoning any claim for contribution against Fire Insurance; and (iii)
there was no legal basis upon which Fire
Insurance could recover against the bank
on its cross-claim for contribution because
contribution is not available to one found to
have committed an intentional tort or a
breach of contract, the only two theories
under which the Crookstons were then proceeding against Fire Insurance,
The court held a hearing on the summary
judgment motion on May 26, 1987, the
Tuesday following the motion's filing and
the morning of trial, which was four calendar days but only one business day after
the motion was filed with the court.1 At
the time of the hearing, Fire Insurance had
not filed any opposition papers. Fire Insurance argues that the court was incorrect on the law of contribution and that the
summary judgment motion was procedurally flawed because it was filed late. See
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). We first consider the
procedural challenge.
[1,2] Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)
requires at least ten days' notice before a
hearing on a motion for summary judgment. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). In this case,
only three days intervened between the
1. The intervening weekend was the Memorial
Day weekend.
2. Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals in Gillmor
v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct.App.1991),
reversed a grant of summary judgment holding
that the trial court committed error when it
ruled on the motion six days before the time to
respond to the moving party's motion to strike
supporting affidavits had expired. Gillmor,
however, even if accepted as an accurate statement of Utah law, is inapposite here because no
harmful error analysis was applied in that case.
Instead, the court of appeals apparently assumed prejudice consistent with rule 61. It
then remanded to the trial court because it was
"unable to determine from the record ... what
the court actually considered in granting the
summary judgment
" Id. at 18 n. 3.
3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 61 states:

filing of the motion and the hearing, two of
which were weekend days and the other, a
legal holiday. Obviously, a technical violation of rule 56(c) occurred. Because a rule
56(c) violation does not divest the court of
jurisdiction over the motion, see Walker v.
Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29
Utah 2d 274, 279, 508 P.2d 538, 541 (1973);
Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v.
Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 61-62, 504 P.2d
1019, 1021 (1972), it has the power to grant
summary judgment despite a rule 56(c) violation. However, such a violation will void
the grant unless the violation amounts to
harmless error.2 See Utah R.Civ.P. 61;
Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d at 62, 504 P.2d at
1021 (summary judgment upheld where
time violation did not adversely affect defendant's rights).
[3,4] The harmless error analysis proceeds under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
61 3 and State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah
1989).4 "Harmless error" is defined in
Verde as an error that is "sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings."
Verde, 770 P.2d at 120; accord, e.g., State
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987)
(explaining meaning of "reasonable" probability or likelihood). Put in other words, an
error is harmful only if the likelihood of a
different outcome is sufficiently high as to
undermine our confidence in the verdict.
Knight, 734 P.2d at 920. Our task, then, is
[N]o error or defect in any ruling or order or
in anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a
new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment
or order, unless refusal to take such action
appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of
the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect
the substantial rights of the parties.
Utah R.Civ.P. 61.
4. In Verde, we discussed harmless error in
depth and attempted to articulate one harmless
error standard that harmonizes the various
rules which state the concept in different terms.
One of the rules we considered in Verde is rule
61. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-21 (Utah
1989).
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to determine whether a different outcome
on the summary judgment motion would
have had a reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of the case.
For purposes of the decision before us,
the law of contribution is governed by section 78-27-39 of the Code. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-39 (1973) (repealed 1986).
That section provides that a right of contribution among tort-feasors is recognized
only after one tort-feasor has paid to discharge a liability common to two or more
tort-feasors "or more than his prorata
share thereof/' Id.5 Fire Insurance contends that an adequate time to respond
would have permitted it to persuade the
trial court that Fire Insurance was entitled
to contribution from the bank for damages
caused by a breach of contract or an intentional tort they jointly committed.

by the trial court in proceeding
consider
the inadequately noticed motion for summary judgment is harmless.
We next address Fire Insurance's contention that the Crookstons' claim was barred
by the clause in the insurance contract
stating, "No suit or action on this policy for
the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity ... unless
commenced within 12 months next after
inception of the loss." This lawsuit was
filed in February of 1983, fourteen months
after the house collapsed in December of
1981. We have previously said that contractual limitations on the time in which to
bring actions on insurance contracts " 'if
reasonable, are valid, binding and enforceable/ " although looked upon with some
disfavor. Hoeppner v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 595 P.2d 863, 865 (Utah
1979) (quoting Anderson v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., 583 P.2d 101, 103
(Utah 1978)); see also Hibdon v. Truck
Ins. Exch., 657 P.2d 1358, 1359 (Utah 1983);
Anderson v. Beneficial Fire & Casualty
Co., 21 Utah 2d 173, 175, 442 P.2d 933, 934
(1968). However, we have not addressed
the question of whether such standard
form clauses operate to limit the time in
which one may bring an action grounded in
tort as opposed to breach of contract.

[5] Even if we assume without deciding
that Fire Insurance is correct, the trial
court's error would be harmful only if Fire
Insurance can show that the jury awarded
damages against it for which there is a
reasonable probability that Fire Insurance
could have persuaded the jury that it was
entitled to contribution from the bant.
Here, the jury was instructed that it could
award plaintiffs only such damages as Fire
Insurance proximately caused.6 The jury
was not told that it could award plaintiffs
any damages to be paid by Fire Insurance
for which the bank was responsible. And
there is nothing in the record to persuade
us that the jury violated its instruction and
awarded any damages against Fire Insurance that were caused by the bank. There
is not a reasonable likelihood that a jury
would have found the bank to owe Fire
Insurance contribution. Therefore, whether a right of contribution actually existed
between the bank and Fire Insurance is of
no consequence, and any error committed

There is a split of authority on the question of whether a limitation provision such
as that contained in the contract of insurance at issue here applies to bar an insured
from suing for an insurer's tortious conduct Those courts holding the provision
effective to bar such a suit reason that the
tortious conduct of the insurer arises out of
its obligations under the provisions of the
policy and, therefore, it would be inequitable not to give effect to the limitation
clause. See, e.g., Barrow Dev. Co. v. Ful-

5. Section 78-27-39 provides:
(1) The right of contribution shall exist
among joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor shall not be entitled to a money judgment
for contribution until he [or she] has, by payment, discharged the common liability or
more than his [or her] prorata share thereof.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 (1973) (repealed
1986).

6. Instruction No. 37 states in full:
You are not to award damages for any
injury or condition from which the plaintiffs
may have suffered, or may now be suffering,
unless it has been established by a preponderance of the evidence in the case that such
injury or condition was proximately caused
by the conduct of defendant FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE.
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ton Ins. Co., 418 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir.
1969); Zieba v. Middlesex Mut. Assurance
Co., 549 F.Supp. 1318, 1323 (D.Conn.1982);
Modern Carpet Indus., Inc. v. Factory
Ins. Ass'n, 125 Ga.App. 150, 152, 186
S.E.2d 586, 587 (1971).
Those courts holding standard form limitations of the kind found in the Fire Insurance policy not applicable to tortious conduct reason that tort causes of action are
not actions on the insurance contract but
separate actions arising from the breach of
a positive legal duty imposed by law. See,
e.g., Davis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., 545 F.Supp. 370, 372 (D.Nev.1982);
Asher v. Reliance Ins. Co., 308 F.Supp.
847, 852-53 (N.D.Cal.1970); Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 83 Cal.App.3d 38, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 565, 571 (1978); Wabash Valley Protective Union v. James, 8 Ind.App. 449, 35
N.E. 919, 920 (1893); Hoskins v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St.3d 272, 279, 452
N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (1983); Plant v. Illinois
Employers Ins., 20 Ohio App.3d 236, 23738, 485 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1984); Lewis v.
Farmers Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 67, 69 (Okla.
1983); Warmka v. Hartland Cicero Mut.
Ins. Co., 136 Wis.2d 31, 35, 400 N.W.2d
923, 925 (1987).

pecially where that provision takes from
the other party rights conferred by existing statutes.7 See, e.g., LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah
1988); Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 94 Utah 570, 575, 80 P.2d 348,
351 (1938); Valley Bank & Trust v. U.S.
Life Title Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah
Ct.App.1989); Draughon v. CUNA Mut.
Ins. Soc, 771 P.2d 1105, 1108-09 (Utah
Ct.App.1989) (limitation must use clear language).
[7,8] Because we conclude that the
Crookstons' tort causes of action are not
barred by the insurance contract's limitations provision, and because we have sustained the trial court's decision to uphold
the jury's finding of the tort of fraud and
all damages awarded by the jury can be
sustained upon the finding of fraud, we
need not address the question of which of
the other causes of action asserted by the
Crookstons may be barred by the contractual limitation.8
We next consider Fire Insurance's challenge to the jury's finding that Fire Insurance committed fraud. Fire Insurance contends that the jury instruction describing
the fraud cause of action was erroneous.
It also argues that even if the jury was
properly instructed, there was insufficient
evidence to support the finding of fraud.

[6] In the context of a contract of insurance, we prefer this latter line of cases.
By reading the "no suit or action on this
policy*' language as not covering tort, we
are simply following the usual rule by
which we narrowly construe a standard
form contractual limitation provision that is
not bargained for and is drafted by the
insurance company for its own benefit, es-

We first address Fire Insurance's claim
that instruction 28 omitted or misstated
three of the nine elements of fraud required in Utah. See generally Pace v.
Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-45, 247 P.2d
273, 274-75 (1952). Fire Insurance con-

7. See section 78-12-23 of the Utah Code, which
confers a six-year limitation on actions pertaining to written instruments. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-23 (1987). We note that section 31A21-313, which was enacted in 1986, specifies a
three-year limit within which to bring any "action on a written policy or contract of insurance." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 (1991).
The section also provides that "no insurance
policy may ... limit the time for beginning an
action on the policy to a time less than authorized by statute." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21313(3)(a) (1991). Although section 31A-21-313
does not apply to these facts, it does govern
actions arising after the section's enactment.

8. We note that the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is an implied contractual provision,
and a cause of action for its breach sounds in
contract. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d
795, 798 (Utah 1985). However, we have never
addressed the question of whether the time for
bringing an action for such a breach runs from
the date of the harm caused by the breach of the
covenant or from the date of the event triggering the insured's alleged liability on the policy.
If it runs from the former date, then the contractual limitation would not have barred the
Crookstons' suit on that claim because the suit
was filed less than twelve months after the challenged settlement with the bank. f } Q I 7
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cedes that no objection was raised at trial
to instruction 28, as is required by Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 51. That rule
states in pertinent part, "No party may
assign as error the giving or the failure to
give an instruction unless he [or she] objects thereto." Utah R.Civ.P. 51. Fire Insurance would have us consider the propriety of the instruction anyway, relying on
another part of rule 51, which states that
"notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion
and in the interests of justice, may review
the giving of or failure to give an instruction." Id.
[9-11] We hold that discretionary review is not appropriate in this case. The
last clause of rule 51 does permit us to
review instructional errors in the interests
of justice. "However, 'it is incumbent
upon the aggrieved party to present a persuasive reason' for exercising that discretion ... and this requires 'showing special
circumstances warranting such a review/ "
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah
1988) (citations omitted). In State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35^36 (Utah 1989), we
described the content of the analogous
"manifest injustice" exception to Utah Rule
of Criminal Procedure 19(c)'s requirement
that any instructional errors raised on appeal be first called to the trial court's attention by proper objection. We held that the
term "manifest injustice" embodied the
concepts of "plain error." See Eldredge,
773 P.2d at 35-36. The last clause of rule
51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
embodies the same concept. See State v.
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-22 (Utah 1989).
In the present case, Fire Insurance has not
begun to make the showing required by
rule 51. Here, there was simple failure of

trial counsel to preserve a arrow technical
objection to an instruction. See Hansen v.
Stewart, 761 P.2d at 17. Therefore, we
decline to consider its challenge to the
fraud instruction.
[12-15] We next address Fire Insurance's contention that the evidence was
insufficient to support a finding of fraud
and that the trial court erred in refusing to
grant a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("j.n.o.v."). Before we
consider this contention, we note the standard of review. In deciding whether to
grant a new trial, a trial court has some
discretion, and we reverse only for abuse
of that discretion. In passing on a motion
for a j.n.o.v., however, a trial court has no
latitude and must be correct. Id.9 Appellate review of a trial court's denial of
either motion based on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, however, is governed by one standard because of the differing degrees of discretion we accord trial
courts in ruling initially on these motions.
Id. Under that standard, we reverse only
if, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.
Hansen, 761 P.2d at 17; King v. Fereday,
739 P.2d 618, 620-21 (Utah 1987); PriceOrem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown, & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 57-58 (Utah 1986).
[16,17] To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury
verdict, the one challenging the verdict
must marshal the evidence in support of
the verdict and then demonstrate that the
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict. E.g.,
Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co.,

9. In citing Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah
1988), we note one point in which the lead
opinion may be misleading. It states that "a
new trial may be granted whenever there is
evidence that would have permitted entry of a
judgment for the losing party." Id. at 17. This
statement is an accurate statement of the standard to be applied by an appellate court reviewing a trial court's grant of a new trial under rule
59(a)(6). Read as a statement of the standard to
be applied by a trial court addressing a new
trial motion, it is inaccurate. A trial court cannot grant a new trial if there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict for either party and
the judge merely disagrees with the judgment of

the jury. Mere disagreement is not a sufficient
basis on which to set aside a verdict and order a
new trial. King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 621
(Utah 1987); Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins,
Brown, & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 57-58
(Utah 1986); see also C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2803 (1973).
Rather, a trial judge may properly grant a new
trial under rule 59(a)(6) when he or she can
reasonably conclude that the verdict is clearly
against the weight of the evidence or that there
is insufficient evidence to justify the verdict as
more fully explained in Goddard v. Hickman,
685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984); see also Wellman v.
Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961).
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704 P.2d 573, 577 n. 3 (Utah 1985); Scharf
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah
1985). Here, Fire Insurance has made no
attempt to marshal the evidence in support
of the jury finding of fraud. In fact, all
Fire Insurance has done is argue selected
evidence favorable to its position. That
does not begin to meet the marshalling
burden it must carry. We do not sit to
retry the facts. See Cambelt InVl Corp. v.
Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987);
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 R2d 766, 769
(Utah 1985). This failure alone is grounds
to reject Fire Insurance's attack on the
fraud finding. E.g., Hansen, 761 P.2d at
17; Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150
(Utah 1987); Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d
478, 483 (Utah Ct.App.1991).
Even if we were to review the record
evidence for support, we would reject Fire
Insurance's attack. The Crookstons alleged seven theories under which fraud
could be found, and a casual review of the
record indicates that there is ample evidence on at least one of the Crookstons'
fraud theories to sustain the verdict.
We have previously restated the elements of fraud as follows:
(1) That a representation was made;
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact;
(3) which was false;
(4) which the representor either (a) knew
to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he [or she] had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representation;
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other
party to act upon it;
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity;
(7) did in fact rely upon it;
(8) and was thereby induced to act;
(9) to his [or her] injury and damage.
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-45, 247
P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952); see also Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124,
126 (Utah 1982); Kohler v. Garden City,
10. Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
"Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive
fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and
unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons ar-

639 P.2d 162, 166 (Utah 1981); Wright v.
Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah
Ct.App.1990). See generally 37 Am.Jur.2d
Fraud and Deceit §§ 432-436 (1968). We
also stated in Pace that the elements of
fraud must be proven by ''clear and convincing evidence/' Pace, 122 Utah at 143,
247 P.2d at 274.
[18] One of the seven theories upon
which the Crookstons relied was that on
June 16, 1982, Clapperton misrepresented
to Klemm that Fire Insurance was not yet
in a position to settle the claims and that he
would include the Crookstons in any settlement negotiation. Clapperton made these
representations knowing that he was prepared to settle with the bank that very day.
There is ample evidence to support these
factual claims.
[19] As for Fire Insurance's challenge
to the jury's finding that reliance was reasonable and that the alleged misrepresentation did not damage the Crookstons, the
record substantiates that the jury could
have found by clear and convincing evidence that the Crookstons relied on Clapperton's representation that the company
was not ready to settle and were induced to
inaction thereby, with the result that Fire
Insurance was able to settle the matter
with the bank without their participation
for an unfairly low amount. The inadequacy of the amount paid the bank by Fire
Insurance set in motion the events that
ultimately resulted in the Crookstons'
bankruptcy and the ensuing harm. Therefore, we find no error in the denial of both
the j.n.o.v. and the new trial motion on this
ground.
[20,21] Fire Insurance's next claim is
that the award of compensatory and punitive damages violates the ban on excessive
fines and the due process provision of the
Utah Constitution. See Utah Const, art. I,
§ 9; Utah Const, art. I, § 7.10 Fire Insurance did not, however, raise these arguments before the trial court and has therefore waived any right to present them on
rested or imprisoned shall not be treated with
unnecessary rigor." Utah Const, art. I, § 9. Article I, section 7 provides: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law." Utah Const, art. f^§d7 I) t
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appeal.11 See, e.g., Ream vlWitzen, 581
P.2d 145, 148-49 (Utah 1978); Bullock v.
Joe Bailey Auction Co., 580 P.2d 225, 228
(Utah 1978); Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d
405, 407 (Utah 1977); State Road Comm'n
v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 300, 495 P.2d
817, 821 (1972).
Fire Insurance also attacks the jury's
verdict under rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule provides that a trial court can grant a new
trial if the damages awarded are "excessive [in amount] ... appearing to have
been given under the influence of passion
or prejudice." Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(5). Fire
Insurance contends that both the compensatory and the punitive damage awards
meet this test and that the trial court erred
in denying its motion for a new trial or a
remittitur. In support of its contention,
Fire Insurance relies on a number of our
prior decisions in which we reduced or reversed awards of compensatory or punitive
damages on grounds they were "excessive." See, e.g., First Security Bank of
Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d
591, 598-99 (Utah 1982) (upholding total
compensatory damages of $36,000 but cut11. Regarding the claimed due process violations, we note that the United States Supreme
Court recently held that the procedures followed under Alabama law in awarding and reviewing punitive damage awards were adequate
and did not violate the federal due process provision. See Pacific Mutual Ins. Co. v. Haslip, —
U.S.
, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991);
see also Browning-Ferns Indus, v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 2923,
106 L.Ed.2d 219, 242 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88, 108 S.Ct. 1645, 1655-56,
100 L.Ed.2d 62 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493
So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986), Alabama implemented a
procedure requiring a post-trial hearing in cases
involving punitive damages wherein the judge
must state on the record the reasons for revising
or upholding the jury's award See generally D.
Blan & J. Hart, The Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages, December 1990 For the Defense 12,
20. The procedure has now largely been enacted by statute See Ala.Code § 6-11-23 (Supp
1990). The standards followed bv courts of this
state in the past for awarding punitive damages,
and certainly the standards we today adopt for
review of punitive damage awards, are at least
as stringent as, if not more stringent than, those
followed in Alabama
12. Other cases in which we have reduced or
vacated and remanded damage awards include

ting punitives from $100,C JO $50,000 and
compensatories for emotional distress from
$25,000 to $12,500).12
Fire Insurance correctly points out that
in the present case, the amount of both
compensatory and punitive damages
awarded is far greater than the awards
reduced m many prior cases and that the
ratio of punitives to compensatories is higher than has been sustained in any of our
prior cases where large dollar awards were
made. Essentially, Fire Insurance contends that the results in those cases, when
considered together, amount to a determination of what constitutes "excessive"
damages as a matter of law, damages that
we have concluded must have been the
result of passion or prejudice. Fire Insurance asks that even if we sustain the finding of liability for fraud, we make a reduction in the amount of both compensatory
and punitive damages. Alternatively, it
asks that we remand for a new trial on the
issue of damages.
In deciding whether Fire Insurance's
claim has any merit, we have reviewed
Jensen v Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P.2d 98
(Utah 1985) (upholding compensatories of
$1,400 but remanding for reduction of punitives
of $100,000 as grossly disproportionate); Bundy
v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984)
(remanding for reduction a $25,000 punitive
award as grossly disproportionate to compensatory damages of $2,133 where court found a low
degree of malice and there were no findings as
to defendant's wealth); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669
P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) (compensatory damages
of $59,600 upheld but punitive award of $25,000
reversed for failure to establish defendant's net
worth), Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah
1983) (reducing punitives from $12,000 to
$6,000 based on lack of findings as to defendant's wealth where compensatories were
$9,000, $7,500 of which were "soft"), Kesler v.
Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975) (reducing punitives from $10,000 to $5,000); Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1975) (reducing punitives already below compensatory damages with
no explanation); Nance v. Sheet Metal Workers
Intl Assoc., 12 Utah 2d 233, 364 P 2d 1027 (1961)
(reversing $40,000 punitives entered by trial
court where jury had awarded none and where
there were only nominal compensatory damages), Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267
P.2d 759 (1954) (punitives of $25,000 reduced to
$5,000 where compensatories were $50,000).
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many of our prior decisions passing on
claims that damage awards were "excessive." We have also reviewed many of our
prior cases considering claims that a trial
court had abused its discretion in granting
or denying a motion for a new trial. Collectively, this review has left us dissatisfied
with the state of the case law. There is
little consistency either in our statements
of the appropriate standard of review to be
applied or in the standard we have actually
applied. Sometimes, we have approached
such cases as though we were reviewing a
trial court's review of the verdict,13 while
at other times, we appear to have directly
reviewed the verdict, ignoring any intermediate actions by the trial court14
Because the standard-of-review law is
confused in this area, we must attempt to
clarify it before considering the merits of
Fire Insurance's claim. Today, we attempt
to bring some order to the processes used
in determining and reviewing damage
awards. We will address the relative roles
of the jury, the trial court, and the appellate court. We will also address the substantive standards for determining the lawfulness of a particular award. Our discussion of the subject will be divided into three
parts. First, we will address the standard
of review to be applied by a trial court
considering a motion that attacks the
amount of a jury's damage award. Second,
we will discuss the standard of review to
be followed by an appellate court reviewing
a trial court's decisions on a challenge to a
jury's damage award. Third, we will explain the substantive standards by which
the damage award is to be judged. Finally,

we will apply these standards to the decision of the trial court here.
The first part of our clarification effort
requires an explanation of the standard of
review to be applied by a trial court in
ruling on a motion for a new trial attacking
the amount of the jury's award. Initially,
we note the procedural posture in which
claims that a particular damage award is
excessive generally come before the trial
court because it is critical to understanding
the relative roles of jury, trial court, and
appellate court. After a jury returns a
damage award in a civil case, the most
common way for the losing party to challenge the amount of the award is to move
for a new trial or remittitur under rule
59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 59(a) provides in part:
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions
of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to
all or any of the parties and on all or part
of the issues, for any of the following
causes ...:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of
the court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion
by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages,
appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that
it is against law.

13. Cases in which we seem to defer to the trial
381, 386-87, 105 P.2d 176, 178 (1941) (trial court
accorded great latitude).
court include Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41
(Utah 1980) (deferring to trial court stating that
14. See, e.g„ Terry v. ZCM.L, 605 P.2d 314, 327its action on the award lends solidarity); Holda28 (Utah 1979) (reversing remittitur and reinway v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77, 80, 505 P.2d 295, 296
stating original award), rev'd on reh'g, 617 P.2d
(1973) ("[W]e cannot say that the trial judge
700 (1980); Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d at 1329
abused his discretion in not further reducing
(reducing trial court award without explanathe amount of punitive damages."); DeVas v.
tion); Falkenburg v. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 270, 269
Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 140, 369 P.2d 290, 295
P. 1008, 1013 (1928) (reducing punitives of
(1962) (action of trial court lends verity to ver$5,000 to $1,500 where compensatories were
dict, although court speaks of reviewing jury
$362.50 while stating that court defers to trial
directly); Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350,
court in assessing damages except where, as
353-54, 366 P.2d 701, 703-04 (1961) (trial court
here, they are so disproportionate as to be exupheld if reasonable); Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah
cessive as a matter of law).
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(7) Error in law.
Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a).15
[22,23] The general rule governing the
grant of a new trial is that the trial court
must find at least one of the seven grounds
listed in rule 59 to be met.16 See Hancock
v. Planned Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185
(Utah 1990); Tangaro v. Marrero, 13 Utah
2d 290, 292 n. 2, 373 P.2d 390, 391 n. 2
(1962); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d
84, 89-90 (Utah Ct.App.1989). In the context of a challenge to the amount of an
award, two of those grounds are pertinent,
subparts (5)—excessive damages—and
(6)—insufficient evidence. If the court
finds that a new trial is warranted on one
of these grounds as to the amount of the

award, it may encourage
e parties to
come to some mutually agreeable solution
rather than incur the time and expense of a
new trial. The court often does this, in the
context of a damage award, by proposing a
remittitur or additur to the jury's award of
damages. See Utah State Rd. Comm 'n v.
Johnson, 550 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1976);
Ruf v. Association for World Travel
Exch., 10 Utah 2d 249, 249, 351 P.2d 623,
623 (1960); Bourne v. Moore, 11 Utah 184,
186, 292 P. 1102, 1103 (1930); Geary v.
Cain, 69 Utah 340, 347, 255 P. 416, 420
(1927); Eleganti v. Standard Coal Co., 50
Utah 585, 592, 168 P. 266, 268 (1917). The
parties may then accept the alteration and
avoid a new trial or reject the proposal and
begin anew.17 If the party against whom

15. It should be noted that although many of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure differ only slightly, if at all, from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 59 is different. The Utah rule
lists seven exclusive grounds on which a new
trial may be granted. In contrast, the federal
rule simply states that a new trial may be granted "for any of the reasons for which new trials
have heretofore been granted in actions at law
in the courts of the United States." Fed.R.Civ.P.
59(a)(1); cf. Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a).
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122
F.2d 350 (4th Cir.1941), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit provided an
articulate history of rule 59, tracing it back to
the 17th century. Quoting from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it stated:
[Ability to grant new trials] is a power to
examine the whole case on the law and the
evidence, with a view to securing a result, not
merely legal, but also not manifestly against
justice,—a power exercised in pursuance of
sound judicial discretion, without which the
jury system would be a capricious and intolerable tyranny
[I]t was a power the
courts ought to exercise unflinchingly.
Id. at 353 (quoting Smith v. Times Publishing
Co., 178 Pa. 481, 36 A. 296, 298 (1897)). The
court continued:
[The jurors] are not, and have never been,
independent of the court of which they are a
part, but their verdicts must meet the approval, or at least they must not offend the sense
of justice, of the presiding judge, who, as the
late Justice Grier, of the supreme court of the
United States, was fond of saying, was by
virtue of his [or her] position "the thirteenth
juror."
Id. (citations omitted). The court noted that
Lord Mansfield had also recognized the necessity of "a power, somewhere, to grant new trials."
Id. (quoting Bright v. Enyon, 1 Burrows 390
(1757)).
Finally, the court went on to explain the
uniqueness of the standard of review for new

trial motions due to the facts that the trial court,
in reviewing the jury, must give them some
deference and that the appellate court must
defer to the trial judge in further reviewing the
decision. Unlike directing a verdict, which a
trial judge may do "only where there is no
substantial evidence, [a vjerdict may be set
aside and new trial granted, when the verdict is
contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, or
whenever in the exercise of a sound discretion
the trial judge thinks this action necessary to
prevent a miscarriage of justice." Id. at 354
(citations omitted).
Although the Fourth Circuit's review was related to the development of the federal rule,
Utah's rule is based on the same rationale.
Utah has simply chosen to delineate specific
exclusive grounds, which the federal courts
have not done. We accept the Fourth Circuit's
summary in Aetna Casualty as largely accurate.
16. Those portions of Utah's rule 59 with which
we are concerned date back at least to 1888,
when rule 59's predecessor was part of Utah's
Code of Civil Procedure. See 1888 Utah Laws
ch. 8, § 3400. These provisions have remained
largely unchanged since that time. The statute
was apparently modeled after a similar California provision enacted in 1851. See 1851 Cal.
Stat. ch. 5, § 193, at 81 (current version enacted
in 1872). Utah's original version of the law,
adopted in 1870, was modeled after this California provision. See 1870 Utah Laws ch. 7, art. 2,
§ 193. Although the Utah provision changed
repeatedly until 1888, the 1888 version is substantially similar to that now found in rule 59 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. For that
reason, our review of relevant case law includes
reference to many Utah decisions that antedate
the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in 1951.
17. Federal courts also allow for such a procedure. "A remittitur gives the plaintiff a choice.
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the motion is brought rejects the proposal,
the court may then grant a new trial on the
issue of damages.

Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 57-58 (Utah
1986); see Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381,
386-87, 105 P.2d 176, 178 (1940).18

[24] Under our rule 59, it is well settled
that, as a general matter, the trial court
has broad discretion to grant or deny a
motion for a new trial. Hancock, 791 P.2d
at 184-85; Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988); Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 186, 389 P.2d 736, 736
(1964); Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co.,
15 Utah 2d 257, 261, 391 P.2d 290, 292-93
(1964); Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 394, 407, 98
P. 300, 305 (1908). The precise nature of
that discretion and what constitutes an
abuse, however, are not clearly stated in
many of our individual cases, though perhaps it may be gleaned from a collective
reading of them. In the context of a new
trial motion attacking the amount of a jury
verdict under subparts (5) and (5) of rule
59(a), it is the responsibility of the trial
court to review the amount of the award to
ensure that the jury has acted within its
proper bounds. If the verdict does not
satisfy the requirements of 59(a)(5) or (6),
the judge must uphold the award.

[27] If the trial court determines that a
new trial is warranted and grants the motion, it should describe the basis for its
decision in the record such that an appellate court can have the benefit of those
reasons. In Saltas v. Affleck, Justice Moffat, speaking for this court, described why
such a statement of reasons is necessary:
In order to eliminate speculation as to
the basis of the exercise of judicial discretion in granting new trials, the record
should show the reasons and make it
clear the court is not invading the province of the jury. The trial court should
indicate wherein there was a plain disregard by the jury of the instructions of
the court or the evidence or what constituted bias or prejudice on the part of the
jury. If no reasons need be given the
province of the jury may be invaded at
will. With no indication as to the basis
for exercise of the power vested in the
court to grant new trials the appeal tribunal would be left to analyze the matter
from the evidence, the record, and the
instructions. It would be required to
search out possible reasons for agreeing
or disagreeing with the trial court in the
exercise of a discretion. The exercise of
judicial discretion must be based upon
some facts notwithstanding great latitude is accorded the trial court in such
matter.
Saltas, 99 Utah at 386-87, 105 P.2d at 178
(citation omitted).
[28] Thus, in passing on a motion for a
new trial, if the trial court cannot reasonably find that the jury erred, it should deny
the motion. On the other hand, if the trial
court can reasonably conclude that there
was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict or it is manifestly against the weight
of the evidence in violation of rule 59(a)(6)
or that the jury acted with passion or preju-

[25,26] The reason that any determination as to whether the jury exceeded its
proper bounds is best made in the first
instance by the trial court is that the trial
judge is present during all aspects of the
trial and listens to and views all witnesses.
Therefore, he or she can best determine if
the jury has acted with "passion or prejudice" and whether the award was too small
or too large in light of the evidence. The
trial judge is free to grant or deny a motion
for a new trial if it is reasonable to conclude that the jury erred. Wellman v.
Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961).
On the other hand, the trial court cannot
grant a new trial merely because it disagrees with the jury's judgment. King v.
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 621 (Utah 1987);
Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown, &
He [or she] can refuse to accept the reduced
amount of damages and instead proceed to a
new trial." 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2815 (1973).

18. But cf. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17
(Utah 1989) (stating that trial judge may grant
new trial whenever there is evidence to support
different verdict). This statement in Hansen is
clarified in footnote 9 of this opinion.
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dice contrary to rule 59(a)(5), * nay grant
the motion and order a new trial.
[29-31] We next address the standard
of review by which an appellate court reviews a trial court decision to grant or deny
a new trial motion challenging a verdict as
excessive under rule 59. In reviewing the
judge's ultimate decision to grant or deny a
new trial, we will reverse only if there is no
reasonable basis for the decision.19 See
Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d at 353, 366
P.2d at 703; see also State v. Petersen, 810
P.2d 421, 426-427 (Utah 1991). For example, even if the jury's award appears supported by substantial evidence on appeal, if
the trial judge could reasonably conclude
that the jury had acted in a manner covered by the grounds stated in rule 59(a)(5) or
(6), an order granting a new trial will be
upheld on appeal. Wellman, 12 Utah 2d at
354, 366 P.2d at 704. Similarly, a trial
court's decision to deny a new trial will be
upheld if there is a reasonable basis to
support that decision.20
In light of the foregoing, some statements about standards of review in prior
cases can be read as misleading, though
not actually incorrect. For example, in
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), we
stated that a "reviewing court will defer to
a jury's damage award unless the award
indicates that the jury disregarded competent evidence." Id. at 1084 (citations omitted); see also Batty v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d
1040, 1043 (Utah 1978). See generally
Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d
754 (Utah 1984); First Security Bank of
Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d
591 (Utah 1982). This statement of the
standard, though perhaps not an inaccurate
characterization of the test to be applied by
19. We note that if, as a preliminary matter prior
to the ultimate determination of the motion, the
judge relies on legal principles which are erroneous or facts which are wholly without record
support, this may also constitute grounds for
reversal. See State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421,
426 (Utah 1991); State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774,
at 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991).
20. We note that the trial court's discretion with
regard to denying a motion for a new trial or a
remittitur on the issue of punitive damages is

a trial court faced with a
trial motion
under rule 59, is inaccurate it it purports to
state the standard of review by which an
appellate court determines the propriety of
a trial court's decision to grant or deny a
new trial. The statement can be read to
mean that this court reviews the jury's
action directly, when in reality we review
the trial court's action for an abuse of
discretion.21 It is this type of loosely worded standard which has, over time, effectively confused the appellate court's proper
role in assessing the merits of a rule 59
motion attacking a jury verdict with that of
the trial judge. E.g., Bennion, 701 P.2d at
1083-84; Bundy, 692 P.2d at 758-59; First
Security, 653 P.2d at 599; Batty, 575 P.2d
at 1043.
Having, we hope, clarified the respective
roles of the trial and appellate courts as
they pertain to rule 59 attacks on jury
verdicts, we now consider the merits of
Fire Insurance's challenge to the amount
of compensatory and punitive damages
awarded by the jury. Fire Insurance contends that both compensatory and punitive
damages are excessive. Because issues of
law and policy differ as to each type of
damages, we consider these claims separately.
We first address the compensatory damage award. Fire Insurance relies on First
Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., as support for its claim that
the compensatory damages are excessive.
The Crookstons' economic loss amounted to
approximately $323,399. Fire Insurance
argues that the remaining $492,427 awarded to the two Crookstons, who are no longer married, for emotional and mental distress and loss of financial reputation is
excessive. Fire Insurance argues that the
soft compensatory damages in this case are
further limited by other conditions as explains!
later in this opinion. See infra notes 24-31 and
accompanying text.
21. We note that in Bennion, no new trial motion
was presented to the trial court and, thus, this
court was considering the issue de novo. Stt
Bennion v. LeGrand Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078.
1083-84 (Utah 1985). We use this statement ol
the standard in Bennion as an example simply
because of the possibility that it may be misread.
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ring to and I am not in the least peranalogous to the damages for emotional
distress in first Security, which were cut
suaded that the jury in this case overfrom $25,000 to $12,500 on appeal. In
stepped their [sic] bounds in awarding
First Security, this court stated that damexcessive general damages and punitive
ages for emotional distress should be
damages. On the contrary, this case, in
awarded with caution. Id. at 598; see also
my judgment, could well have resulted in
Gumbs r. Pueblo InVl, Inc., 823 F.2d 768, greater damages than were awrarded by
773 (3d Cir.1987).
the jury.
In the present case, Judge Frederick con[32,33] While it is true, as we stated in
sidered the excessiveness of the compensaFirst
Security, that soft compensatory
tor}- damages when Fire Insurance moved
damages,
i.e., for pain and suffering, must
for a new trial or a remittitur. He concluded not only that the amount awarded was be awarded with caution, "[w]hen the dejustified by both the law and the evidence, termination of the jury has been submitted
but that even a higher amount would have to the scrutiny and judgment of the trial
been appropriate. He made the following judge, his [or her] action thereon should be
regarded as giving further solidarity to the
observations:
judgment"
Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d
During the course of the ten or so days
that we tried the case, it was my obser- 37, 41 (Utah 1980). Or, as we said in
vation that indeed we were dealing here Geary v. Cain, 69 Utah at 358, 255 P. at
n
with conduct which was pernicious, perni- 423, "[I] case of doubt, the deliberate accious not merely in the sense of the tion of the trial court should prevail. Othdefendant's] having taken und[ue] ad- erwise this court will sooner or later find
vantage of the insureds, the Crookstons, itself usurping the functions of both the
in treating their claim in a high-handed jury and the trial court.,, Id. These statefashion, but pernicious further in the ments in Elkington and Geary are consistsense that clear, unequivocal misrepre- ent with our statement of the appropriate
sentations were made by agents of the appellate standard of review today.
defendant to the plaintiffs and to their
counsel, and as if that were not suffi[34] The judge's determination to deny
cient, pernicious in the form of conduct, a new trial on this issue was reasonable in
which, whiie it may not have been geared light of the law and the facts. See Doelle
to create emotional harm and suffering v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-*79 (Utah
to the plaintiffs, was, at the very least, in 1989); In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d
reckless disregard of their rights by deal- 885, 886 (Utah 1989). In addition, Judge
ing sub wsa with the bank and there- Frederick articulated support for the award
after closing the file and advising the in the record. Although his statements
plaintiffs to file, the claim file would be could have been more specific, they were
closed.
sufficient to justify his upholding the comIn making an ultimate determination of pensatory damage award. See Saltas, 99
the propriety of the award, Judge Freder- Utah at 386-87,105 P.2d at 178. We therefore uphold the trial court's decision to
ick stated:
I have reviewed my notes and I recall the deny a new trial on the question of compen22
evidence in the regard that I am refer- satory damages.
22. Although Fire Insurance also contends on
appeal that me court failed to allocate attorney
fees bervveen the bank and Fire Insurance, that
argument was not raised below and is therefore
waived. Set: State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29
(Utah 1«0\
Fire Insurance also argues that the award
here so shxks "one's conscience [as] to clearly
indicate passion, prejudice, or corruption on the
part of the ;un." Duffy v. Union Pacific R.R.,

118 Utah 82, 89, 218 P.2d 1080, 1083 (1950)
(citations omitted). Therefore, Fire Insurance
contends that regardless of the trial court's action, this court can and should reverse or reduce the award as we did in First Security, 653
P.2d at 598-99; see also Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1
Utah 2d at 372, 267 P.2d at 764; Duffy, 118 Utah
at 91-92, 218 P.2d at 1085. We stated in Bundy
v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d at 760, "It is well
settled that when an award of punitive damages
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[35] We next consider th. claim that
the punitive damage award was excessive,
warranting a new trial. The jury awarded
$4,000,000 in punitive damages, which Fire
Insurance claims is excessive under rule
59(a)(5) for the same reasons it argued that
the compensatory damage award is excessive. Any motion for a new trial on the
question of punitive damages requires that
the trial court engage in a two-part inquiry: 23 (i) whether punitives are appropriate at all, i.e., whether the evidence is
sufficient to support a lawful jury finding
of defendant's requisite mental state, see
Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(6); Elkington v. Foust,
618 P.2d at 41; Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d
354, 359-60 (Utah 1975); Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Utah 1975), and
(ii) whether the amount of punitives is excessive or inadequate, appearing to have
been given under the influence of passion
or prejudice. See Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(5).

1186 (Utah 1983) (citatio. omitted); see
also Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 304,
117 P. 54, 57 (1911). Here, although Fire
Insurance's motion for a new trial on damages did not expressly raise 59(a)(6)
grounds, the trial court, in passing on the
new trial motion, did conclude that there
was substantial record evidence to support
the jury's determination that Fire Insurance acted with reckless disregard of
Crookston's rights. We also note that the
jury properly found intentional fraud.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court correctly concluded that Fire Insurance had
acted with the mental state required for
punitives.

As to the second inquiry required—
whether the amount of the award was appropriate—Judge Frederick articulated the
same basis for denying a new trial on the
amount of punitives as he did for denying
[36] With regard to the first inquiry the motion on the amount of compensatorequired of the trial judge, under our case ries. However, punitives are, by nature,
law, punitives are allowed only where there not to compensate but to punish and deter
is " 'wilful and malicious' conduct, ... or future egregious conduct and are grounded
... conduct which manifests a knowing on wholly different policies. Moreover, the
and reckless indifference toward, and dis- amount of punitives awarded here exceeds
regard of, the rights of others." Behrens the bounds of the general pattern set by
v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, our prior decisions. Therefore, we vacate
is determined to be excessive or otherwise inappropriate, this court may order a new trial on
the issue of damages or, in the alternative, remission of a portion of the punitive damages by
the plaintiff." Id. While it is true that this
court has the power to grant a new trial in an
appropriate case, we will do so only according
to the standard v^ e adopt today, i.e., we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the trial
judge in making a decision on a motion for a
new trial. Such a decision will be upheld if
there is a reasonable basis for it based on the
law and the facts. This court's statement in
Duffy applies equally here:
The verdict here was admittedly liberal. But
the mere fact that it was more than another
jury, or more than this court, might have
given, or even more than the evidence justified, does not conclusively show that it was
the result of passion, prejudice, or corruption
on the part of the jury.
Duffy, 118 Utah at 89, 218 P.2d at 1083 (citations
omitted).
23. The legal elements that must be met to sustain an award of punitive damages are now
largely controlled by statute, although the statute does not apply to this case because it is

made applicable only to claims for punitive
damages arising on or after May 1, 1989. 1989
Utah Laws ch. 237, § 4. Section 78-18-1 provides that before any punitive damages can be
awarded, the finder of fact must be shown "by
clear and convincing evidence that the acts or
omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of
wilful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent
conduct, or conduct tha: manifests a knowing
and reckless indifference :oward, and disregard
of, the rights of others." I*:ah Code Ann. § 7818-l(l)(a) (Supp.l990>. Therefore, a judge
faced with a new trial mccon must ensure that
the evidence is sufficien: :n this point before
upholding any award. The*? standards do not
apply to punitives arising : -: ot the operation of
a motor vehicle while v:l;ruarily intoxicated.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-: 1Kb).
of a defendant's
Under the statute, eva<
wealth would be admiss:^> only after the jury
had properly determinec :rj: an award of punitive damages was prober Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-18-1(2). Addition^ 50 percent of any
punitives awarded in excess x $20,000 is remitted to the state treasurer SJT:rr payment of attorney fees and costs. Ui&r C ode Ann. § 7 8 - 1 8 1(3).
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the trial court's ruling on the new trial
motion and remand for reconsideration.
We will now give a detailed explanation
for this portion of our holding.
As we noted earlier in this opinion, a
review of our case law on punitive damages
has left us dissatisfied with articulated
standards for determining the amount of
such awards. These standards provide little guidance for either a jury fixing the
punitive damages, a trial court reviewing a
challenge to the amount of such an award,
or an appellate court reviewing a trial
court's grant or denial of a new trial on
grounds of an inadequate or excessive
award. We have, however, found that the
results of our prior cases dealing with challenges to damages, taken as a whole, provide patterns that furnish useful guidance
as to what constitutes an excessive award.
Based on these patterns, we now craft a
set of guidelines that retain the advantages
of flexibility but clearly set parameters beyond which awards may not go without
some expressed justification. This framework should bring some predictability to
this area of the law and should permit
courts to more explicitly address the considerations that come into play in fixing the
amount of punitive damage awards.
The stated list of factors we have said
must be considered in assessing the
amount of punitives to be awarded include
the following seven: (i) the relative wealth
of the defendant; (ii) the nature of the
alleged misconduct; (iii) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct; (iv)
the effect thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and others; (v) the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct; (vi) the
relationship of the parties; and (vii) the
amount of actual damages awarded. See
Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d
754, 759 (Utah 1984); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 771 (Utah 1985). Our
cases have done little more than list these
factors. No relative weights have been
assigned them, and no standards or formulas have been established for properly evaluating them when making an award or
when reviewing the propensity of a jury
award. This makes such an enterprise

highly problematic for judge and jury. The
finder of fact has no guidance on how
much weight to give each factor or even
how the factors should be assessed. And
nothing suggests to the jury or the trial
court that there is any sort of limit or
ceiling on an award.
There is nothing uniquely vague about
the punitive damage standards set out in
our cases. Many other jurisdictions have
quite similar lists of factors that are supposed to guide the award of punitives. See
American College of Trial Lawyers, Report
on Punitive Damages of the Committee
on Special Problems in the Administration of Justice 3-7 (Mar. 3, 1989) [hereinafter "Report on Punitive Damages"]
(such vague standards are problematic nationwide). And, quite predictably, the bases for awards made in those jurisdictions
are no more fathomable than ours. The
problem that results from this lack of guidance to juries and trial courts is exemplified by disparate ratios of punitive to actual damages that appear in separate cases
involving similar conduct.
It might be argued that widely disparate
punitive damage awards by separate juries
for the same conduct reflects only the
weakness of the jury system, not the weakness of the list-of-factors standard for measuring punitives. But that explanation
fails where it is confronted with the fact
that appellate courts in different jurisdictions applying essentially the same standard have reached wildly different conclusions as to what ratio of actuals to punitives is legitimate under the pure list-offactors approach. Compare Employers
Mut Casualty Co. v. Tompkins, 490 So.2d
897 (Miss. 1986) (upholding punitives of
$400,000 and actuals of $500, a ratio of 800
to 1) with Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d
1325 (Utah 1975) (reducing punitives from
$3,000 to $1,000 where actuals were $5,537,
with no explanation). The Alabama Supreme Court has noted the weakness in the
list of factors used in Alabama, which is
quite similar to Utah's list:
[F]or the same conduct, one insurance
company and its special agent were punished by a punitive damages award of
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$21,130.86 ... and another
urance
company and its special agent were punished by a punitive damages award of
$2,490,000.... The instruction given to
the juries in those two cases were substantially the same.
... [T]he standard by which the jury is
to gauge the amount of punitive damages, if any, that it is to award is incomprehensibly vague and unintelligible
Under such a "standard," one jury can
award $21,130.86 and another $2,490,000
for the same "wrong."
Charter Hosp. of Mobile, Inc. v. Weinberg,
558 So.2d 909, 916-17 (Ala.1990).
Many states have recognized the problems created by giving finders of fact essentially standardless discretion to award
punitive damages and have legislatively determined that trial courts may not sanction
punitive damage awards that exceed actual
damages by a certain ratio. See, e.g., Colo.
Rev.Stat. § 13-21-102 (1987) (punitives cannot exceed actual damages); Fla.StatAnn.
§ 768.73(l)(a) (1989) (punitives cannot exceed three times actual damages); Okla.
Stat.Ann. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987) (punitives
can only exceed actual damages if clear
and convincing evidence of fraud, malice,
oppression, or wanton or reckless disregard
for other's rights); see also Report on
Punitive Damages 5 n. 21.
At least one court has fixed a rough ratio
ceiling by judicial decision. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in considering an award of punitive
damages in an intentional business tort
case under Texas law, stated, "A formula
of punitive damages equal to three times
compensatory damages is a fairly good
standard against which to assess whether a
jury abused its discretion." Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 331 (5th
Cir.1981).
Other states have imposed strict dollar
ceilings on punitive damage awards. See,
e.g., Ga.Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp.1990)
($250,000 ceiling except in cases of product
24. See Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah
1985); Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702
P.2d 98 (Utah 1985); Synergetics v. Marathon
Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah

liability or intentional tort); *-\Code Ann.
§ 8.01-38.1 (Supp.1990) ($35^00 ceiling).
The courts of both Connecticut and Michigan have judicially imposed bright-line
limits on punitive damage awards. See,
e.g., Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v.
Silver, 154 Conn. 116, 127, 222 A.2d 220,
225 (1966) (limiting punitives to compensate
for expenses of litigation); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich.
401, 419-21, 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (1980) (only
allowing what it termed "punitives" to
compensate for "soft" or intangible harm).
The advantages of imposing bright-line
ceilings on punitive awards are obvious. A
ceiling provides unmistakable guidance to
juries, trial courts, and appellate courts.
However, the absolute ceiling approach is
too mechanical and could potentially defeat
the very purpose of punitive damages. See
generally Phillips, A Comment on Proposals for Determining Amounts of Punitive
Awards, 40 Ala.L.Rev. 1117 (1989); Mallor
& Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a
Principled Approach, 31 Hastings L.J. 639
(1980) [hereinafter Mallor & Roberts]. For
example, strict dollar amount, percentage
of the defendant's wealth, and ratio ceilings all would allow potential defendants to
calculate their exposure to liability in advance, thus diminishing the deterrent effect of punitive damages. In addition, such
absolute ceilings do not provide the flexibility needed to deal adequately with the type
of case that involves only minimal actual
damages, but where the conduct of the
defendant is so flagrant as to justify a
large punitive award. See generally Mallor & Roberts at 666-67.
Bearing in mind the weaknesses of reliance on a list-of-factors standard alone
and the weaknesses created by absolute
ceilings, whether legislatively or judicially
created, we conclude that when considered
together, the language and pattern of results from our prior cases provide a basis
for finding a middle ground.24
1984); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah
1984); Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah
1983); Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657
P.2d 267 (Utah 1982); Leigh Furniture 6 Carpet
Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982); First
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Among the seven factors we have repeatedly listed that should be considered in
determining the amount of a punitive damage award is the "amount of actual damages." E.g., Bundy, 692 P.2d at 759. Although we have not articulated any standard for determining the importance to be
assigned this factor, we have said that the
amount of a punitive damage award generally must bear a "reasonable and rational"
relationship to the actual damages.25 Id.
The punitive damage awards we have characterized as violating this "reasonable and
rational" relationship rule have been labeled "grossly disproportionate" to the actual damages awarded and have been said
to be the result of passion or prejudice.
These awards have been either reduced by
this court directly or remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings. See, e.g.,
Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702
P.2d 98, 101 (Utah 1985).
Although vague in its articulation, an
examination of the results of our cases
shows that in its operation, this "reasonable and rational" relationship principle has
produced some fairly predictable results.
Generally, we have found punitive damage
awards below $100,000 not to be excessive
only when the punitives do not exceed actual damages by more than a ratio of approximately 3 to l.26 See, e.g., Von Hake v.
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); Branch
v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267
(Utah 1982); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d
37 (Utah 1980); Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah
Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc.,
653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982); Clayton v. Crossroads
Equip. Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Terry v.
Z.C.M.L, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on
other grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Co., 678
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d
354 (Utah 1975); Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d
1325 (Utah 1975); Holdaway v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d
77, 505 P.2d 295 (1973); Powers v. Taylor, 14
Utah 2d 152, 379 P.2d 380 (1963); DeVas v.
Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962);
Nance v. Sheet Metal Workers Intl Assoc, 12
Utah 2d 233, 364 P.2d 1027 (1961); Holland v.
Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P.2d 989 (1960);
Ostertag v. La Mont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 339 P.2d
1022 (1959); Sadleir v. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26,
296 P.2d 278 (1956); Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah
2d 362, 267 P.2d 759 (1954); Evans v. Gaisford,
122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952).

2d 152, 379 P.2d 380 (1963); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962);
Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d
431 (1952).
Because of the limited number of cases
considering large awards, it is more difficult to note a particular pattern once the
award exceeds approximately $100,000.
However, it is safe to say that these large
awards appear to receive more scrutiny
than the smaller awards and that the acceptable ratio appears lower. See, e.g.,
Von Hake, 705 P.2d at 772 (Stewart, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (majority opinion upholding $500,000 punitives—1 to 1
ratio); Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching
Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1113 (Utah 1985) (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting) (majority
upholding $200,000 punitives—lh to 1 ratio). In one such case, when the ratio
exceeded 2 to 1, we reduced the award on
grounds of excessiveness. See First Security Bank, 653 P.2d at 598-99 (reducing
$100,000 punitives—3 to 1 ratio—to $50,000—2 to 1 ratio).
[37,38] The general rule to be drawn
from our past cases appears to be that
where the punitives are well below $100,000, punitive damage awards beyond a 3 to
1 ratio to actual damages have seldom been
upheld and that where the award is in
excess of $100,000, we have indicated some
inclination to overturn awards having ratios of less than 3 to 1.
25. Although this is only one of the factors identified by this court to date to be considered in
determining an appropriate amount of damages, it is one which is more concretely definable and which we today further refine to give
better guidance. We leave for another day the
possibility of further refining other factors we
have previously identified, as well as the possibility that additional factors may be developed
as we consider particular situations presented to
us in the course of reviewing trial court rulings.
26. A few cases have upheld punitives above a 3
to 1 ratio. See Ostertag v. La Mont, 9 Utah 2d
130, 339 P.2d 1022 (1959) (upholding punitives
of $860 to actual damages of $140); see also
Falkenburg v. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 270, 269 P.
1008, 1013 (1928) (reducing punitives to $1,500
where actuals were $362.50).
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In these patterns, we find th guidelines
emerge for trial courts faced with challenges to punitive damage awards on the
grounds of excessiveness under rule
59(a)(5). If the ratio of punitive to actual
damages falls within the range that this
court has consistently upheld, then the trial
court may assume that the award is not
excessive. In denying a rule 59(a)(5) motion for a new trial, the trial court need not
give any detailed explanation for its decision if the punitive damage award falls
within this ratio range. If the award-exceeds the ratios set_hy our past pattern of
decision, the trial courtis^iot—bound to
reduce it. However, if such an award is
upheld, the trial judge must make a detailed and reasoned articulation of the
grounds for concluding that the award is
not excessive in light of the law and the
facts. The judge's articulation should generally be couched in terms of one or more
of the seven factors we earlier listed as
proper considerations in determining the
amount of punitive damages, unless some
other factor seems compelling to the trial
court. For example, a trial court might
conclude that an award should stand, despite a ratio that is higher than we have
generally approved, because the defendant
displayed an extremely high degree of malice, e.g., actual intent to harm27 or a high
degree of likelihood of great harm based on
the reprehensible nature of the act.28
In addition to articulating support for the
amount of the award in terms of the relevant factors, the judge may also want to
explain why the large ratio of punitives to
actuals is necessary in the context of the
particular case in order to further the purposes of punitive damages "by punishing
and deterring outrageous and malicious

conduct [or conduct wh
manifests a
knowing or reckless indifference toward,
and disregard of, the rights of others]
which is not likely to be deterred by other
means." Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1112;
see also Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp.,
675 P.2d at 1186. In sum, the trial judge's
articulation should explain why the award
is not excessive despite the fact that it
exceeds the general pattern of awards upheld in our prior cases. The purpose of
this requirement for an articulation of reasons warranting the denial of the rule
59(a)(5) excessiveness motion is to permit
more effective and reasoned appellate review of the decision to uphold the award
and to enable the appellate court to more
carefully consider the various factors that
may warrant punitives and the weight to
be accorded them, while giving adequate
deference to the advantaged position of the
trial judge to appraise the witnesses and
the evidence. Such appellate review will
presumably lead to more substantive analysis of the punitive damage standards than
has been heretofore possible.
[39,40] Should the trial court decide to
either reduce or enlarge an award of punitive damages by way of remittitur or additur, it should also explain its action. See
Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 386-87, 105
P.2d 176, 178 (Utah 1940) (requiring such
an explanation when the trial court grants
a new trial motion). Factors that may justify a remittitur could include the fact that
the award exceeded the proper ratio, lack
of intent or a low degree of malice, the
benign nature of the act, the fact that a
substantial portion of the actual damages
is "soft," thus making the ratio analysis
suspect,29 or a substantial risk of bankrupt-

Ford Motor Co. v. Havlick, 351 So.2d 1050, 1050
27. See, e.g., Cox v. Stolworthy, 496 P.2d 682, 690
(Fla.Ct.App.1977) (upholding award of $1,740,(Idaho 1972) (exemplary damages in deceptive
000 against Ford).
for-profit business scheme should make the cost
of such repetitive antisocial conduct uneconomical), overruled in part, Cheney v. Pahs Verdees 29. Our past cases, taken together, also establish
a distinction between "hard" and "soft" actual
Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 665 P.2d 661, 667
damages when used as a basis in determining
(1983).
the appropriate amount of punitive damages.
Where actual damages are largely "soft," this
28. See, e.g.t Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119
court has been reluctant to uphold punitive
Cal.App.3d 757, 174 Cal.Rptr. 348, 388 (1981)
damage awards of a ratio that might survive
(upholding punitive award of $3.5 million for
scrutiny if the actual damages involved were
"conscious and callous disregard of public safe"hard." Compare Von Hake v. Thomas, 705
ty in order to maximize corporate profits");
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ing the defendant. The articulation of
grounds for a remittitur or an additur
should serve the same salutary purpose on
appeal as where a motion for a new trial is
denied.
[41] Returning to the present case, and
applying the standards we articulate today,
we conclude that we must vacate the denial
of the motion for a new trial and remand
the matter for reconsideration by the trial
court in light of the foregoing discussion.
At this time, we express no opinion as to
whether a remittitur should be granted on
remand. However, if one is again denied,
the trial judge must explain the reasons for
denial under the standards set forth above,
given the large proportion of the compensatory damages arguably attributable to emotional distress or loss of financial reputation and the fact that the ratio of punitives
to ccmpensatories here appears to be much
higher than in any case where we have
upheld a punitive damage award.

for some concrete loss, is most appropriately scrutinized within a 59(a)(6) framework
because subsection (6) claims "[insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or
other decision, or that it is against the law"
as ground upon which a new trial may be
granted. Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(6). Generally, hard compensatory damages will be either supported by the evidence or not.
While it may be appropriate generally to
consider hard compensatory damages under subsection (6), the case may be different with soft compensatory damages,
which constitute a majority of the compensatory damages awarded in this case. At
times, those may more properly be addressed under the "passion or prejudice"
framework of rule 59(a)(5).

[44] We note one final problem that
could result from the standard we articulate today, which gives considerable deference to the trial court in passing on motions for new trials based on a claim of
[42,43] Finally, a review of our cases damage excessiveness. We do not wish to
leads us to observe that a motion for a new encourage parties who may try to bypass
trial challenging the amount of a punitive the trial court by appealing an excessive
damage award is most appropriately damage award directly without moving for
brought under rule 59(a)(5), while a motion a new trial and thus benefit from a less
challenging an award of hard actual dam- deferential standard on appeal. To avoid
ages is more appropriately brought under such an anomalous result, and because of
rule 59(a)(6). We note this because in re- the highly subjective nature of appraisal
viewing damage awards in the past, this required in assessing the excessiveness of
court has at times seemed to merge a rule an award, we hold that any challenge to an
59(a)(5) and (6) analysis. See generally award based on its excessiveness that is
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., brought before an appellate court will be
701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985); Wellman v. considered under the same standard articuNoble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961); lated today for reviewing trial court deciWeber Basin Water Conservancy Dist v. sions on motions for a new trial. If no new
Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958). trial motion was filed below, we will asa
A challenge to the amount of an award sume that the trial court considered such
30
motion
sua
sponte
under
rule
59(d)
and
of hard compensatory damages, which by
definition are to compensate the plaintiff denied the motion.
First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards,
P.2d 766 (Utah 1985) and Jensen v. Pioneer
Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P.2d 98 (Utah 1985) and
Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) (all involving
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 largely "soft" damages).
P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985) and Bundy v. Century
Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) and Leigh 30. Rule 59(d) provides that "the court of its own
violation may order a new trial for any reason
Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293
for which it might have granted a new trial on
(Utah 1982) and Clayton v. Crossroads Equip.
motion of a party." Utah R.Civ.P. 59(d). If no
Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982) (all involving
motion was filed below and the trial court did
"hard" damages) with Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669
not grant a motion sua sponte, the effect is the
P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) and Cruz v. Montoya, 660
same as if the trial court had considered and
P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) and Branch v. Western
denied the motion. Thus, it is reasC^tfBe fi
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982) and
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[45] The course we take : ,y should
produce sounder decision making by trial
and appellate courts. First, we plainly fix
the primary responsibility of reviewing the
amount of punitive damage awards on the
court best equipped to perform such a review—the trial court.31 We make it plain
that the appellate court's role is to review
the trial court's new trial ruling rather
than the jury's verdict directly. Second,
we give some context to the term "excessive" in rule 59(a)(5) through the imposition
of an operatively presumptive ceiling, albeit a soft one. Finally, through the requirement of an articulation of reasons for
sustaining or modifying damage awards,
we establish a mechanism for the further
development of the law. The express consideration of the norms by which awards
are determined will promote careful review
by both trial and appellate courts of the
policies underlying punitive damages and
the facts pertinent to a vindication of those
policies on a case-by-case basis. See Report on Punitive Damages 13-15 (advocating a flexible formula based on the amount
of compensatory damages to determine the
appropriate amount of punitive damages).
A sounder law of punitive damages should
result.
The trial court's order denying the motion for a new trial on grounds that the
punitive damage award was excessive is
vacated, and the motion is remanded to the
to apply the same standard of review for punitive damage awards whether they are on appeal
from a trial court's refusal to grant a new trial
or on direct appeal. We note, however, that we
so hold with regard to punitives only because of
the highly subjective nature of punitive damage
awards. By so interpreting rule 59(d) with regard to punitive damage awards, we do not
intend to imply that a similar interpretation of
the rule will be given as it relates to other types
of damages or to other grounds upon which
new trials may be granted.
31. Some may argue that allowing the trial court
to consider in the first instance the propriety of
the jury's award of punitives and to reduce or
increase the award if it deems appropriate violates the plaintiffs right to trial by jury. We
certainly are not advocating that the trial court
substitute wholesale its own judgment for that
of the jury. See, e.g., Hancock v. Planned Development Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990)
(trial court has no discretion to grant new trial
8l7P2d—19

trial court for further ecus
ation in light
of this opinion. The judgment against Fire
Insurance is affirmed in all other respects.
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice
(Concurring with Reservations):
I concur but write to express my reservation about some statements in the majority
opinion as to when it is appropriate for the
trial court to grant a new trial on the
ground contained in Rule 59(a)(6), which is
"[insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the verdict or other decision, or that it is
against law." I prefer not to express any
opinion as to the law governing the granting of a new trial when the motion to grant
is premised on that ground. This is because Fire Insurance, in its motion for a
new trial, in its argument to the trial court
at the hearing on its motion, and in its brief
and argument to this court, has relied only
on Rule 59(a)(5), which allows a new trial to
be granted when there has been "[excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to
have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice."
The majority opinion correctly states and
applies the law governing this ground. We
need not go further and attempt to restate
the law governing other grounds for a new
trial and examine, overrule, and criticize
absent showing of at least one circumstance in
rule 59). Rather, we are recognizing that the
trial judge is in a better position to determine in
the first instance the appropriateness of the
award.
Our holding today in no way results in the
loss of a plaintiffs right to a jury trial. A trial
judge, in proposing a remittitur or additur, only
does so as an alternative to granting a new trial.
This is true because a trial judge may only remit
the damages if he or she finds them excessive or
add to them if he or she finds them inadequate—which is one of the grounds for granting
a new trial. Thus, if a plaintiff does not want to
accept the proposed remittitur, he or she may
elect to retry the matter.
In addition, as we have already pointed out, a
trial judge may not substitute judgment for the
jury. Rather, the judge must be able to articulate a reasonable basis for the inappropriateness of the verdict. Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah
2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961); Saltas v. Affleck, 99
Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176 (1941).
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our cases arising under those grounds, especially in brief footnotes.
I also refrain from expressing any opinion as to whether a motion for a new trial
which challenges an award of "hard actual
damages" is more appropriately brought
under Rule 59(a)(6). In addition, I fail to
see how an appellant could benefit by declining to move for a new trial but instead
appealing directly an excessive damage
award. In fact, there is an obvious disadvantage to that strategy. Therefore, I do
not think we need assume that the trial
court considered and denied a motion for a
new trial sua sponte under Rule 59(d).
STEWART, Justice (Concurring in Part
and Dissenting in Part):
I agree with much of what the majority
states about the standards to be employed
under Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, but I have reservations
about several points in the opinion concerning the trial and appellate standards for
dealing with motions for new trials, and I
disagree with the ultimate disposition of
the punitive damages issue. I concur in all
other parts of the opinion.
The sole issue raised on appeal in this
case with respect to the award of punitive
damages is that they were "excessive" under Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 59(a) specifies seven
grounds for granting a new trial by a trial
court. Subpart (5) provides that a trial
court may order a new trial if it finds that
the jury returned "excessive or inadequate
damages" that appear "to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice." The majority uses that contention
of error as a springboard to launch into a
sweeping, and in some instances confusing,
discussion of the operation of Rule 59(a).
In parts of the discussion, it appears that
the majority is defining standards for all of
Rule 59(a), but in other parts the majority
seems to address issues that arise only
under subparts (5) and (6), although the
latter subpart is not before the Court and
has not been argued by the parties.
I think it appropriate to note that although a verdict may be supported by

some evidence, the trial court may set that
verdict aside under subpart (6) if the verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence so "that the trial judge 'cannot in
good conscience permit it to stand/ " Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah
1984) (quoting Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah
2d 435, 441, 326 P.2d 722, 726 (1958)
(Crockett, J., concurring)). See also
Brown v. Johnson, 24 Utah 2d 388, 391,
472 P.2d 942, 944 (1970); Hyland v. St.
Mark's Hosp.y 19 Utah 2d 134, 137, 427
P.2d 736, 738 (1967); Efco Distrib., Inc. v.
Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 380, 412 P.2d 615,
617-18 (1966); King v. Union Pacific R.R.,
117 Utah 40, 45-49, 212 P.2d 692, 695-96
(1949); 6A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's
Federal Practice H 59.08[5] (1991). In
Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah
1984), and Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730
(Utah 1982), we held that the standard of
review on appeal of an order granting a
new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) is that the
order will be sustained "if the record contains 'substantial competent evidence which
would support a verdict for the [moving
party]/ " 657 P.2d at 732 (quoting King v.
Union Pacific R.R, 117 Utah at 53, 212
P.2d at 698).
In dealing with the standard of review
that an appellate court should utilize in
reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion
for a new trial, the majority states that
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), is a
case that has contributed to confusion with
respect to the proper standard because that
case stated that a "reviewing court will
defer to a jury's damage award unless the
award indicates that the jury disregarded
competent evidence...." 701 P.2d at 1084.
The majority then asserts that if that statement purports to state the standard of
review by which an appellate court determines the propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a new trial, it is
incorrect. The majority further states:
The statement can be read to mean that
this court reviews the jury's action directly, when in reality we review the trial
court's action for an abuse of discretion.
It is this type of loosely worded standard
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which has, over time, e
tively confused the appellate court's proper role in
assessing the merits of a rule 59 motion
attacking a jury verdict with that of the
trial judge.
Maj. op. at 805 (citation omitted).
The confusion that the majority finds is
based on its misreading of Bennion.
There was no issue of the propriety of the
grant or denial of a new trial motion in
Bennion.* This Court was simply asked to
review directly the validity of the award of
damages. Although Rule 59(a) was argued
by the appellant in Bennion as if it established standards for reversing a verdict on
appeal, there was no motion for a new trial
made in the trial court, and the issue before this Court was the standard for reviewing a damage award directly on appeal. In short, the majority's loose analysis is used to argue that it is necessary to
restate our case law because it is inaccurate. I disagree.

Clearly, the proper a
)ach is for an
appellate court to review tne award of punitive damages straight-out in light of the
various factors set out in the majority opinion for determining the reasonableness of
punitive damages. Compare Bennion, 701
P.2d at 1084, which states that to justify a
new trial for excessive damages under
Rule 59(a)(5), the damage award must be
"clearly excessive on any rational view of
the evidence." Although that statement
was not made in the context of a punitive
damage award, it is an appropriate standard to be applied in light of the six relevant factors referred to by the majority to
be considered in determining the validity of
a punitive damage award. Applying usual
appellate standards to the review of a punitive damage award is altogether sound.
There is no reason to devise a fictional
procedure to justify an unnecessary and
inappropriate result. Given the difficulties,
it is important to recognize that the majority's view is strictly dictum. There was in
fact a motion for a new trial in this case.

Indeed, the majority contrives a strange,
hypothetical procedure to justify an inappropriate standard of appellate review of
punitive damage awards not reviewed by
the trial court on a motion for a new trial.
The majority states that in cases in which a
motion for a new trial is not made and an
appeal is taken directly from the award of
punitive damages, an appellate court will
assume that the trial court sua sponte
considered and denied a hypothetical motion. This hypothetical motion and ruling
is then made the basis for applying the
same standard of review in direct appellate
review of an award of punitive damages as
is applied when a motion for a new trial is
actually made and denied by the trial court
and that ruling is then appealed. Such an
approach is unnecessary and if literally applied would lead to serious difficulties. After assuming the hypothetical motion and a
ruling by the trial court denying it, an
appellate court must then, according to the
majority, determine if the trial court would
have abused its discretion in denying the
hypothetical motion.

The defendant in this case argues that its
net income for the year of its misconduct
was $23,000,000 and that a $4,000,000 puni-

1. Although the majority notes this distinction in
footnote 21, it does not explain how Bennion
could be misread as to the proper standard of

review when considering the denial or grant of
a motion for a new trial when no such issue was
before the Court.

The majority remands this case to the
trial court for the trial judge to state his
reasons for sustaining the award of punitive damages. In explaining the factors
the trial judge may examine, the majority
opinion, in my view, unduly emphasizes the
relationship of the punitive damages to
compensatory damages. That relationship
is certainly not determinative, but is only
one of many factors to be considered. In
the context of this case, it is significant
that our prior cases have not dealt with
punitive damages awarded against a multimillion dollar corporation. Of greater significance than the relationship of the punitive and compensatory damage awards are
the other factors which have been enumerated in our cases, such as the financial
resources of the defendant and the likelihood that a defendant will continue its malicious conduct.
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By excluding misdemeanor convictions
which carry a maximum possible imprisonment of six-months, from the reach of the
federally protected right, the Court has implicitly qualified the scope of its later cases
concerning jury size.13
Since the present conviction falls within
this category, i. e., a misdemeanor offense
with maximum possible imprisonment of
six-months, the defendants have no federally protected right to a jury trial and, therefore, can claim no right to a six-member
panel.14
Because the defendants were
granted the full panoply of rights secured
by state law including "a speedy trial by an
impartial jury," 15 their convictions must be
upheld.16
WILKINS, HALL and STEWART, JJ.,
concur.
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their entitlement, assured by Article I, Section 12 of our Utah Constitution, of a trial
by jury under the same prescription for a
jury as has existed in Article I, Section 10
since statehood.

( o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^

GUARANTY NATIONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Barbara J. MORRIS, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 16207.
Supreme Court of Utah.

CROCKETT, Chief Justice (concurring in
result):

May 12, 1980.

I agree with the affirmance of the convictions because the defendants have had

Insurer brought action against its insured seeking reimbursement for personal

13. See Ballew v. Georgia, supra note 2, 435
U.S. at 229f 98 S.Ct. at 1033. ["The right (to a
jury trial) attaches in the present case because
the maximum penalty for violating Sec. 262101, as it existed at the time of the alleged
offenses, exceeded six-months imprisonment"];
see also Burch v. Louisiana, supra note 2, 441
U.S. at 136, 137, 99 S.Ct. at 1627. ["While
readily admitting that the line between six
members and five was not altogether easy to
justify at least five Members of the Court believed (in Baldwin) that reducing the jury to
five persons in nonpetty cases raised sufficiently substantial doubts as to the fairness of the
proceeding and proper functioning of the jury
to warrant drawing the line at six.'* (Emphasis
added)].

der consideration to fall within the category
related historically to public nuisance and not
public disorders. The present offense, i. e.,
driving under the influence of alcohol, was considered by the Rodgers Court as falling within
the latter category and thus distinguishable
from the infraction involved in Colts; see
Hamilton v. Walker, 65 N.M. 470, 340 P.2d 407,
409 (1959); see also District of Columbia v.
Clawans, supra note 5, 300 U.S. at 625, 57 S.Ct.
at 662; see also State v. Roth, 154 N.J.Super.
363, 381 A.2d 406 (1977); State v. Amick, 173
Neb. 770, 114 N.W.2d 893 (1962).

14. Cf. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S.
63, 51 S.Ct. 52, 75 L.Ed. 177 (1930). In Colts
the Supreme Court concluded a driving infraction to be of such a nature as to require a jury
trial. However, in Colts the offense charged
was not the "slight offense of exceeding the
twenty-two mile limit of speed, subdivision (a),
or merely [with] driving recklessly, subdivision
(b)(1); but [with] the grave offense of having
driven at the forbidden rate of speed and recklessly, 'so as to endanger property and individuals' " at 72, 51 S.Ct. at 53. The Court distinguished this offense from that considered in
State v. Rodgers, 91 N.J.L. 212 (1917). In endorsing the delineation between petty and serious traffic violations discussed in Rodgers, the
Court concluded the reckless driving then un-

15. Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution, provides: "In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right
to appeal on all cases. . . . "
16. We express no opinion concerning second
offenses of driving under the influence of alcohol or the reckless or negligent operation of a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
See 41-6-44(d) and (e).
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injury protection payments paid to her under Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance
Act. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, G. Hal Taylor, J., granted insurer's
motion for summary judgment, and appeal
was taken. The Supreme Court, Crockett,
C. J., held that PIP insurer would be liable
for reasonable amount of attorney fees incurred by insured in obtaining settlement
against third-party tort-feasor to extent
that insurer benefited from such settlement
and from insured's willing reimbursement
of PIP benefits.
Vacated and remanded.
Insurance <3=>601.25
PIP insurer was liable for reasonable
amount of attorney fees incurred by insured in obtaining settlement against thirdparty tort-feasor to extent that insurer benefited from such settlement and from insured's willing reimbursement of PIP benefits. U.C.A.1953, 31-41-1 et seq.
Kent M. Kasting and Gary E. Atkin of
Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis, Salt Lake
City, for defendant and appellant.
Timothy R. Hanson and David H. Epperson, of Hanson, Russon, Hanson & Dunn,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
CROCKETT, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff Guaranty National Insurance
Company brought this action against its
insured, defendant Barbara J. Morris, seeking reimbursement for personal injury protection (PIP) payments it paid to her under
the "Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance
Act." l
The stipulated facts are: On December
16, 1975, Mrs. Morris was involved in an
automobile accident with a Mr. Rick Chapman, whose insurer was State Farm Insurance Company (hereinafter State Farm).
Pursuant to its policy with the defendant,
the plaintiff paid no-fault benefits of
$2,030.21 for her medical expenses and
$757.40 for her loss of earnings.

On June 24, 1976, the plaintiff notified
State Farm of its claim for reimbursement
of the PIP benefits it had paid. On November 9, 1976, State Farm advised the plaintiff that the defendant Morris had retained
the services of an attorney to pursue her
claim against Chapman and that the reimbursement request could not be dealt with
until the claim of their insured (Mrs. Morris) against Chapman had been resolved. A
few months later, State Farm further advised the plaintiff that negotiations with
the defendant were still pending.
About two years after the accident occurred, the defendant Morris arrived at a
settlement with State Farm on the claim
against Chapman for $14,000. The release
recited that it was "a full and final .
settlement of any and all claims, .
[for] injuries and damages
arising out of the aforesaid accident." State
Farm issued two checks, one which was
payable jointly to the defendant Morris and
her attorney, Mr. Kent Kasting, for $11,212.39 for all other damages, and the other
payable jointly to plaintiff herein, Guaranty
National Insurance, and Mr. Kasting, for
$2,787.61, expressly stated to be reimbursement for the PIP benefits plaintiff had paid
to Mrs. Morris.
On January 6, 1978, Mr. Kasting advised
the plaintiff that the defendant had settled
her claim with State Farm. He also explained that the $14,000 settlement, which
resulted from his efforts and from which
plaintiff Guaranty National received its reimbursement of $2,787.61, was also subject
to his one-third contingency attorney's fee.
Wherefore, Mr. Kasting claimed $928.27
from plaintiff. The plaintiff refused to pay
that fee and instituted this suit for reimbursement for the entire PIP payment.
The trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, stating that
the plaintiff had
no obligation to the defendant
for attorneys' fees or costs with
respect to
the no-fault pay-

1. Section 31-41-1 ee seq., U.C.A.1953.
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ments and benefits paid to defendant
Defendant concedes that the plaintiff is
entitled to that part of her recovery from
State Farm which represents the PIP benefits that had been paid to her by the plaintiff.2 But the defendant asserts that since
it was due to the efforts of herself and of
her attorney that the $14,000 settlement
was obtained, and from which plaintiff is
able to obtain reimbursement for its PIP
payments, the plaintiff should bear its fair
proportion of the attorney fee thus incurred. The plaintiffs rejoinder is that the
defendant's attorney is claiming a fee for
services which the plaintiff neither requested, desired nor authorized and, if it is required to pay those fees when section 3141-11, U.C.A.1953, provides for reimbursement between insurers, insurance costs will
increase rather than decrease, as was intended by the legislature.3
Recent decisions of this Court have construed the rights of insurers and insureds
under our No-Fault Act. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. /vie,4 this Court held that a
no-fault insurer who has paid PIP benefits
to its insured is not entitled, by way of
subrogation, to reimbursement of those
funds from a subsequent recovery by its
insured against the third-party tortfeasor
or his insurer. Rather, as was explained in
that case, any reimbursement claimed by
the PIP insurer is to be sought in an arbitration proceeding between the insurance
companies of the respective parties, as provided in section 31-41-11, U.C.A.1953. The
gist of the decision was that the PIP payment would not be considered as part of
any settlement between the injured party
and the third-party tortfeasor or his insurer.

claim against the third-party tortfeasor for
$14,000 and from that recovery, similar to
the instant case, plaintiff Street willingly
agreed to the reimbursement of her own
insurer for her PIP benefits, in that instance $4,601.98. However, she claimed
that there should be deducted therefrom a
reasonable attorney's fee for the benefit
resulting to her insurer by reason of the
settlement that had been obtained. In that
case, this Court recognized that in appropriate circumstances and where it has had
notice, a subrogated insurance carrier
should pay its fair share of an attorney's
fee and costs which have been incurred in
protecting its interests.6 We noted in the
Street case that the trial court had made no
findings as to whether any benefit had been
conferred upon the PIP insurer and the case
was remanded for a determination of that
fact.
Consistent with our decision in the Street
case, the trial court's refusal to require the
plaintiff to participate in the payment of
the defendant's attorney's fees on her tort
claim against Chapman is vacated. This
case is remanded for further proceedings to
determine whether, by the defendant's obtaining the $14,000 settlement, any benefit
was conferred upon the plaintiff, and if so,
the reasonable amount of attorney's fees to
be allowed to the defendant. Costs to defendant (appellant).
MAUGHAN, WILKINS,
STEWART, JJ., concur.

Subsequently, in Street v. Farmers Insurance Co.,1 the injured party settled her
2. In that regard, this case is different from
Allstate Insurance Co. v. /vie, Utah, 606 P.2d
1197 (1980)

4. Supra, note 2

3. Section 31-41-2 provides that* "
The intention of the legislature is hereby to
possibly stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings in, the rising costs of automobile accident
insurance

6. Id

5. Utah, 609 P.2d 1343 (1980).
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Donald J. JAMISON, Sr., et al., Plaintiffs
and Respondents,
v.
UTAH HOME FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 14523.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 20, 1977.
Parents, whose 12-year-old son was involved in collision with pickup truck while
son was riding bicycle, brought action
against truck drivers insurer to recover on
basis of No-Fault Insurance Act. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., J., awarded parents
disability benefits of $12 per day for foss of
son's household services and awarded parents $475 in attorney fees, and insurer appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J.,
held that son's household chores were not
chores for which his family would "reasonably have incurred" expenses within meaning of No-Fault Insurance Act provision,
but that award of attorney fees would not
be disturbed.
Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opinion in which Ellett, J., concurred.
1. Statutes e=>184
Background and purpose of a statute
may be looked to for purpose of ascertaining its meaning and proper application in
particular circumstances.
2. Insurance ®=* 467.61
Provisions of No-Fault Insurance Act
should be construed in conformity with
principle that purpose of insurance is to
indemnify for losses or damages suffered,
as contrasted to gambling for a munificent
reward if a loss occurs. U.C.A.1953, 3 1 41-1 et seq.
3. Damages <s=»184
Generally, an award of damages cannot
be based on mere possibility or conjecture;

such an award must be supported by proof
on which reasonable minds acting fairlj
thereon could believe that it is more probable, than not, that damage was actually
suffered.
4. Insurance &=> 513.4
Twelve-year-old boy's household chores,
which allegedly consisted of taking out the
garbage, washing dishes, vacuuming carpet,
helping carry in groceries and washing car
during summer, were not chores for which
his family would "reasonably have incurred" expenses within meaning of NoFault Insurance Act provision which in effect provides for an allowance of $12 per
day "in lieu of reimbursement for expenses
which would have been reasonably incurred
for services that, but for the injury, the
injured person would have performed for
his household and regardless of whether
any of these expenses are actually incurred." U.C.A.1953, 3 1 ^ 1 - 1 et seq., 3 1 41-6, 31-41-6(l)(b)(ii).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
5. Insurance <§=»675
Award of attorney fees of $475 to
plaintiffs in action in which recovery was
sought against an insurer on basis of NoFault Insurance Act would not be disturbed
on appeal, in view of fact that exhibit,
which showed details and time of certain
payments made by insurer, was not included in record on appeal and in light of fact
that there was evidence as to reasonableness of the attorney fee. U.C.A.1953, 3 1 41-1 et seq.

L. L. Summerhays, of Strong & Hanni,
Salt Lake City, for defendant-appellant.
Gaylen S. Young, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs-respondents.
CROCKETT, Justice:
The issue involved herein is plaintiffs*
asserted right to recover from the defendant insurance company $12 per day for loss
of household services of their 12-year-old
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son as coming within the meaning of Section 31^1-6(l)(b)(ii), U.C.A.1953, which is
quoted below. From a determination on
that issue in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding disability benefits at $12 a day for 112
days, totaling $1,344, and attorney fees totaling $475 and costs, the defendant appeals.
Inasmuch as the recovery sought is based
on the No-Fault Insurance Act, the exact
details as to how the accident occurred are
not material to the issue involved. There is
no dispute about the fact that while Donald
was riding his bicycle on Highland Drive
about 3700 South in Salt Lake County on
November 19, 1974, he was involved in a
collision with a pickup truck driven by Boyd
D. Lemon, who was insured by the defendant, nor that Donald suffered bruises and
contusions, injuries to his hip and a broken
nose. He was hospitalized for a week, then
remained at home until after the Christmas
holidays when he was permitted to attend
school, but was not given an outright release by his doctor until March 11, 1975.
This totals the 112 days during which plaintiff says he was not able to perform the
household services hereinafter listed.
The parties reached an agreement and
the court approved a settlement as to other
aspects of the case for Donald's injury,
medical and hospital expenses. But, they
were unable to agree upon, and therefore
stipulated to reserve for determination by
the court, the issue as to plaintiff's rights to
any further damages as disability benefits
under the No-Fault Insurance Act, and as
to attorney's fees.
The statute of concern here, Section 3 1 41-6(l)(b)(ii), states:
in lieu of reimbursement for
expenses which would have been reasonably incurred for services that, but for
the injury, the injured person would have
performed for his household and regardless of whether any of these expenses are
actually incurred, an allowance of $12 per
day commencing not later than three
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days after the date of the injury and
continuing for a maximum of 365 days
thereafter, . . . . [Emphasis added.]
[1] The view of this statute advocated
by the plaintiff is that it mandates an automatic award of $12 per day for injury to
any member of a household who would have
performed services of any nature, however
much or minimal, and whether their value
is great or small. As it is but natural to
expect, the defendant takes a differing
view and argues that the statute is not
susceptible to any such interpretation. We
have no hesitancy in agreeing that the interpretation and application of the law
should be a process of reason, as contrasted
to a mere reading of tables or schedules,
nor that when controversies arise it is both
permissible and desirable to look to the
background and purpose of a statute to
ascertain its meaning and proper application in particular circumstances.
Since the advent of the automobile near
the turn of this century there has been a
constant and accelerating increase, both in
the number of automobiles and the speed at
which they travel, and a corresponding increase in injuries and damages resulting
from their use. This has resulted in ever
increasing insurance coverage and insurance costs, including various methods of
compelling insurance coverage. Consequent to this, due to the controversies and
litigation over who was at fault in such
accidents, with the attendant delays, uncertainties and expenses, the concept of NoFault Insurance arose. In enacting it, our
legislature determined as a matter of public
policy that some specified primary damages
as to necessary medical, hospital, and loss of
wages should be paid without undue delay.1
This objective is plainly stated in Sec.
31-41-2:
to effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of handling the
greater bulk of the personal injury claims
that arise out of automobile accidents

1. The No-Fault Insurance Act was enacted in 1973 as Chap. 55 S.L.U.1973, is now in our
Code as Sec. 31 4 1 - 1 , et seq.
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Another equally important and desirable
objective of the act, to be achieved in correlation with the foregoing, is coping with
the ever increasing costs of the insurance.
This is also clearly expressed in the language of the same section, stating that a
purpose of the act is to possibly stabilize, if
not effectuate certain savings in the rising
costs of automobile accident insurance.
Consistent with the general purposes just
stated, Sec. 31-41-7 provides a formula to
arrive at what the actual losses are; and
also provides that any benefits shall be reduced by other coverages, workmen's compensation or military benefits, which the
injured person receives. This idea finds
further support in Section 31-41-8, which
states that payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31-41-6 shall be made on
a monthly basis as expenses are incurred;
and that benefits are overdue if not paid
within 35 days after the insurer receives
"reasonable proof of the fact and amount of
expenses incurred.'1
To test the validity of plaintiff's contentions and how they coordinate with the
above stated objectives and provisions of
the statutes, such problems as this should
be considered: assume, e. g., a family where
there are eight or ten children, each of
whom does his assigned share of the family
chores. The family car has a collision and
all are injured. Does the insurer pay the
$12 per day X 10 = $120 per day? Or,
does the rule of reason apply?
However much we may desire it to be
otherwise, this fact might as well be accepted as inescapable: that insurance is a business, not a philanthropy. There can be no
free gifts or benefactions. In the long run
premiums must pay for losses; and therefore, increases in premiums must and will
be correlated to the extent of the coverage.
2.

3.
4.

Farmers Insurance Co. v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 13
Wash.App. 836, 537 P.2d 839 (1975); Oregon
Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Salzberg, 85
Wash.2d 372, 535 P.2d 816 (1975).
No bad faith is imputed in this case.
Cumis, Inc. Society v. Republic Nat. Bank,
480 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Civ.App.1972); Anderson

Otherwise, the business cannot continue to
operate. Someone has to pay the increased
premiums. That someone is the policyholders, i. e., the public. Accordingly, a seeming
generosity in broadening coverage in an
individual situation, would be no favor to
policyholders generally, nor to the public.
The principle which best serves the objective to be desired is to give both parties the
benefit of a sensible, even-handed and practical application of the statute, under the
assumption that all of its language was
used advisedly and in harmony with its
purposes.2 If the Act had intended reimbursement for any and all duties performed
by members of households, it could have
plainly so stated. But it does not do so.
Only by keeping the awards within reason,
and excepting therefrom claims that might
be unrealistic, fanciful, or perhaps even
fraudulent, 3 can the stated objective, "to
effectuate
. savings in the rising
costs of automobile accident insurance
." be accomplished. Otherwise it is
obvious that necessary increases in premiums would defeat, rather than promote, the
purposes of the Act.
[2] When the provisions of the sections
of the Act as quoted herein are considered
together in the light of that purpose, particularly the key statement in Section 31-416, wherein it speaks in terms of reimbursement "for expenses which would have been
reasonably incurred " it becomes plain that
the Act, both in its statement of general
purpose, and its specific provisions, was not
intended to provide an automatic reward or
a "windfall," for being involved in an accident by requiring payment when there was
no loss actually suffered, nor for any expense not reasonably to be incurred,4 but
should be construed in conformity with the
v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 203 A.2d 421
(D.C.Ct.App.1964); Barmeier v. Oregon Physicians Service, 194 Or. 659, 243 P.2d 1053 (Ore.
1952); Fire Assn. of Philadelphia v. Strayhorn,
211 S.W. 447 (Texas 1919); Whitney Estate Co.
v. Northern Assur. Co., 155 Cal. 521, 101 P. 911
(Cal.1909).
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lunaamentai principle of insurance law,
that the purpose of insurance is to indemnify for losses or damages suffered, as contrasted to gambling for a munificent reward if a loss occurs.5
The clause of the statute, "and regardless
of whether any of these expenses are actually incurred
.," was undoubtedly
included to eliminate the necessity of proof
and to prevent an insurance company from
claiming the benefit of services rendered
gratuitously by friends or relatives,6 which
otherwise would have to be paid for. But it
is still speaking of "expenses which would
have been reasonably incurred."
It seems commendable indeed that Donald assumed and discharged considerable
responsibility in the household. Particularly in view of the fact that he had two older
sisters, one 13 and one 14, and his parents,
all of whom were able to help. Donald's
contributions are summarized, with the
time for each, thus:
Took out the garbage daily (five minutes); washed dishes two or three times a
week (fifteen to twenty minutes); vacuumed carpet three or four times a week
(fifteen to twenty minutes); helped mother
carry in groceries from car each Friday (no
time given); and washed the car in the
summer once every week or two (no time
given).
In response to a question as to whether
the sisters and others helped with those
chores Mrs. Jamison testified:
Q. And they shared the household duties
around the house, did they with your son?
A. A little. My oldest one worked, and
my other one was mainly out tending. She
5.

U.C.A., Sec. 31-1-7 defines insurance as 4ta
contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify
another or pay or allow a specified or ascertainable amount or benefit upon determinable risk contingencies."

6.

See Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261,
409 P.2d 121 (1965).

7.

The dissent poses questions which are quite
different from and therefore not involved here.
But in the interest of avoiding misunderstand559 P.2d—21
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brought in extra money by going out tending.
Q. You say they didn't do the dishes
along with your son?
A. A little, yes. They helped around
the house, but Don did most of the chores
around the house because the girls were not
home that much.
Q. Did the manager of the apartment
have your walks cleaned for you?
A. I will say, sometimes.
Q. Did you ever complain to him about
not doing it?
A. Oh, definitely.
That's why we
moved out. We had a lot of complaints
with him.
Whatever view may be taken of the foregoing, for the purpose of dealing with the
issue presented in this case, we accept the
validity of the plaintiffs averment that,
"but for the injury, the insured (Donald)
would have performed his household duties
as recited herein." But, in accordance with
our understanding of the statute as hereinabove discussed, there remains the other
critical question: Is it reasonable to suppose
that the plaintiff's family would have hired
someone else and paid out money to do the
chores he lists.7
[3] In this connection, it is also pertinent to observe that the general rule is that
an award of damages cannot properly be
made on mere possibility or conjecture,
there must be a firmer foundation. That is,
any such award must be supported by proof
upon which reasonable minds acting fairly
thereon could believe that it is more probaing, we respond: It would seem that in both
examples there would be reimbursement. In
the first because they are the type of services
for which the family would reasonably incur
expenses: and the second because there would
be actual expenditures for that type of service.
Whereas here, we have concluded that the minor tasks done by Donald were not things for
which the family would have "reasonably incurred" expenses by hiring someone else to
perform.
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ble than not, that damage was actually
suffered.8
[4] Upon our consideration of the problem in the light of what has been said
herein, it is our opinion that reasonable
minds would not believe that the chores
done by Donald were something for which
the family would "reasonably have incurred" expenses, i. e., would have hired
someone else to do them and thus have
made a cash outlay. That being so, reimbursement for such services is not covered
by the statute.

were other claims in this lawsuit, and it is
really difficult to separate out time; and
looking at what generally, reasonably
would have been required to pursue just
this claim, I find that $475 would be a
reasonable attorney's fee for that
amount.
The exhibit showing the details and time
of other payments made by the defendant
insurance company was not included in the
record brought here. In order to overturn
the judgment, it is the appellant's burden to
affirmatively show that the trial court was
in error. In the absence of that record, and
because there is evidence as to the reasonableness of the attorney's fee, that portion of
the judgment should remain undisturbed.
But the award of $12 per day benefit is
reversed. The parties to bear their own
costs. (AJI emphasis in this opinion is added.)

[5] Concerning the award of $475 to the
plaintiffs as attorney's fees,9 the problem is
quite different and the record is somewhat
confused. This is undoubtedly due to the
fact that concern was focused upon the
main problem in the case, which we have
discussed above. There is concededly some
indication that the matter of attorney's fees
was tied to that problem. But, there are
also indications otherwise. In his summation the trial court included the following:
The insurance company knew then
what the nature of the claim was and
declined to make any payment within 35
days thereafter. And I suppose the counterargument is we were in litigation.
But I suppose the answer to that is we
were in litigation when medical expenses
were paid, and that took those out of this
present action.
So the court finds that the reasonable
sufficient proof of claim was given at one
or the other of those dates, and that the
amounts which the Court has heretofore
adjudged to be due as benefits under the
Act were not paid within 35 days. The
Court finds, therefore, that a reasonable
attorney's fee is provided for under the
Act under this circumstance, and further
finds that the sum of $475 is a reasonable
attorney's fee under all the circumstances. This is not taking into account there

The language of the section is clear, precise, specific and unambiguous and it is the
duty of this court to interpret as the legislature has expressed it.

8. As to the degree of certainty required to
prove loss or damage incurred, see Robinson v.
Hreinson, footnote 5 above.

that in an action to recover those expenses, the
insurer is required to pay reasonable attorney's
fees.

9. Section 31-41-8 provides that benefits under
the Act are overdue if not paid within 35 days
after the insurer receives notice and proof and

HENRIOD, C. J., and WILKINS, J., concur.
NOTE: The majority of the court had
acted in this case prior to the retirement of
Chief Justice HENRIOD. Its release was
delayed pending preparation of the dissent.
MAUGHAN, Justice (Dissenting).
We should affirm the trial court. All
references are to U.C.A.1953, as enacted
L.1973.
The majority opinion is premised on the
assumption that 31-41-6(l)(b)(ii) is ambiguous and that it is essential to apply the
rules of construction to determine the underlying legislative intention in order to
construe its provisions.
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(ii) in lieu of reimbursement for expenses which would have been reasonably
incurred for services that, but for the
injury, the injured person would have
performed for his household and regardless of whether any of these expenses are
actually incurred, an allowance of $12 per
day . .
The clear meaning of this statute is that
if the injured person would have performed
household services, but for the injury, he is
granted a flat allowance. The injured party in the instant case, washed dishes, took
out garbage, vacuumed carpets, assisted his
mother in carrying groceries, and washed
the car. The statute provides an allowance
for this labor, whether any expense was
actually incurred. The flat rate avoids the
necessity of proving the reasonable value of
each service performed. The effect of the
majority opinion is to engraft a valuation
requirement in contradiction of the express
terms of the statute, viz., whether the value
of the services is sufficient to merit the
employment of another to perform them.
Through judicial legerdemain the majority
opinion has amended the statute to conform
with the Massachusetts Act, Mass.Genrl.
Laws, Chapt. 90, Sec. 34A, Amended by
St.1970, C. 670, Sec. 1, which provides:
and for payments in fact
made to others, not members of the injured person's household and reasonably
incurred in obtaining from those others
ordinary and necessary services in lieu of
those that, had he not been injured, the
injured person would have performed not
for income but for the benefit of himself
and/or members of his household
. . [Emphasis supplied.]
Since Utah Act, Chapt. 41, Title 31, was
basically patterned after the Massachusetts
Act, the determination of the legislature to
depart from the benefit provisions has
great significance. The majority has it, to
be entitled to the statutory benefits, the
injured party must prove actual damages,
viz.; he must prove the household services
were of such a value to his family, that
through interruption of the performance,
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the family is compelled to hire someone
else, and make a cash outlay.
The phrase "regardless of whether any of
these expenses are actually incurred" has
been restricted to those instances where the
injured person fortuitously locates a good
Samaritan, who administers to his brother's
needs gratuitously. If a member of the
household performs the injured party's
household duty, no benefit need be paid is
the underlying philosophy of the majority,
which, in fact, coincides with the Massachusetts statute. In that statute the services
must be rendered by one who is not a
member of the injured party's household.
How would the majority apply its ruling
to the following fact situation: The mother
of five young children is injured. Her husband takes his annual vacation and performs the mother's regular household
duties. As father and husband, he is equally responsible for the care of his family.
Should the mother recover the statutory
allowance? What if the family has three
healthy teen-age daughters, who suffer
from a terminal case of laziness? The
mother is injured, and the family employs
someone to clean the house and cook the
meals. Should the statutory allowance be
denied because the daughters should have
performed these household services?
The legislative design of the statute was
to eliminate any valuation proof, e. g., were
the household services of minimal or great
value, and to set a flat rate. The sole issue
under this statute is whether the party
would have performed household services,
but for the injury. If he would have, he is
entitled to the statutory benefit.
The selective citations of the Act to buttress the peculiar construction of the majority merits attention.
31-41-2, provides:
The purpose of this act is to require the
payment of certain prescribed benefits in
respect to motor vehicle accidents
through either insurance or other approved security but on the basis of no
fault, preserving, however, the right of
an injured person to pursue the customary tort claims where the most serious

#/y?
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type of injuries occur. The intention of
the legislature is hereby to possibly stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings in,
the rising costs of automobile accident
insurance and to effectuate a more efficient method of handling the greater bulk
of the personal injury claims that arise
out of automobile accidents, these being
those not involving great amounts of
damages. This act is not designed to
have any effect on property damage
claims.
The majority opinion states the public
policy set forth is to provide the payment
for some specified, primary damages without undue delay. I construe this section as
declaring that in certain accidents where
personal injury claims do not involve great
amounts of damages, the injured party is
deprived of his common law tort action. In
substitution thereof certain prescribed benefits will be paid. The Act further states
the intention of the legislature to stabilize,
if not effectuate certain savings in, the cost
of automobile insurance. The flat rate of
$12 per day in Section 6(l)(b)(ii), in substitution of value, is a specific application of
this policy.
The majority further cites Sec. 8 of the
Act, wherein it is provided in regard to the
various benefits set forth in Sec. 6, that
they shall be paid on a monthly basis as
expenses are incurred and that benefits are
overdue if not paid within 35 days after the
insurer receives "reasonable proof of the
fact and amount of expenses incurred."
Since these are general provisions in direct conflict with the specific provision of
Sec. 6(l)(b)(ii) providing "regardless of
whether any of these expenses are actually
incurred" the majority's interpretation is
perplexing.
The majority expresses the view that to
grant the benefit in the instant case would
be a windfall and against public policy, by
broadening coverage, to the detriment of
the public through increased insurance
costs. Basic policy is a legislative determination. The selection of a flat rate in place
of an individual valuation is a matter specifically within the province of the legisla-

ture; it alone may determine the coverage,
viz., the payment of certain prescribed benefits in lieu of the common law tort action.
The application of insurance law in this
matter is inappropriate. This is not an
insurance act, per se, but a scheme analogous to the Workmen's Compensation Act,
wherein the legislature has determined that
common law actions and principles are inadequate to deal with the social problem. In
response to social conditions, the legislature
has created an entirely new basis to compensate injured persons; the Act should be
so interpreted without reliance on the concepts of traditional tort law.
ELLETT, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of MAUGHAN, J.
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Archie Clarence PACE, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Larry C. PACE et al., Defendants
and Appellant.
No. 14542.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 21, 1977.
Mortgagee brought foreclosure suit
against mortgagor and second mortgagee.
Second mortgagee filed a counterclaim on
an open account to which the mortgagee
asserted a defense of accord and satisfaction. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Marcellus K. Snow, J., rendered
summary judgment for the mortgagee on
the counterclaim and second mortgagee appealed. The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J.,
held that an issue of material fact existed
as to whether there was payment on the
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marriage are to be preserved with a more
rigorous and technical set of requirements
for recovery. Innocent parties must defend
themselves, and then assert their right to be
free of such actions by suing in separate
actions for malicious prosecution or abuse
of process. Nowhere does the majority
point to a basis in law or a benefit to
society to justify such a cost to the parties
or to our judicial system.
As the court stated in Henson v. Thomas,
supra, "The mutual rights and privileges of
home life grow out of the marital status.
Such obligations . . . are not legal in nature
and may not be made the subject of commerce and bartered at the counter." Id.
231 N.C. at 175, 56 S.E.2d at 433. It is time
that we acknowledge the operation of the
process spoken of by Justice Holmes whereby the customs and needs which give rise to
a rule disappear but the rule remains, justified by some new policy based on new beliefs and customs. Holmes, The Common
Law 5 (1881). This old "rule" does not have
a basis in today's beliefs and customs. Its
existence now testifies only to the persistence of an old form of action in our common law system and to the understandable
but regretable human desire for revenge
and a greenback poultice. This was a judicially instituted cause of action and should
be judicially extinguished, especially since
our legislature has never provided a statutory basis for it See Wyman v. Wallace,
supra. It should not be said of Utah that it
is a place
Where juries cast up what a wife is
worth,
By laying -s-hate'er sum, in mulct they
please on
The lo%~er. who must pay a handsome
price.
Because i; is a marketable vice.
(Byron, Don J^n, Canto I, lxiv.)
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Jerry R. JARAMILLO, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, a corporation, and State Farm Insurance Co,,
a corporation, Defendants and Appellant.
No. 18019.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 1, 1983.

Tort victim brought action to recover
balance claimed due under terms of settlement agreement reached in compromise of
personal injury action. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Jay E. Banks, J.,
entered judgment in favor of tort victim,
and tort-feasor's insurer appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that settlement agreement, by which tort-feasor's insurer agreed to pay tort victim and tort
victim's insurer for its payment to tort victim of no-fault benefits, was valid and binding on tort victim; therefore, tort victim
was not entitled to amount tort-feasor's
insurer intended to pay tort victim's insurer.
Reversed and remanded.
Stewart, J., dissented and filed opinion,
in which Durham, J., concurred.
1. Insurance §=^579
Proposition that Automobile No-Fault
Insurance Act does not confer a no-fault
insurer right of subrogation to funds received by its insured in subsequent action
against tort-feasor does not preclude liability insurer from negotiating settlement with
tort victim which compromises both its own
liability and that of its insured. U.C.A.
1953, 31-41-1 et seq.
2. Contracts <s=>14
Unexpressed intentions do not affect
validity of contract.
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3. Insurance <§=> 579.3
Settlement agreement, by which tortfeasor's insurer agreed to pay both tort
victim as well as tort victim's insurer for
latter's payment of no-fault benefits to tort
victim, was valid and binding on tort victim, where tort victim and his attorney
stipulated that it was tort-feasor's insurer's
intention to compromise liability to both
tort victim and tort victim's insurer by payment of sum which was to be disbursed to
tort victim in full settlement of his claims
and to tort victim's insurer as reimbursement for its payment of no-fault benefits,
notwithstanding that express terms of tort
victim's release recited payment of consideration in total amount paid by tort-feasor's
insurer; therefore, tort victim was not entitled to amount intended to be paid to its
insurer as reimbursement for no-fault benefits.

Farm's intention to compromise the liability
to both plaintiff and Farmers by payment
of the sum of $12,000, which was to be
disbursed as follows: $9,305.87 to plaintiff
in full settlement of his claims, and
$2,694.13 to Farmers as reimbursement for
its payment to plaintiff of PIP benefits.
That portion of their stipulation which so
provides reads as follows:
5. Plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney, at
the time of the settlement on October 20,
1980, because of previous discussions and
negotiations with State Farm representatives, and because of the discussions between plaintiff's attorney and State
Farm's representative at the time of settlement, knew or had reason to believe
and assumed that State Farm intended at
the time of the settlement that $9,305.87
would be paid to plaintiff in full settlement of his claims, and that $2,694.13
would go to Farmers as reimbursement to
it for its payment to plaintiff of no-fault
Frank G. Noel, Salt Lake City, for debenefits, the total of the two being the
fendants and appellants.
sum of $12,000.00; and further because
L. Charles Evans, Libby, Mont., Daniel
of said negotiations and discussions, at
Barker, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
the time of settlement State Farm berespondent.
lieved and assumed that plaintiff also intended the money to be disbursed as deHALL, Chief Justice:
scribed above.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover a
Following the agreement of settlement
balance of $2,694.13 claimed due under the reached on October 20, 1980, two drafts
terms of a settlement agreement reached in were issued and mailed to plaintiff's attorcompromise of a personal injury action ney, one in the amount of $9,305.87, payable
against C. Dale Sharp, defendant State jointly to plaintiff and his attorney, and the
Farm Insurance Company's insured. On other in the amount of $2,694.13, payable
the basis of stipulated facts, the trial court jointly to plaintiff and Farmers. The letter
granted summary judgment in favor of of transmittal, dated October 27, 1980, also
plaintiff, and State Farm appeals.
recited the terms of settlement:
Plaintiff sustained injuries as the result
These drafts are being tendered in full
of a collision with a vehicle driven by Sharp.
in final settlement of all claims in this
He received personal injury protection
case of both your client and Farmer's [sic]
(PIP) benefits in the amount of $2,694.13
Insurance subrogation claim for no-fault
from his own no-fault insurance carrier,
benefits.
defendant Farmers Insurance Group.
Plaintiff executed an accompanying rePlaintiff dismissed the personal injury ac- lease, which recited as consideration theretion against Sharp when he was successful for payment of the sum of $12,000. He
in negotiating the subject settlement agree- negotiated the $9,305.87 check. He then
ment with State Farm.
requested Farmers to endorse the other
It was stipulated that plaintiff and his check over to him. Farmers refused and
attorney were aware that it was State plaintiff initially brought this action
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against only Farmers, seeking to recover
the amount of the check. However, when
State Farm stopped payment on the check,
plaintiff joined State Farm as a party defendant. Farmers and State Farm filed
separate appeals from the judgment in favor of plaintiff. Farmers has since withdrawn its appeal and is not a party to this
proceeding.
On appeal, State Farm focuses on the
settlement agreement as evidenced by the
stipulation of the parties, and contends that
plaintiff is bound by the terms thereof, and
thus is not entitled to receive those funds
which he knew were intended for the reimbursement of Farmers. Plaintiffs rejoinder is that the ruling of this Court in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Iviel precludes any deductions of no-fault benefits from the overall
settlement figure. He further asserts that
the release he executed recites, without ambiguity, payment of consideration therefor
in the amount of $12,000, and that he is
therefore entitled to receive that amount.
The crux of this case is not the ruling in
Me; rather, it is whether the settlement
agreement that compromised both the liability of State Farm's insured and that of
its own statutory obligation2 to reimburse
Farmers was valid and binding. We conclude that it was.

ment figure included funds to be used for
the reimbursement of the no-fault insurer,
whereas in the instant case, plaintiff admittedly understood that the $12,000 settlement figure included funds intended for the
reimbursement of no-fault benefits paid by
Farmers.

It is also to be observed that Me arose
out of a different set of facts. In that case,
the tort victim reached a settlement with
the liability insurer, but did so without any
understanding or agreement that the settle-

[2] In light of the stipulation of the
parties, it is clear that plaintiff outwardly
accepted State Farm's terms of settlement.
Any contrary intentions he may have had
were left unexpressed and were not otherwise disclosed. It is well established in the
law that unexpressed intentions do not affect the validity of a contract. The rule of
law is as was stated in Allen v. Bissinger &
Co.:*
The apparent mutual assent of the parties, essential to the formation of a contract, must be gathered by the language
employed by them, and the law imputes
to a person an intention corresponding to
the reasonable meaning of its words and
acts. It judges of his intentions by his
outward expressions and excludes all
questions in regard to his unexpressed
intention. If his words or acts judged by
reasonable standard manifests an intention to agree to the matter in question,
that agreement is established and it is
immaterial what may be the real but
unexpressed state of his mind upon the
subject.
[3] Furthermore, plaintiff accepted
State Farm's tender of the sum of $9,305.87
and negotiated the check drawn in his favor
in that amount. It was not until after he
had done so that he then laid claim to the
further sum of $2,694.13.
Plaintiff's remaining contention that the
express terms of the release he executed
entitle him to the full amount of the settlement figure also fails. This is so because
when the release is contrasted with the
stipulation of the parties, it does not reflect
their understanding and intentions at the
time the settlement agreement was

1. Utah, 606 P.2d 1197(1980).

3. U.C.A., 1953, § 31^*1-1, et seq.

2. Set forth in U.C.A., 1953, § 31-41-11.

4. 62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539, 541-42 (1923).

[1] Me stands for the proposition that
the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance
Act 3 does not confer on a no-fault insurer
the right of subrogation to funds received
by its insured in a subsequent action
against the tortfeasor. There is nothing
about the holding in that case which precludes a liability insurer from negotiating a
settlement with the tort victim which compromises both its own liability and that of
its insured.
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reached. Therefore, the release is irrelevant to the issues presented by this appeal.
The judgment is reversed and the case is
remanded for entry of judgment in favor of
State Farm. No costs awarded.

as in this case. In Anderson the Court
stated:
Plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company,
brought this action to recover no-fault
insurance benefits paid to its insured, the
defendant, following a settlement between the defendant and the insurance
OAKS and HOWE, JJ., concur.
carrier
of a third-party tortfeasor.
STEWART, Justice (dissenting).
In January 1976 defendant, a passenger
I respectfully submit that the majority
in a vehicle insured by Allstate, was infails to give effect to the law stated in
jured in an automobile accident. PursuAllstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, Utah, 606
ant to his claim, Allstate paid defendant
P.2d 1197 (1980), and Allstate Insurance Co. $2,000 in no-fault medical benefits. Subv. Anderson, Utah, 608 P.2d 235 (1980), and
sequently, defendant filed suit against
misapplies governing principles of contract
the tortfeasor, who was insured by State
law in holding that the plaintiff is not entiFarm Mutual Insurance Company. Detled to the full settlement proceeds of $12,fendant entered into a settlement agree000.
ment with State Farm. On settlement of
The release signed by State Farm Insurthat suit defendant executed a release,
ance Co. and plaintiff states in relevant
and State Farm agreed to pay a settlepart:
ment amount of $10,000. Two thousand
For the sole consideration of twelve
dollars of this amount was made payable
thousand and no/100 Dollars, . . . the unjointly to defendant and Allstate. Dedersigned [Jerry R. Jaramillo] releases
fendant refused to deliver the draft, and
and forever discharges Clarence Dale
Allstate initiated this action.
Sharp
The issue is whether Allstate is entitled,
because of a right of subrogation, to
The plain meaning of this document is
recover the no-fault payments made to its
that the plaintiff was to receive a full $12,insured out of proceeds of a settlement
000 from State Farm in settlement of his
with a third-party tortfeasor.
claim. The release does not state that
We hold that Allstate Insurance Co. v.
$2,694.13 of the total was to go to Farmers
Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 (1980), is disposInsurance Group as reimbursement for the
itive of this case.
PIP payments paid by Farmers to the plaintiff, or that the PIP payments figured in Thus, we held that the no-fault insurer was
any way in the settlement and the release. not entitled to recover from the insured.
The release was in full accord with the law Compare Street v. Farmers Insurance Exstated in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, change, supra, in which the no-fault reimsupra; Allstate Insurance Co. v. Anderson, burseable damage categories were broken
supra, and Street v. Fanners Insurance Ex- out in the settlement papers.
change, Utah, 609 P.2d 1343 (1980), that
The fact that State Farm, the liability
remuneration for PIP payments is a matter insurer in this case, is not the no-fault carrisolely between the no-fault insurance com- er as in Ivie and Anderson is of no consepany and the liability insurance carrier in quence. Although the right of subrogation
an arbitration proceeding between them. is not technically at issue in this case, that
In Anderson the facts were similar to the is also of no consequence. Both Ivie and
instant case except that there was no stipu- Anderson held that the injured person was
lation between the injured person and the entitled to the total of a lump sum settleliability insurance carrier, as in the instant ment and that PIP payments could not be
case, and the plaintiff in Anderson was the deducted therefrom. In Ivie we stated,
no-fault carrier suing its insured, rather "[T]he tort victim's recovery . . . cannot be
than the liability carrier suing the insured, reduced by the PIP payments." 606 P.2d at
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1203. Where, however, the parties have clear that plaintiff outwardly accepted
expressly provided otherwise, the case is State Farm's terms of settlement." That
different. Christensen v. Farmers Insur- conclusion does not, I submit, follow. The
ance Exchange, Utah, 669 P.2d 1236 (1983). stipulation only states that plaintiff "knew
Compare Street v. Farmers Insurance Ex-or had reason to believe and assumed that
change, supra.
State Farm intended at the time of settleThe stipulation in the instant case, which ment" that $2,694.13 of the total settlement
was entered into for the purpose of dispos- would go to Farmers as reimbursement for
ing of the matter on summary judgment, the paid-out PIP benefits. The stipulation
does not indicate in any way that the par- does not state that plaintiff ever agreed to
ties agreed to modify the simple and clear that condition. Apparently, State Farm
terms of the release. There is nothing in was unaware of the effect of the No-Fault
either the release or the stipulation indicat- Act, Allstate v. Ivie, supra, Allstate v. Aning that the parties agreed that the PIP derson, supra, and Street v. Farmers Insurpayments were to be deducted from the ance Exchange, supra. In short, State
total settlement or that the settlement was Farm was operating under a mistake of
anything more than it purported to be—a law, and it was not plaintiff's duty either to
settlement of the injured party with the inform his adversary of the law or to accede
liability insurance carrier, State Farm. The to its misunderstanding.
majority states that the settlement agreeIn all events, plaintiff's mere belief or
ment is at variance with the stipulated assumption of State Farm's intent does not
facts as to the parties' beliefs regarding constitute assent to that intent. On
their intent. That is, I submit, incorrect. straight contract principles, mere silence,
There is nothing in the stipulation that adds without any accompanying outward acts, is
to or takes away from the legal effect of not ordinarily sufficient to constitute asthe release. The relevant portion of the sent. 1 Corbin on Contracts § 72 (1963 ed.).
stipulation states:
See generally Annot, Silence When Offer
5. Plaintiff and plaintiffs attorney, at
the time of the settlement on October 20,
1980, because of previous discussions and
negotiations with State Farm representatives, and because of the discussions between plaintiff's attorney and State
Farm's representative at the time of settlement, knew or had reason to believe
and assumed that State Farm intended at
the time of the settlement that $9,305.87
would be paid to plaintiff in full settlement of his claims, and that $2,694.13
would go to Farmers as reimbursement to
it for its payment to plaintiff of no-fault
benefits, the total of the two being the
sum of $12,000.00; and further because
of said negotiations and discussions, at
the time of settlement State Farm believed and assumed that plaintiff also intended the money to be disbursed as described above.
The majority also argues that "[i]n the
light of the stipulation of the parties, it is

Is Made or Failure to Reject It Is an Acceptance Which Will Consummate a Bilateral Contract, 77 A.L.R. 1141 (1932). Without plaintiff's assent to a modification of
the release, there was no binding covenant
to enforce it. See Oberhansly v. Earle,
Utah, 572 P.2d 1384 (1977); Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., Utah, 558 P.2d
1317 (1976); Morgan v. Board of State
Lands, Utah, 549 P.2d 695 (1976); B & R
Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442,
503 P.2d 1216 (1972).
The majority also states that "[t]here is
nothing about the holding in that case
[Ivie ] that precludes a liability insurer from
negotiating a settlement with the tort victim which compromises both its own liability and that of its insured." That, I submit,
is not accurate. By what legal right can a
stranger compromise another's legal liability? Under the Utah No-Fault Act and Ivie
and its progeny, the obligation to reimburse
the no-fault insurer is solely that of the
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liability insurer, and the injured person can ties' intent were a series of letters between
not compromise that right.
the parties. In the present case, the parties'
stipulation deals only with the parties'
I see no relevancy in the fact that in Ivie
beliefs
and assumptions, not with what they
there was no "understanding or agreement
that the settlement figure included funds to said or did. The only objective evidence of
be used for the reimbursement of the no- their intent is (1) the written release signed
fault insurer . . . , " as the majority states. by plaintiff, and (2) plaintiff's attempt to
That was true then, it was also true in cash both settlement checks. Thus, rather
Anderson, and it is just as true in this case. than supporting the majority's conclusion
There is not a shred of evidence that the that the parties intended that Farmers be
parties agreed otherwise in this case. The reimbursed, Allen v. Bissinger & Co., supra,
stipulation states only what plaintiff sup- supports that conclusion that they did not
posed defendant intended—which must also so intend.
have been the case in Ivie. It states nothIn light of the above, Ivie, Anderson, and
ing whatsoever about what plaintiff stated Street control this case. Thus, Farmers has
he intended. In short, the parties did not no right of subrogation, and plaintiff is
agree to deduct PIP payments, nor was entitled to the full $12,000 settlement paythere a mutual mistake of fact.
able to him by State Farm under the settleThat State Farm "believed and assumed ment agreement. I would therefore affirm
that plaintiff also intended the money to be the trial court.
disbursed [according to this arrangement]"
certainly does not prove plaintiffs assent.
DURHAM, J., concurs in the dissenting
Plaintiff's assent to the condition must have opinion of STEWART, J.
been physically manifested in words or
deeds. The supposition by State Farm that
plaintiff intended to so contract does not
fa | KEYNUMB£RSrSTEM>
create any contractual assent by plaintiff.
See Morgan v. Board of State Lands, supra.
The cover letter dated October 27, 1980,
which accompanied the settlement checks,
Jerry CHRISTENSEN, Plaintiff
adds nothing to State Farm's argument.
and Appellant,
That letter stated:
These drafts are being tendered in full
v.
in final settlement of all claims in this FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
case of both your client and Farmer's
corporation, aka Fanners Insurance
Insurance subrogation claim for no-fault
Group, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff
benefits.
and Respondent,
This statement indicates only that State
v.
Farm was unaware of the ruling in Ivie and
erroneously relied upon the prior practice STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY, aka State Farm Inwhich the No-Fault Act displaced. State
surance, Third-Party Defendant and ReFarm now relies on the prior practice to
spondent.
avoid its contractual commitment.
The majority cites Allen v. Bissinger &
No. 18283.
Co., 62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539 (1923), for the
Supreme Court of Utah.
proposition that "the law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reaSept. 1, 1983.
sonable meaning of his words and acts."
Id. at 231, 219 P. at 541, quoting 13 C.J.
Appeal was taken from a judgment of
Contracts § 49 (1917). In Bissinger, the
"words and acts" which evidenced the par- the Fourth District Court, Utah County,
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Cite as 592 P.2d 609

It is now well established that the trial
court has power to summarily enforce on
motion a settlement agreement entered
into by the litigants while the litigation is
pending before it. Quite obviously, so
simple and speedy a remedy serves well
the policy favoring compromise, which in
turn has made a major contribution to its
popularity.
Yet it is apparent that the summary
procedure for enforcement of unperformed settlement contracts is not a panacea for the myriad types of problems
that may arise. The summary procedure
is admirably suited to situations where,
for example, a binding settlement bargain is conceded or shown, and the excuse
for nonperformance is comparatively unsubstantial. On the other hand, it is illsuited to situations presenting complex
factual issues related either to the formation or the consummation of the contract,
which only testimonial exploration in a
more plenary proceeding is apt to satisfactorily resolve. [Citations omitted.]
The case at hand is not one in which
complex factual issues are presented; here,
a "binding settlement bargain is conceded
or shown, and the excuse for nonperformance is comparatively unsubstantial."
CROCKETT, C. J. and WILKINS, HALL
and STEWART, JJ. concur.

Utah County, George E. Ballif, J., which
denied him right to recover certain benefits
under contract of no-fault insurance issued
in conformance with Automobile No-Fault
Insurance Act. The Supreme Court, Hall,
J., held that: (1) insured, who earned more
than $150 per week during period for which
he sought compensation but whose income
allegedly was 25% less than what it would
have been had the accident never occurred,
was not "disabled" for purposes of loss of
earnings benefits nor for purposes of household services benefits under the Act, and (2)
by entering into settlement agreement with
his tort-feasors, whereunder insured released him from all personal injury claims
as well as property damage, insured cut off
insurer's subrogation rights under the Act,
notwithstanding attempted "specific exclusion" relating to no-fault benefits; thus,
insured was foreclosed from seeking additional benefits from insurer.
Affirmed.
1. Insurance <§=>531.4
Under Automobile No-Fault Insurance
Act, an injured person will not be permitted
to recover from an insurance carrier over
and above what carrier has previously paid
in benefits once he has successfully recovered from his tort-feasor for personal injuries. U.C.A. 1953, 31 41 1 et seq.
2. Insurance <£=>531.4
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act
has no application to property damage
claims. U.C.A. 1953, 31 41 1 et seq.

Elmer G. JONES, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.

March 12, 1979.

3. Insurance @=*531.4
Term "disability" within meaning of
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act means
an inability to work as contrasted with
term "physical impairment," which generally refers to loss of bodily function. U.C.A.
1953, 31-41-1 et seq.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

Insured appealed from summary judgment entered by Fourth District Court,

4. Insurance o=>531.4
Insured, who earned more than $150
per week during period for which he sought

TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 15809.
Supreme Court of Utah.

610

Utah

592 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

compensation but whose income allegedly
was 25% less than what it would have been
had the accident never occurred, was not
"disabled" for purposes of loss of earnings
benefits nor for purposes of household services benefits under Automobile No-Fault
Insurance Act. U.C.A. 1953, 31 41 6(l)(b).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
5. Insurance c=>601.25
By entering into settlement agreement
with his tort-feasors, whereunder insured
released them from all personal injury
claims as well as property damage, insured
cut off insurer's subrogation rights under
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, notwithstanding attempted "specific exclusion"
relating to no-fault benefits; thus, insured
was foreclosed from seeking additional benefits from insurer. U.C.A. 1953, 31 41 1
et seq.
6. Insurance <®=* 601.2

Fact that insured entered into settlement with his tort-feasors whereby he released them from all claims for personal
injuries and property damage did not preclude insurer from seeking reimbursement
from tort-feasor's insurer. U.C.A. 1953,
31-41-11.
D. John Mussleman, of Stott, Young &
Wilson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
appellant.
Raymond M. Berry, of Snow, Christensen
& Martineau, Salt Lake City, for defendant
and respondent.

County, Utah, while on a sales trip to California. He experienced little pain at the
time of the accident and continued on his
sales trip. It was not until he returned
home to Orem, Utah, on February 21, 1974,
that he consulted one Dr. Jacobs, an orthopedic surgeon. He then absented himself
from his employment until March 10, 1974,
when he returned to work and has worked
continuously since that time. Shortly after
the accident, plaintiff applied for various
no-fault benefits under his insurance policy.
Defendant insurer paid the charges of Dr.
Jacobs, and other medical expenses totalling $365.63. Defendant also paid plaintiff
$567.89 in disability benefits for the period
of February 21 through March 9, 1974. On
September 5, 1975 (approximately 18
months later), plaintiff presented an additional claim to defendant for $2,485.36 representing lost earnings from a reduction in
earning capacity based on a claim that he
was partially disabled (25 percent) for a
period of 47 weeks following the injury.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff claimed an additional $4,380.00 for inability to perform
household services, the maximum allowable
under the Act. At the same time as these
further claims for disability were made
upon defendant, plaintiff also entered into
settlement negotiations with his tortfeasors.
Defendant refused to pay these subsequent
claims; however, plaintiff entered into a
settlement agreement with his tortfeasors
on January 3, 1976. For the consideration
of $6,000.00, plaintiff released his tortfeasors of any and all claims he may have
had against them for personal injury as
well as property damage.

Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment denying him the right to recover benefits under a contract of "no-fault" insurance issued in conformance with the Utah
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act,1 (hereinafter "Act").

On August 3, 1977, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for having refused
to pay the later disability claims, asserting
that he had a legal right to compensation
for loss of gross income and reimbursement
for his inability to perform household services.2 He sought punitive damages for defendant's failure to pay.

On February 13, 1974, plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident in Kane

After both parties moved for summary
judgment, the trial court ruled as follows:

1. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-1 et seq.

2. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-6(l)(b).

HALL, Justice:

P9 158

JONES v. TRANS MERICA INS. CO.
Cite as 5

It is the opinion of this Court that the
intent of the No-Fault Act was to provide
benefits to those sustaining less serious
injuries in automobile accidents, but to
allow those sustaining more serious injuries the right to proceed against the party
at fault without limitation as to amounts
recoverable, but that the person would
not be entitled to both recovery under the
No-Fault Act and a suit against and recovery from the tort feasor.
[1] On appeal, the parties choose not to
squarely address the basis of the trial
court's decision but focus instead on peripherally related matters. Basically the court's
ruling is correct. The whole tenor of the
Act is that an injured person will not be
permitted to recover from an insurance carrier (over and above what the carrier has
previously paid in benefits) once he has
successfully recovered from his tortfeasor
for personal injuries. Any other interpretation would be to permit double damage
recovery.
[2] The Act mandates 3 that every resident owner of a registered motor vehicle
maintain either insurance or other approved
security thereon.4 It is designed to totally
eliminate claims for injuries 5 of lesser consequence which fail to meet a basic "threshold" test set forth in the statute 6 and provides for the payment of benefits by one's
own insurer without regard to fault.7
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tween insurers whenever no-fault benefits
are paid.9
A fortiori, the legislative intent specifically expressed in the Act itself to "possibly
stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings
in, the rising costs of automobile accident
insurance and to effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of handling the
greater bulk of the personal injury claims
that arise out of automobile accidents" 10
negatives the contention that double recovery is permitted. Double recovery for a
single item of loss was never contemplated
by the legislature n and we will not permit
any type of automatic reward or "windfall"
to an injured plaintiff.12
Specific points raised on appeal concern
the validity of the disability claims plaintiff
made upon defendant in 1975. Plaintiff
argues that by wrongfully refusing to pay
the benefits sought, defendant had tortiously breached the insurance contract, thereby
giving rise to a claim for punitive damages.
Defendant counters with two main arguments: 1) that the refusal to pay the disability benefits was justified in that plaintiff was not "disabled"; and 2) that by
settling with his tortfeasors, plaintiff had
chosen his remedy and had cut off defendant's subrogation rights as provided by statute. With these contentions we agree.

No-fault benefits are also available to
those who sustain greater injuries. This is
so even though they remain free to pursue
a tort claim as well.8 However, this does
not entitle one to a double recovery for a
single loss since the statute specifically affords subrogation rights and arbitration be-

[3,4] The benefits contemplated by the
Act are phrased in terms of "disability" not
in terms of "physical impairment." The
former is generally understood to mean the
inability to work, whereas the latter refers
to the loss of bodily function.13 Plaintiff
concedes that he was able to work during
the period for which compensation is sought

3.

U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-4(1).

10.

4.

U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-2.

11. See Compensation Systems and Utah's NoFault Statute, Keeton, 1973 Utah Law Review
383.

5. The act has absolutely no application to property damage claims. See U.C.A., 1953, 3 1 - 4 1 2. *
6.

U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-9.

7. Supra, footnote 4.
8.

Ibid.

9. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-11.

Supra, footnote 4.

12. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., Utah,
559 P.2d 958 (1977).
13. See 99 CJ.S. Workmen's
§ 296.

Compensation
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but argues that his income was 25 percent
less than what it would have been had the
accident never occurred. The Act limits
disability benefits for loss of earnings to a
maximum of $150 per week and plaintiff
admittedly earned more than $150 per week
during the entire time for which benefits
were claimed. He does not, therefore, fall
within the "disability" coverage. Likewise,
if not disabled for purposes of loss of earnings benefits, neither is he disabled for purposes of household services benefits. Indeed, the Act was never intended to give an
injured plaintiff a windfall or extra income
as a benefit for having had an accident.14
[5,6] Notwithstanding the foregoing
analysis, defendant's second argument is
dispositive of this appeal. As indicated supra, in 1974 plaintiff received no-fault benefits totalling $933.52.15 In 1976, plaintiff
accepted $6,000.00 from his tortfeasors as
additional recovery and released them of
any further claims for personal injury and
property damage. Plaintiff asserts that the
specific exclusion in the release agreement
preserved any no-fault claims which may be
made against the tortfeasors. He also
makes various intimations that the recovery
from the tortfeasors is not the same as the
disability sought from the insurance carrier.
For example, in his brief on appeal, plaintiff suggests that the portion of the
$6,000.00 to be allocated for personal injury
should be determined by "a court" which
would then "offset" any insurance claim.
No such motion or other request for apportionment was ever made. Before the trial
court, plaintiff urged that he may well be
prohibited from suing his tortfeasors for his
injuries, (due to the "threshold" requirements discussed supra), and therefore the
14.

Supra, footnote 12.

15. The trial judge correctly ruled that any
rights defendant may have for reimbursement
for this amount from the tortfeasor's insurer
under U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-11 is unaffected by
the settlement and by this action.
16.

U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-11 provides as follows:
Subrogation rights and arbitration between
insurers.—(1) Every insurer authorized to
write the insurance required by this act shall

$6,000.00 must have been tendered as a
release from only property damage liability.
We cannot adopt plaintiff's arguments.
Plaintiff accepted the $6,000.00 from his
tortfeasors as additional recovery in lieu of
any further insurance benefits to which he
might have been entitled. This agreement
expressly releases plaintiff's claim against
the tortfeasors for known and unknown
personal injuries as well as for property
damage arising from the accident. As indicated supra, defendant insurer is subrogated to the rights of plaintiff in asserting a
claim against the tortfeasors' insurers in
recovering benefits based upon liability.16
The rights to which the subrogee succeeds
can be no greater than those of the person
for whom he is substituted.17 By executing
the release, plaintiff discharged the tortfeasors of any and all liability, notwithstanding the attempted "specific exclusion"
relating to no-fault benefits. By so doing,
plaintiff has chosen his recovery and cannot
now successfully assert a claim against his
insurer.
The above discussion being dispositive of
the issue of the availability of further nofault benefits, defendant has not breached
its contractual obligations with plaintiff to
give rise to a claim for punitive damages.
The summary judgment is therefore affirmed. Costs to defendant.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur.

O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

agree as a condition to being allowed to continue to write insurance in the state of Utah:
(a) That where its insured is or would be
held legally liable for the personal injuries
sustained by any person to whom benefits
required under this act have been paid by
another insurer, including the state insurance
fund, it will reimburse such other insurer for
the payment of such benefits, but not in excess of the amount of damages so recoverable, . . .
17. 73 Am.Jur.2d, Subrogation, Sec. 10&v»
/

1304

Utah

657 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Clark LAUB and Maude E. Laub,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
SOUTH CENTRAL UTAH TELEPHONE
ASSOCIATION, INC., Defendant
and Respondent
Nos. 17925, 17926.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 29, 1982.
Appeal was taken from order of the
Fifth District Court, Washington County, J.
Harlan Burns, J., which reduced judgment
obtained by no-fault insureds against thirdparty tort-feasor by the amount of previous
compensation from the no-fault insurer and
which required no-fault insurer to contribute to insured's costs and attorney fees.
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that:
(1) insurer was not entitled to relief from
judgment under catchall provision of rule
relating to relief from judgment, and (2)
no-fault insured should receive no funds on
behalf of no-fault insurer, as prayer against
tort-feasor should not include damages compensated by personal injury protection payments, and insurer thus has no right of
subrogation as to funds obtained by the
insured and is not required to contribute to
the insured's cost.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Hall, C.J., filed an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part.

six months later when it realized that plaintiffs were getting a partial double recovery,
it was not entitled to relief from judgment
on the basis of "any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment."
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(bX7).
3. Judgment <s=>386(l)
Six-month delay in seeking relief from
judgment, along with prior satisfaction of
judgment, showed that motion was not
made within a reasonable time. Rules Civ.
Proc., Rule 60(bX7).
4. Judgment <s=>343
Where subdivision of relief from judgment rule relating to relief from a judgment rendered by mistake or excusable neglect was applicable, catchall provision of
the rule was not applicable. Rules Civ.
Proc., Rule 60(b)(l, 7).
5. Automobiles <§=> 251.11
Insurance <s=>601.25
Tort-feasor who has the required security under the No Fault Act is liable neither
to the injured party nor to the no fault
insurer for reimbursement of personal injury protection payments. U.C.A.1953, 3141-1 et seq.
6. Insurance <s=»601.25
Because no-fault insured should receive
no funds on behalf of the no-fault insurer,
insurer has no right of subrogation as to
funds obtained by the insured through either settlement with or judgment against
the tort-feasor; no-fault insurer's only
right of reimbursement through subrogation is against the liability insurer in an
arbitration proceeding.

1. Judgment <s=»343
Rule permitting relief from judgment
because it has been satisfied or discharged
and should not be given any more prospective application did not apply where judgment had been satisfied so that it had no
more prospective application. Rules Civ.
Proc., Rule 60(b).

7. Insurance <s=>601.25
Because no-fault insurer ideally will
not receive its reimbursement from no-fault
insured, practice of the insurer paying to
the insured a fair share of the costs and
attorney fees is obsolete.

2. Judgment <e=»343
Where defendant approved judgment
and paid it in full without objection until

8. Insurance <s=>601.25
If parties allow no-fault insured to recover funds on behalf of the no-fault insur-

pj/y
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er and the no-fault insurer does in fact
receive reimbursement from those funds,
insurer must contribute to the payment of
costs and attorney fees incurred by the
insured in obtaining those funds.
9. Insurance <fc=>601.25
Where tort-feasor's insurer was mistaken in its belief that reimbursement to nofault insurer should pass through the insured and where the insureds were mistaken in their belief that they could not retain
the entirety of amounts paid by the tortfeasor's insurer, but where no-fault insurer
was not entitled to reimbursement for
funds held by insured, and received no part
of it, no-fault insurer was not required to
contribute to insured's costs and attorney
fees incurred in obtaining judgment against
third-party tort-feasor and its insurer.

Gary W. Pendleton, St. George, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Leroy S. Axland, Salt Lake City, Ray H.
Ivie, Ray P. Ivie, Provo, for defendant and
respondent.
STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiffs Clark and Maude Laub obtained a judgment against the tortfeasor's employer South Central Utah Telephone Association (South Central) for injuries suffered
in an automobile accident. On a subsequent motion by South Central, the trial
court reduced the judgment by the amount
of plaintiffs' economic losses previously
compensated by their no-fault insurer,
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. A
separate action by plaintiffs seeking contribution from State Farm for costs and attorney's fees incurred in the suit against South
Central was dismissed. Plaintiffs appeal,
claiming error in the court's modification of
the final judgment and error in the dismissal of their contribution action. We reverse
the modification of final judgment and affirm the denial of contribution for costs and
attorney's fees.

Plaintiffs sustained personal injury and
property damage in an accident that occurred in Mojave County, Arizona, September 4, 1978. Pursuant to their no-fault
insurance policy with State Farm, plaintiffs
received $4,347.71 in personal injury protection (PIP) benefits from State Farm. Since
plaintiffs' damages exceeded the threshold
limitations controlling tort actions against a
tortfeasor, see U.C.A., 1953, § 31-419(l)(e), they filed suit against the tortfeasor
and his employer South Central. State
Farm subsequently filed notice of its claim
to subrogation for the PIP benefits already
paid to plaintiffs.
In December 1980, plaintiffs obtained a
judgment against South Central that included amounts for damages previously
compensated by the PIP benefits. To satisfy the judgment, South Central's liability
insurer, Employers of Wausau, tendered to
plaintiffs two checks, one in the amount of
$4,347.71, payable to plaintiffs, their attorney, and State Farm, and a second check
for the balance of the judgment in the
amount of $31,505.39, payable to plaintiffs
and their attorney. Plaintiffs filed a Satisfaction of Judgment in January of 1981.
Wausau apparently intended the check
for $4,347.71 to be reimbursement to State
Farm for the PIP benefits previously paid
by State Farm to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs conceded State Farm's right to reimbursement,
but withheld the check while filing a separate action to establish their right to retain
a portion of the check as a contribution
from State Farm for costs and attorney's
fees incurred in obtaining that check for
State Farm.
State Farm, meanwhile, relying on this
Court's ruling in Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 (1980), realized
that it had no subrogation rights with respect to the judgment obtained by their
no-fault insured against South Central.
Therefore, State Farm claimed no right to
the $4,347.71 check held by plaintiffs and
denied any liability for plaintiffs' costs or
attorney's fees. State Farm, rather, pur-
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sued its statutory remedy, see U.C.A., 1953,
§ 31-41-11, by seeking reimbursement directly from Wausau in an arbitration proceeding. On June 10, 1981, the Salt Lake
Arbitration Committee entered a decision in
favor of State Farm, requiring Wausau to
reimburse State Farm for the $4,347.71 paid
to plaintiffs pursuant to the no-fault coverage.
Because plaintiffs had retained the
$4,347.71 check intended for State Farm,
South Central filed, on July 2, 1981, a motion under rule 60(b), Utah R.Civ.P., to reduce the judgment against them by that
amount and thereby prevent a double recovery by plaintiffs and a double payment
by Wausau. The trial court subsequently
granted that motion and simultaneously
dismissed plaintiffs' separate action against
State Farm for costs and attorney's fees.
I. Modification of Final Judgment
Defendant South Central moved to modify a final judgment that, six months earlier,
it had approved as to form and content and
fully satisfied through payment by its liability insurer. To accomplish this end,
South Central relies on rule 60(b), alleging
not fraud, mistake, newly discovered evidence, or that the judgment was void (all
but the last of which must be raised within
three months of the judgment), but that the
judgment should no longer have prospective
application, and any other reason the Court
might think of justifying relief. In relevant part the rule reads:
On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: . . .
(6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have
1. In response to Justice Howe's dissent, the
satisfied judgment clause of subdivision (6) is
inapplicable because first, South Central does
not rely on it, and second, the judgment South

prospective application; or (7) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall
be made within a reasonable time . . . .
This rule brings into conflict competing
interests in the finality of judgments and
relief from inequitable judgments. A motion to modify a final judgment is addressed to the discretion of the trial court,
the exercise of which must be based on
sound legal principles in light of all relevant
circumstances. The court's determination
may be reversed only upon a showing that
this discretion was abused. In addition to
the concerns that final judgments should
not be lightly disturbed and that unjust
judgments should not be allowed to stand,
other factors the court should consider are
whether rule 60(b) is being used as a substitute for appeal, whether the movant had a
fair opportunity to make his objection at
trial, and whether the motion was made
within a reasonable time *f**?ijgzrtry "&
judgment 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's
Federal Practice 160.19 (2d ed. 1982).
[1] Our consideration of these factors
and the express language of rule 60(b) compel us to conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in reducing the judgment against defendant South Central.
Subdivision (6) of rule 60(b) does not apply
to the circumstances of this case. The third
clause of subdivision (6), particularly relied
on by South Central, is inapplicable because
the judgment ceased to have prospective
application between the parties when it was
satisfied by South Central. That clause is
most commonly invoked to terminate injunctions.1
Subdivision (7) is the residuary clause of
rule 60(b); it embodies three requirements:
First, that the reason be one other than
those listed in subdivisions (1) through (6);
second, that the reason justify relief; and
third, that the motion be made within a
Central seeks reduced is not satisfied through
payment of a different judgment (in arbitration) by a third party (Wausau).
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reasonable time. The reason offered by
South Central as justification to reduce the
judgment is that failure to reduce it will
result in a partial double recovery for plaintiffs and a partial double payment by the
liability insurer, Wausau. As South Central
accurately states, prevention of double recovery is one of the purposes of the Utah
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. And
in keeping with that purpose, we recently
upheld a trial court's reducing the special
damages of a judgment by the amount of
damages previously compensated by PIP
benefits. Dupuis v. Nielson, Utah, 624 R2d
685 (1981). Dupuis followed naturally from
our holding in Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 (1980), that a
tortfeasor is not personally liable to the
injured insured for special damages previously compensated by PIP benefits from
the no-fault insurer, and that the injured
party should therefore not be allowed even
to plead for those damages. However, if a
plaintiff does improperly plead for previously compensated damages and they are
allowed to be included in the judgment, the
court should, at the conclusion of the trial,
either on its own initiative or on motion of
a party, reduce the judgment by the
amount of those previously compensated
damages, and thereby prevent double recovery.
[2] Assuming that the reason offered by
South Central to justify relief is a reason
other than those listed in subdivisions (1)
through (6), does it justify relief on the
facts of the instant case? We hold that it
does not. Dupuis, in which relief was
granted, is distinguishable from the instant
case because there the judgment was modified at the conclusion of trial and before it
was accepted and satisfied. In the instant
case the judgment was modified long after
the time for amending the judgment (pursuant to rule 59(e)) or filing an appeal had
passed and long after South Central had
approved and satisfied the judgment.
Clearly, under Ivie, plaintiffs were not entitled to previously compensated damages.

When the excessive judgment was rendered, South Central should have moved
that it be reduced, as was done in Dupuis.
Instead, South Central approved the judgment and paid it in full without objection,
until six months later when it finally realized that plaintiffs were getting a partial
double recovery.
[3] Furthermore, both the six-month delay and the fact of prior satisfaction show
that the motion was not made within a
reasonable time. While we decline plaintiffs' invitation to go so far as to say that a
judgment once knowingly and voluntarily
satisfied becomes extinguished and is therefore never subject to modification, see
Mitchell v. Lindly, Okl., 351 P.2d 1063
(1960), we do consider the fact of prior
satisfaction an important consideration in
determining whether the motion to modify
was made within a reasonable time. The
possibility of prejudice to the nonmoving
party increases significantly when the judgment has already been paid.
Federal courts construing the identical
residuary clause of rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.,
also deny modification on similar facts.
E.g., Hughes v. Sanders, 287 F.Supp. 332
(E.D.Okl.1968). In Hughes the plaintiff
was injured in an automobile accident, and
because he was a member of the military,
the Government paid his medical expenses
under an agreement that he would reimburse the Government out of any recovery
obtained from the tortfeasor. Analogously,
then, the Government was in the position of
a no-fault insurer. Plaintiff subsequently
obtained a judgment that included the value of the medical expenses already paid by
the Government. Thereafter, the Government released the needy plaintiff from his
reimbursement obligation, and as a result,
defendant moved, prior to satisfaction, that
the judgment be reduced by the sum of the
compensated medical expenses pursuant to
the residuary clause of rule 60(b). The
court denied the motion, reasoning:
The power given to the Court by that
clause, however, "should be very cau-
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tiously and sparingly invoked by the
Court only in unusual and exceptional
instances." [Citation omitted.] The
Court does not believe that this is such a
case.
Hughes at 334. That reasoning and result
are even more applicable in the instant case
since plaintiffs were under no obligation to
pay the $4,347.71 check over to their nofault insurer and defendant South Central
made its motion long after satisfaction.
George Thatcher Corp. v. Bullen, 108
Utah 562, 162 P.2d 421 (1945), cited by
South Central in support of its motion to
modify the judgment, is inapplicable because it deals with a plaintiff's right to set
aside a filed Satisfaction of Judgment when
the judgment has not in fact been satisfied.
Here we deal not with a motion to set aside
a Satisfaction of Judgment, but with defendant's motion to reduce a judgment previously satisfied.
[4] In summary, then, neither subdivision (6) nor subdivision (7) of rule 60(b)
affords South Central relief from the judgment against it. In view of the fact that
plaintiffs' judgment should never have included the previously compensated damages, defendant South Central's own mistake or neglect is the cause of plaintiffs'
partial double recovery. As discussed
above, South Central could have prevented
this undesirable result by timely motion to
strike the improper portion of the prayer
for relief or to amend the judgment. This
failure to act seasonably falls more accurately under subdivision (1) of rule 60(b),
allowing relief from a judgment rendered
by "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." However, even if subdivision (1) had been relied on, relief would still
be denied for failure to make the motion
within three months of the judgment. In
Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471
P.2d 143 (1970), we reversed the granting of
a motion to correct a nonclerical error in a
judgment pursuant to subdivision (1) of rule
60(b) because, as here, the motion was made
too late. The time strictures of rule 60(b)

are wholesome and necessary, for there
must be an end to the time when judgments
can be questioned. See also Ackermann v.
United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198, 71 S.Ct.
209, 211, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950) (denied relief
under rule 60(b): "There must be an end to
litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to be relieved
from."). Furthermore, since subdivision (1)
is applicable to the instant case, subdivision
(7) cannot apply and may not be used to
circumvent the three-month filing period.
Calder Brothers v. Anderson Signs, Inc.,
Utah, 652 P.2d 922 (1982). See also Pitts v.
McLachlan, Utah, 567 P.2d 171 (1977).
II. Attorney's Fees
Prior to passage of the Utah Automobile
No-Fault Insurance Act in 1973, standard
practice was for the insurer to compensate
the insured for his economic losses and then
seek reimbursement out of the insured's
subsequent judgment or settlement. To facilitate this reimbursement process, the liability insurer would typically make one
check payable to both the insured and the
insurer in the amount of the compensation
previously paid. Another check would be
made payable to the insured alone for the
balance of the judgment. Because the reimbursement fund was procured by the insured, the insurer typically contributed a
fair share of the costs and attorney's fees
incurred in obtaining the fund. See Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Barnes, 29 Utah
2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972).
[5-8] The No-Fault Act and cases construing it have significantly altered this
practice. To begin with, a tortfeasor who
has the required security is liable neither to
the injured party nor to the no-fault insurer
for reimbursement of PIP payments;
therefore, the plaintiff's prayer should not
include the damages compensated by the
PIP payments. Since the no-fault insured
should receive no funds on behalf of the
no-fault insurer, the insurer has no right of
subrogation as to funds obtained Jxy the
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insured through either settlement with or such benefit is too remote to require a
judgment against the tortfeasor. The no- sharing of costs and fees. To require confault insurer's only right of reimbursement tribution under such circumstances would
through subrogation is against the liability only multiply the disputes and litigation
insurer in an arbitration proceeding. All- and thus yield a result the No-Fault Act
state Insurance Co. v. Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d was designed to eliminate.
1197 (1980). Since the no-fault insurer
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
ideally will not receive its reimbursement
from the no-fault insured, the practice of
OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
the insurer paying to the insured a fair
share of the costs and attorney's fees is now
HALL, Chief Justice (concurring and disobsolete. However, if, as in Street v. senting):
Farmers Insurance Exchange, Utah, 609
I concur in affirming the denial of attorP.2d 1343 (1980), and Guaranty National
ney
fees and costs to plaintiffs. However, I
Insurance Co. v. Morris, Utah, 611 P.2d 725
dissent
from that part of the Court's opin(1980), the parties deviate from the aboveoutlined practice and allow the no-fault in- ion which reverses the trial court's modifisured to recover funds on behalf of the cation of the judgment against South Cenno-fault insurer and the no-fault insurer tral.
does in fact receive reimbursement from
The very purpose of the Utah Automobile
those funds, then the insurer must contrib- No-Fault Insurance Act l is to prevent douute to the payment of costs and attorney's ble payment for the same loss and thus to
fees incurred by the insured in obtaining avoid increased costs of insurance coverage.2 In furtherance of that worthy objecthose funds.
tive, the trial court appropriately modified
[9] The parties in the instant case devi- the judgment against South Central by the
ated from proper procedure in that plain- specific, identifiable and undisputed amount
tiffs were allowed to plead for and recover of the PIP benefits received by plaintiffs
previously compensated damages. Liability prior to the time they initiated this lawsuit.
insurer Wausau was mistaken in its belief
Plaintiffs filed this action prior to this
that reimbursement to State Farm should Court's decision in Allstate Insurance Compass through the plaintiffs, and plaintiffs pany v. Ivie 3 when it was common practice
were mistaken in their belief that they to plead for and recover all damages, incould not retain the whole of it. No-fault cluding those covered by PIP payments preinsurer State Farm was not entitled to the viously received under first party insurance
reimbursement fund held by plaintiffs, benefits. The tortfeasor's liability insurer
made no claim to it, and received no part of typically made payment in two separate
it. Therefore, State Farm need not contrib- checks, one drawn solely in favor of the
ute to payment of plaintiffs' costs and at- injured party covering general damages,
torney's fees. Plaintiffs urge that State and the other drawn jointly in favor of the
Farm is benefitted indirectly through appli- injured party and his no-fault insurer covercation of collateral estoppel in the arbitra- ing prior PIP payments. This procedure
tion proceeding as to issues decided at trial afforded the no-fault insurer the right of
and should therefore bear some of the costs subrogation to recover the PIP payments
and attorney's fees of trial. However, any previously advanced to its insured.
1. U.C.A., 1953, § 31-41-1, et seq.
2. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Anderson,
P.2d 235 (1980).

3. Utah, 606 P.2d 1197; Ivie was decided February 7, 1980, after this action was filed, but
before it was tried and decided on December
Utah, 608
23, 1980.
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The foregoing procedure was followed in
the instant case,4 except that plaintiffs retained the PIP check, not for the purpose of
effecting a double recovery, but to compel
South Central to contribute toward their
costs and attorney fees in recovering the
PIP payments for State Farm. Consequently, as contemplated by Ivie,5 State
Farm sought and obtained reimbursement
of the sum of $4,347.71 from Wausau
through arbitration proceedings.
This
placed Wausau in the unexpected and inequitable position of having to make a double
payment of PIP damages. The trial court's
subsequent modification of the initial judgment, reducing the amount thereof by the
sum of the PIP payments, constituted an
appropriate effort on the part of the court
to rectify its error and to comply with the
recent Ivie decision. In modifying the
judgment, the court relied upon the provisions of Rule 60(bX6) and (7),6 which read in
pertinent part as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: . . .
(6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (7) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall
be made within a reasonable time
The main opinion concludes that the trial
court erred in relying on the foregoing rules
4. In apparent unawareness of the intervening
decision in Ivie.

and suggests that the only subsection of
Rule 60(b) which would have supported a
motion to modify in this case was subsection (1) which allows relief from a judgment rendered by "mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect," and requires
such a motion be made within three months
of the date of the judgment. South Central's motion to modify was made on June
30, 1981, more than six months after judgment. Therefore, it would not qualify under subsection (1). However, under the
unique facts and circumstances of this case,
the need to modify did not arise within the
three-month limitation period. In light of
the fact that this case was tried pursuant to
the pre-Jv/e procedure, Wausau had no reason to believe that the check it had issued to
plaintiffs and State Farm jointly would not
eventually be endorsed to State Farm under
the customary principles of subrogation.
The prospect of having to make a double
payment if the PIP damages did not become a reality until the arbitration decision
was reached on June 10, 1981, which was
five months after judgment. Wausau's
need for relief did not exist prior to the
arbitration decision, and promptly thereafter (on June 30,1981) South Central brought
its motion to modify based on Rule 60(bX6)
and (7).
The main opinion accurately recites the
general rule of law that there must be a
day when a judgment becomes final and
litigation ceases, and that the filing of a
satisfaction of judgment usually accomplishes that purpose.7 However, a satisfaction of judgment does not conclusively establish the finality of the matter. Upon
ferring on the No-Fault insurer a right of
subrogation to the funds received by its insured for personal injuries. Section 11
grants the no-fault insurer a limited, equitable right to seek reimbursement in arbitration
proceeding against the liability insurer.
Me at 1202.

5. In Ivie, the Court interpreted the procedure
contemplated by the no-fault statute, supra, as
follows:
[T]he injured party should plead only for
those damages for which he has not received
reparation under his first party insurance 6. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
benefits.
7. Hollingsworth v. Fire Insurance Exchange,
Ivie at 1200.
Utah, 655 P.2d 637 (1982).
[S]imilarly, section 11 in the Utah No-Fault
Insurance Act cannot be interpreted as con-
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Those
proper motion and adequate reasons, a sat8
principles are invariably applied by the
isfaction of judgment can be set aside.
courts in construing Rule 60(bX5), and
Equitable principles govern the vacation of
the leading decisions explicating those
an entry of satisfaction of judgment just as
9
principles bear exposition. For example,
they do a motion to modify a judgment.
it is established that a change in condiAlthough no specific motion to set aside the
tions, whether a fact or by subsequently
satisfaction of judgment was made in this
enacted statute, may warrant relief from
case, it was necessarily set aside pursuant
a final judgment, but only from the proto the modification of the judgment and
spective
application of that judgment.
upon equitable principles.
[Emphasis added.]
I agree with the further reasoning of the 14 A.L.R.Fed. 309 § 3(b).
main opinion that the possibility of prejuJustice in this case demands that the
dice to the nonmoving party increases sigprinciples of equity be applied. There has
nificantly when the judgment has already
been an obvious change in conditions. The
been paid and satisfied, but that reasoning
Ivie decision came down while this case was
has no application to the particular facts of
pending in the trial court, changing the
this case. What possible prejudice could customary procedure followed in applying
inure to plaintiffs by invalidating the the no-fault statute. This prompted State
$4,347.71 PIP check issued by Wausau, Farm's otherwise unexpected arbitration
which plaintiffs never expected to retain, proceeding against Wausau to recover the
and which has never been negotiated? The PIP payments which had already been paid
check is still uncashed, and now that the jointly to the plaintiffs and State Farm in
instrument is more than six months old, by accordance with the trial court's judgment
statute it need not be honored.10 It is Certainly, these were changed circumstanctherefore not only reasonable, but incum- es within the contemplation of the Rule.11
bent upon this Court to apply principles of
Furthermore, the judgment still has proequity in this matter and sustain the reduc- spective application. This is so notwithtion of judgment against South Central, standing the fact that the judgment has
thus fulfilling the objective of the law with- been paid and a satisfaction of judgment
out causing undue prejudice to any party. filed, because the $4,347.71 check representThe judgment of the trial court is sup- ing the PIP payments previously made by
ported by the practice followed in the feder- Wausau remains unnegotiated.
In such circumstances, the sage advice of
al courts. Rule 60(bX5) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is identical to Rule Justice Cardozo regarding the application of
60(bX6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce- Rule 60(b)(5), supra, has full application:
A court does not abdicate its power to
dure, and the provision "no longer equitable
revoke
or modify its mandate if satisfied
that the judgment should have prospective
that what it has been doing has been
application" has been construed as follows:
turned
through changing circumstances
The reference in clause (5) to judgment
into
an
instrument
of wrong.
which it is "no longer equitable" to apply
prospectively invokes equitable principles 286 U.S. at 114, 52 S.Ct. at 462.
for relief from the prospective operation
I would affirm the judgment of the trial
of a judgment which long antedate the court in its entirety.
10. U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-4-404.
8. George Thatcher Corporation v. Bullen, 108
Utah 562, 162 P.2d 421 (1945); Cason v. Glass
Bottle Blowers Association, 113 Cal.App.2d 11. See 14 A.L.R.Fed. 309, § 5[a]; see also, 77
263, 247 P.2d 931 (1952); 47 Am.Jur.2d JudgMoore's Federal Practice ^60.26[4]; see also,
ments § 1032.
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 52
S.Ct. 460, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932).
9. George Thatcher Corporation v. Bullent supra, n. 6; see also, Utah C.V. Federal Credit
Union v. Jenkins, Utah, 528 P.2d 1187 (1974).
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HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissenting):
I concur in the opinion of Chief Justice
Hall with the following observation. Neither in his opinion nor in the majority opinion is any recognition given to that part of
Rule 60(bX6) which specifically provides
that if a judgment has been "satisfied, released, or discharged", that is a ground
upon which the court may relieve a party
from the judgment. Entirely aside from
the fact that the plaintiffs here had filed a
written Satisfaction of Judgment in the
court below, the judgment debtor's insurer,
Wausau, has paid or is obligated to pay the
plaintiffs' insurer, State Farm, $4,347.71 on
a subrogation claim handled through arbitration. This fact clearly provided the
judgment debtor with grounds to have the
judgment against it modified to the extent
of that amount. On somewhat similar
facts, a judgment was modified because of
partial satisfaction thereof in Sunderland v.
City of Philadelphia, 575 F.2d 1089 (3rd
Cir.1978). There, the plaintiffs obtained a
judgment against the defendants in the
amount of $35,000 arising out of a gas
explosion. After entry of judgment, defendants filed a motion to amend the judgment because one of them had paid $7,500
to the plaintiffs' insurer on account of the
latter's subrogation claim against the defendants. The court held that the denial of
the motion by the district court was an
abuse of discretion and that the defendants
were entitled to such relief modifying the
judgment under Federal Rule 60(bX5),
which is the same as our Rule 60(bX6).

O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
v.

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY and Marian Lynch,
Defendants.
No. 17922.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 30, 1982.

City employee had worked as real estate acquisition officer. When city departments were reorganized, employee was refused employment in new position commensurate to her former position, and was offered position with different job description
and lower job classification, and employee
voluntarily terminated employment with
city. She subsequently was granted unemployment compensation benefits, and city
appealed such award. Appeals referee determined that employee's resignation was
without "good cause," but the Board of
Review reversed referee, granting employee
benefits, and city appealed. The Supreme
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) employee
who quits "voluntarily and without good
cause" may nevertheless be awarded benefits if Industrial Commission finds that it
would be contrary to equity and good conscience to deny them; (2) evidence supported finding that employee left her employment not because she failed to receive
raise but because it appeared inevitable she
would be demoted; and (3) employee was
entitled to compensation on basis of "equity
and good conscience."
Affirmed.

1. Social Security and Public Welfare
<s=»280
Although Employment Security Act is
not designed to provide benefits to those
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Bostwick v. Beach, 103 N.Y. 414, 9 IE. 41
(1886).
[7] Following the general rule, when
specific performance is ordered and a plaintiff seeks an award of lost rents or profits,
the vendor who wrongfully withholds conveyance of property is entitled to credit for
actual interest earned on the purchase money retained by the purchaser, if any. The
seller in default may not, however, profit
from his own wrongdoing and therefore
will not be awarded any excess of interest
over rents and profits. Pearce v. Third
Ave. Improvement Co., 221 Ala. 209, 128 So.
396 (1930).
[8] In the present case, defendant's refusal to convey the property was found to
be "wrongful in that it was in contravention of the contract but it was not willful or
malicious so as to entitle plaintiffs to punitive damages." The usual rule of credit for
purchase money interest against rental value should therefore be followed in adjusting
the equities between the parties based upon
their position had there been a timely conveyance.
[9] Plaintiffs have attempted to cross
appeal from the award of damages, alleging
its inadequacy as a matter of law. However, they have failed to comply with Rules
74(b) and 75(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which require a timely filing and service of a statement of the points to be
relied on in a cross appeal. The cross appeal is therefore not properly before this
Court, and we decline to consider the additional issues raised by plaintiffs.
Remanded for further proceedings to determine the amount of plaintiffs' rental-value losses as offset by interest on the purchase pricp Costs to Respondents.
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS and
HALL, JJ., concur.
MAUGHAN, Justice (concurring and dissenting):
With one exception, I concur with the
judgment of the Court. That exception is
with the dismissal of the Cross-Appeal for
failure to comply with Rules 74(b) and
75(d), U.R.C.P.

Where, as here, the appellant brings up
the whole record, and specifically makes the
issue of damages one of his points on appeal, I see no reason why the respondent
should not be free to cross-appeal on the
issue of damages. The issue of damages
comes as no surprise to the appellant.
Rules 74(b) and 75(d) are designed to
prevent surprise when the record is selectively brought to the Court, and where the
Cross-Appellant may wish to select other
parts of the record, not already argued.

Michael W. McBRIDE, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
Terry Lynne JONES (formerly Terry
Lynne McBride), Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 16650.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 15, 1980.

A wife instituted supplementary proceedings in divorce action, to modify the
decree on ground of deception. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Christine
Durham, J., granted husband's motion for
summary dismissal, and the wife appealed.
The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., held
that: (1) alleged want of any factual basis
for wife's claim of fraud was not ground
for entry of summary judgment where
averments of the parties were in fact in
diametric disagreement; (2) in case of interfamily feuding, where contentions make
it appear that there is substantial likelihood
that proof may show that party to proceeding wherein judgment was entered was so
cheated, imposed upon or unfairly dealt

432

Utah

615 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2a ^ERIES

with that it should shock conscience of the
court to allow it to stand, court should
resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to present their evidence and have issues determined, instead of allowing distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
fraud to be controlling; and (3) in determining propriety of granting motion for
summary dismissal, testimony of party or
witness could be looked at in its entire
context, and it was not necessary that it be
measured solely on one statement.
Cause remanded for trial upon issues in
dispute.
1. Judgment <s=>181(20)
In supplementary proceedings in divorce action to modify decree, alleged want
of any factual basis for wife's claim of
fraud was not ground for entry of summary
judgment where averments of the parties
were in fact in diametric disagreement.
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c).

Joseph L. Henriod, Earl Jay Peck, Stephen L. Henriod of Nielsen, Henriod,
Gottfredson & Peck, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
Raymond J. Etcheverry of Parsons, Behle
& Latimer, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
respondent.
CROCKETT, Chief Justice:
The defendant, Terry Lynne Jones, instituted supplementary proceedings in this divorce action to modify the decree. She
alleges that her former husband, plaintiff
Michael W. McBride, actively deceived her
about the value of family property, referred
to below. On the ground that the rights of
the parties had been settled in the decree,
the court granted the plaintiff's motion for
summary dismissal. Defendant appeals.
A motion for summary dismissal can
properly be granted only when even assuming the facts as asserted by the party
moved against to be true, he could not
prevail.1 In circumstances where the granting of such a motion is justified, it serves
the salutary purpose of eliminating the
time, trouble and expense of a trial which
would be to no avail anyway.2 However,
since the party moved against is denied the
opportunity of presenting his evidence and
his contentions, it is and should be the policy of the courts to act on such motions with
great caution, to assure that a party whose
cause might have merit is not deprived of
the right to access to the courts for the
enforcement of rights or the redress of
wrongs.8

2. Judgment <s=* 185(2)
In case of interfamily feuding, where
contentions make it appear that there is
substantial likelihood that proof may show
that party to proceeding wherein judgment
was entered was so cheated, imposed upon
or unfairly dealt with that it should shock
conscience of the court to allow it to stand,
court should resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to present their evidence
and have issues determined, instead of allowing distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud to be controlling. Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c); Const. Art. 1,
§11.
3. Judgment <s=>186
In determining propriety of granting
motion for summary dismissal, testimony of
party or witness could be looked at in its
entire context, and it was not necessary
that it be measured solely on one statement.
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c).

In defense of the summary order, the
plaintiff asserts two propositions: first,
that there is no factual basis for the defendant's claim of fraud, and second, that if
any fraud existed, it was intrinsic fraud and
not available as a ground for disturbing the
decree.

1. See Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P.; and see In Re Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83, 348 P.2d 683.

3. Id. Also see Art. 1, Sec. 11 of the Utah Constitution

2. Rich v. McGovem, Utah, 551 P.2d 1266. See
also Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. United Resources, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165.
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[1] As to (1) above: Defendant's correct
anc: sufficient rejoinder is that the averments of the parties are in diametric disagreement, wherefore summary dismissal
could not properly be based on that ground,
and that the issue would have to be resolved on the basis of the credibility of their
respective evidence thereon. Accordingly,
if summary disposition is justified, it would
have to be on plaintiffs second ground.
We acknowledge awareness and appreciation of the cases cited and relied upon by
the plaintiff to the effect that intrinsic
fraud will not usually be grounds for setting aside a judgment. 4 The reasoning is to
the effect that intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud
which occurs during and within the proceedings, so that a party exercising reasonable diligence could meet and have an adjudication thereon, will not justify relief from
a judgment. 5 Whereas, it is held that the
only type of fraud which will justify granting relief from a judgment is extrinsic
fraud, that is, the deception or misrepresentation was outside the proceedings and effectively prevented the party from meeting
and having the issue determined.6
It is not to be doubted that, in appropriate circumstances, there may be merit to
the just-stated distinction between intrinsic
and extrinsic fraud, and the allowance of a
belated collateral attack upon a judgment
only for the latter. The principal reason
for this is that there must be some end to
litigation; and to serve that purpose, the
findings and judgment on issues previously
tried or triable should have respect and
solidarity; and this includes all matters
4. Haner v. Haner, 13 Utah 2d 299, 373 P.2d
577; Clissold v. Clissold, 30 Utah 2d 430, 519
R2d 241; Rice v. Rice, 11 Utah 27, 212 P.2d
685.
5. Id.
6. Clissold v. Clissold, supra, note 4.
7. See Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 376
P.2d 946, and authorities therein cited.
8. Haner v. Haner, 13 Utah 2d at 300-1, 373
P.2d at 578. Approaching such a problem in a
realistic way, this Court has heretofore recognized that to deny a party post-judgment relief
on the basis of the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction

which could, with reasonable diligence, have
been presented and resolved in the trial. 7
And r or that reason a judgment should not
be disturbed except for compelling reasons
where the interests of justice so demand.
The other side of that proposition is that
the courts should not forsake the interests
of justice; and when it appears that an
egregious deception or oppression may have
been practiced, it should neither be condoned nor rewarded. Particularly, that this
should not be done by allowing one to seek
refuge in niceties of legal terminology.
[2] Consistent with that principle,
thougti we remain committed to the desirability of respecting judgments and preserving their solidarity, we have heretofore recognized that it is more important to give
consideration to the degree of the injustice
that may have resulted than to terminology
or labels as to the type of fraud alleged.8
Accordingly, in a case such as this of interfamily feuding, where the contentions make
it appear that there is a substantial likelihood that the proof may show that a party
was so cheated, imposed upon, or unfairly
dealt with that it should shock the conscience of the court to allow it to stand, the
court should resolve doubts in favor of permitting the parties to present their evidence
and have the issues determined.
In preface to refocusing attention on the
controversy here in the light of what has
just been said, we note that we do not
presume to judge the credibility of evidence
nor the outcome of the controversy. But on
review of the summary dismissal, we a&may be too restrictive. In Haner v. Haner, we
stated:
It is sometimes said that when a judgment is
attacked collaterally on the ground that it
was obtained by fraud or deceit it will be set
aside only for extrinsic fraud. But we are in
accord with the Restatement of Judgments
that this is too limited. [Restatement of
Judgments, Sec. 118 et seq.] It seems more
realistic to say that when it appears that the
processes of justice have been so completely
thwarted or distorted as to persuade the
court that in fairness and good conscience
the judgment should not be permitted to
stand, relief should be granted.
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sume the averments of the party ruled
against to be true.

consider it nor representations concerning it
in connection with the settlement.9

Sparing detail not essential to our purpose here, the generality of the defendant's
allegations of fraud are: that at the time of
the divorce proceedings the plaintiff represented to her that their 10 percent interest
in a partnership known as Alpine Ltd. had
become worthless in that its assets had been
transferred to Land & Cattle Funding, Inc.,
owned by the plaintiff; whereas, Alpine
Ltd. had had 5,000 acres of land near Alpine, Utah, which was sold the year after
the divorce for 7.5 million dollars. From
this defendant reasons that their 10 percent
share thereof should have been about $750,000 at the time of the divorce. Further,
that the plaintiff was in an advantaged
position having knowledge of those facts;
that defendant had a right to and did reasonably rely on his representation, which
prevented her from asserting her claim to
her share of the Alpine Ltd. assets.

Plaintiff also argues that his representation as to the value of marital assets was a
mere expression of opinion and as such is
not a representation of fact which would be
a basis for an action in fraud. It is true
that in usual commercial transactions,
statements as to value, subsequently found
to be false, may be tolerated as expressions
of opinion or puffery.^ However, this case
is different. In some husband-wife relationships, it would not be unreasonable to
believe that the husband had superior
knowledge of property which he was handling in the family's interest; and that the
wife would be justified in reposing confidence in his knowledge and his representations concerning value. In situations relating to family welfare, the parties should be
held to a higher than usual degree of responsibility in making full and fair disclosure of the facts of which each has special
knowledge.

Plaintiff quite understandably points out
and stresses an answer in defendant's testimony that she did not rely upon the representation by him about the value of Land &
Cattle Funding, Inc.:
Q. The question is: At the time you
decided not to take any stock in Land
& Cattle Funding, did you rely on the
statement that the corporation had a
negative net worth?
A. No, I did not rely on that statement.
But she also testified:
Q. You don't know whether you relied
on that statement or not?
A. I don't know what you're asking.
A. I don't know what I relied on. How
can you take half of something that
isn't even there any more?

Upon the basis of what has been said
herein, it is our conclusion that the trial
court was not justified in granting the motion for summary dismissal, but should have
allowed a trial upon the issues in dispute.
The cause is remanded for that purpose.
Any award of costs is to abide determination by the trial court.
MAUGHAN, WILKINS and STEWART,
JJ., concur.
HALL, J., concurs in result.

O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

[3] The fact is that if her testimony is
analyzed in its total context, it is also susceptible of being understood as indicating
that because the plaintiff had represented
that the property had no value, she did not
9. That the testimony of a party, or a witness,
need not be measured solely on one statement,
but may be looked at in its entire context, see
DeVas v. Noblef 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290.

10. Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Utah, 557
P.2d 1009.
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Phillip C. PEPPER, an Arizona
resident, et al., Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A.,
et al., Defendants, Counter-claimants,
and Appellees.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A.,
et al., Third-Party Plaintiffs,
v.
Fred M. ROSENTHAL, et al.,
Third-Party Defendants.
Nos. 20807, 20958.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 9, 1990.
Rehearing Denied in No. 20807
Nov. 28, 1990.
Beneficiaries of trust brought action
against bank as executor of estate and as
trustee of trust which was sole beneficiary
of estate. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., entered
summary judgment in favor of bank, and
beneficiaries appealed. Bank filed protective, or conditional, cross appeal from summary judgment dismissing its third-party
indemnification claim against third-party
defendant who had managed family businesses for and on behalf of bank as executor. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held
that: (1) denial of motion for relief from
estate closing order did not preclude subsequent independent action collaterally attacking order on grounds of fraud and
misrepresentation; (2) if a trustee fails to
assert claims of a trust against an executor
who transfers dissipated assets to the
trust, those claims are not precluded by
probate order discharging executor, even
though trustee and executor are the same
entity; and (3) estate closing order which
approved estate's transfer of partnership
assets to trust, and subsequent sale of
assets by trust did not have any res judicata effect upon trust beneficiaries' claims
against trustee for failing to enforce
trust's claims against estate for executor's

mismanagement of assets prior to their
transfer to trust.
Reversed and remanded.
Howe, J., concurred in result.

1. Executors and Administrators G=>508(1,
2)
Court order approving a final accounting and settlement of an estate is a decree
that closes the estate and discharges the
executor; order binds all persons interested who are given proper notice of the final
proceeding as to all matters properly the
subject of the accounting. U.C.A.1953, 753-1001(1).
2. Judgment <3=>508
Final judgments and decrees generally
may be collaterally attacked if obtained by
fraud.
3. Executors and Administrators <&=>509(1,
4)
Estate closing orders, like other decrees, may be assailed in equity and upon
the same grounds as other judgments.
4. Executors

and

Administrators

<2>513(3)

Collateral attack on a decree closing an
estate and approving final accounting may
be based on fraud or misrepresentation.
U.C.A.1953, 75-1-106.
5. Executors
and
Administrators
<s>513(3)
For a collateral attack against an estate closing order on ground of fraud,
plaintiff must allege that executor was
guilty of misrepresentation or concealment
in presenting his account or in obtaining
approval of the court for the final accounting.
6. Judgment <&»585(1), 588
For denial of a relief from judgment
motion to have preclusive effect on a subsequently filed independent action, claim or
ground actually adjudicated on the motion
must be the same claim or ground that is
asserted in the independent action. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b).
pCj
tf(t
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7. Executors
and
Administrators
<S=>509(10)
Denial of motion for relief from estate
closing order did not preclude subsequent
independent action collaterally attacking
order on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation, where motion sought to have
order vacated on procedural ground that
movants had insufficient time to respond to
executor's petition at final hearing. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b).
8. Trusts 0 2 4 3
Trustee owes duty to beneficiary on
taking over property from an executor to
examine the property tendered and see
whether it is that which he ought to receive.
9. Trusts <s=»243
Successor trustee is liable for breach
of trust if he neglects to take proper steps
to compel his predecessor to deliver trust
property to him.
10. Trusts e=*243
Trustee has duty to enforce claims
against executor as a prior fiduciary upon
the transfer of the assets of estate to trustee; moreover, trustee's duty is not diminished or altered because trustee was also
the executor of the estate that transferred
assets to trust, even though executor was
absolved from liability for administration
of estate by court order.
11. Executors
and
Administrators
@=>513(13)
Beneficiary's claim for relief against
trustee for failure to enforce trust's claim
against executor as a predecessor fiduciary
is not barred by res judicata doctrines of
collateral estoppel and issue preclusion
based on an estate closing order; claim
against trustee for defaulting on its duty to
protect trust does not constitute a collateral attack on estate closing order.
12. Executors
and
Administrators
<s=>513(9)
If trustee fails to assert claims of trust
against executor who transfers dissipated
assets to trust, such claims are not precluded by probate order discharging executor,

even though trustee and
same entity.

^cutor are the

13. Trusts ®=>243
Statute limiting a trustee's liability for
failure to take steps to redress breach of
trust or fiduciary duty by predecessor executor or trustee to those acts of predecessor
concerning which the trustee had actual
knowledge or information which would
have caused reasonable trustee to inquire
further, could not absolve bank which acted in dual capacity as executor and successor trustee, and thus was clearly aware of
any breach of duty it may have committed
as executor. U.C.A.1953, 75-7-306(6).
14. Executors
and
Administrators
<s=>513(13)
Estate closing order which approved
estate's transfer of partnership assets to
trust, and subsequent sale of assets by
trust, did not have any res judicata effect
upon trust beneficiaries' claims against
trustee for failing to enforce trust's claims
against estate for executor's mismanagement of assets prior to their transfer to
trust; grounds alleged in complaint were
not actually litigated in probate proceeding,
which was a default proceeding.

Irving H. Biele, Edward S. Sweeney, J.
Peter Mulhern, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Gary R. Howe, Charles M. Bennett, Sheryl L. Simpson, Salt Lake City, for defendants, counter-claimants, and appellees.
Bernard L. Rose, Salt Lake City, for
third-party defendant.
STEWART, Justice:
Phillip C. Pepper and other members of
the Pepper family ("the Peppers"), the beneficiaries of the Jerome B. Pepper trust,
filed this action against Zions First National Bank as the executor of the Jerome B.
Pepper estate and as the trustee of the
Jerome B. Pepper inter vivos trust. The
trust is the sole beneficiary of the estate,
and Jerome B. Pepper's wife and children,
the appellants here, are the beneficiaries of
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the trust. The Peppers appeal from an
adverse summary judgment on counts I
and II of their five-count second amended
complaint. Count I of the complaint alleged that Zions, as the executor of the
estate, was guilty of fraud, mismanagement, and self-dealing, which caused a dissipation of the assets of the estate. Count
II of the complaint alleged that Zions, as
trustee, failed to charge Zions as executor
with breach of its fiduciary duty as executor in failing to transfer to the trustee the
assets of the estate undiminished by Zions'
alleged unlawful acts as executor.
Zions filed a protective, or conditional,
cross-appeal from a summary judgment
dismissing Zions' third-party indemnification claim against Fred M. Rosenthal, who
had managed the Pepper family businesses
for and on behalf of Zions as executor.
The trial court dismissed the above claims
and certified that there was no just reason
for delay and entered a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
I.

FACTS

On April 15, 1975, Jerome B. Pepper
executed the Jerome B. Pepper inter vivos
trust, which named Zions as the trustee,
for the benefit of his wife and children.
After he died in 1976, Zions was appointed
the executor of his estate, and in that capacity, Zions obtained the probate court's
approval to continue the ordinary operations of the Pepper family businesses.
Zions also obtained court approval to appoint Fred M. Rosenthal to manage several
businesses that Pepper had owned. Rosenthal served as general manager of the Pepper businesses for the estate from February, 1976, to December, 1980.
In December, 1978, Pamco, one of the
estate's businesses, made application to
Zions Bank to increase its line of credit
with the bank to obtain additional working
capital and to pay $250,000 in estate taxes.
The net worth of the Jerome B. Pepper
estate at about that time was represented
to be $2,119,468. The net worth of the
estate in December, 1979, increased to
$2,555,248. In February, 1981, the line of

credit with Zions reached a high of $930,000. A few months later, Zions, as executor, filed a final accounting that showed a
negative net worth for the estate.
In July, 1981, Zions filed a petition with
the probate court for approval of its first
and final accounting, the only formal accounting Zions filed. Zions also sought an
order that approved Zions' administration
of the estate, closed the estate, and discharged Zions. In addition, the petition
sought judicial approval of Zions' transfer
of the estate's interest in the Lerner-Pepper joint venture, a Pepper estate asset, to
the Pepper trust for sale to Hugh Neu
Steel Products, Inc., for $1,000,000 and the
subsequent use of a portion of those proceeds to purchase a debt from Kennecott
Metals for $225,019.36, which was owned
by Pamco, a Pepper business, and a debt
from Teledyne National for $24,356.22. No
mention was made in the petition to the
probate court of using the proceeds of the
sale to pay off the security interest that
Zions, as a commercial bank, had securing
its line of credit. The Peppers allege, inter
alia, that defendant Zions, as trustee of the
Jerome B. Pepper inter vivos trust, had
represented to the plaintiffs that the sale
of the interest in the Jerome B. Pepper
joint venture was to benefit the beneficiaries, when in fact the sale was to protect
the defendant's commercial line of credit
which the defendant had increased to approximately $930,000.
As executor, Zions mailed to the Pepper
family members written notice of Zions'
petition for closure of the estate and for
court approval of the sale of the LernerPepper joint venture interest. The notice
stated that the estate's liabilities exceeded
its assets. The Peppers did not appear at
the hearing, and on October 8, 1981, the
probate court entered a decree that approved the estate's first and final accounting and closed the estate. The closing order approved the executor's transfer of the
assets to the trustee, the trustee's sale of
the Lerner-Pepper joint venture interest to
Hugh Neu Steel Co., and Zions' subsequent
payment of the debts of Pepper's Allied
Metals. The final accounting *foog^d/that
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as of September 22, 1981, ti estate had
only liabilities and no assets to pass on to
the Jerome B. Pepper inter vivos trust.
On July 1, 1982, the Peppers filed a motion in the probate court to set aside the
closing order under Rule 60(b)(7) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the
ground that there was excusable neglect in
failing to appear to oppose the closing order. Before the probate court ruled on
that motion, the Peppers filed an amended
complaint in the district court against
Zions, alleging fraud and misrepresentation. Thereafter, the probate court denied
the Peppers' Rule 60(b)(7) motion to vacate
the closing order on the ground that the
motion was untimely. The Peppers appealed the denial of the motion, and this Court
affirmed. In re Estate of Pepper, 711 P.2d
261 (Utah 1985).
Again, the Peppers amended their complaint in the district court, this time alleging five claims for relief. The first claim
for relief alleged fraud and misrepresentation against Zions as executor. The complaint alleges, inter alia:
The misrepresentations made by the
Defendant were made with the intent
that the Plaintiffs rely upon said misrepresentations for the purpose of inducing
the Plaintiffs to acquiesce to the continuance of the operations of the various
companies in the control of Defendant
Zions while Personal Representative.
The misrepresentations made by the
Defendant were made with the intent
that the Plaintiffs rely upon such misrepresentations with the purpose of continuing non-profitable businesses in order to
protect the commercial line of credit with
Defendant Zions Sugarhouse Branch,
which the Defendant had allowed to increase to as high as $930,000.
The second claim for relief alleged that
Zions breached its fiduciary duty in failing
to object to the entry of the order closing
the estate. The third and fourth claims
alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary
duty by Zions as trustee of the Fannie N.
Pepper inter vivos trust and the Jerome B.
Pepper irrevocable trust. The fifth claim
sought punitive damages for the miscon-

duct alleged in the firs jur claims for
relief.
Zions filed a third-party complaint
against Fred M. Rosenthal and several other third-party defendants, alleging that if
Zions were held liable to the Peppers, the
third-party defendants were liable to indemnify Zions for any dissipation of assets
caused by mismanagement of the businesses by Rosenthal and the other defendants.
Zions also specifically alleged misrepresentation and breach of contract against Rosenthal and the other third-party defendants. Zions stipulated that it had no claim
against Rosenthal arising from the Peppers' third, fourth, and fifth claims for
relief, except to the extent that the fifth
claim alleged punitive damages based on
the Peppers' first and second claims for
relief.
Zions moved for summary judgment on
the fraud claim against it as executor under the first claim for relief and on the
claim against it as trustee for failure to
object to the executor's final accounting
under the second claim for relief. Zions
asserted that both claims were barred by
res judicata. The trial court granted summary judgment on both claims. Rosenthal
also moved for summary judgment against
Zions on the ground that Zions' claims
against him derived from the Peppers' first
and second claims for relief. Zions argued
that its claims against Rosenthal should be
dismissed only if Zions' motion for partial
summary judgment against the Peppers
were granted. The trial court granted
summary judgment to Rosenthal independent of the court's rulings against the Peppers and for Zions.
On this appeal, the Peppers argue that
the trial court erred in ruling that the
estate closing order was res judicata as to
(1) the Peppers' fraud claim against Zions
as executor of the estate, and (2) their
claim against Zions as trustee for failing to
object to the entry of the closing order.
On its cross-appeal, Zions contends that if
its partial summary judgment against the
Peppers is reversed, Zions is entitled to
indemnification from Rosenthal and that
the summary judgment in favor of Rosen-
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thai and against Zions on the cross-claim
should be reversed.
II.

FIRST CLAIM FOR
RELIEF—FRAUD

Zions asserts, and the trial court held,
that the estate closing order was res judicata and precluded the Peppers' fraud claim
against Zions in its capacity as executor.
[1] A court ordt,i approving a final accounting and settlement of an estate is a
decree that closes the estate and discharges the executor. Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-3-1001(1) (1978). The order binds all
persons interested who are given proper
notice of the final proceeding as to all
matters properly the subject of the accounting. In re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah
428, 440-41, 182 P.2d 111, 117 (1947); accord Miller v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.,
17 Utah 2d 88, 89-90, 404 P.2d 675, 676
(1965); In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah
128, 133-34, 158 P. 705, 707 (1916); 4 J.
Henderson, Bancroft's Probate Practice,
§ 1011 (2d ed. 1950).
[2-4] Final judgments and decrees generally may be collaterally attacked, however, if obtained by fraud. St. Pierre v.
Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah 1982).
Estate closing orders, like other decrees,
may be assailed in equity and upon the
same grounds as other judgments. In re
Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah at 137, 158 P. at
709. See also In re Estate of Pepper, 711
P.2d 261, 262-63 (Utah 1985). This Court
has held on a number of occasions that a
collateral attack on a decree closing an
estate and approving the final accounting
may be based on fraud or misrepresentation. Miller, 17 Utah 2d at 89-90, 404 P.2d
at 676; In re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah at
440-41, 182 P.2d at 117; In re Raleigh s
Estate, 48 Utah at 137, 158 P. at 709; Utah
Code Ann. § 75-1-106 (1978).
But not every claim of fraud or misrepresentation provides a basis for a collateral
attack against a judgment or decree. A
number of older cases state the test to be
whether the fraud was "extrinsic" or "intrinsic" and hold that if extrinsic, the fraud
is actionable in a collateral atcack, but if

intrinsic, it is not actionable. The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud
has often turned on a rather formal and
artificial analysis dependent largely on the
particular label that is attached to the
fraud. See St Pierre v. Edmonds, 645
P.2d at 618-19. Because of widespread
dissatisfaction with the distinction, we reassessed the law and held in St Pierre that
the fraud alleged need only affect the basic
fairness of the adjudication.
[5] Our trust and estate cases have essentially employed that test, even before
our ruling in St Pierre, although they
have sometimes couched the conclusion in
the old intrinsic-extrinsic language. See,
for example, In re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah
at 442, 182 P.2d at 118, in which this Court
defined extrinsic fraud to mean fraudulent
acts that prevent the fair submission of a
case for adjudication. See also Auerbach
v. Samuels, 10 Utah 2d 152, 155-56, 349
P.2d 1112, 1114 (1960). Thus, to allege an
actionable fraud on a collateral attack, a
plaintiff in a probate case must allege that
an executor "was guilty of misrepresentation or concealment in presenting his account or in obtaining the approval of the
court." Restatement (Second) of Trusts,
§ 220, comment a (1959).
An executor's failure to disclose pertinent facts to those who take under a will
may constitute the kind of fraud that is
actionable in a collateral attack. Hewitt v.
Hewitt 17 F.2d 716, 717 (9th Cir.1927),
stated the general rule that "mere silence"
of an executor in not disclosing important
facts to the heirs was the type of fraud
against which a court generally was powerless to grant relief, but held that there is
an exception to that rule:
"But there is an admitted exception to
this general rule in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful
party to a suit, there was m fact no
adversary trial or decision of the issue in
the case. Where the unsuccessful party
has been prevented from exhibiting fully
his case, by fraud or deception practiced
on him by his opponent, as by keeping
him away from court, a false promise of
a compromise; or where t t e ^ f e w d a n i
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never had knowledge of tl ^uit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to
represent a party and connives at his
defeat; or where the attorney regularly
employed corruptly sells out his client's
interest to the other side—these, and
similar cases, which show that there has
never been a real contest in the trial or
hearing of the case, are reasons for
which a new suit may be sustained to set
aside and annul the former judgment or
decree, and open the case for a new and
a fair hearing."
This case, we think, falls within the
exception, and not within the general
rule. Here the appellant was prevented
from presenting a claim for his portion of
the estate by the fraudulent conduct of
the administratrix, and there has been no
adversary trial or decision of any issue
as between the parties to the present
suit. The appellees frankly concede that,
if the appellant had been prevented from
making claim to the estate because of
some fraudulent statement or misrepresentation on the part of the administratrix, a court of equity would readily
grant relief; but it is contended that
mere silence on her part presents an
entirely different question. But there
can be no sound distinction between the
giving of false information and the failure to give correct information, where
the giving of the latter is a matter of
legal duty.
17 F.2d at 718 (quoting United States v.
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65-66, 25 L.Ed.
93 (1878)). Accord, Pickens v. Merriam,
242 F. 363 (9th Cir.1917); Jose v. Lyman,
316 Mass. 271, 55 N.E.2d 433 (1944); In re
Enger's Will, 225 Minn. 229, 30 N.W.2d
694 (1948); 31 Am.Jur.2d Executors and
Administrators
§ 1001 (1989).

In effect, the Peppers allege that they
were thus prevented from litigating the
question whether Zions mismanaged several of the major assets of the estate, i.e., the
Lerner-Pepper joint venture interest, the
businesses of Pamco and Pasco (Pepper
estate businesses), and managed in such a
manner as to promote Zions' self-interest
as a commercial bank by insuring payment
of Zions' line of credit rather than making
business decisions solely for the benefit of
the estate. The second amended complaint
specifically alleges that the Pepper businesses obtained working capital, at least in
part, from the commercial line of credit
obtained from Zions in the name of Pamco
which reached approximately $350,000 at
the time of Pepper's death. The complaint
further alleges, inter alia, that after Pepper's death, Pasco and Pamco, through Rosenthal, obtained from Zions an increase in
the line of credit to $750,000 and that the
line of credit did not benefit the LernerPepper joint venture, even though it was
secured by assignments of Lerner-Pepper
accounts receivable and inventory.

The fraud the Peppers allege against
Zions as executor is that Zions misrepresented the value of the Pepper estate "in
the form of quarterly reports prepared by
Defendants Zions and forwarded to the
Plaintiffs which showed misleading values
of the Jerome B. Pepper estate and companies within the estate" and other informa-

[6] Zions contends that the Peppers are
barred as a matter of law from any remedy
on the ground that a party who moves to
vacate a final order pursuant to Rule 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as
the Peppers did, may not thereafter attack
that same order collaterally in an independent action. According to Zions, a party
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tion conveyed "directly t
ie plaintiff by
written correspondence and conversations
which gave misleading information as to
the value of the estate." The Peppers do
not claim that Zions misrepresented the
value of the estate in the final accounting;
indeed, the Peppers' complaint is based on
the loss in the value of the estate, as reflected in the final accounting. A fair inference from the Peppers' allegations is
that Zions lulled the Peppers into a false
sense of security as to the proper management and value of the estate, with the
consequence that they did not act with
sufficient promptness to object formally to
the closing order.
See Goldberg i\
Goldberg, 217 Cal.App.2d 623, 32 Cal.Rptr.
93 (1963).
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may do one or the other, but not both.
Zions relies on Mendenhall v. Kingston,
610 P.2d 1287 (Utah 1980), for the proposition that if a party to a final judgment
moves to set aside the judgment under
Rule 60(b) and is unsuccessful, that party
may not thereafter collaterally attack the
judgment in an independent action. Zions
also argues, alternatively, that the October
8 closing order bars all the Peppers' claims
against Zion« as executor because the closing order has not been vacated.

Zions misreads Rule 60(b) and our case
law on res judicata. Rule 60(b) provides
that a final judgment or decree may be set
aside on seven grounds, some procedural
and some substantive. 1 The rule expressly
provides that a court also may entertain
"an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order or proceeding or to
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action." Thus, despite the doctrine of res judicata, the rule expressly
recognizes two different methods for attacking a judgment.

As noted, the Peppers moved under Rule
60(b)(7) to set aside the closing order on the
ground that because the notice given them
was insufficient to allow them to appear
and to effectively challenge the closing order, that order was invalid because it denied them due process. This Court's opinion in In re Estate of Pepper, 711 P.2d 261,
263 (Utah 1985) sets forth precisely the
allegation that the Peppers made in the
hearing on their Rule 60(b) motion: "Appellants assert that because the notice was
mailed to them, out of state, they did not
have an adequate opportunity to read the
233-page petition and prepare for the hearing held twelve days after the mailing.
They argue that this denial of their due
process rights necessitates that the order
be set aside." The Court held that the
notice was adequate and affirmed the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. Thus, the
Peppers' motion to set aside was based
exclusively on procedural grounds.

Rule 60(b) sets forth several grounds for
setting aside a judgment by motion that
would not be an adequate ground for an
independent collateral attack on a judgment. For example, the rule provides that
a party may be relieved of a judgment for
"excusable neglect" in failing to appear to

1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) through
(7) provides:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when,
for any cause, the summons in an action has
not been personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5)
the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has

been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or (7) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1),
(2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months after
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside
a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.

Rule 60(b) does not, however, specify
what res judicata effect, if any, the denial
of a Rule 60(b) motion has on a subsequent
independent action collaterally attacking
the same judgment. Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610 P.2d 1287, 1289, held, on the facts
of that case, that the denial of a Rule 60(b)
motion precluded a subsequent independent
action because of res judicata. Nevertheless, it does not follow that every denial of
a 60(b) motion has a preclusive effect on a
subsequently filed independent action.
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contest the entry of a deic^it judgment.
That ground, however, would certainly not
justify a collateral attack. There are also
other grounds for vacating a judgment under Rule 60(b) that would not sustain an
independent collateral attack, and the denial of a 60(b) motion on such grounds could
not, under res judicata law, preclude an
independent action based on fraud or misrepresentation. Certainly, a denial based
on one of the mandatory time limitations in
the rule for filing a motion could not have a
preclusive effect in a subsequent independent action. To be preclusive, the claim or
ground actually adjudicated on the 60(b)
motion must be the same claim or ground
that is asserted in the independent action.
See, e.g., Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme,
Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983). To hold
otherwise could result in a denial of due
process. To the extent that Mendenhall
endows the denia; of a Rule 60(b) motion
with greater preclusive effect than that
stated above, it is hereby disapproved.
[7] The Peppers' Rule 60(b) motion
sought to have the October 8 order vacated
on the ground that the movants had insufficient time to respond to Zions' petition at
the final hearing. The denial of that motion established that the time allowed met
constitutional requirements, but that ruling
does not bar the Peppers' claims for fraud
and misrepresentation alleged in the
present independent action against Zions.
In sum, the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the Peppers'
claim based on fraud and misrepresentation
against Zions as executor was necessarily
barred by res judicata. On remand, the
plaintiffs must first establish that they
were in fact prevented by fraud or misrepresentation from litigating the allegations
of mismanagement and self-dealing.
III.

COUNT II—RES JUDICATA EFFECT OF THE CLOSING ORDER ON
THE
ACTION
AGAINST
THE
TRUSTEE

The Peppers also allege that, as trustee,
Zions violated a duty owed them as beneficiaries by failing to enforce the trust's
claims against the estate for the executor's

mismanagement of its L ets prior to their
transfer to the trust. The Peppers also
allege that Zions had a conflict of interest
because of its self-interest in protecting its
loan to the Pepper estate businesses and its
duty to administer the estate and the trust
for the benefit of the Pepper family members as beneficiaries.
Executors and trustees are charged as
fiduciaries with one of the highest duties of
care and loyalty known in the law. Although Zions acted as both executor and
trustee, the duties of each office remained
separate and independent from the other
and did not merge. Thus, Zions as trustee
had a duty to act with the utmost fidelity
to protect and preserve the beneficiaries'
interests, even though Zions had to challenge its own conduct as executor.
[8-10] The law is settled that a "trustee
owes a duty to the beneficiary on taking
over property from the executor to examine the property tendered and see whether
it is that which he ought to receive." G.
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 583, at
358-59 (rev'd 2d ed. 1980) (citations omitted). A successor trustee "is liable for
breach of trust if he neglects to take proper steps to compel his predecessor to deliver the trust property to him." 3 A. Scott &
W. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 223.2, at
398-99 (4th ed. 1988). A trustee has a duty
to enforce claims against an executor as a
prior fiduciary upon the transfer of the
assets of the estate to the trustee. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 177, comment a (1959) states:
The trustee is under a duty to the
beneficiary to take reasonable steps to
enforce any claim which he holds as a
trustee against predecessor trustees . . .
or in the case of a testamentary trust
against the executors of the estate, to
compel them to transfer to him as trustee property which they are under a duty
to transfer, or to redress any breach of
duty committed by them.
See also In re First Nat'l Bank of Mansfield, 37 Ohio St.2d 60, 307 N.E.2d 23
(1974).
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A trustee's duty is not diminished or
altered because the trustee was also the
executor of the estate that transferred its
assets to the trust, even though the executor is absolved from liability for his administration of the estate by a court order.
Dickerson v. Camden Trust Co., 1 N.J.
459, 464, 64 A.2d 214, 218 (1949); In re
First National Bank of Mansfield, 37
Ohio St.2d at 66, 307 N.E.2d at 26-27.
Zions asserts tliat because the estate's
transfer of the Lerner-Pepper partnership
assets to the trust and the subsequent sale
of those assets as trustee was approved in
the October 8 closing order, the doctrine of
res judicata now bars the Peppers from
attacking that order. That argument, however, fails to meet the thrust of the Peppers' argument. They do not complain of
the sale as such; rather, they contend that
the executor mismanaged the estate, that
the trustee had a duty to charge the executor with the estate's loss of value occasioned by the executor's mismanagement,
and that as beneficiaries of the trust they
have a claim against the trustee for its
failure to enforce the claim against the
executor.
[11] A beneficiary's claim for relief
against a trustee for failure to enforce a
trust's claim against a predecessor fiduciary is not barred by res judicata doctrines
of collateral estoppel and issue preclusion
based on an estate closing order. A claim
against a trustee for defaulting on its duty
to protect the trust does not constitute a
collateral attack on an estate closing order.
The Minnesota Supreme Court stated in In
re Irrevocable Inter Vivos Trust Established by R.R. Kemske, 305 N.W.2d 755,
762 (Minn.1981), "This is not a collateral
attack on a probate court order. It is a
claim of breach of a trustee's duty to its
beneficiaries, not breach of an executor's
duty to its legatee."
Zions argues, however, that the estate
closing order creates a preclusive bar
against the beneficiaries' claim against
Zions as trustee because that order adjudicated the lawfulness of the transfer of all
the estate's assets to the trustee at closing.
In short, Zions contends that the closing

order precludes a claim against a trustee
for failing to receive the proper assets
from the executor when the trustee and the
executor are the same person.
[12] There is some authority to support
Zions' contention that a probate decree is
res judicata as to both the executor and a
successor trustee. Carr v. Bank of America NaVl Trust & Savings Assoc, 11
Cal.2d 366, 79 P.2d 1096 (1938); In re Liquidation of Canal Bank & Trust Co., 185
La. 34, 168 So. 485 (1936); Shearman v.
Cameron, 78 N J.Eq. 532, 80 A. 545 (1911);
In re Menzie's Estate, 54 Misc. 188, 105
N.Y.S. 925 (1907). See also In re Chaves1
Estate, 143 Misc. 868, 257 N.Y.S. 641
(1932), affd, 239 App.Div. 900, 265 N.Y.S.
932 (1933). Nevertheless, we believe that
the better view is that if a trustee fails to
assert the claims of a trust against an
executor who transfers dissipated assets to
the trust, those claims are not precluded by
a probate order discharging the executor,
even though the trustee and the executor
are the same entity. A number of cases
support that proposition. See, e.g., In re
Estate of Winston, 99 Ill.App.3d 278, 54
Ill.Dec. 756, 425 N.E.2d 973 (1981); Bullis
v. DuPage Trust Co., 72 Ill.App.3d 927, 29
Ill.Dec. 68, 391 N.E.2d 227 (1979); Liska v.
First Nat'l Bank in Sioux City, 310
N.W.2d 531 (Iowa Ct.App.1981); In re Irrevocable Inter Vivos Trust Established
by R.R. Kemske, 305 N.W.2d 755 (Minn.
1981); In re First Nat'l Bank of Mansfield, 37 Ohio St.2d 60, 307 N.E.2d 23
(1974); Smith v. McMahon, 236 Or. 310,
388 P.2d 280 (1964).
That proposition follows from the principle that an entity acting in one capacity is
not the "same party" for res judicata purposes as the same entity acting in a different capacity. 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 4449, at 414 (1981). The Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 36(2) (1982)
states:
A party appearing in an action in one
capacity, individual or representative, is
not thereby bound by or entitled to the
benefits of the rules of res judicata in a
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subsequent action in which .ie appears in
another capacity.
On its face, that rule applies to an entity
acting in the dual capacity of trustee and
executor.
The principle is illustrated by In re Irrevocable Inter Vivos Trust Established by
R.R. Kemske, 305 N.W.2d 755 (Minn.1981),
in which a bank acted as both executor of
Rudolph Kemske's estate and the trustee
of a trust which was the legatee of part of
Kemske's estate. The probate court approved a final decree of distribution more
than two years before a suit was filed
against the bank alleging mismanagement
of the funds. The Minnesota Supreme
Court rejected the argument that the probate court's approval of the executor's final accounting conclusively established
that there was no basis for the trustee to
have objected to that accounting:
This is not a collateral attack on a probate court order. It is a claim of breach
of a trustee's duty to its beneficiaries,
not breach of an executor's duty to its
legatee.
. . . The fact that a bank serves in a
dual capacity, and as trustee may have to
question its own conduct as executor,
does not alter the trustee's duty to its
beneficiaries.
. . . At the hearing on the final account, the trustee—acting for the trust
beneficiaries—owed the beneficiaries a
duty to use reasonable care and diligence
in examining that accounting and objecting thereto if reasonable and prudent to
do so
[I]t was error not to have
permitted appellants . . . to introduce evidence of the executor's performance as
bearing on the trustee's duty of care.
305 N.W.2d at 762-63.
In re First National Bank of Mansfield,
37 Ohio St.2d 60, 307 N.E.2d 23 (1974), is
similar. There, the defendant bank was
the executor of an estate and trustee of a
testamentary trust created to receive the
assets of the estate. The executor overpaid more than $5,000 in inheritance taxes.
Five years after the probate court had ap-

proved a final accounting die trust beneficiary sued the bank in its capacity as trustee for the overpayment. The Supreme
Court of Ohio held that the failure of the
beneficiary to "file exceptions to the final
account of the executor does not preclude
her from filing exceptions to the [bank's]
account in its capacity as trustee." 37
Ohio St.2d at 66, 307 N.E.2d at 27. Furthermore, the court held that the bank, as
trustee, was under an "unqualified duty"
to "take action to recover . . . that portion
of the trust property which had been
wrongfully disbursed by the bank while
acting as executor." 37 Ohio St.2d at 66,
307 N.E.2d at 27.
Likewise, in In re Estate of Winston, 99
Ul.App.3d 278, 54 Ill.Dec. 756, 425 N.E.2d
973 (1981), a decedent's widow served as
both administratrix of his estate and trustee of a trust which was to receive certain
assets under his will. More than seven
years after the court approved the widow's
final account as administratrix, one of the
beneficiaries of the trust sued, alleging
that she had converted assets in her husband's estate that should have been placed
in the trust. The appellate court rejected
the argument that the order approving the
widow's final accounting as administratrix
barred the suit:
As trustee, she had a duty to assure that
any assets rightfully belonging to the
trust became part of the trust
As
trustee, it was incumbent upon her to
challenge the final account if she knew
or should have known that [certain stock
she retained] constituted part of the residue of [the] estate and thus part of the
trust. [She] cannot now assert the binding effect of the order approving the
final account obtained . . . in her capacity
as administratrix to escape accountability
for . . . breach of her fiduciary duty as
trustee in failing to challenge the final
account
99 Ill.App.3d at 287, 54 Ill.Dec. at 763-64,
425 N.E.2d at 980-81 (citations omitted).
The policy that underlies the rule we
adopt gives full effect to the trust principle
that a "trustee owes a duty to the beneficiary on taking over the property from the
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executor to examine the property tendered
and see whether it is that which he ought
to receive." G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 583, at 359 (rev'd 2d. ed. 1980). That
duty should not be diluted on a theory that
the duties of an executor and trustee are
merged for res judicata purposes when one
party acts in both capacities. There is no
sound reason to diminish the protection the
law affords beneficiaries who rely on fiduciaries for their protection.
Furthermore, a straight forward application of res judicata principles under standard law compels the same conclusion.
The grounds alleged in the complaint here
were not actually litigated in the probate
proceeding and therefore cannot collaterally estop the beneficiaries against the trustee. See Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme,
Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983).
[13] Zions also contends that Utah Code
Ann. § 75^7-306(6) (1978) absolves it from
liability as trustee on the ground that as
executor, it was solely responsible for the
loss of value. That section limits a trustee's liability "for failure to take necessary
steps to compel the redress of any breach
of trust or fiduciary duty by any predecessor executor, trustee, or other fiduciary" to
those acts of the predecessor of which the
trustee has "actual knowledge or information which would cause a reasonable trustee to inquire further
"
Because Zions acted in a dual capacity as
trustee, it clearly was aware of any breach
of duty it may have committed as executor
of Pepper's estate. The knowledge that
Zions had as executor, it also necessarily
had as trustee. Section 75-7-306(6) does
not absolve a trustee who has knowledge
of the unlawful conduct of a predecessor
executor. The statute avails Zions nothing.
[14] The October 8, 1981 decree approving the trust transaction did not, therefore,
have any res judicata effect upon plaintiffs'
claim against Zions as trustee. The issue
of the trustee's liability was not actually
litigated in an adversarial proceeding, but
was decided in a default proceeding. It
follows that plaintiffs' claim against Zions
as trustee is not precluded.

The partial summary judgment against
the Peppers on their claim against Zions as
trustee is reversed.
IV. ZIONS' CROSS-APPEAL OF
THIRD-PARTY CLAIM
In light of the foregoing, we now consider the propriety of the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Rosenthal on
Zions' third-party claims against him.
Zions' first cause of action against Rosenthal asserts that he made material representations which were imputed to Zions
as acts of fraud and misrepresentation and
that he should be held liable to Zions for
those acts for which Zions might be found
liable to the Peppers.
Zions' second claim for relief alleges that
Rosenthal was negligent in the performance of his duties in managing the various
Pepper companies held by the estate.
Zions' final cause of action is based on
breach of contract. It asserts that Rosenthal's breach was the proximate cause of
the diminution of the estate of Jerome B.
Pepper. Zions has stipulated that it has no
claims against third parties arising from
the Peppers' third and fourth causes of
action.
Zions seeks indemnification from Rosenthal on the theory, apparently, that he was
primarily liable for whatever injury was
done to the estate, if any, and that Zions
was only derivatively liable. The allegations in the Peppers' complaint against
Zions are far from rifle shot allegations.
Conceivably, the Peppers might be able to
prove several different theories, some of
which might give Zions a third-party claim
against Rosenthal and some of which
might not. Under these circumstances, it
is premature to rule that Zions has no
claim. We, therefore, reverse the summary judgment against Zions. We observe,
however, that Rosenthal may, when the
case is more clearly outlined, seek an order
of dismissal or summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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HALL, C.J, DURHAM, J., and
GARFF, Court of Appeals Judge, concur,

Affirmed in part;
manded in part.

.versed and re-

HOWE, J., concurs in the result.
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ZIMMERMAN, J., having disqualified
himself, did not participate herein;
GARFF, Court of Appeals Judge, sat.
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Deanna FOXLEY, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
William M. FOXLEY, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 890493-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct. 12, 1990.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 3, 1990.

Former wife sought modification of alimony and child support. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Richard H. Moffat, J., increased alimony and child support
in light of husband's increase in income.
Husband appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court
Judge, held that: (1) change in husband's
income from negligible earnings of unemployed medical student to earnings in excess of $100,000 per year was substantial
change of circumstances justifying modification of decree; (2) evidence of husband's
increased income and hardships experienced by wife and children justified amount
of increase in alimony and child support;
and (3) newly discovered evidence of
amounts expended by wife for improvements on home did not have degree of
probative value sufficient to warrant new
trial.
1.

Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court
Judge, sitting by special appointment pursuant

Change in former husband's income
from negligible earnings of unemployed
medical student to earnings in excess of
$100,000 a year was substantial change of
circumstances justifying modification of divorce decree.
2. Divorce <S>245(2), 309.6
Trial court finding that former husband's income had increased from negligible amount to over $100,000 and that former wife and children had experienced
hardships and been on public assistance
supported increases in child support from
$150 per child and alimony of $10 per
month to alimony of $1,350 per month and
child support of $546 per child.
3. Divorce <$=>151

Newly discovered evidence concerning
former wife's alleged expenditures for improvements on home did not have degree of
probative value sufficient to have probable
effect on result and, thus, did not warrant
new trial; amount allegedly expended for
improvements on home included substantial
amount representing value of labor wife
performed herself and did not indicate that
she and children had additional assets or no
additional needs.
4. Divorce <§=>287
Evidentiary basis for amount of attorney fees awarded to former wife had to be
established on remand, absent any admissible evidence in record to substantiate reasonableness of amount awarded and in
light of husband's objection to lack of evidence.
Greg S. Ericksen, Bountiful, for defendant and appellant.
Robert W. Hughes, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellee.
Before GARFF, JACKSON and
NEWEY,1 JJ.
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1990).
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to redeem the property, which she did, the
[4] After reviewing the record in this
second attorney did not effect a redemption case, we conclude that reasonable minds
and the redemption period expired. The could differ on the question of whether the
client's action against this second attorney attorney's actions in this matter measured
was settled for $4,000 during the trial, and up to the standard of care required of attoris not before us on appeal.
neys in their professional duties. We therefore
reverse the summary judgment and
On this appeal from the granting of summary judgment to the first attorney, the remand the case for trial on that issue.
client contends that the record disclosed a Costs to appellant.
genuine issue of fact, specifically, whether
the defendant exercised "due care in performing the duties reasonably to be expected of an attorney under the circumstances."
[1] An attorney is required to possess
the legal knowledge and skills common to
members of his profession, Young v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 338, 437 P.2d 686, 690
(1968), and to represent his client's interests
with competence and diligence. Dunn v.
McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman,
Utah, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (1978).
[2,3] Ordinarily, whether a defendant
has breached the required standard of care
is a question of fact for the jury. FMA
Acceptance Co, v. Leatherby Insurance Co.,
Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 (1979); Jensen v. Dolen, 12 Utah 2d 404, 367 P.2d 191 (1962).
Consequently, a motion for summary judgment should be denied where the evidence
presents a genuine issue of material fact
wrhich, if resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, would entitle him to judgment as
a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 29 Utah 2d
184, 506 P.2d 1274 (1973); University Club
v. Invesco Holding Corp., 29 Utah 2d 1, 504
P.2d 29 (1972).1 A genuine issue of fact
exists where, on the basis of the facts in the
record, reasonable minds could differ on
whether defendant's conduct measures up
to the required standard. Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126
(1967); FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby
Insurance Co., supra.
1. In contrast, a motion for summary' judgment
may be granted where the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, admissions, and answers to
interrogatories, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that no
genuine issue of material fact exists and that

HALL, C. J., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
rw
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Sandra ST. PIERRE, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Stanley W. EDMONDS, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 17075.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 19, 1982.
Ex-wife brought action alleging that
ex-husband used harassment, threats of
bodily harm and physical abuse and intimidation to force her to sign documents wrhich
resulted in substantially reducing her share
in property settlement in divorce action and
in preventing her from contesting allegations in divorce complaint and sought damages or, alternatively, imposition of constructive trust. The Fifth District Court,
Washington County, J. Harlan Burns, J.,
dismissed amended complaint, and ex-wife
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J.,
held that complaint did state claim upon
which relief could be granted.
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Bihlmaier
v. Carson, Utah, 603 P.2d 790 (1979); Livingston Industries, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust
Co., Utah, 565 P.2d 1117 (1977).
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Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part

1. Divorce <s=>254(2)
Although court has continuing jurisdiction over its decree in divorce proceeding
for alimony, support, and division of property, motion to modify decree must be made
in original action and allege changed circumstances sufficient to warrant a reopening. U.C.A.1953, 30^3-5.
2. Divorce <s=>254(2)
Where ex-wife's claim was that ex-husband used harassment, threats of bodily
harm and physical abuse, and intimidation
to force her to sign documents which resulted in substantially reducing her share in
property settlement in divorce action and in
preventing her from contesting allegations
in divorce complaint, ex-wife did not plead
change of circumstances and therefore was
not entitled to have divorce decree modified. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
3. Judgment <§=>386(1)
Rule authorizing trial court to relieve
party from final judgment-laerdecree procured by fraud if motioTHr^fnade within
three months after judgment does not limit
power of court to entertain independent
common-law action to set aside judgment or
decree for fraud or duress after threemonth period has expired. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 60(b).
4. Judgment <&»456(1)
Doctrine of laches and other equitable
principles determine time within which independent common-law action to satisfy
judgment or decree for fraud or duress
must be brought.
5. Judgment <®=>372, 443(1)
Extrinsic fraud arises from acts preventing fair submission of case for adjudication and intrinsic fraud refers to matters
occurring during course of proceedings,
such as false testimony during trial, which
may have influenced the judgment.

6. Judgment <s=»372
Drawing- distinction between extrinsic
and intrinsic fraud in deciding whether independent action for relief from prior judgment lies has little merit and distinction
should be abandoned in determining when
independent action may lie to set aside
judgment or decree on ground that it was
obtained by fraud, overruling Clissold v.
Clissold, 30 Utah 2d 430, 519 P.2d 241, to
extent that it is contrary to holding.
7. Divorce <s=>165(3)
Intentional act by party in divorce action which prevents opposing party from
making full defense amounts to fraud upon
opposing party, as well as upon justice, justifying court in setting aside decree so
obtained.
8. Judgment e=>90, 375
When fraud or duress are properly
pleaded, it is not important whether decree
is entered after litigation or by consent.
9. Divorce <s=>165(5%)
Ex-wife's complaint alleging that exhusband used harassment, threats of bodily
harm and physical abuse, and intimidation
to force her to sign documents which resulted in substantially reducing her share in
property settlement in divorce action and in
preventing her from contesting allegations
in divorce complaint and wherein she
sought damages or, alternatively, imposition of constructive trust on ex-husband's
property stated claim upon which relief
could be granted.
David Nuffer, St. George, for plaintiff
and appellant.
Phillip L. Foremaster, St. George, for defendant and respondent.
STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiff appeals the district court's order
dismissing her amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. We reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint
for failure to state a claim, we assume the
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plaintiff's allegations to be true and construe them and the reasonable inferences
arising therefrom liberally in determining
whether a claim for relief has been stated.
Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398
P.2d 207 (1965); Heathman v. Hatch, 13
Utah 2d 266, 372 P.2d 990 (1962).
On March 23, 1978, a complaint seeking a
divorce and a division of the marital estate
was filed. Sandra Edmonds (now St.
Pierre) was the named plaintiff and Stanley
W. Edmonds the named defendant. Edmonds' attorney drafted the original divorce pleadings naming St. Pierre as the
complaining party. Edmonds executed and
filed an acknowledgment of service, consent
to default, and a waiver of appearance in
the original action; and both parties entered into a property settlement agreement.
On April 11, 1978, the court entered a
default judgment against Edmonds. On
April 21,1978, another attorney retained by
Edmonds appeared before the district court
and moved to withdraw Edmonds' consent
to the default and filed an answer and
counterclaim, an acknowledgment, a consent and waiver signed by St. Pierre, and a
property settlement stipulation executed by
both parties. The stipulation greatly reduced the property awarded St. Pierre.
Based on these documents, the court granted the divorce and divided the marital estate according to the terms of the stipulation.
On January 14, 1980, St. Pierre initiated
this action. In an amended complaint, she
alleges that Edmonds used harassment,
threats of bodily harm and physical abuse,
and intimidation to force her to sign the
documents which resulted in substantially
reducing her share in the property settlement in the divorce action and in preventing her from contesting the allegations in
the divorce complaint. By way of relief,
she seeks damages in the amount of that
1. In Land v. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248 at 1251
(1980), we held that a decree for the division of
property based on a voluntary stipulation may
be modified only in unusual circumstances not
present here. The Court stated:
. . . Accordingly, the law limits the continuing jurisdiction of the court where a property

portion of the marital estate that she claims
she should have had, i.e., $150,000, or, alternatively, imposition of a constructive trust
on the defendant's property. She also
seeks, in the alternative, an order setting
aside the property division in the decree and
a new distribution of the marital assets as
provided in the first property settlement
agreement.
In dismissing the complaint, the district
court stated:
. . . it appear[ed] to the Court that the
First Cause of Action represents facts
which, if substantiated by credible evidence would support intrinsic fraud upon
the Court in Civil No. 6665, Sandra Edmonds v. Stanley W. Edmonds, divorce
action, and more properly heard under
30-3-5, subparagraph 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in a divorce
case . . . .
[1,2] In this action plaintiff alleged
common law claims which were independent claims for relief, in addition to the
attempt to modify the divorce decree itself.
Clearly she was not entitled to a modification of the divorce decree pursuant to
§ 30-3-5. Although a court has continuing
jurisdiction over its decree in a divorce proceeding for alimony, support, and the division of property,1 a motion to modify the
decree must be made in the original action
and allege changed circumstances sufficient
to warrant a reopening. Crofts v. Crofts,
21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701 (1968). The
plaintiff in this action did not plead a
change in circumstances and therefore was
not entitled to have the decree modified.
Nor could plaintiff obtain relief based on
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because the time had expired for filing
a motion to set the decree aside.
[3] Rule 60(b) authorizes the trial court,
on motion, to relieve a party from a final
settlement agreement has been incorporated
into the decree, and the outright abrogation
of the provisions of such an agreement is
only to be resorted to with great reluctance
and for compelling reasons.
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judgment or a decree procured by fraud,
whether intrinsic or extrinsic, but only if
the motion is made within three months
after the judgment. That rule, with its
short time limitation, does not, however,
limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent common law action to set aside
a judgment or decree for fraud or duress
after the three-month period has expired.
Indeed, Rule 60(b) expressly recognizes and
preserves the court's historic powers to relieve a party from the operations of an
unconscionable judgment or order. "It remains clear, as it has from the beginning,
that Rule 60(b) does not limit the power of
a court to entertain an independent action."
7 Moore's Federal Practice, § 60.31 at 502
(2d ed. 1979).

[4] Nonetheless, even when there is
fraud in obtaining a judgment, there must
be some limit on the bringing of an action
to set the judgment aside. The time limitation in Rule 60(b), however, does not control
the filing of an independent action. Rather, the doctrine of laches and other equitable principles determine the time within
which the action must be brought. E.g.,
Compton v. Compton, supra; Selway v.
Burns, supra; Dunham v. First National
Bank in Sioux Falls, supra ; 7 Moore's Federal Practice, § 60.33 (2d ed. 1979); 11
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2868 (1973).

The availability of an independent action
for setting aside a judgment has been said
to rest on whether the fraud alleged is
"intrinsic"
or "extrinsic." The distinction
The well established and fundamental
between
extrinsic
and intrinsic fraud origidoctrines designed to establish the stability
nated
in
United
States
v. Throckmorton, 98
of judgments and decrees must yield to the
overriding principle that in our system of U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93 (1878), where the Court
justice the essential integrity of the adjudi- held that the fraud that was the basis of an
catory process must be preserved. One who independent action for relief must be exwould destroy that integrity cannot plead trinsic rather than intrinsic. However,
as a defense that his fraud on the system of thirteen years later, Marshall v. Holmes,
justice must be protected in the name of 141 U.S. 589, 12 S.Ct. 62, 35 L.Ed. 870
preserving judgments. Thus, it has long (1891), declared the "settled doctrine" that
been recognized by state amfcfederal courts relief from a prior judgment would lie
alike that an independent equitable action whenever it is "against conscience to exefor relief from a prior judgment is available cute a judgment" and the party seeking
in addition to those remedies afforded un- relief is without fault.
der Rule 60(b). E.g., Bizzell v. Hemingway, [5] Extrinsic fraud arises from acts pre548 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1977); Kodekey Elec- venting the fair submission of the case for
tronics Inc. v. Mechanex Corporation, 500 adjudication. Clissold v. Clissold, 30 Utah
F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1974); Anderson v. State 2d 430, 519 P.2d 241 (1974); Auerbach v.
Department of Highways, Alaska, 584 P.2d Samuels, 10 Utah 2d 152, 349 P.2d 1112
537 (1978); Perper v. Pima County, 123 (1960). Intrinsic fraud refers to matters
Ariz. 439, 600 P.2d 52 (1979); Dudley v. occurring during the course of the proceedKeller, 33 Colo.App. 320, 521 P.2d 175 ings, such as false testimony during the
(1974); Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho trial, which may have influenced the judg328, 612 P.2d 1175 (1980); Selway v. Burns, ment. Clissold v. Clissold, supra, Crouch v.
150 Mont. 1, 429 P.2d 640 (1967); Dunham McGaw, 134 Tex. 633, 138 S.W.2d 94 (1940).
v. First National Bank in Sioux Falls, 86 Needless to say, the line between the two is
S.D. 727, 201 N.W.2d 227 (1972); Jerkins v. neither straight nor bright.
McKinney, Tenn., 533 S.W.2d 275 (1976).
We recognize that a number of courts
See also 11 Wright and Miller, Federal continue to adhere to the Throckmorton
Practice and Procedure, § 2868 (1973); 7 distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic
Moore's Federal Practice, §§ 60.31, 60.36 (2d fraud. However, a number of other courts
ed. 1979); Moore, Federal Relief from Civil have abandoned the distinction and recogJudgments, 55 Yale L.J. 623 (1946).
nize an independent claim for relief from

PIERRE v. EDMONDS

Utah 619

Cite as, Utah, 645 P.2d 615

judgments for both extrinsic and intrinsic
fraud. E.g., Bussey v. Bussey, 95 N.H. 349,
64 A.2d 4 (1949) (divorce case). Boring v.
0% 138 Wis. 260, 119 N.W. 865 (1909),
(approved in 22 Harv.L.Rev. 600 (1909));
Laun v. Kipp, 155 Wis. 347, 145 N.W. 183
(1914). Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F.2d
949, 952 (3rd Cir. 1939), cert, denied, 308
U.S. 624, 60 S.Ct. 379, 84 L.Ed. 521 (1940).
[6] Drawing a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud in deciding
whether an independent action for relief
from a prior judgment lies, has little merit.
Professors Wright and Miller state that,
"[s]ince there is 'little real basis for the
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic
fraud/ it would be unfortunate if the ancient learning on this point were to be
resurrected as a limitation on independent
actions now that it is at last decently buried
with regards to motions." [Footnotes omitted.] 11 Wright & Miller, § 2861 at 196
(1931). A survey of the cases supports the
observation that:
The perpetuation of this extrinsic-intrinsic distinction has led the federal courts
into a thicket of inconsistency, because
the distinction is unnecessary, often irrational, and potentially productive of injustices not outweighed by the interests
of finality. [Rule 60(b): Survey and Proposal for General Reform, 60 Cal.L.Rev.
531, 542 (1972).]
We agree that the extrinsic-intrinsic distinction fails to provide a rational basis for
the harsh legal consequences which flow
from it. We, therefore, decline to determine whether the allegations in the complaint constitute the equivalent of extrinsic
or intrinsic fraud and hold that the distinction should be abandoned in determining
when an independent action may lie to set
aside a judgment or decree on the ground
that it was obtained by fraud.2
Plaintiff alleges that her waiver of appearance and her execution of the second
settlement agreement resulted directly
from physical and mental intimidation di2. To the extent that Clissold v. Clissold, 30
Utah 2d 430, 519 P.2d 241 (1974) is contrary to

rected at her by Edmonds. Relying on the
alleged acknowledgment, waiver and consent, the district court granted Edmonds a
default divorce and divided the marital
property pursuant to the agreement tendered by him. Assuming plaintiff's allegations to be true, as we must at this point,
she was prevented by defendant's duress
from presenting her evidence to the trial
court in the divorce proceeding.
[7] An intentional act by a party in a
divorce action which prevents the opposing
party from making a full defense "amounts
to fraud upon the opposing party, as well as
upon justice, justifying a court in setting
aside the decree so obtained." [Citations
omitted.] Berg v. Berg, 223 Minn. 173, 175,
34 N.W.2d 722, 724 (1948). Duress and
fraud are commonly held sufficient to vacate a property settlement in a divorce decree. Cary v. Cary, 257 Ala. 431, 59 So.2d
659 (1952). "Public interest requires that
no spouse be defrauded or coerced by the
other in obtaining a decree of divorce."
Guzzo v. Guzzo, 269 Wis. 21, 28-29, 68
N.W.2d 559, 563 (1955). In Anno. 157
A.L.R. 6, 80 (1945) it is stated:
Duress as a ground for setting aside a
default judgment of divorce has been frequently bracketed by the courts with
fraud. Generally speaking, the courts
will, as in the case of fraud .. . exercise
their power and set aside a judgment
obtained by duress.
[8] When fraud or duress are properly
pleaded, it is not important whether the
decree is entered after litigation or by consent. Civic Western Corporation v. Zila
Industries, Inc., 66 CaLApp.3d 1, 135 Cal
Rptr. 915 (1977); Parke v. Parke, 72 Idaho
435, 242 P.2d 860, 863 (1952).
[9] The claim in this case is for damages
and in the alternative for a constructive
trust to be imposed on the assets awarded
defendant that had been part of the marital
estate. In a narrow sense, therefore, the
claim for relief does not seek to set the
this holding, it is overruled.
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decree aside, although it is clear that the
action attacks the property distribution
made under the decree and therefore the
decree itself. Since, as we have held, a
claim for relief was stated that could have
resulted in setting the decree aside, it follows that the less drastic remedy sought in
this case does not preclude the action. In
sum, plaintiff's allegations of duress state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.
Affirmed as to the motion to modify and
reversed in all other respects and remanded
for further proceedings. Costs to appellant.
HALL, C. J., and OAKS and HOWE, JJ.,
concur.
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein.
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NORTH PARK BANK OF COMMERCE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

Donald G. NICHOLS ana Joseph H.
Bottum, Defendants and Appellant.
No. 17498.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 22, 1982.
Guarantor of loan appealed from a
judgment of the First District Court, Cache
County, VeNoy Christopherson, J., holding
him jointly liable with borrower for the
balance due on three promissory notes
signed by borrower. The Supreme Court,
Hall, C. J., held that guarantor was liable
for the entire balance owed by borrower to
lender on three separate loans even though
guarantor had only guaranteed the first
loan where the agreement signed by guarantor stated that guarantor agreed to guarantee payment of all obligations of borrower to lender "now existing or which may

thereafter arise," and where the agreement
was to "encompass future accommodations
and indebtednesses" of borrower, in that
such language was unambiguous as to guarantor's liability with respect to borrower's
future obligations.
Affirmed and remanded.
Guaranty <s=*36(l)
Guarantor of loan was liable for entire
balance due by borrower to lender on original loan and two subsequent loans where
guarantor had agreed in agreement to
guarantee payment when due of any and all
obligations of borrower to lender "now existing or which may thereafter arise," and
where agreement was to "encompass future
accommodations and indebtednesses" of
borrower, in that such language was unambiguous as to guarantor's liability with respect to borrower's future obligations.
C. C. Patterson, Ogden, for Bottum.
Frank M. Wells, Ogden, for Nichols.
Walter G. Mann, Brigham City, for plaintiff and respondent.
HALL, Chief Justice:
Defendant Joseph H: Bottum appeals a
judgment holding him jointly liable with
defendant Donald G. Nichols for the balance due on a total of three promissory
notes signed by Nichols.
Nichols borrowed $40,000 from plaintiff
North Park Bank of Commerce on December 15, 1976, executing a promissory note
and pledging 130,000 shares of Ametek
stock as collateral. As additional security,
appellant Bottum signed an agreement
promising to personally guarantee payment
of the loan. On January 7, 1977, plaintiff
loaned Nichols an additional $5,000 without
obtaining further security.
Nichols' original promissory note fell due
on March 15, 1977, and his $5,000 note fell
due on April 7, 1977. However, as of April
21, 1977, Nichols had paid only the interest
on these notes. At that time, Nichols
signed a new promissory note for the entire
$45,000 principal.
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number of cores. The court was justified in
its action but did not go far enough. We
Mildred A. STREET, Plaintiff
feel the court also should have considered
and Appellant,
the parties' course of performance and alv.
lowed defendant a reasonable time after
termination to recover cores from its late The FARMERS INSURANCE EX1974 purchases. Our position is supported
CHANGE, a corporation, and Preferred
by the Code, which provides, "[o]n 'terminaRisk Mutual Insurance Company, a cortion' all obligations which are still executoporation, Defendants and Respondents.
ry on both sides are discharged but any
No. 16109.
right based on prior breach or performance
survives." 70A-2-106(3). Thus, under the
Supreme Court of Utah.
Code defendant's right to a reasonable time
to gather cores for turn-in is not destroyed
March 28, 1980.
by termination of the parties' relationship.
We conclude, after termination, defendant was entitled to a reasonable time in
which to recover cores from its late 1974
purchases. We do not disturb the trial
court's amended holding allowing defendant to turn in 2,450 cores from purchases in
1975. We place an important qualification
on our holding, however. Although defendant is entitled to turn in enough usable
cores to cover his $4,807.40 debt, defendant
is not entitled to turn in cores for cash.
Throughout the course of their dealings the
parties operated on the basis that credit
rather than cash would be allowed for core
turn-ins. It would be unjust for the court
to restructure their understanding at this
point. In summary, defendant should be
allowed a reasonable time to turn in to
plaintiff, up to 6,410 usable cores. This
figure includes the 2,450 cores the trial
court allowed defendant to turn in. Any
number short of 6,410 not turned in, at the
close of the reasonable time period, shall be
paid for in cash.
Remanded to the trial court for judgment
in accordance with this opinion.
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS and
STEWART, JJ., concur.

Insured brought action seeking order
compelling no-fault automobile insurer to
endorse and deliver draft issued by automobile liability insurer of tort-feasor, with
whom insured had entered into settlement
agreement, to insured, and insured also
sought award *of attorney fees of one third
of amount received on behalf of no-fault
insures. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Maurice Harding, J., entered
judgment after granting insurer's motion to
dismiss, and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1)
no-fault automobile insurer did not have
interest in proceeds of settlement, which
concerned payments for inability to perform household services, between its insured and third-party tort-feasor by virtue
of claimed right of subrogation pursuant to
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act,
and (2) remand was required to determine
factual issues concerning insured's entitlement to attorney fees.
Reversed and remanded.
Hall, J., concurred in part and dissented in part and filed opinion.

HALL, J., concurs in the result.
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1. Insurance <s=>601.25
No-fault automobile insurer did not
have interest in proceeds of settlement,
which concerned payments for inability to
perform household services, between its in-
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sured and third-party tort-feasor by virtue
of claimed right of subrogation pursuant to
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act.
U.C.A.1953, 31^41-1 et seq., 31-416(lXbXii).
2. Insurance <*=>601
General rule that subrogated insurance
carrier must pay its fair share of attorney
fees and costs if it has given notice and does
nothing to assist in prosecution of claim
applies in situations in which benefit is conferred upon insurer as result of mistake,
such as when there is in fact no subrogation
right in the insurer to any of sums obtained
in settlement.
3- Appeal and Error <s=> 1177(8)
In action in which insured sought reasonable attorney fees for benefit conferred
on no-fault automobile insurer as result of
settlement of action against third-party
tort-feasor, remand was required to determine insured's entitlement to attorney fees
where no factual findings were made $s to
whether insurer in fact benefited from insured's recovery to extent that draft was
allegedly endorsed and delivered to the insurer in amount representing reimbursement for medical expenses, lost wages and
property damage, and as to whether insured
did so in mistaken belief as to nature of
subrogation rights provided under no-fault
insurance statutes. U.C.A.1953, 31-41-1 et
seq.

F. Alan Fletcher & Patrick J. Garver, of
Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff and appellant.
A. Alma Nelson of Hanson & Garrett,
Frank N. Karras, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
STEWART, Justice:
The issue in this case is whether a nofault insurance carrier has an interest in
the proceeds of a settlement between its
insured and a third-party tortfeasor by vir-

tue of a right of subrogation claimed pursuant to the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. See §§ 31-41-1 et seq., Utah
Code Ann. (1953), as amended. Plaintiff
also seeks an award of attorney's fees to be
paid out of any recovery Farmers Insurance
Exchange may obtain based on a right of
subrogation.
The district court dismissed plaintiffs
complaint to compel her no-fault insurer,
the defendant Farmers, to endorse a draft
made out jointly to plaintiff and Farmers
by Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company. Preferred Risk, the insurer of the
tortfeasor, tendered the draft in settlement
of plaintiffs claim. Plaintiff seeks reversal
of the lower court's dismissal and claims
that Farmers had no right by way of subrogation to share in the settlement amount.
The plaintiff, Mildred A. Street, was injured in a collision between her automobile
and one operated by Janet M. Clayton in
August 1975. Pursuant to the terms of
Street's no-fault insurance policy with
Farmers Exchange, Farmers paid Street
$10,132.47, of which $3,233.10 was for medical expenses, $1,816.40 for lost wages,
$702.97 for property damage, and $4,380 for
inability to perform household services
(hereafter "loss of services").
The payment for loss of services was
made in accordance with the insurance policy and as required by § 31-41-£(l)(bXii),
which provides for payment to be made for
loss of services at the rate of $12 per day
"in lieu of reimbursement for expenses
which would have been reasonably incurred
for services that, but for the injury, the
injured person would have performed for
his household and regardless of whether
any of these expenses are actually incurred." Street did not actually incur expenses for "loss of services," since substitute household services were provided voluntarily and without compensation by
Street's neighbors, friends, and family
members.
Street's damages exceeded the threshold
limitations controlling tort actions against a
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tortfeasor, soo § 31-41-9, and she filed suit
against Ms. Clayton seeking general and
special damages for her injuries. This action was concluded by a settlement. Prior
to settlement of the tort action, Farmers
placed Street and the tortfeasor's insurer,
Preferred Risk, on notice of its claim to
subrogation for the amount Farmers paid
to Street
Farmers agreed to discount its subrogation claim by 20% in the event the parties to
the action entered into a settlement. This
was based on the comparative negligence
ratio between plaintiff and tortfeasor which
plaintiff and Preferred Risk had agreed to.
It was agreed that plaintiff was 20% negligent and the tortfeasor, 80%.
The stipulation for dismissal and release
provided for a total payment of $14,000,
broken down as follows:
(1) Special damages of $7,256.14, representing $3,165.31 for medical expenses,
$2,480.45 for lost wages, and $610.38 for
property damages; and (2) General damages in the amount of $6,743.86. The stipulation between the parties contains the following language:
Plaintiffs hereby acknowledge such claim
and agree to pay Farmers Insurance
Group such amounts, not exceeding the
above itemization, which may be determined to be due and owing to Farmers
Insurance Group pursuant to its subrogation rights. In entering into this stipulation, however, plaintiffs do not concede
that Farmers Insurance Group's claim of
subrogation rights for payments made for
"services" is valid or that plaintiffs have
an obligation to repay to Farmers Insurance Group any amount paid by it pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-416(lXbXii), [U.C.A.], as set forth in the
Personal Injury Protection Endorsement
to plaintiffs' insurance policy.
Preferred Risk issued three drafts payable as follows:
1. A draft payable to Jack L. and Mildred A. Street and Farmers Insurance
909 PM—&

Group in the amount of $4,601.98 for medical expenses, lost wages, and property damage.
2. A draft payable to Jack L. and Mildred A. Street and Farmers Insurance
Group in the amount of $3,504 for "loss of
services."
3. A draft payable to Jack L. and Mildred A. Street and their attorneys in the
amount of $5,894.02, representing the balance of the settlement amount.
The Streets endorsed and delivered the
first draft to Farmers. The Streets refused
to endorse the second draft and claimed
that Farmers is not entitled to reimbursement for loss of services payments because
loss of services was not a recoverable damage item. Specifically, they claimed that
since this item could not have been recovered from the tortfeasor by way of damages, Farmers had no right of subrogation
as to it.
Plaintiff filed suit in district court seeking an order compelling Farmers to endorse
and deliver the second draft to the plaintiff
and to restrain Farmers and Preferred Risk
from arbitrating the reimbursement issue.
Plaintiff also sought an award of attorney's
fees of Vi of the amount received on behalf
of Farmers.
The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that a
no-fault insurance carrier is entitled to reimbursement to the extent that the insured
recovered damages from the tortfeasor or
its insurance carrier, even though the
amount recovered did not include the type
of damages for which the no-fault insurer
had made direct payments to the no-fault
insured. Thus, according to the trial court's
ruling, a no-fault insurer could collect out
of damages attributable to pain and suffering sums paid for an entirely different type
of damage, i. e., loss of services payments to
the insured.
[1] Farmers' claim for reimbursement
in this case cannot be sustained. Allstate
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Insurance Co. v. Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197
(1980), is dispositive. It holds that the Utah
No-Fault Insurance Act does not contemplate the granting of a right of subrogation
to a no-fault insurer in an action by the
no-fault insured against a third-party tortfeasor. The right of subrogation, as explained in Ivie, is a right to be exercised in
an arbitration proceeding between insurance companies of the respective parties so
that double recovery can be avoided, unnecessary litigation made less likely, and the
inherent conflicts between the insured and
the insurer avoided.
The plaintiff also contends that she is
entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee for
the benefit conferred on Farmers as a result of a settlement of her action against
the third-party tortfeasor. The general
rule is that a subrogated insurance carrier
must pay its fair share of attorney's fees
and costs if it has given notice and does
nothing to assist in the prosecution of the
claim. Cedarholm v. State Farm Mutual
Insurance Companies, 81 Idaho 136, 338
P.2d 93 (1959); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Clinton, 267 Or. 653,
518 P.2d 645 (1974); Iowa National Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Huntley, 78 Wyo. 380, 328
P.2d 569 (1958); 44 Am.Jur.2d Insurance
§ 1846 (1969); and Annot. 2 A.L.R.3d 1441
(1965).
[2] The problem in this case is that
there was in fact no subrogation right in
Farmers to any of the sums obtained in
settlement, as we held in Ivie, supra. However, if a benefit was conferred on Farmers
as a result of a mistake, the general rule
which governs attorney's fees in a proper
subrogation claim should be extended to the
instant situation. Had Farmers been compelled to collect from Preferred Risk under
the rule enunciated in Ivie, supra, it would
necessarily have incurred expenses. Equity
and good conscience require that Farmers
should not have a free ride from plaintiff's
efforts if such be the case.
1. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Me, Utah, 606 P.2d
1197(1980).

[3] The resolution of plaintiffs claim
for attorney's fees must depend upon findings of fact to be made by the trial court.
Since the court dismissed plaintiff's complaint without taking evidence, no factual
findings were made as to whether Farmers
in fact benefited from Street's recovery to
the extent that the Streets allegedly endorsed and delivered a draft to Farmers in
the amount of $4,601.98, which represented
reimbursement for medical expenses, lost
wages, and property damage, and whether
plaintiff did so in a mistaken belief as to
the nature of%the subrogation rights provided by the No-Fault Insurance Statute. If
such a benefit were conferred upon Farmers by the actions of the plaintiff, plaintiff
is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee
from Farmers to the extent that Farmers
benefited in the settlement secured by
plaintiff.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
the lower court and remand the case to the
trial court for further proceedings in accord
with this opinion.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN and
WILKINS, JJ., concur.
HALL, Justice (concurring and dissenting):
I agree that Farmers has no right of
subrogation.1 However, for that very reason (i. e., as a matter of law), it is my
opinion that plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys' fees. Simply stated, I deem it
wholly inappropriate to compensate plaintiff for "protecting" a right of subrogation
when in fact no such right existed to be
protected. Farmers' only right to reimbursement of PIP payments is through
mandatory, binding arbitration, 2 to which
plaintiff is barred as a party.
Furthermore, the judgment having been
reversed, plaintiff's demand that Farmers
and Preferred Risk be restrained from arbitrating the reimbursement issue would ap2. Id., interpreting U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-11.
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fc^weenTnsurers and that Pontiff should
E l u d e d from participating in the proc a i n e in any way. At the very least a
SSual question exists as to whether plamS f is entitled to equitable relief as would
deprive Farmers of its statutory right to
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Louis L. TIMM, John Neiuwland, and
Floyd M. Childs, trustees of United Precision Machine and Engineering Company Profit Sharing Trust; ABCO Insurance Agency, Inc., a Utah corporation; and Joseph L. Henroid, trustee
for the Annette Jacob Trust, Plaintiffs,
Appellees, and Counterclaim Defendants,
v.
T. LaMar DEWSNUP and Aletha Dewsnup; Arrow Investment Co., a limited
partnership; The Federal Land Bank of
Berkley; Imperial Land Title Inc., as
trustee and Eugene L. Carson and
Elaine Carson as beneficiaries; Stringham, Masuran, Larsen & Sabin, a professional corporation; Mineral Fertilizer Co., Inc.; and Harry V. Kaps, Defendants, Appellants, and Counterclaimants.
No. 910157.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 27, 1993.

Lenders brought action against borrowers to recover amounts paid on behalf
of borrowers to preserve equity interest in
property purchased on contract for deed
allegedly securing the loan. Borrowers
counterclaimed to reform trust deed in several respects including vacating assignment of contract for deed as security. The
Fourth District Court, Millard County, Ray
M. Harding, J., entered summary judgment
in favor of lenders and later denied borrower's motion to amend counterclaim and to
reconsider and set aside summary judgment. Borrower appealed. The Supreme
Court, Howe, Associate C.J., held that: (1)
summary judgment implicitly adjudicated
only one issue raised by counterclaim; (2)
trial court's erroneous belief that counterclaim was no longer before it warranted
remand so that court could address merits
of motion to amend counterclaim; and (3)
motion to reconsider summary judgment is

permitted where the summary judgment is
subject to revision.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Judgment <^181(14)
Summary judgment on lenders' claim
against borrowers to recover payments by
lenders to preserve borrowers' equity interest in property purchased by them on contract for deed implicitly ruled against borrowers on their counterclaim for reformation of trust deed to exclude contract for
deed as security, but the judgment did not
adjudicate other issues raised by counterclaim; lenders made no express reference
to counterclaim or its issues in their motion
for summary judgment or notice of hearing. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(a, b).
2. Judgment <s=>181(14)
Moving party determines scope of motion for summary judgment, decides issues
presented to court for adjudication, may
move for summary judgment on all or less
than all issues raised by complaint and
answer, and may move for termination of
issues raised by counterclaim or cross
claim. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(a, b).
3. Judgment <3=>178
Summary judgment procedure is generally considered drastic remedy requiring
strict compliance with rule authorizing it.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(a, b).
4. Pleading <S=>236(1)
Motion to amend pleading is addressed
to discretion of trial court. Rules Civ.
Proc, Rules 15, 15(a).
5. Appeal and Error @=>1178(1)
Trial court's erroneous belief that
counterclaim was no longer before it warranted remand so that court could address
merits of motion to amend counterclaim,
even though case had been dormant for
approximately ten years; long delay was
occasioned by bankruptcy proceedings and
was largely not fault of either party, and
one issue on remand involved only interpretation of loan documents unaffected by
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6. Judgment <3=>720
Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion
prevents relitigation of issues determined
in prior action.
7. Judgment <S=>956(1)
Party invoking collateral estoppel has
burden of proof.
8. Judgment <e=>829(3)
In dismissing adversary proceeding
with prejudice, bankruptcy court did not
determine issue whether trust deed should
be reconveyed as result of payment of
notes, and, therefore, dismissal had no collateral estoppel effect on that issue, though
it was raised in debtors' complaint in bankruptcy court and in trial briefs of both
parties.
9. Judgment <s=>186
Motion to reconsider summary judgment is permitted where the summary
judgment is subject to revision. Rules Civ.
Proc, Rule 54(b).
Michael Z. Hayes, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs.
Russell A. Cline, Salt Lake City, for
Dewsnups.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
Defendant Aletha Dewsnup appeals the
trial court's denial of her motions to (1)
amend her counterclaim, and (2) either reconsider and set aside a summary judgment entered against her or certify the
summary judgment as final so that she
could appeal it Defendant T. LaMar
Dewsnup, Aletha's husband, died in 1986
during the pendency of this action.
FACTS
In June of 1978, the Dewsnups, farmers
in Delta, Utah, with the help of two attorneys who the Dewsnups assert represented
them, borrowed $119,000 for a two-year
period to purchase a motel. The lenders
were the Annette Jacob Trust, of which one
of the attorneys was a trustee, the United
Precision Machine and Engineering Company Profit Sharing Trust, and ABCO Insur-

ance Agency, Inc. As securit4 ,. Dewsnups offered their 160-acre farm, together
with its water rights. They were required
to make an interest-only payment on the
loan on June 1, 1979, and to pay the loan in
full by June 1, 1980. The attorneys1 firm
prepared the loan documents that the
Dewsnups executed, including three promissory notes and a trust deed to secure the
notes. The Dewsnups later contended that
they were not aware at that time (1) that
the trust deed included, in addition to their
farm, 56.71 acres of land in Oak City, Utah,
that Aletha Dewsnup had inherited, and (2)
that one of the papers they signed assigned
to the lenders the Dewsnups' interest as
purchasers in a real estate contract. The
assignment was given as additional security for the notes.
The Dewsnups entered into the real estate contract in 1976 with Arrow Investment Company to purchase farm land adjacent to their farm. The contract provided
that the $400,000 purchase price would be
paid in twenty annual installments of $47,880.50, due on January 2 each year. The
contract also stated that should the Dewsnups default on any payment and remain in
default for five months (until June 2 of the
same year), they would forfeit any interest
in the contract and property.
The Dewsnups failed to timely pay the
1979 property taxes on the Arrow land and
failed to make the 1980 annual January 2
payment on the Arrow contract. On June
7, 1980, the lenders made the January 2
payment and paid the past due 1979 property taxes. They then demanded that the
Dewsnups reimburse them for those
amounts because the assignment of contract required reimbursement for payments
made by the lenders "under or pursuant
to" tne purchase contract. The Dewsnups
refused to reimburse, contending that because the default terminated the purchase
contract on June 2, by its own terms, the
June 7 payments could not have been made
under and pursuant to the purchase contract.
Although the Dewsnups had made the
interest payment on the loan on June 1,
1979, they were unable to pay the loan in
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full when it came due a year later. The
lenders commenced a nonjudicial foreclosure of the trust deed, and in September
of 1980, they filed this action against the
Dewsnups to foreclose the assignment of
contract because of their failure to pay the
loan and to reimburse the lenders for the
1979 property taxes and the 1980 $47,880.50 installment on the Arrow contract.
The Dewsnups engaged a new attorney
who filed an answer and a counterclaim,
seeking to (1) reform the trust deed to
conform with what they asserted were the
intentions of the parties, i.e., to include
only the 160-acre farm and the water
rights, and (2) vacate the assignment of the
Arrow contract as security for the payment
of the notes. The counterclaim alleged a
breach of fiduciary duty on the part of
their former attorneys, who the Dewsnups
asserted had also acted on behalf of the
tenders, in failing to fully advise the
Dewsnups of the content of the loan documents.
In December of 1980, the Dewsnups sold
the motel, paid the $119,000 loan in full,
and asked the lenders to reconvey the trust
deed. The lenders refused unless they
were reimbursed for the $47,880.50 payment they made on the Arrow contract and
the 1979 property taxes in the sum of
$2,085.71. In March of 1981, the lenders
moved for summary judgment for those
amounts plus attorney fees. Neither the
motion for summary judgment nor the notice of the hearing on the motion mentioned
the counterclaim.
The Dewsnups' attorney did not appear
at the hearing, and the trial court granted
summary judgment and a decree of foreclosure against their interest in the contract in favor of the lenders for the
amounts sought in their motion. The summary judgment did not refer to the counterclaim by name. The lenders then pursued the foreclosure until April 23, 1981,
when the Dewsnups filed chapter 11 (business reorganization) bankruptcy to forestall the foreclosure. The chapter 11 bank1. This issue was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. The Court held that 11 U.S.C.
section 506(d) does not permit a chapter 7 debtor to void that part of a lien on real property in

ruptcy was never completed, and in June of
1984, the Dewsnups filed chapter 7 (liquidation) bankruptcy, which was pending at
the time of this appeal. In March of 1986,
the Dewsnups filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court, primarily to determine whether they could void the lenders'
lien in excess of the fair market value
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 506.1
On January 6, 1991, the chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee abandoned the counterclaim
the Dewsnups had filed in this action, and
two weeks later, Mrs. Dewsnup filed (1) a
motion to amend the counterclaim and (2) a
motion to reconsider and set aside the summary judgment or, in the alternative, to
certify the summary judgment as final pursuant to rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, so that she could appeal it. The
trial court denied both motions, holding
that it had "implicitly" denied the counterclaim when it granted summary judgment
in 1981 and that the summary judgment
was "a final appealable judgment" at that
time. Consequently, it would now be improper to certify it for appeal under rule
54(b).
ANALYSIS
Adjudication of Counterclaim
[1] Mrs. Dewsnup contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to
amend her counterclaim. The denial was
based on the court's determination that the
counterclaim had been implicitly denied by
the summary judgment and thus had been
wholly disposed of and was no longer subject to amendment She argues that the
counterclaim and the issues raised therein
were not before the court at the time the
summary judgment was granted, that the
counterclaim was unaffected by the judgment, and that the court should have addressed on its merits her motion to amend
the counterclaim.
Rule 56(a) and (b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, states that a party seeking to
excess of its fair market value. Dewsnup v.
Timm, 502 U.S.
, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d
903 (1992).
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recover on a claim, countered .*, .. crossclaim or the party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted
may move for summary judgment in his
favor "upon all or any part thereof/' We
held in Bennion v. Amoss, 28 Utah 2d 216,
500 P.2d 512 (1972), that summary judgment on a complaint is not precluded by the
existence of a counterclaim. Also, cases
which raise issues of both fact and law may
lend themselves to summary judgment only
on issues of law.
[2] The moving party determines the
scope of a motion for summary judgment.
That party decides what issues to present
to the court for adjudication. He or she
may move for summary judgment on all or
less than all of the issues raised by the
complaint and answer and may also move
for determination of issues raised by any
counterclaim or cross-claim if he or she
deems it appropriate. When the moving
party has decided what the scope of the
motion for summary judgment shall be,
rule 56 contemplates that a written motion
shall be served on the opposite party setting forth with clarity the relief sought by
the motion so that the opposite party may
prepare to defend against it if he or she
chooses to do so.
[3] Summary judgment procedure is
generally considered a drastic remedy, requiring strict compliance with the rule authorizing it. Parmelee v. Chicago Eye
Shield Co., 157 F.2d 582, 168 A.L.R. 1130
(8th Cir.1946). In Lazar v. Allen, 347
So.2d 457 (Fla.DistCt.App.1977), the court
stressed the importance of "scrupulously
observing the notice requirements" prior to
entering summary judgment. The Florida
Supreme Court has observed:
If the [requirements of the rules] are
not fulfilled, both in letter and spirit, the
summary judgment procedure may become a vehicle of injustice rather than a
salutary medium of reaching a swift but
just result on a pure matter of law, as
intended by the framers of the rules.
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Foster, 93 So.2d
112, 114 (Fla.1957).
In accordance with that policy, the Florida District Court of Appeal in Faussner v.

Wever, 432 So.2d 100
ia.^/ist.Ct.App.
1983), held that a summary judgment
awarded to a seller in an action brought by
a buyer seeking specific performance did
not mean that the seller was also necessarily entitled to summary judgment on his
counterclaim against the buyer for retention of the earnest money. The court held
that in order to recover on the counterclaim, the seller had to make a motion for
summary judgment to that effect and give
notice as required by the rules of civil
procedure. In a later decision of the same
court, Redding v. Powell, 452 So.2d 132
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984), at issue was whether a summary judgment for foreclosure of
a mortgage disposed of a counterclaim for
an accounting and for a satisfaction of the
mortgage. The Redding court held that
"the summary judgment did not dispose of
appellant's counterclaim because the record
indicates that neither appellee's motion for
summary judgment nor the court's order
specifically mentioned or referred to the
counterclaim." Id. at 135.
A review of this court's decisions indicates that we have allowed summary judgments to be granted without strict compliance to the rules only when both parties
are present and no prejudice is shown. In
Security Title Co. v. Pay less Builder's
Supply, 17 Utah 2d 179, 407 P.2d 141
(1965), we found no error in a summary
judgment granted at the close of a pretrial
hearing when both parties were present,
although the ten-day notice required by the
rules had not been given. See also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah
1991); Western States Thrift & Loan Co.
v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019
(1972). In contrast, we held in Hein 's Turkey Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing
Plant, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 271, 470 P.2d 257
(1970), that a motion for summary judgment filed on the day of trial was not
timely.
Turning to the instant case, the lenders
contend that although neither the motion
for summary judgment, the notice of the
hearing on said motion, nor the summary
judgment itself made mention or reference
to the counterclaim by name, the counter-
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claim was implicitly denied when summary
judgment was granted. This contention requires us to examine what issues were
raised by the counterclaim and what issues
were resolved by the summary judgment.
In their counterclaim, the Dewsnups alleged that their attorneys had failed to
fully advise them that the trust deed they
executed included property in addition to
the 160-acre farm and had failed to advise
them that they were also assigning their
equity in the Arrow contract as additional
security for the $119,000 loan. They further alleged that they did not learn of these
facts until two years later, in June of 1980.
The relief which they sought in their counterclaim was a decree reforming the trust
deed to include only the 160-acre farm and
its water rights and vacating the assignment of the Arrow contract. The lenders
replied to the counterclaim by denying each
and every allegation. Thereafter, the lenders moved for summary judgment against
the Dewsnups for the principal sum of $49,966.21, plus accrued interest and attorney
fees. As set forth in the affidavit of one of
the lenders, the principal sum consisted of
the $47,880.50 payment that the lenders
had made on the Arrow contract and the
$2,085.71 property taxes. The Dewsnups
would not have owed these two amounts if
they could have proved as alleged in their
counterclaim that they did not intend the
Arrow contract to be part of the security
for the loan. Therefore, we are led to
conclude that although the motion for summary judgment, the notice of hearing on
the motion, and the summary judgment
itself made no reference to the counterclaim by name, the grant of summary judgment implicitly and necessarily constituted
an adverse ruling on that part of the counterclaim that sought reformation to exclude the Arrow contract as security in the
loan transaction. See Ford Motor Co. v.
Transport Indemnity Co., 795 F.2d 538,
543 (6th Cir.1986) (if district court's ruling
on one claim necessarily precludes alternative or mutually exclusive claim, final order
will arise despite lack of explicit declaration
by district court).
However, in accordance with the policy
that the procedure for summary judgment

should be strictly observed, we conclude
that nothing else was implicitly adjudicated
by the grant of summary judgment. Inasmuch as the lenders, as the moving party,
made no express reference to the counterclaim or the issues raised by it in their
motion or in their notice of hearing, none of
the other issues raised by the counterclaim
were implicated by the grant of summary
judgment. Those issues remain unaffected
in the trial court. One of those issues is
whether the parties intended to include the
Oak City property in the trust deed.
Mrs. Dewsnup also asserts that the trust
deed secures only the promissory notes but
does not secure payment of the summary
judgment, which was for the 1980 annual
installment on the Arrow contract and the
1979 property taxes on the Arrow land.
We do not reach this question because neither the merits of the summary judgment
nor the interpretation of the trust deed is
before us for review. At this point, there
is no final judgment subject to appellate
review.
Motion to Amend Counterclaim
[4,5] Having determined that the trial
court erred in its conclusion that the counterclaim was implicitly wholly disposed of
and that part of the counterclaim remains
in the trial court, we now turn to the
court's denial of Mrs. Dewsnup's motion to
amend the counterclaim. A motion to
amend a pleading is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Here, the court
did not exercise its discretion because it
took the position that the counterclaim was
no longer before it and subject to amendment. Therefore, it is necessary to remand
this case to the trial court to address the
merits of the motion to amend so that the
court may exercise its discretion with regard to it.
For the guidance of the trial court, we
briefly review our case law on amendments
to pleadings. Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, permits amendment with
leave of the court and states that 'leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires/' In Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d
205, 211, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963), we held
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that rule 15 should be interpi^ceu liberally
so as to allow parties to have their claims
fully adjudicated: "[The r u ies of civil procedure] must all be looked to in the light of
their even more fundamental purpose of
liberalizing both pleading and procedure to
the end that the parties are afforded the
privilege of presenting whatever legitimate
contentions they have pertaining to their
dispute." See also Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 89 Utah 530, 538-39, 57 P.2d 1132,
1136 (1936) ("[T]he policy of the law is
toward liberality in the allowance of
amendments and to regard them favorably
in order that the real controversy between
the parties may be presented, their rights
determined, and the cause decided/'); Hancock v. Luke, 46 Utah 26, 38, 148 P. 452,
457 (1915) ("Courts should be liberal in
allowing amendments to the end that cases
may be fully and fairly presented on their
merits.").
This liberal application of rule 15(a), however, is limited when the opposing party
does not have adequate opportunity to respond to the amended pleadings. In overruling the trial court's denial of a rule 15
motion to amend, we held in Lewis v. Moultrie, 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981), that leave
to amend should have been granted because the opposing party had "fair opportunity" to respond to the amended pleading:
"A prime consideration in determining
whether an amendment should be permitted is the adequacy of an opportunity for
the opposing party to meet the newly
raised matter." This court had previously
noted:
Some tempest has been raised about the
court allowing the plaintiff to make tardy amendments to the pleadings
The pleadings are never more important
than the case that is before the court
There can be no prejudice in this case
because we'll give ample time for an
answer
This is in harmony with
what we regard as the correct policy: of
recognizing the desirability of the pleadings setting forth definitely framed issues, but also of permitting amendment
where the interest of justice so requires,
and the adverse party is given a fair
opportunity to meet it.

Thomas J. Peck & Sons, * at. v. Lee Rock
Prods., Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 193, 515 P.2d
446, 449-50 (1973) (citations omitted), quoted in Lewis, 627 P.2d at 98.
Mrs. Dewsnup contends that this court
has never upheld a trial court's refusal to
grant leave to amend a pleading before a
trial date has been set because at that point
in the litigation, the opposing party will
always have time to respond to the amended pleading. She refers to Gillman v.
Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045
(1971), in which we found that a trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to permit
the defendant to amend its answer and add
a counterclaim when the case had not been
set for trial. Conversely, Mrs. Dewsnup
asserts that we have upheld a trial court's
refusal to grant leave to amend only when
the amendment was sought shortly before
trial or at trial so that the opposing party
did not have adequate time to respond.
See Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irr.
Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983) (trial
court's denial of motion to amend answer
on day of trial affirmed); Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983) (no abuse of
discretion in trial court's denying motion to
amend made on first day of trial).
The lenders assert that they would be
prejudiced by any amendment coming after
ten years of dormancy of the case. On
remand, any defenses or arguments
against amendment may be presented to
the trial court. It should be observed that
the long delay was occasioned by the bankruptcy proceedings and is largely not the
fault of either party. Also, one of the
issues which Mrs. Dewsnup seeks to raise
in the amended counterclaim is whether the
trust deed secures reimbursement of the
1980 annual installment and the 1979 property taxes which the lenders paid on the
Arrow contract and for which amounts
summary judgment was granted. This issue would appear to involve only an interpretation of the loan documents, which
would be unaffected by the passage of
time.
[6,7] The lenders further assert that
collateral estoppel prevents Mrs. Dewsnup
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from amending her counterclaim to raise
the issue of whether the trust deed should
have been reconveyed after the $119,000
loan was paid in December 1980. They
contend that this issue was raised and litigated in an adversary proceeding in the
bankruptcy court. Collateral estoppel or
issue preclusion prevents the relitigation of
issues determined in a prior action. Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 136 (Utah
1992). In raising the defense of collateral
estoppel, the lenders have the burden of
proof.
The party invoking this doctrine must
demonstrate the following: (1) the issue
involved in the subsequent action is identical to the issue decided in the previous
action; (2) the issue was decided in a
final judgment on the merits; (3) the
issue was competently, fully, and fairly
litigated in the first action; and (4) the
party against whom the doctrine is invoked must be either a party to the first
action or in privity with that party.
Id.
[8] In reviewing the record, we find
that the issue of whether the trust deed
should be reconveyed as a result of the
payment of the promissory notes was
raised in the Dewsnups' complaint in the
bankruptcy court and in the trial briefs of
both parties. However, the lenders have
offered no evidence that the bankruptcy
court ruled on the merits of this issue.
The memorandum decision and the judgment of dismissal make no reference to the
issue; they refer only to the 11 U.S.C.
section 506 bankruptcy issue as to whether
the Dewsnups are entitled to avoid liens in
excess of the fair market value of the
property and then redeem the property.
Mrs. Dewsnup contends that she tried to
raise the issue, but the bankruptcy court
would not consider it.
Because the party asserting collateral estoppel has the burden of proof and there is
no evidence of the bankruptcy court's determination of the issue, we hold that the
bankruptcy court did not determine the issue. The lenders drafted the judgment of
dismissal, which simply states that the
Dewsnups' adversary proceeding is dis-

missed in its entirety with prejudice, with
no findings of facts or reference to the
Dewsnups' claims. Consequently, there
has been no issue preclusion. In all likelihood, the bankruptcy court thought that
the summary judgment had determined the
issue, and the court did not want to go
behind the state court judgment. See Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 734, 66 S.Ct.
853, 857, 90 L.Ed. 970, 976-77 (1946), which
holds that where a state court judgment
has been validly rendered, that judgment
"is now res judicata and may not be further litigated in the bankruptcy proceeding." As earlier expressed in this opinion,
we do not reach the issue on this appeal.
Motion to Reconsider the Summary
Judgment or Certify as Final
under Rule 54(b)
[9] The trial court denied Mrs. Dewsnup's motion to reconsider the summary
judgment, stating that "no such motion
exists under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." In so ruling, it relied on Peay v.
Peay} 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). See also
Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415
P.2d 662 (1966) (to the same effect). Those
cases, however, do not hold that a motion
to reconsider does not exist in the circumstances presented by this case, where a
final judgment has not been entered.
Mrs. Dewsnup relies on the provisions of
rule 54(b) and in the court of appeals' analysis in Salt Lake City Corp. v. James
Constructors, 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct.App.
1988), for her contention that a motion to
reconsider exists and it was error for the
trial court not to grant the motion. She
asserts that because the summary judgment did not wholly dispose of the case, the
judgment is "subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties." Utah R.Civ.P.
54(b). Mrs. Dewsnup contends that under
the analysis in James Constructors, a motion to reconsider, although not explicitly
allowed in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, may be permitted under rule 54(b).
The court in James Constructors stated
that rule 54(b) "does allow for the possibility of a judge changing his or her^miijd in
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those claiming through an ancestor more
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY,
a California corporation, Plaintiff
remote.
and Appellant,

v.

Now, the appellants take only through
their mother. If she could not take, then
her daughters cannot take.
At common law illegitimate children
could not inherit property. 4 The common
law of England is the law of Utah except
as it has been modified by statute; and
while the statute permits the illegitimate
child to inherit from its mother and from
its father if he acknowledges the child to
be his, the statute makes no provision for
inheriting from the brothers and sisters
who are legitimate children of their father.
Section 74-4-11, U.CA.1953, seems to
indicate a legislative intent that an illegitimate cannot inherit from collateral half
blood relatives on the father's side. It provides that the property of an illegitimate
child who dies intestate without leaving
husband or wife or lawful issue will go to
his mother or in case of her death to her
heirs at law. This statute prevents the decedent from participating in the estate of
his half sister, and it would seem that the
legislature intended that she (or in case of
her prior death, her descendants) should
not be able to share in his estate.
The appellants, therefore, cannot take
under Subsection (4), supra, a share of the
decedent's property through their mother,
nor can they take under Subsection (6)
above for the reason that they are not recognized in law as the "next of kin." The
term "next of kin" refers to nearest blood
relatives who would take the personal estate of one who dies intestate 5 and does
not include bastards. 6 Since their mother
could not inherit any part of the estate of
the decedent, the appellants likewise are
precluded from inheriting and, therefore,
cannot be considered as belonging to the
class of "next of kin."
4. 2 Wendell's Blaekstone Commentaries,
page 286.

Earl R. BARNES, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 12771.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 17, 1072.

Automobile liability insurer brought
action to enforce its claimed right of subrogation to certain funds received by defendant in settlement of his tort action for
personal injuries against third party. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Stewart M. Hanson, J., rendered summary
judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Callister, C.
J., held that where record was insufficient
to indicate whether defendant who had
received medical expense payments from
insurer, was paid twice for his injuries and
record was inadequate to establish who had
greater equity and did not clearly establish
that tort-feasors or their representatives
had actual or constructive knowledge of insurer's right of subrogation, issues of fact
were raised, precluding summary judgment
for defendant.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
Tuckett, J., concurred in result.
Henriod, J., dissented and filed opinion.
Crockett, J., dissented and filed opinion.
Insurance <£»606(4)

Where an automobile liability policy
did not specify occupant of a vehicle being
used by an insured as a "person insured,"
defendant, who was such a passenger, who
had been paid by insurer under medical expense coverage and against whom insurer
5. Bullentine Law Dictionary page SON.
6. 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 24.
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subsequently brought action to enforce its
claimed right of subrogation to funds received by defendant in settlement of his
tort action for personal injuries against
third party, was not an "insured" subject
to insurer's subrogation rights under policy
clause providing that insurer shall be subrogated to all insured's rights of recovery.
(Per Callister, C. J., with one Justice concurring and one Justice concurring in the
result.)
2. Insurance <§=>606(l)
Regardless of an express contract provision, an insurer may be entitled to subrogation. (Per Callister, C J., with one Justice concurring and one Justice concurring
in the result.)
3. Subrogation C^l
Equitable principles apply to subrogation. (Per Callister, C. J., with one Justice
concurring and one Justice concurring in
the result.)
4. Insurance €=>606(l)
Insured is entitled to be made whole
before insurer may recover any portion of
insured's recovery from tort-feasor; if one
responsible has paid full extent of the loss,
insured should not claim both sums, and insurer may then assert its claim to subrogation. (Per Callister, C. J., with one Justice
concurring and one Justice concurring in
the result.)
5. Subrogation <§=»!

Subrogation is not a matter of right
but may be invoked only in those circumstances where justice demands its application. (Per Callister, C. J., with one Justice
concurring and one Justice concurring in
the result.)
6. Subrogation 0=>l

Subrogation is not permitted where it
will work any injustice to others. (Per
Callister, C. J., with one Justice concurring
and one Justice concurring in the result.)
7. Subrogation C=>l

To entitle one to subrogation, the equities of one's case must be strong. (Per
Callister, C. J., with one Justice concurring
and one Justice concurring in the result.)

8. Subrogation <5=>\
The purpose of subrogation, as a creation of equity, is to effect an adjustment
between parties so as to secure ultimately
the payment or discharge of the debt by a
person who in good conscience ought to
pay for it. (Per Callister, C. J., with one
Justice concurring and one Justice concurring in the result.)
9. Insurance 0^606(10)
If third-party tort-feasor's settlement
with person who had received payment
from automobile liability insurer for medical expenses was intended to include the
prior medical expenses paid for by insurer,
two drafts should have been issued, one to
insurer and person receiving benefits jointly and one to that person alone. (Per Callister, C. J., with one Justice concurring
and one Justice concurring in the result.)
10. Insurance <§=>606(I0)

If settlement by third-party tort-feasor
with person who had received medical expense payments from automobile liability
insurer was made with knowledge, actual
or constructive, of insurer's subrogation
right, such settlement and release was a
fraud on insurer and would not affect insurer's right of subrogation as against
tort-feasor or his insurer. (Per Callister,
C. J., with one Justice concurring and one
Justice concurring in the result.)
11. Judgment C=^I85.3(I2)
Where record, in automobile liability
insurer's action to enforce its claimed right
of subrogation to certain funds received by
defendant in settlement of his tort action
for personal injuries against third party,
was insufficient to indicate whether defendant, who had received medical expense
payment* from insurer, was paid twice for
his injuries and record was inadequate to
establish who had greater equity and did
not clearly establish that tort-feasors or
their representatives had actual or constructive knowledge of insurer's right of
subrogation, issues of fact were raised,
precluding summary judgment for defendant. (Per Callister, C. J., with one Justice
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concurring and one Justice v .curring in
the result.)
12. Insurance <S=*606( 10)

If an insurer has had an opportunity
to assert its subrogation rights to thirdparty tort-feasors who have entered into
settlement with person against whom subrogation rights are claimed and insured has
neglected to give notice or enforce its demands, it may be determined under such
circumstances that insurer's rights in equity are equal or inferior to those of person
against whom subrogation is claimed.
(Per Callister, C. J., with one Justice concurring and one Justice concurring in the
result.)
13. Equity <S=>54

Equity will not relieve one who could
have relieved himself. (Per Callister, C.
J., with one Justice concurring and one
Justice concurring in the result.)
14. Insurance O60I.2
Insurer, to establish a superior equity
against person who has received medical
expense payments from insurer and thereafter recovered against third-party tortfeasors,'and thus to be entitled to prevail
in subrogation action, must present proof
which establishes that damages recovered
by defendant's settlement were the same or
cover those for which defendant has already received indemnity from insurer;
otherwise, receipt of payment from tortfeasor does not entitle insurer to return of
payments made by it. (Per Callister, C. J.,
with one Justice concurring and one Justice concurring in the result.)

certain funds received b\ £fendant in settlement of his tort action for personal injuries against third parties. Both parties
moved for summary judgment based on the
pleadings, affidavits, admissions and answers to interrogatories; the trial court
granted judgment to the defendant. Plaintiff appeals therefrom and seeks judgment
rendered in its favor.
Defendant was a passenger in a motor
vehicle, owned and operated by one Jenson; plaintiff had issued a policy of insurance to Jenson. The vehicle was involved
in a collision, and defendant sustained personal injuries. Plaintiff, under its medical
expense coverage, paid defendant $1,000,
the maximum benefit under the policy.
Thereafter, defendant filed an action
against the alleged tort-feasors, whom he
claimed by their negligence caused the collision with the vehicle in which he was riding. Defendant alleged that he had sustained permanent injuries, and sought
$65,000 general damages and $10,000 special damages. Plaintiff notified defendant's attorney of its claimed subrogation
right; however, plaintiff refused to participate in defendant's action or to permit his
counsel to act on its behalf. Defendant
has emphasized that the law firm that represents plaintiff also represented the tortfeasors, with whom defendant entered into
a settlement for a lump sum of $7,500.
Plaintiff claims that it is entitled to reimbursement to the extent of $1,000 less a
reasonable attorney's fee and its proportionate share of the costs from the fund
recovered by defendant from the tort-feasors.

Allan L. Larson, of Worsley, Snow &
Christensen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and appellant.
William H. Henderson and Mark S.
Miner, Salt Lake City, for defendant and
respondent.

Plaintiff predicates its right of subrogation on three alternative theories: one, on
an express contract as provided in the insurance policy issued to Jenson; two, on
an implied contract as money had and received; or third, on a quasi contract for
unjust enrichment.

CALLISTER, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff insurer initiated this action to
enforce its claimed right of subrogation to

The insurance contract provided that the
company would pay, "on behalf of the insured," all reasonable medical expenses for
bodily injury caused by accident and sus-
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taincd by any person while occupying an
owned automobile while being used by an
insured. The policy further defined an
"insured" as a person or organization described under "Persons Insured/' Under
the express provisions of the policy, an occupant of a vehicle being used by an insured was not specified as a "person insured." The subrogation clause of the policy provided:
In the event of any payment under
the Liability or Medical Expense Coverage or under Part II of this policy, the
company shall be subrogated to all the
insured's
rights of recovery therefor
against any person or organization and
the insured shall execute and deliver instruments and papers and do whatever
else is necessary to secure such rights.
The insured shaU do nothing after ]oss
to prejudice such rights.
[Emphasis
added.]
[1,2] From the foregoing, defendant
was not an ''insured" under the express
provisions of the contract; and, therefore,
it may not be urged that as an insured he
breached the contractual provisions of the
subrogation clause. Regardless of an express contract provision, an insurer may be
entitled to subrogation.
Subrogation springs from equity concluding that one having been reimbursed
for a specific loss should not be entitled
to a second reimbursement therefor.
This principle has been accepted in the
insurance field with respect to property
damage, and with respect to medical
costs by an impressive weight of authority.
. . . »

feasor. If the one responsible has paid the
full extent of the loss, the insurer should
not claim both sums, and the insurer may
then assert its claim to subrogation. 2 Subrogation is not a matter of right but may
be invoked only in those circumstances
where justice demands its application, and
the rights of the one seeking subrogation
have a greater equity than the one who opposes him. 3 Subrogation is not permitted
where it will work any injustice to others.
To entitle one to subrogation, the equities
of one's case must be strong, as equity will,
in general, relieve only those who could
not have relieved themselves. 4 The purpose of subrogation, as a creation of equity, is to effect an adjustment between parties so as to secure ultimately the payment
or discharge of a debt by a person who in
good conscience ought to pay for it. 5
Plaintiff urges that defendant's settlement and release of his entire claim must
necessarily include all of his medical expenses, and therefore, he has received double payment to the extent that plaintiff
paid under its medical coverage. On the
other hand, defendant claims that he sustained severe injuries, but he was compelled
to settle for a sum that inadequately compensated him for the total damages sustained.

[3-8J Equitable principles apply to subrogation, and the insured is entitled to be
made whole before the insurer may recover
any portion of the recovery from the tort-

[9,10] The settlement was for a lump
sum without apportionment as to specific
items of damage. From the state of the
instant record, there is insufficient evidence to indicate whether defendant was
paid twice.
When the settlement was
made, the tort-feasors or their representatives apparently had actual or constructive
knowledge that some of defendant's medical expenses had previously been paid by
plaintiff.
Perhaps the negotiated settlement was reduced by this amount, particularly when defendant's counsel had been

1. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fanners
Ins. Ex<-liaii£<\ 22 I'tali 2<1 1X3, 1X4. 450
I\2<1 45S (1909).

4. Ashton Jonkins Ins. Co. \. Layton Sugar
Co., X5 Ctah 333, 337, 39 I\2<1 701
(1935).

2.

Lyon v. IlartfonI Arc. & In<]<«m. Co.. 25
Etah 2d 311, 31 \ 4X0 I\2<1 739 (1971).

5. Holmstead v. Abbott C. M. I)i<>sd, Inc..
27 Ctah 2d 109, 493 I\2«I 025 (1972).

3.

Beavor County v. Homo Inrieni. Co., XX
Ctah 1, 3G-37. 52 I\2d 435 (1935).
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informed that he did not repreb .it plaintiff's interest. If the settlement were intended to include plaintiff's prior medical
expenses, two drafts should have been issued, one to plaintiff and defendant jointly
and one to defendant, alone. If the settlement were made with knowledge, actual or
constructive, of plaintiff's
subrogation
right, such settlement and release is a
fraud on the insurer and will not affect
the insurer's right of subrogation as
against the tort-feasor or his insurance
carrier. 6
[11-14] The present state of the record
is inadequate to establish who has the
greater equity. The record does not clearly establish that the tort-feasors or their
representatives had actual or constructive
knowledge of plaintiff's right of subrogation. If such fact be established, they may
not disregard plaintiff's known subrogation
right in settling the liability. In such a
case, the tort-feasors in good conscience
should discharge the liability and plaintiff
does not have a right in equity superior
to defendant's. Furthermore, if plaintiff
had an opportunity to assert its subrogation rights to the tort-feasors and neglected
to give notice or enforce its demands, the
trial court may determine under such circumstances that plaintiff's rights in equity
are equal or inferior to defendant's, i. e.,
equity will not relieve one who could have
relieved himself. The plaintiff to establish
a superior equity and thus to be entitled to
prevail must present proof which establishes that the damages covered by defendant's
settlement were the same or cover those
for which the defendant has already received indemnity from plaintiff; otherwise, the receipt of payment from the
16 Coueli On Insurance 2d, § 01:197, i>i>.
348-350; Davenport v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 81 Nov. 361, 404
P.2d 10 (1965) ; Hospital Service Corp.
of Rhode Island v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co.,
101 R.I. 708, 227 A.2d 105, 112 (1967) ;
Sentry Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 246 Ark. 6*0,
439 S.W.2d 797, 799 (1909) ; 0A Appleman Ins. Law & Practice, § 4092, p. 240.

tort-feasor does not entitle
plaintiff to
the return of the payments made by it. 7
This cause is reversed and remanded for
a trial in accordance with this opinion.
No costs are awarded.
E L L E T T , J., concurs.
T U C K E T T , J., concurs in the result.
H E N R I O D , Justice (dissenting) :
I dissent. The main opinion indulges
generalities as substitutes for the facts in
subrogation matters relating to insurance
contracts.
The policy in this case provided two
things pertinent to this case: It insured
Barnes, defendant here, who was no signatory to the insurance contract, but a beneficiary thereof, by the happenstance that
he was a passenger in the car owned by
the insured who paid the premium. As
such beneficiary he obtained no greater
rights under the policy than did the insured, and under the terms of the policy
the insurance company, plaintiff here, was
1) required to pay medical benefits to the
defendant, as passenger, and 2) was subrogated, in equity, which is the case here, to
any recovery for such benefits made by
defendant. 1
Defendant, having full knowledge of the
policy terms, after having been paid the
maximum medical benefits of $1,000 by the
plaintiff insurance company, sued for both
medical and general damages.
At this
point the insurance company, plaintiff
here, notified Barnes of its equitable right
of subrogation to recover back what it had
paid Barnes ($1,000) for the medicals.
Barnes settled his suit against the tort-feasor for $7,500, giving a full release for all
7. 15 Blashfield Automobile Law and Practice, § 484.0, p. 192.
!. There was nothing therein requiring
company to sue for or assist Barnes
recovering anything other than what
company had paid under the policy,
maximum $1,000.

the
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claims, without insisting that the release
include or exclude the medical payment of
$1,000 already paid. In equity one is said
to be required to do equity. If this be so,
Barnes should have said "I have been paid
$1,000 on the claim for medical damages
which I sued you for along with general
damages, and therefore I cannot give you
a release for all claims unless you either
pay an additional $1,000 to the insurance
company or make out two checks, one to it
for its equitable subrogation right of reimbursement of $1,000, leaving a second
check to me for $6,500." Barnes having
failed in equity either to notify the plaintiff company of its willingness to accept a
sum for a "release of all claims," without
condition or exclusion of the one claim,—
the medical one,—is not responsive to the
maxim that "He who seeks equity must do
equity."2 It is no answer for the main
opinion to return this case to determine
what Barnes's understanding with the defendant tort-feasor's insurance carrier was,
since such circumstances are quite irrelevant and inconsistent with any rights
plaintiff and defendant here may have entertained. Barnes, defendant here, cannot
adjudge the conditions under which he may
give a release for all claims, without reservation, without being obligated to abide by
the only contract that gave him any rights
for medical payments at all—the insurance
policy, and the only thing involved here.
It seems silly for him to say that I am
bound by the policy under which, though I
was no signatory thereto, I am not bound,
if the insurer doesn't intervene and protect
me in some fantastic claim I made in rny
complaint, which I admitted in my brief
that I, "Barnes, fearful of losing suit
settled it for a lump sum of
$7,500" To this author, this sounds like a
first-class shakedown, and as icing on a
cake that would give a double payment of
$1,000 medical expense paid by the plaintiff insurance company, which latter in equity should have at least some kind of relief, and which should be the amount paid,

or $1,000 as compared to $7,500 settlement
which should amount to 100% recovery, in
my opinion, but at least a proportionate recovery from Barnes. This would seem to
be equity, and there is no equity in sending
this case back to determine any other equities between plaintiff and defendant, since
such equities already were resolved in an
insurance contract, to the terms of which
Barnes was but a beneficiary, not a signatory, and to which he was no party as to
subrogation rights, and in which contract
he was not entitled to lay down his own
rules, but to whose terms, if he relies on
its terms, he must comply,—one of which
is that certainly he cannot sign a release of
all claims unless he recognizes the rights
of the contract under which he has accepted benefits, without reserving rights to the
insurer in a release.
CROCKETT, J., dissents and files opinion.
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting):
It is important to bear in mind that, as
correctly set forth in the main opinion, the
defendant Barnes was not an "insured" under Jensen's policy with plaintiff Transamerica. Therefore Barnes and Transamerica had no contractual relationship
nor obligations to each other. Defendant
Barnes simply became a third-party beneficiary of Transamerica's promise to its insured, Jensen, that it would pay up to
$1000 medical to any occupant of his car
who was injured. It should be assumed
that Jensen both desired and paid for this
protection to his passengers, of which
Barnes became a beneficiary. Transamerica received the premium for that protection and should fulfill that obligation and
should not be permitted to sue and recover
from the third-party beneficiary (defendant Barnes). Allowing it to take the money away from the intended beneficiary to
reimburse itself results in failure to fulfill
the promise for which it accepted the premium, and defeats the purpose for which
its insured (Jensen) paid his money.

2. State Farm Mutual v. Farmers Insurance E change, 22 Utah 2d 183, 450 P.2d 458 (1969).
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The conclusion thus stated is affirmed
by the well known authority, Couch on Insurance, Sec. 61:172, 2d Ed., wherein it is
stated:
It may be required by statute or contract that some person other than the insured shall have the benefit of the insurance procured by the insured. When
such is the case, the insurer may not assert any claim by zcay of subrogation
against such person, [this is] on the
theory that the policy is designed to afford protection to such third person and
this purpose would obviously be defeated
if the insurer could sue the third person
to recover from him the payments made
by the insurer to the third person. (Citation) [Emphasis added.]
It is also significant that Transamerica's
policy contained numerous and ample provisions for its own protection, including
rights of subrogation expressly reserved to
itself, but it did not include the right of
subrogation against any third-party beneficiary, therefore not against one in the position of the defendant Barnes.
Further, assuming without conceding
that there may be some circumstances

where such a subrogation would be available to this plaintiff, it certainly would be
obliged at least to make it clearly appear
that $1000 of the settlement received by
Barnes in the other suit was for the medical expense plaintiff had paid. On the basis of the pleadings, affidavits, admissions
and answers to interrogatories, the trial
court could view the facts thus: that inasmuch as the settlement of Barnes (defendant here) in the other case wherein he settled his claim of $65,000 for $7500 was
indicated as being for his personal injuries, and with no segregation nor indication as to separate medical expense, there
therefore would exist no reasonable basis
for a finding that the $1000 medical expense which had been paid by plaintiff
Transamerica was repaid in that settlement.
On the basis of what I have said above I
think the trial court was justified in concluding that there was no disputed issue of
fact which if resolved in favor of the
plaintiff would entitle it to prevail, and
that accordingly, the summary judgment
was proper in order to avoid the time, trouble and expense of a trial.
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and their minor children And Sec. 78-45- self when he reaches his majority, his par2(4) states thereof that
ents may be required to provide support
"Child" means a son or daughter under beyond that time.2
the age of twenty-one years and a son or
daughter of whatever age who is incapac- [3,4] As to the plaintiff's challenge to
itated from earning a living and without the sufficiency of evidence: There has been
no transcript of the evidence brought to
sufficient means. [Emphasis added.]
this Court; and in the absence thereof we
Upon appropriate hearing and considera- assume that it supports the findings of the
tion of the matter, the trial court ordered trial court.8 However, we make the obserthe father, plaintiff Leonard, to pay $150 vation that, in view of the financial circumper month to support his son, Joseph (no
stances of the parties as shown in our prior
one questions that he is retarded and incapdecision in this case, it does not appear that
able of self-support), after he became 21.
$150 per month to provide for a retarded
On appeal, the father urges: (1) that child would be excessive or inequitable.
inasmuch as the divorce decree awarded
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff.
support for Joseph until he was 21, that was
res judicata on that issue; and (2) insufficiMAUGHAN, HALL and WILKINS, JJ.,
ency of the evidence to support the decree.
and HENRIOD, Retired Justice, concur.
[1] As to (1), above: The issue presentSTEWART, J., having disqualified himed and decided in the prior proceeding related to the support of the children during self, does not participate herein.
their minority. It does not appear that the
issue, as to the obligation of the plaintiff
Leonard to support the son Joseph after the
latter had attained the age of 21, nor of the
son's right to receive such support, was
tried or determined therein. Joseph is now
21, when it would normally be expected
that he would have become self-supporting.
But the fact is that he has not, and he is
The WESTERN CASUALTY AND
without means of support and will become
SURETY COMPANY, Plaintiff
an object of charity, or a burden on public
and Appellant,
welfare, unless that responsibility is placed
v.
upon his parents, including his father, as
Ralph MARCHANT, Darve Miller, and
does this adjudication.
Sherman Peterson, Defendants and
[2] There is a firm foundation for the
Respondents.
judgment of the trial court in the statute
No. 16512.
quoted above. It expressly fixes responsibility for support of a child "of whatever
Supreme Court of Utah.
age who is incapacitated from earning a
living and without sufficient means" upon
July 11, 1980.
his parents. Correlated to the foregoing
and in further support of the trial court's
Automobile liability insurer, which
ruling, this Court has recognized that when
a child is so limited, either physically or claimed that injured employee was an emmentally, that he is unable to support him- ployee of insured and thus excluded under
2. See Dehm v. Dehm, Utah, 545 P.2d 525
(1976), and authorities therein cited. This principle was also stated and reaffirmed in the later
case of Carlson v. Carlson, Utah, 584 P.2d 864
(1978).

3. Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385
P.2d 154 (1963).
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policy, brought declaratory judgment action
to have its rights determined. The Second
District Court, Davis County, J. Duffy
Palmer, J., found that clause excluding coverage was not applicable to employee, and
insurer appealed. The Supreme Court,
Crockett, C. J., held that: (1) no reason
existed to disturb determination that employee was not employed by insured at time
of injury, but (2) trial court's recitation "for
good cause shown" provided no foundation
for award of attorney fees to insured.
Affirmed as modified.
Stewart, J., concurred in result.

1. Insurance <s=> 155.1
Master and Servant <s=>l
When a question arises under insurance
policy as to whether one person is an employee of another, it is to be resolved as are
other questions of fact, considering a number of factors, none of which is necessarily
alone controlling; in general, it can be said
that an employee is one who is hired for
compensation, for a substantial period of
time, to perform duties wherein he is subject to a comparatively high degree of direction and control by the one who hires
him.

4. Insurance <$=>467.61(4)
No reason existed to disturb trial
court's determination that truck-leasing
business employee was not employed at
time of his injury by insured, who operated
similar truck-leasing business and who pursuant to arrangement with other business
asked employee if he would be interested in
working one or two days on demolition
project, and thus automobile liability policy
clause excluding coverage of insured's own
employees did not protect insurer from paying employee no-fault personal injury protection benefits under the policy for injuries
sustained by employee while working on
insured's demolition site nor from its obligation to defend insured in suit brought
against him by employee.
5. Costs <s=>173(l)
Authorization contained in declaratory
judgment statute to award such "costs as
may seem equitable and just" covers award
of attorney fees if they were necessarily
incurred because of litigation which was not
resorted to in good faith but was spiteful,
contentious or obstructive. U.C.A.1953, 7833-10.

2. Insurance <s=>467.61(4)
In determining whether employee was
a "loaned employee" of the insured and
therefore fell within automobile liability
policy clause excluding coverage of insured's own employees, factors to be considered included for whose benefit work
was done, who paid employee, and as pertinent to issue of control, whether lending
employer also furnished specialized equipment to be used by employee.

6. Insurance <s=>675
Where there was no finding of fact
that showed that insurer initiated declaratory judgment action to determine its
rights because of spite or to be obstructive,
and where no such finding was warranted
and insurer merely stated its position and
initiated declaratory judgment action for
determination of what appeared to be a
justiciable controversy concerning coverage
under automobile liability policy, no foundation existed for award of attorney fees to
insured under declaratory judgment statute, which provides that court may make
equitable and just award of costs. U.C.A.
1953, 78-33-10.

3. Insurance <s=>155
If it is shown that a person is an employee of one employer, burden of proving
change of employment status is upon party
contending that such a change has occurred
for purposes of determining coverage under
an insurance policy.

Roger H. Bullock of Strong & Hanni, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, for Marchant and Miller.
Wendell E. Bennett, Salt Lake City, for
Peterson.

WESTEF

:AS. & SUR. CO. v. MARCHANT

Utah

425

Cite as, Utah, 615 ?2d 423

CROCKETT, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff Western Casualty, which issued
an automobile liability insurance policy to
defendant Ralph Marchant, appeals from a
finding that a clause excluding coverage of
the insured's own employees was not applicable to defendant Sherman Peterson who
was injured while he was working on defendant Marchant's demolition job site.
Plaintiffs principal contention is that
"the only reasonable conclusion from the
evidence" is that Peterson was working as
an employee of Marchant, and not of Gary
Yates, as the trial court found.1
Defendant Marchant operates a trucking
business whereby he leases both trucks and
drivers to other businesses for various purposes. He is also a licensed demolition contractor. In the early fall of 1977, he agreed
to perform demolition work on a lot in
Clearfield, Utah. He and Gary Yates, who
operated a similar truck leasing business,
had a long standing arrangement whereby
they sold and hauled fill dirt and topsoil
from land owned by Marchant. Any material sold by Yates would be charged against
his account, with the understanding that
when Marchant needed an extra truck or
driver, he could borrow Yates' equipment
and/or drivers and Yates' account would bfe
credited accordingly.
Pursuant to that arrangement, Marchant
asked Sherman Peterson, who worked fof
Yates at the time, if he would be interested
in working one or two days on the demolition project in Clearfield. After Peterson
agreed, Marchant told him that the work
would begin on Saturday, September 3,
1977, and that Peterson was to use one of
Yates' trucks on the job. Marchant also
talked with Yates, who agreed to the use of
his truck and driver on the weekend demolition job. Yates further testified that he
had paid Peterson in advance for that work.
On September 3, Peterson and four other
men reported to Marchant for work, who
1. We assume that the tnal court believed those
aspects of the evidence which support the findings and judgment. Tate's lnc v. Little America Refining Co., Utah, 535 P.2d 1228 (1975);
Corma v. Cornia, Utah, 546 P2d 890 (1976).
615 P2d—U

then explained how the demolition job was
to proceed. At the end of the day, he told
the men to return the following Monday.
That morning, since the Yates truck needed
repairs, Peterson used one of Marchant's
trucks. After he had returned from the
dumping site to pick up his second load,
Peterson noticed that the loading positions
of the other trucks had changed. He left
his truck to determine whether there was a
new loading procedure and, while he was
talking to one of the other drivers, he was
hit by a truck being backed up by defendant Darve Miller.
Peterson subsequently brought two actions, one against plaintiff Western Casualty to obtain the no-fault benefits, i. e., the
personal injury protections (PIP) for medical expenses, loss of income and loss of
services.2 He also initiated an action for
general damages against Marchant. When
the plaintiff was notified of these claims, it
took the position that Peterson was an employe of Marchant, and thus excluded under
its policy, and refused to pay either the PIP
no-fault benefits or to afford its insured,
Marchant, a defense in the action against
him. Controversy arose and the plaintiff
brought this declaratory judgment action to
have its rights determined.
It is upon the basis of the t€ timony and
the evidence of the parties relating to the
foregoing that the trial court made its finding that, at the time of the accident, Peterson was not the employee of Marchant, but
was still in the employ of Gary Yates. It
further found that neither Marchant nor
Gary Yates carried workman's compensation coverage and, thus, Peterson was not
entitled to receive any workman's compensation.
The insurance policy issued by the plaintiff provides liability coverage for bodily
injury "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile" and that
the plaintiff "shall defend any suit alleging
2. The amounts claimed for those losses were
$5,031.47, $7,800.00 and $4,800.00, respectively.
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such bodily injury . .
and seeking son is an employee of one employer (Gary
damages which are payable" under the Yates), the burden of proving a change of
terms of the policy. The express language employment status is upon the party (plainof the exclusion relied upon by the plaintiff tiff) contending that such a change has
is that the policy does not apply
occurred.7
to (1) bodily injury to any em[4] Upon our survey of the evidence in
ployee of the insured arising out of and in the light of the foregoing, we see no reason
the course of
employment by to disturb the trial court's determination
the insured, or (2) any obligation for that Sherman Peterson was employed by
which the insured .
may be held Gary Yates at the time of his injury, and
liable under any workman's compensa- not by defendant Marchant. It therefore
tion, unemployment compensation or dis- correctly ruled that the clause in plaintiff's
ability benefits law, or under any similar policy excluding Marchant's employees does
law
. . [Emphasis added.]
not protect plaintiff from paying Peterson
[1] When a question arises as to wheth- the PIP no-fault benefits under the policy,
er one person is an employee of another, it nor from its obligation to defend Marchant
is to be resolved as are other questions of in the suit brought against him by Peterson.
fact.3 In doing so, there are a number of
Plaintiff also attacks the trial court's
factors which should be considered, no one
of which is necessarily alone controlling.4 granting of defendant Marchant's motion
In general, it can be said that an employee for attorneys' fees, alleged to be taxable
is one who is hired for compensation, for a costs. The court's action on that motion
substantial period of time, to perform stated:
Pursuant to the Motion of defendant
duties wherein he is subject to a comparaMarchant
and good cause aptively high degree of direction and control
5
pearing
therefor;
IT
IS HEREBY ORby the one who hires him.
DERED that . . . he is . . .
[2,3] When, as in the present case, the
awarded . . . $3,500.00 attorney
question relates to a person alleged to be a
fees.
"loaned employee," there are additional facIn support of that order, defendant relies
tors to be considered: (1) for whose benefit
on
Section 78-33-10, U.C.A., 1953, pertainthe work was done; (2) who paid the eming
to declaratory judgments. It provides
ployee; and, as pertinent to the issue of
that
the court "may make such award of
control, (3) whether the "lending" employer
also furnished specialized equipment to be costs as may seem equitable and just." It is
used by the employee.6 In focusing the to be noted that the statute makes no exforegoing principles upon our problem, press mention of attorneys' fees.
there is yet another proposition that has
[5] The basic rule which this Court has
application here: If it is shown that a per- declared and long adhered to is that attor3. Truck Insurance Exchange v. Yardley, Utah,
556 P.2d 494 (1976); Kiefer Concrete, Inc. v.
Hoffman, Colo., 562 P.2d 745 (1977); Peterick
v. State, 22 Wash.App. 163, 589 P.2d 250
(1978).
4. Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, Utah,
538 P.2d 316 (1975); Storrusten v. Harrison,
169 Mont. 525, 549 P.2d 464 (1976); Antonini
v. Hanna Industries, Nev., 573 P.2d 1184
(1978).
5. Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 267, 176 P.2d
118 (1947); Christean v. Ind. Comm., 113 Utah
451, 196 P.2d 502 (1948); Oberhansly v. Travelers Ins. Co., 5 Utah 2d 15, 295 P.2d 1093 (1956);

Adamson v. Okland Construction Co., 29 Utah
2d 286, 508 P.2d 805 (1973); Harry L. Young &
Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, supra, note 4.
6. Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, supra, note 4; Kepa v. Hawaii Welding Co. Ltd.,
56 Haw. 544, 545 P.2d 687 (1976); Storrusten
v. Harrison, supra, note 4.
7. Pichler v. Pacific Mechanical Constructors, 1
Wash.App. 447, 462 P.2d 960 (1969). That the
insurer has the burden of proof that a loss is
excluded from coverage, see Standford v.
American Guaranty Life Ins. Co., 280 Or. 525,
571 P.2d 909 (1977).
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neys' fees are not to be allowed unless they
are provided for by contract or by statute 8
Stephan R. ELIASON and Marilyn D.
or where they are a legitimate item of
Eliason, husband and wife, Plaintiffs,
damages caused by the other party's wrongRespondents, and Cross-Appellants,
ful act. 1 As an extension of the latter
v.
proposition, we have no doubt that the statutory authorization to award such "costs as Richard C. WATTS and John A. Kerr,
partners, dba K. W. Development, a
may seem equitable and just" may include
partnership, and Jan Watts and Barbara
an award of attorneys' fees if they were
Kerr,
as Individuals, Defendants, Appelnecessarily incurred because of litigation
lants,
and Cross-Appellants.
which was not resorted to in good faith, but
was merely spiteful, contentious or obstructive.10
[6] It is true that in granting defendant's motion for attorneys' fees, the trial
court recited "for good cause shown." But
that is merely a conclusion, without any
finding of fact which would bring the plaintiffs conduct within the rules just stated
above. Moreover, no such finding would be
warranted where the plaintiff merely stated its position and initiated this action for
determination of what appears to be a justiciable controversy. It would not comport
with our ideas of either law or justice to
prevent any party who entertains bona fide
questions about his legal obligations from
seeking adjudication thereon in the courts.11
There being no foundation for the award
of attorneys' fees to the defendant,12 that
portion of the judgment is vacated; and
with that modification, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed. No costs awarded.
MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ.,
concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in result.
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No. 16402.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 14, 1980.
Purchasers sued vendors for specific
performance of contract to sell realty. The
First District Court, Cache County, VeNoy
Christofferson, J., entered judgment granting specific performance and rental-value
damages and vendors appealed and purchasers cross-appealed.
The Supreme
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) purchasers' tender of cash for amount of purchase
price of realty was sufficient performance
on their part and they were entitled to
specific performance; (2) where vendors'
refusal to convey realty contravened contract but was not willful or malicious, interest earned on purchase money retained by
purchasers would be credited against rental
value in adjusting equities between parties
based upon their positions had there been a
timely conveyance; and (3) in absence of
plaintiffs' timely filing and serving statement of points to be relied on in cross
appeal, cross appeal was not properly before
the court.
Remanded to d*fermine amount of
plaintiffs' rental-value losses as offset by
interest on the purchase price.

Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp.,
8. Nelson v. Newman, Utah, 583 P.2d 601
Utah, 592 P.2d 620 (1979).
(1978); Biesinger v. Behunin, Utah, 584 P.2d
801 (1978); Dyson v. Aviation Office of America, Inc., Utah, 593 P.2d 143 (1979).
11. Utah Const., Art. 1, sec. 11.
9. 20 Am.Jur.2d, Costs, sec. 72; Espinoza v. 12. Cf., American States Ins. Co. v. Walker,
Safeco Title Ins. Co., Utah, 598 P.2d 346 (1979).
supra, note 10 (where the record indicated that
an award of attorneys' fees was justified).
10. American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 26 Utah
2d 161, 486 P.2d 1042 (1971). See statement in
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Dismissal of claim.
This statute provides no basis on which to
dismiss a claim. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
Time computation.
The 52 consecutive week period in Subsection
(l)(b)(i) runs from the loss of gross income and
loss of earning capacity, not from the date of the
accident. Plaintiff who did not begin to suffer
loss of income and loss of earning capacity until
six months after an accident and continued to
suffer that loss for a period exceeding the
maximum benefit of 52 weeks was improperly
denied coverage when the trial court only provided for coverage for 52 weeks following the
date of the accident. Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
217 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Ct. App. 1993).
Tort claims.
—Availability of i n s u r a n c e benefits.
No-fault benefits are available to those who
sustain serious injury even though they remain
free to pursue a tort claim as well; however, the

injured person is not entitled to a double recovery from the tort-feasor and under no-fault for a
single loss. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592
P.2d 609 (Utah 1979).
Where insured brought action against his
no-fault insurer seeking additional no-fault
benefits after receiving benefits from the nofault insurer and obtaining a judgment against
a third-party tort-feasor, insured was collaterally estopped from recovering additional nofeult benefits in the form of lost wages but was
not collaterally estopped from recovering for
household expenses. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins.
Co., 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981).
—Motorist's liability.
A party having the security required under
this section is granted partial tort immunity
and is not personally liable for the benefits
provided hereunder; he remains liable for customary tort claims, such as general damages
and economic losses not compensated by the
benefits paid hereunder, if the threshold provisions of § 31A-22-309 are met. Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
providers from the practice of waiving patients'
C J . S . — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 113.
AJL.R. — Validity and construction of "no- -obligation to pay health insurance deductibles
fault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d or copayments, or advertising such practice, 8
AX.R.5th 855.
229.
Key Numbers. — Automobiles *=* 43.
Validity of state statute prohibiting health

31A-22-308. Persons covered by personal injury protection.
The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection coverage:
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any motor
vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state, the United
States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except where the injury is
the result of the use or operation of the named insured's own motor vehicle
not actually insured under the policy;
(2) persons related to the insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or
guardianship who are residents of the insured's household, including
those who usually make their home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere under the circumstances described in Section (1), except
where the person is injured as a result of the use or operation of his own
motor vehicle not insured under the policy; and
(3) any other natural person whose injuries arise out of an automobile
accident occurring while the person occupies a motor vehicle described in
the policy with the express or implied consent of the named insured or
while a pedestrian if he is injured in an accident occurring in Utah
involving the described motor vehicle.
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CONTACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-308, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1990, ch. 327, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, divided the formerly undivided language in Subsection (1)
into present Subsections (1) and (2); redesignated former Subsection (2) as present Subsection (3); substituted "when injured in an accident involving any motor vehicle, regardless of
whether the accident occurs in this state, the
United States, its territories or possessions, or
Canada, except when the injury is a result of

31A-22-3(Jy

the use or operation of the named insured's own
motor vehicle not actually insured under the
policy" for "and" in Subsection (1) and "under
the circumstances described in Section (1), except where the person is injured as a result of
the use or operation of his own motor vehicle
not insured under the policy; and" for "when
injured in an accident in Utah involving any
motor vehicle" in Subsection (2); and, in Subsection (3), deleted "in Utah" after the first
instance of "occurring" and inserted "occurring
in Utah" near the end of the subsection.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Limitation of policy covering driver.
Motorcycle driven by insured.
Named-driver exclusionary endorsement.
Out-of-state incidents.
Limitation of policy covering driver.
Passenger in an automobile driven by
insured's son but owned by another person was
not entitled to personal injury protection (PIP)
coverage under a policy covering the driver.
McCaffery v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
Motorcycle driven by insured.
The coverages described in § 31A-22-307
were applicable to an insured killed while riding a motorcycle involved in an accident in this
state with a motor vehicle; there is no requirement that the insured must be operating or
occupying the motor vehicle to be subject to
coverage, but only that he be in an accident
involving a motor vehicle. Coates v. American
Economy Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981).

Named-driver exclusionary endorsement.
Insurance policies used as security must include minimum omnibus coverage including
persons operating the vehicle with the express
or implied permission of the owner-insurer, and
include the statutory minimum liability limits;
a named-driver exclusionary endorsement to
an insurance policy presented as security is
void in relation to the statutory minimum level
of coverage, but is enforceable as to coverage
provided above the mandatory minimum limits. Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co., 619 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980) (decided
before 1985 repeal of Chapter 12 of Title 41).
Out-of-state incidents.
In light of language limiting application of
these provisions to accidents in this state, insurance commissioner's regulation making nofault insurance coverage applicable to incidents
occurring outside the state was in error. IML
Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah
1975).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — What constitutes "entering" or
"alighting from" vehicle within meaning of in-

surance policy, or statute mandating insurance
coverage, 59 A.L.R.4th 149.

31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to
personal injury protection.
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of
action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been
caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained one
or more of the following:
(a) death;
(b) dismemberment;
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings;
(d) permanent disfigurement; or
331
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(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured
or a resident family member of the insured and not insured under the
policy;
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle;
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his
injury:
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(B) while committing a felony;
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises;
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war,
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition
incident to any of the foregoing; or
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive,
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials,
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which
may be contained in other types of coverage.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are
reduced by:
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers'compensation
or similar statutory plan; and
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its agencies because that person is on
active duty in the military service.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy,
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by
the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident.
(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred.
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30
days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of
expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as
to the entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue
if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any
part or all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by
reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof
is received by the insurer.
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses
shall bear interest at the rate of 1 V2% per month after the due date.
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract
to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is
required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant.
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to
the following:
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(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another
insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the otjier
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages
recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160;
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74,
§ 8; 1992, ch. 230, § 9; 1994, ch. 4, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, made minor
stylistic changes in Subsection (1) and rewrote
Subsection (2Xa)(i), which read: "for any injuries sustained by the injured while occupying
another motor vehicle owned by the insured

and not insured under the policy.n
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, inserted "or is required to have" near the
beginning of Subsection (1).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
added a or permanent impairment based upon
objective findings'' to the end of Subsection
(l)(c); made a stylistic change in Subsection
(3)(b); and added letter designations in Subsection (5).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
appeal in order to be entitled to attorney's fees
incurred on appeal in defending his judgment
for benefits. Coates v. American Economy Ins.
Co., 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981).

ANALYSIS

Acceptance of monthly payment.
—Effect on insurer's obligation.
Accrual of cause of action.
Attorney's fees.
—Appeal.
Claims against federal government.
Household exclusion clause.
Personal injury protection requirements.
Reimbursement.
—Recovery from insured and his insurer.
Release given by injured party to tort-feasor.
Ibrt claims.
—Liability of insured.
—Pleading and instructions.
Workers' compensation.

Claims against federal government.
Even if the federal government could be characterized as an insurer because it provided
financial security for its employees in regard to
vehicle operation claims, it could not be subjected to mandatory arbitration under Subsection (6), since this would conflict with the
administrative arrangement established in the
Federal Tort Claims Act. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 651 (D.
Utah 1989).

Acceptance of monthly payment.
—Effect on insurer's obligation.
The acceptance of a monthly payment by an
insured from a no-fault insurer does not terminate the contractual obligation of the insurer to
make additional payments for subsequently
accrued claims. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.,
635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981).
Accrual of cause of action.
A cause of action against the state accrues at
the time of the subject accident rather than
when the plaintiff satisfies the threshhold requirements under this section. Jepson v. State,
846 P.2d 485 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Attorney's fees.
—Appeal.
Plaintiff was not required to file a cross-

Household exclusion clause.
A household or family exclusion clause in an
automobile insurance policy is contrary to public policy and to the statutory requirements
found in the No-Fault Insurance Act as to the
minimum benefits provided by statute. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985).
If an insurer fails to disclose material exclusions in an automobile insurance policy and the
purchaser is not informed of them in writing,
those exclusions are invalid. Without disclosure, the household exclusion clause fails to
honor the reasonable expectations of the purchaser, rendering the exclusion clause invalid
as to the entire policy limits. Farmers Ins.
Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985).
Household or family exclusions are valid in
this state as to insurance provided by an automobile policy in excess of the statutorily mandated amounts and benefits. State Farm Mut.
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Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042
(Utah 1987).
Personal injury protection requirements.
In order to invoke the provisions of Subsection (6), the individual who initially pays the
amounts for which personal injury protection
benefits are also available must be "another
insurer."McCaffery v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
Subsection (6) does not contemplate arbitration between an uninsured victim's father and
another's insurance company. McCaffcry v.
Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1990,'.
Reimbursement.
—Recovery from insured and his insurer.
Where passenger collected personal iiyury
protection benefits from driver's insurer and
received an additional settlement in an action
against the driver of the other car, the insurer
had no right of subrogation to the recovery of
the passenger, but could claim reimbursement
from the other driver's insurer in an arbitration
proceeding. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d
1197 (Utah 1980).
Release given by injured party to tortfeasor.
Injured party who entered into a settlement
agreement with his tort-feasor, whereby he
released the tort-feasor from any and all known
and unknown personal injury as well as property damage arising from the auto accident, cut
off his insurance company's subrogation rights,
and by so doing was not entitled to further
benefits from his insurance company under the
no-fault coverage. Jones v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), but see Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980).

§ 31A-22-307, he is granted partial tort immunity and is not personally liable for the benefits
provided under § 31A-22-307, but he remains
liable for customary tort claims of general damages and economic losses not compensated under § 31A-22-307. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606
P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980).
—Pleading and instructions.
When injured party is entitled under threshold provisions of this section to maintain claim
for personal injuries not compensated by personal injury protection benefits, the injured
party should plead only for those damages for
which he has not received reparation under his
first party insurance benefits; to present a
completely factual picture to the jury, the injured party may wish to present evidence of all
his medical bills or other economic losses; in
such a case, the court, by appropriate instruction, could explain to the jury that those economic losses have not been included in the
prayer for damages because the injured party
has previously received reparation under his
own no-fault insurance. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie,
606 R2d 1197 (Utah 1980).
Workers' compensation.
A no-fault insurer is permitted by Subsection
(3)(a) to exclude from coverage provided under
its insurance policy any liability for usuries
that are compensable under the workers' compensation statute or a similar statutory plan.
This provision, however, is irrelevant in a proceeding before the Industrial Commission involving only the employee and an employer who
has carried no-fault insurance but not workers'
compensation insurance. Bevans v. Industrial"
Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Tort claims.
—Liability of insured.
If a party has the security required under
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. —Allstate Insurance Co.
v. Ivie: Reimbursement Between Insurers Under Utah's No-Fault Act, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 379.
Attorney's Fees in Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev.
553.
Note, The Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: A New Cause of Action in Utah, 1989
Utah L. Rev. 571.
AX.R. — Validity and construction of "nofault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d
229.
Injury or death caused by assault as within
coverage of no-fault motor vehicle insurance, 44
A.L.R.4th 1010.

Who is "employed or engaged in the automobile business" within exclusionary clause of
liability policy, 55 A.L.R.4th 261.
What constitutes "entering" or "alighting
from" vehicle within meaning of insurance policy, or statute mandating insurance coverage,
59 AL.R.4th 149.
Validity and construction of automobile insurance provision or statute automatically terminating coverage when insured obtains another policy providing similar coverage, 61
A.L.R.4th 1130.
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31-41-10. Exclusions from coverage.—Any insurer may exclude benefits:
(a) (i) For injury sustained by the injured while occupying another
motor vehicle owned by the insured and not insured under the policy, or
(ii) for an injury sustained by any person while operating the insured
motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the insured or
while nut in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle.
(b) To any injured person, if such person's conduct contributed to
his injury under any of the following circumstances:
(i) Causing injury to himself intentionally; or
(ii) While committing a felony.
History: L. 1973, ch. 65, § 10.
31-41-11. Subrogation rights and arbitration between insurers.—(1)
Every insurer authorized to write the insurance required by this act shall
agree as a condition to being allowed to continue to write insurance in the
state of Utah:
(a) That where its insured is or would be held legally liable for the
personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits required under
this act have been paid by another insurer, including the state insurance
fund, it will reimburse such other insurer for the payment of such benefits, but not in excess of the amount of damages so recoverable, and
(b) That the issue of liability for such reimbursement and the amount
of same shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the
insurers.
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 11.
Compter's Notes.
Section 11 of Laws 1973, ch. 55, does
not contain a subsection (2).
_ m
CoUateral References.
Insurance<§=>4.1.
44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64.
See Am. Jur. 2d, No-Fault Insurance
§§ 1-34, when published.
Validity and construction of "no-fault"

automobile insurance plans, 42 A. L. R.
3d 229.
L a

^ Eeviews.
No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah
—State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah
L. Rev. 248.
Compensation Systems and Utah's NoFault Statute, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 383.
Countrywide Overview of Automobile
No-Fault Insurance, 23 Defense L. J. 443
(1974).

31-41-12. Rules and regulations of department.—The department is
authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
for the purposes of this act.
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 12.

Cross-Reference.
Rules and regulations,
commissioner, 31-2-3.5.

authority

of

31-41-13. Operation of vehicle without security a misdemeanor—Possession of evidence of security required—Additional penalties—Procedures
following conviction or arrest for violation.—(1) Any owner of a motor
vehicle with respect to which a security is required under this act, who
operates this vehicle or permits it to be operated on a public highway in
this state without this security being in effect is guilty of a misdemeanor.
381
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TITLE II.
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF
TRIAL COURTS.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the
petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last
known address.
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court.
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing
and docketing fees are paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, the docketing fee, and a copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the
clerk that the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon
receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of
the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be
docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the title.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

Advisory Committee Note. — e designation of parties is changed to confo. o the designation of parties in the federal appellate
courts.
The rule is amended to make clear that the
mere designation of an appeal as a "cross-appeal" does not eliminate liability for payment
of the filing and docketing fees. But for the
order of filing, the cross-appellant would have
been the appellant and so should be required to
pay the established fees.

Amendment Notes. — Thf £992 amendment, effective October 1,1992, jrted "and a
copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the clerk that the bond has been
filed" and made minor stylistic changes in Subdivision (g).
Cross-References. — Circuit courts, appeals from, § 78-4-11.
Justice courts, appeals from, § 78-5-120.
Juvenile courts, appeals from § 78-3a-51.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss was
ANALYSIS
not
a final judgment subject to appeal. Little v.
Absence of record.
Mitchell, 604 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979).
Attorney fees.
Dismissal without prejudice of plaintiffs acContent of notice.
tion
was appealable where the trial court's rulDenial of intervention.
ing went to the legal merits of any cause that
Dismissal by trial court.
plaintiff may have framed. Bowles v. State ex
Filing fees.
rel. DOT, 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1982).
Filing of notice.
Final order or judgment.
Filing fees.
Judgment nunc pro tunc.
It is not the clerk's duty to file notice of apMotion to strike.
peal until he has received the appropriate filNew trial.
ing fee. McLain v. Conrad, 19 Utah 2d 346,431
Partial judgment.
P.2d 571 (1967).
Postjudgment orders.
Where the notice of appeal was left at the
Purpose of notice.
clerk's office prior to the expiration of the time
Review in equity cases.
for filing but the filing fee was not paid until
Summary judgment.
after expiration of the time for filing and the
Unsigned minute entry.
clerk did not file the notice until the fee was
Cited.
paid, the notice was untimely filed and the
Absence of record.
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
There was nothing for the court to review McLain v. Conrad, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d
where the alleged error was not made part of 571 (1967).
the record. Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, Filing of notice.
Inc., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977).
Where the deadline for filing an appeal exAttorney fees.
pired on Saturday, the notice of appeal which
Because plaintiff was entitled to attorney wasfiledon the following Monday was within
fees by law, he was entitled to attorney fees the time limit, in view of the provisions of
incurred on appeal in defending his judgment § 17-16-9. Transwestern Gen. Agency v. Morwithout the necessity of having to file a cross gan, 526 P.2d 1186 (Utah 1974).
appeal. Coates v. American Economy Ins. Co.,
Without notice of appeal being given, the Su627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981); Wallis v. Thomas, preme Court is without jurisdiction to hear the
632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).
matter. Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah
Content of notice.
1981).
Subdivision (d) requires only specification of
The Supreme Court cannot take jurisdiction
the parties taking the appeal, not of all the over an appeal which is not timely brought beparties involved. Scudder v. Kennecott Copper fore it; and an untimely appeal will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Burgers v.
Corp., 886 P.2d 48 (Utah 1994).
When appealing from an entire final judg- Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Bowen v.
ment, it is not necessary to specify each inter- Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Nellocutory order of which the appellant seeks re- son v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1983).
Mailing a notice of appeal to the clerk of the
view. Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 886
court does not constitute a "filing" of the notice
P.2d 48 (Utah 1994).
of appeal under this rule. Isaacson v. Dorius,
Denial of intervention.
Order denying with prejudice an application 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983).
for intervention was appealable. Tracy v. Uni- Final order or judgment
versity of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340 (Utah
An oralfindingof contempt of court and sen1980).
tence of 15 days in the county jail, with 10 days
Dismissal by trial court
suspended, was not a final judgment from
Both an order to dismiss with prejudice, on which an appeal could have been taken.
the merits of the issues under Rule 41(b), Hinkins v. Santi, 25 Utah 2d 324, 481 P.2d 53
U.R.C.P., and an order of dismissal without (1971).
In the case of a divorce decree which did not,
prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1), U.R.C.P., are
final abjudications of tho issues and the time by its terms, become a final judgment until
for appeal under this rule begins to run with three months after it was entered, appeal had
the entry of the order. Steiner v. State, 27 Utah nonetheless to be taken within one month of
the decree, which was the last proceeding nee2d 284, 496 P.2d 809 (1972).
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essary before the judgment became final.
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888 (Utah
1976).
A judgment is final when it ends the controversy between the parties litigant. Salt Lake
City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah
1979).
Order finding person in contempt was an appealable order. Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d
543 (Utah 1981).
District court orders requiring party to convey property in accordance with divorce decree
were final orders and thus appealable where
the effect of such orders was to determine substantial rights in the property and to terminate
finally the litigation surrounding it. Cahoon v.
Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982).
Where the order appealedfromwas not final
and was not certified nor eligible for certification under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., the appeal was
not properly taken, and the remedy was dismissal of the appeal. A.J. Mackay Co. v.
Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323 (Utah 1991).
Judgment nunc pro tunc.
A judgment nunc pro tunc has no effect on
the time for appeal from that judgment and
cannot be used to reduce the time, or defeat the
right, to take an appeal. Utah State Bldg. fid.
v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249, 399
P.2d 141 (1965).
Where judgment was entered on April 2 but
the judgment recited that it was entered nunc
pro tunc as of February 24, this latter recital
had no effect upon the time for appeal and appeal could be taken by filing notice within the
required time from April 2. Utah State Bldg.
Bd. v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249,
399 P.2d 141 (1965).
Motion to strike.
Order granting plaintiffs motion to strike
defendant's pleadings is not a final order or
judgment, and is not appealable. Nielsen v.
Nielsen, 529 P.2d 803 (Utah 1974).
Where defendant petitioned court for modification of a divorce decree and alternatively
alledged in the petition that the decree should
be vacated and set aside, the granting of defendant's motion for modification fully satisfied
his claim and his alternative claim became
moot, so that the court's granting of a motion
to strike the motion to vacate and set aside was
meaningless and no appeal would lie therefrom. Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980).
New trial.
An order granting a new trial is not a final
judgment; it only sets aside the verdict and
places the parties in the same position as if
there had been no previous trial. Haslam v.
Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 389 P.2d 736 (1964).
Order denying a motion for a new trial was
not appealable. Habbeshaw v. Habbeshaw, 17
Utah 2d 295, 409 P.2d 972 (1966).
Partial judgment.
Where the real issue before the court was
whether mountain ground belonged to decedent's estate or to bis widow and the decree
decided the issue against the widow, the fact
that the court retained, jurisdiction to adjudicate further matters did not leave open for re-
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property, and the decree entered wasfinaland
appealable and became conclusive in the absence of a timely appeal. In re Voorhees' Estate, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977 (1961).
Where plaintiffs complaint contained eight
causes of action, court's judgment on merits as
to one cause with reservation of jurisdiction
and judgement as to other causes was not a
final judgmentfromwhich an appeal could be
taken. J.B.& R.E. Walker, Inc. v. Thayn, 17
Utah 2d 120, 405 P.2d 342 (1965).
Where court granted one defendant's motion
to dismiss with prejudice and entered default
judgment in favor of that defendant on his
counterclaim, but action against other defendants and one defendant's counterclaim remained alive, court's order was not final and
an appealfromit would be dismissed. Kennedy
v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534 (Utah
1979).
A judgment that disposes of fewer than all of
the causes of action alleged in the plaintiffs
complaint is not a final judgmentfromwhich
an appeal may be taken. Salt Lake City Corp.
v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979).
A partial summary judgment is not generally a final judgment and hence it is not appealable under the limitations prescribed by
this rule. South Shores Concession, Inc. v.
State, 600 P.2d 550 (Utah 1979).
District court order setting aside certain provisions in a default decree of divorce and providing for a further hearing on the matter was
not a final rulingfromwhich an appeal could
be taken. Pearson v. Pearson, 641 P.2d 103
(Utah 1982).
Postjudgment orders.
An order vacating a judgment is not a final
orderfromwhich an appeal can be taken pursuant to this rule. Van Wagenen v. Walker,
597 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1979).
The final judgment rule does not preclude
review of postjudgment orders; such orders
were independently subject to the test of finality, according to their own substance and effect. Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah
1982).
Purpose of notice.
The object of a notice of appeal is to advise
the opposite party that an appeal has been
takenfroma specific judgment in a particular
case. Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15
Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 (1964).
Review in equity cases.
In the appeal of an equity case, the Supreme
Court may weigh the facts as well as review
the law, but will reverse on the facts only when
the evidence clearly preponderates against the
findings of the trial court. Crimmins v.
Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981).
In reviewing trial court'sfindingsof fact in
equity cases, the Supreme Court would give
due deference to the trial court's decision and
reverse only when the evidence clearly preponderated against the trial court's findings.
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981).
Summary judgment
£7d? J J /
Order setting aside summary jungran^mj*

son might appeal as matter of rigbl Jensen v.
Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P.2 ^6 (1968).
Order denying a motion for summary judgment was not a final order and was not appealable. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc.,
571 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977).
A summary judgment in favor of one defendant alone is not a final judgment where the
action against the remaining defendant remains alive. Neider v. State DOT, 665 P.2d
1306 (Utah 1983).
Unsigned minute entry.
An unsigned minute entry did not constitute
COLLATERAL

an entry of judgment, nor wasj f a final judgment for purposes of appeal.
' on v. Manning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 198*,, Utah State
Tax Comm'n v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah
1986); Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah
1986); Ahlstrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979
(Utah 1986).
An unsigned minute entry does not constitute a final order for purposes of appeal. State
v. Crowley, 737 P.2d 198 (Utah 1987).
C i t e d ^ H u s t o n v L e w i s > 8 1 8 p 2 d 531
(Utah 1991); Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
REFERENCES

A.L.R. — Appealability of order suspending
imposition or execution of sentence, 51
A.L.R.4th 939.

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1)
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court
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No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 daysfromthe
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Administrative actions.
Attorney fees.
Cross-appeal.
Extension of time to appeal.
—Amendment or modification of judgment.
Filing of notice.
Filing with county clerk.
Final order or judgment.
Post-judgment motions.
Premature notice.
Reconsideration of order.
Timeliness of notice.
—Date of notice.
Cited.
Administrative actions.
Subdivision (c) does not apply to petitions for
review of administrative actions. Maverik
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860
P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Attorney fees.
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in defending their judgment on appeal. Wallis v.
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).
Cross-appeal.
Subdivision (d) requires that a notice of
cross-appeal be timely filed. Absent a cross-appeal, a respondent may not attack the judgment of the court below. Henretty v. Manti
City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990) (decided
under former R. Utah S. Ct. 4).
Extension of time to appeal
Neither Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P., granting the
court power to extend a time limit where a failure to act in time is due to excusable neglect
generally, nor Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., authorizing the court to relieve from final judgment
for inadvertence or excusable neglect, applies
where a notice of appeal has not been timely
filed. Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466
P.2d 843 (1970).
A party could not extend the time for filing
an appeal simply by filing a "Motion for Reconsideration of Order Striking Petition and Motion for Relief from Final Judgment." Peay v.
Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980).
When the question of "excusable neglect"
arises in a jurisdictional context, as opposed to
a nonjurisdictional context, the standard contemplated thereby is a strict one; it is not
meant to cover the usual excuse that the lawyer is too busy, but is to cover emergency situations only. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984).
The time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional
and ordinarily cannot be enlarged. State v.
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Proper remedy of defendant whose cross-appeal was not timely filed under Subdivision (d),
upon having the notice returned, was to file a
motion to extend time with the district court

sion, on appeal. Glezos v. Frontier Inv., 896
P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
—Amendment or modification of judgment
If an amendment or modification does not
change the substance or character of a judgment, it does not enlarge the time for appeal.
Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).
Filing of notice.
The mailing of a notice of appeal was not
equivalent to a filing of notice of appeal.
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983).
Filing with county clerk.
Filing with the county clerk was not a timely
filing with the juvenile court, where there was
no indication when the clerk transmitted a
copy of the notice of appeal to the juvenile
court, and the original was returned to appellant's counsel. State, In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Final order or judgment
Where the tried court signed two different
judgments but neither party served his prepared judgment on the other party before submitting it to the court, the filing of either judgment would be erroneous, and an appeal taken
from either is premature because the judgments are not properly "final." Larsen v.
Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983).
Juvenile court's order for temporary confinement in a youth facility for observation and
assessment prior to a final disposition was not
a final order, for purposes of appeal, because it
did not finally dispose of all issues, including
the rights of the juvenile and/or his mother's
rights as parental custodian. State, In re
T.D.C., 748 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
An unsigned minute entry is not a final
judgment for purposes of appeal. A judgment,
tolled by a timely post-judgment motion, starts
to run on the date when the trial court enters
its first signed order denying the motion.
Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah
1990).
A signed minute entry ordering defendant's
counsel to prepare an order showing that plaintiffs post-judgment motions filed pursuant to
Rules 52(b) and 59, U.R.C.P., were denied was
not a final appealable order. Swenson Assocs.
Architects v. State, 254 Utah Adv. Rep. 9
(Utah 1994).
Post-judgment motions.
Where a post-judgment motion was timely
filed under Rule 59(a)(6), U.R.C.P., to upset the
judgment, and notices of appeal from the judgment were filed after the motion was made, but
before the disposition of the motion, the motion
rendered the notices of appeal ineffective, and
notice of appeal had to be filed
ea within
wiuun the
ine rerequired time from the date of>f the entrv that
disposed of the motion. U-M Ir
. ~. <* .. * A/% / r n ^ L
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an arbitrator's award runs froin^the order
denying appellant's timely motior^^ alter or
amend that judgment under Rule WPiJ.R.C.P.
Robinson & Wells v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844
(Utah 1983).
The Supreme Court may not consider an appeal from the dismissal of a complaint for
unpaid overtime compensation until the trial
court has had an opportunity to review the order in question by ruling on all pending postjudgment motions. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc.,
694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984).
A notice of appealfiledbefore the disposition
of a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective
to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court.
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723
P.2d 425 (Utah 1986); DeBry v. Fidelity Natl
Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520 (Utah Ct. App.
1992), cert denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
Filing a post-judgment motion of a type
listed in this rule suspends the finality of the
judgment, and a notice of appeal filed prior to
disposition of such a motion by entry of a
signed order is not effective to confer jurisdiction on an appellate court. Anderson v.
Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
Filing of an "exception to order and motion
for reconsideration" of summary judgment
tolled the thirty-day time period within which
to file a notice of appeal, notwithstanding the
incorrect title placed upon the pleading, since
the judge ruled on the motion as if it were a
motion for a new trial. Watkiss & Campbell v.
Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991).
Where a motion to set aside a judgment was
not timely served and was subsequently withdrawn, and thus the court neither granted nor
denied the motion and did not enter an order,
the motion did not trigger a new thirty-day
appeal time under Subdivision (b). Nielson v.
Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
When a party files a post-judgment motion
pursuant to either Rule 52(b) or Rule 59,
U.R.C.P., a notice of appeal must befiledafter
the order disposing of the motion is entered in
order to vest jurisdiction in an appellate court.
Swenson Assocs. Architects v. State, 889 P.2d
415 (Utah 1994).
Premature notice.
A notice of appeal filtd after a ruling on a
motion to alter or amend a judgment has been
announced, but before the entry of an order
disposing of the motion, is premature and does
not confer jurisdiction on the court Anderson
v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
Reconsideration of order.
The Court of Appeals declined to reconsider
and overrule its prior denial of the state's request to dismiss an appeal as untimely. State
v. Yates, 765 P.2d 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Timeliness of notice.
Notice of appealfiledwithin the required periodfromdate of entry of order of contempt was
filed timely and Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear appeal concerning the contempt
order. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah
1982).
An untimely motion for a new trial had no

effect on the running of the time for filing a
notice of appeal. Burgers v. Ms*-^, 652 P.2d
1320 (Utah 1982).
Case was temporarily remanded to the juvenile court in order to allow that court to make
a determination whether an order extending
the time for appeal should be entered by the
juvenile court under this rule, when it was not
apparent whether the notice of appeal was either timelyfiledor deemed timely filed by the
juvenile court. State In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Where plaintiff, one day after the voluntary
withdrawal of its motion for directed verdict,
filed a notice of appeal and also moved for an
extension of time in which to file a notice of
appeal, the notice of appeal was timely filed,
irrespective of whether the order granting additional time for filing had a nunc pro tunc
effect. Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778
P.2d 1 (Utah 1989).
Notice of appeal placed in the prison mail by
an incarcerated criminal defendant within the
30-day period set forth in this rule was not
timely, where the notice was filed in the district court more than 30 days after entry of the
judgment being appealed. State v. Palmer, 777
P.2d 521 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
By using the disjunctive "or," Subdivision (c)
clearly allows the notice of appeal to be filed
after the announcement of either a decision, a
judgment, or an order. "Decision" is broadly
defined to coverfinaljudgments, interlocutory
orders, or "the first step leading to a judgment," and includes a trial court's determination of guilt. City of St. George v. Smith, 814
P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), overruled on
other grounds, City of St. George v. Smith, 828
P.2d 504 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Appellant's notice of appeal, which was filed
after the announcement of the decision of guilt
but before sentencing, was timely filed under
Subdivision (c). City of St. George v. Smith,
814 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), overruled
on other grounds, City of St. George v. Smith,
828 P.2d 504 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Motion filed within ten days of an entry of
judgment, objecting to trial court's award of
pre-judgment interest to plaintiff, was a motion to alter or amend the judgment under
UUCP. 59(e). Filing of notice of appeal within
30 days of the order disposing of that motion
was timely. Brunetti v. Mascaro, 854 P.2d 555
(Utah Ct App. 1993).
When the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's cross-appeal because it was not timely filed, the lack of jurisdiction was not waived by plaintiffs failure to
move for dismissal within ten days after defendant filed its docketing statement under
R.App.P. 10(a). Rule 10(a) is permissive, not
mandatory, and a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Glezos v. Frontier
Inv., 896 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
-—Date of notice.
In determining whether a notice of appeal is
timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in an
appellate court, the appellate court is bound by
thefilingdate on the notice of appeal transmit-
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ted to it by the trial court. State in re M.S., 781
P.2d 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Cited in Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817
P.2d 320 (Utah 1991); Wiggins v. Board of Re-
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view, 824 P.2d 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); DLB
Collection Trust v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — When will premature notice of appeal be retroactively validated in federal civil
case, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 199.

Rule 5* Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders.
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory
order may be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court,
with proof of service on all other parties to the action. A timely appeal from an
order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the
appellate court determines is not final may, in the discretion of the appellate
court, be considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission to
appeal an interlocutory order. The appellate court may direct the appellant to
file a petition that conforms to the requirements of paragraph (c) of this rule.
(b) Fees and copies of petition. For a petition presented to the Supreme
Court, the petitioner shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court an original and five copies of the petition, together with the fee required by statute.
For a petition presented to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner shall file with
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals an original and four copies of the petition,
together with the fee required by statute. The petitioner shall serve the petition on the opposing party and notice of the filing of the petition on the trial
court. If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the appellate
court shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to the respective
parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the order, together with a copy of
the petition and filing fee, to the trial court where the petition and order shall
be filed in lieu of a notice of appeal.
(c) Content of petition.
(1) The petition shall contain:
(A) A concise statement of facts material to a consideration of the
issue presented and the order sought to be reviewed;
(B) The issue presented expressed in the terms and circfamstances
of the case but without unnecessary detail, and a demonstration that
the issue was preserved in the trial court. Petitioner must state the
applicable standard of appellate review and cite supporting authority;
(C) A statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory
appeal should be permitted, including a concise analysis of the statutes, rules or cases believed to be determinative of the issue stated;
and
(D) A statement of the reason why the appeal may materially advance the termination of the litigation.
(2) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the
Court of Appeals, the phrase "Subject to assignment to the Court of Appeals" shall appear immediately under the title of the document, i.e.
Petition for Permission to Appeal. Appellant may then set forth in the
petition a concise statement why the Supreme Court should decide the
case in light of the relevant factors listed in Rule 9(c)(7).
(3) The petitioner shall attach a copy of the order of the trial court from
which an appeal is sought and any related findings of fact and conclusions
of law and opinion.
ft
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); v3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 60, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Form of motion.
Fraud.
"Any other reason justifying relief."
—Burden of proof.
—Default judgment.
—Divorce action.
—Impossibility of compliance with order.
Independent action.
—Incompetent counsel.
—Constitutionality
of taxes.
—Lack of due process.
—Divorce
decree.
—Merits of case.
—Fraud or duress.
—Mistake or inadvertence.
—Motion distinguished.
—Mutual mistake.
Invalid summons.
—Real party in interest.
—Amendment
without notice.
—Refund of fine after dismissal.
Inequity
of
prospective
application.
Appeals.
Jurisdiction.
Clerical mistakes.
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
—Computation of damages.
neglect.
—Correction after appeal.
—Default
judgment.
—Date of judgment.
Illness.
Void judgment.
Inconvenience.
—Estate record.
Meritorious.
—Inherent power of courts.
Merits of claim.
—Intent of court and parties.
Negligence of attorney.
—Judicial error distinguished.
No claim for relief.
—Order prepared by counsel.
••-* J _ ^ . « — ^r ~,viir ferial m n t i n n .
—Delayed motion for new tEl^S* 1 1 Q

&& special
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cions of a judicial officer, and thus should not
(X

xJVTERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity
§§ 226, 228; 66 Am. Jur. 2d References §§ 1 et
seq., 30 et seq.
C.J.S. — 30A C.J.S. Equity §§ 515, 520, 521
to 528, 532, 533, 535, 537, 539 et seq.
A.L.R. — Bankruptcy, right of creditor who
has not filed timely petition for review of referee's order to participate in appeal secured by
another creditor, 22 A.L.R.3d 914.
Power of successor or substituted master or
referee to render decision or enter judgment on

testimony heard by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d
1079.
Referee's failure to file report within time
specified by statute, court order, or stipulation
as terminating reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889.
What are "exceptional conditions" justifying
reference under Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b),
1 A.L.R. Fed. 922.
Key Numbers. — Equity •=» 393 to 395, 401,
404 to 406; Reference «=> 3 et seq., 35 to 77, 99
et seq.

PART VII.
JUDGMENT.
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
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where defendant was not denied a fair opportunity to meet the change in theory of recovery.
PLC Landscape Constr. v. Piccadilly Fish 'n
Chips, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P.2d 562
(1972).
Complaint for foreclosure of a lien was defective because of the nature of relief sought even
though it did not demand judgment for personal liability on contract and judgment was
granted for such personal liability, since this
rule provides that a judgment shall grant the
relief to which a party is entitled even though
it is not demanded. Motivated Mgt. Int'l v.
Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (Utah 1979).
In a dispute over the appropriation of assets
and goodwill of a business corporation, it was
error for trial court to liquidate assets of the
corporation where the issues upon which such
action rested were neither pleaded nor raised
by parties, nor tried. Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984).
Judgment in favor of nonparty.
Subdivision (c)(1) is consistent with the general principle that a trial court may not render
judgment in favor of a nonparty. Courts can
generally make a legally binding abjudication
only between the parties actually joined in the
action. Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah
1987).
Subdivision (c)(1) cannot dispense entirely
with the necessity that a claimant make some
claim in the lawsuit against the defendant.
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah
1987).
A court may not grant relief to a nonparty.
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah
1987).
Judgment creditors who participated as parties in a lien case could not recover in a separate fraudulent conveyance case, where they
had not moved to intervene and were never
parties in the separate case. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987).
Motion to reconsider.
Although a motion to reconsider is not expressly available under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Subdivision (b) does allow by implication for the possibility of a judge's changing
his or her mind in cases involving multiple
parties or multiple claims. Salt Lake City
Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
When summary judgment had been granted
on some issues but a final judgment in the case
had not been entered, the summary judgment
was "subject to revision" under Subdivision (b);
a motion to reconsider was a reasonable means
of requesting such a revision and was therefore
permitted. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178
(Utah 1993).
The law of the case doctrine did not preclude
the trial court from revisiting a prior ruling on
a summary judgment motion. Trembly v. Mrs.
Fields Cookies, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).
Tf uroa uri+Viin fV»o f r i o l nnnrf'fl rl i a f r o f i r m
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of factual similarities. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields
Cookies, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).
Pleading in the alternative.
In action by architect against owners for
value of his services, the alternate remedies of
an action on the contract or in quasi contract
under the theory of quantum meruit could be
pleaded in alternative form and inserted by
amendment late in the proceedings. Parrish v.
Tahtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318 P.2d 642 (1957).
Presumption of finality.
Subdivision (b) allows courts to reacjjust
prior rulings in complex cases as subsequent
developments in the case might require, unless
those rulings disposed of entire claims or parties and those rulings were specifically certified as final. The "law of the case" doctrine
nonetheless promotes a measure of predictability in such cases by creating a kind of presumption that the court's prior rulings, even if not
certified as final, were correct and should
stand. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Real party in interest
Where surety's pleadings in action on bond
stated that it deemed plaintiffs partial assignment of right of action on bond as a breach of
contract releasing its liability, plaintiff had
sufficient notice and surety was entitled to
show that plaintiff was not real party in interest as a result of the assignment even though
this specific defense was not pleaded. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 325 P.2d
899 (1958).
Relief not demanded in pleadings.
Where plaintiffs prayer for relief does not
include punitive damages but he adduces the
necessary requirements for such damages at
trial, he can claim punitive damages under
Subdivision (c) without a formal amendment to
the pleadings. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp.,
675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983).
Every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in his pleadings. However, although
Subdivision (c)(1) permits relief on grounds not
pleaded, that rule does not go so far as to authorize the granting of relief on issues neither
raised nor tried. Combe v. Warren's Family
Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984);
Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 829 P.2d 117 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
Every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party is entitled, even if the party
has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.
Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d
287 (Utah 1984).
In consonance with Subdivision (c)(1), it
would have been proper for the court to have
reformed the contract if a mutual mistake of
fact had been established by clear and convincing evidence even though the J9W ofnngiuJd
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THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wall.

You have done a

3

good job representing yourself and I'm assuming that

4

Mrs. Wall is content with the arguments that have been

5

presented.

6

You have nothing more to add?

7

And Mr. Duffin, in his defense, has taken a

8

position which there's a legal argument about.

Because of

9

the status of the Jones v. Transamerica case, the

10

different interpretation that you all are making as to the

11

impact of State v. Ivie —

12

of the Anderson matter, which you have referenced, there

13

is in my opinion, a bona fide dispute which gave raise to

14

the filing of this.

15

I mean of Allstate v. Ivie, and

It is not as clear as you would urge me to find.

16

And I think that that is exemplified by the difficulty I'm

17

having in enunciating my reasoning in this matter.

18

regardless of which, as to the cross motions for summary

19

judgment, plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings

20

or summary judgment is denied.

21

Defendant's motion for summary —

But

and it's denied

22

based upon Allstate v. Ivie, and my interpretation that

23

that is an instance which is a very close factual basis

24

for this matter here. And that the concept which

25

Mr. Duffin has admitted been changed from Jones v.

COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

PI zsy

1

Transamerica is the one in which I'm having some

2

difficulty with.

3

But I'm holding that the PIP payments are

4

separate and distinct and different from the general

5

settlement of the $16,000. But I'm further holding that

6

Bear River has the ongoing obligation to pay the PIP

7

payments in this matter pursuant to the contract, and

8

binding arbitration, regardless of what position Hawkeye

9

will take in this matter.

10

Whether or not that has been settled, because of

11

the blanket release that has been executed by Mr. and

12

Mrs. Wall, that binding arbitration will proceed as to

13

Hawkeye and Bear River regarding the PIP payments, which I

14

have now determined that are due and owing to Mr. and

15

Mrs. Wall.

16

counterclaims in this matter.

So with that, I don't know the status of the

17

Now, Mr. Duffin, can you help me out?

18

MR. DUFFIN:

I think it disposes of them all as

19

far as you have made a finding that it is a justifiable

20

debatable question in good faith.

21

the only issue is we are required to continue on making

22

the payments.

23

So that being the case,

That disposes of the case.

THE COURT: And I'm assuming this may go up on

24

appeal because it is an issue in which there has been

25

contest, and if it does go up on appeal, Mr. and
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1

Mrs. Wall, I urge you very strongly that you get counsel

2

to help you on the appeal procedures.

3

You have admitted yourself that you haven't

4

followed or known of all the procedures in District Court,

5

and Appellate Court is different, again.

6

want, possibly good arguments that you may have, lost on

7

procedural basis and I would —

8

if this matter is appealed, which it very well may be,

9

then you ought to seek counsel. You ought to get an

And I don't

and if I —

10

attorney to help you out on the appeals.

11

But, my ruling is as indicated:

like I said,

That plaintiffs'

12

motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment

13

is denied.

14

upon my interpretation of Ivie is —

15

affirmed —

16

Defendant's motion for summary judgment, based
and it's progeny is

I mean, is granted.

I am going to dismiss —

and I'm further going to

17

make the observation that as to plaintiffs' motion to

18

dismiss the counterclaim, I'm finding that the

19

counterclaim, while it may speak generally in terms of

20

bona fide —

21

find it improper that you allege communication fraud, a

22

criminal matter, and specific reference to the criminal

23

statute in a counterclaim of a civil matter.

24
25

that's really what you are arguing about —

I

If you wish to allege fraud, then there's a
statute —

then there's the common law pleading that you

COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION
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1

can rely upon.

2

criminal statute and ask for criminal sanctions in a civil

3

matter.

4

But you will not be able to incorporate a

In that regard, I'm dismissing all of your

5

counterclaim, but it is not really necessary because I

6

have ruled in your favor on a motion for summary judgment.

7

If you wish to pursue a bad faith allegation, I

8

have already made my observation that there was a bona

9

fide issue that needed to be handled in a declaratory

10

manner, which Mr. Duffin has done, but if you wish to

11

pursue that, that's entirely up to you.

12

is not worth it. At this time you have one on your point

13

that PIP payments are there but that's entirely up to you.

14

So do you understand the ruling, Mr. and

15

I would think it

Mrs. Wall?

16

MR. WALL:

17

THE COURT: All right. And then I'm going to

18

make it your obligation to prepare an order consistent

19

with my ruling, granting your motion for summary judgment

20

and denying plaintiffs' motion.

21

Yes, sir.

MR. DUFFIN:

I would be glad to prepare it, your

23

THE COURT:

If you would, that would help me out.

24

MR. DUFFIN:

22

25

Honor.

I think that would be a better

position, because then I can prepare it in a form that —

COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION
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1

and I will make the following findings: That based upon

2

Ivie, blank, the defendant, is under a duty to continue

3

making the payments.

4

No, 2.

I would make a further finding that the

5

issue is debatable.

6

fide and, therefore, based upon that, with that finding

7

then, any issue as to counterclaims and so on are

8

automatically dismissed.

9

It was brought in good faith and bona

THE COURT: Make the further finding that I am

10

also dismissing the counterclaim on the court's own motion

11

sue sponte, due to the fact of intermixing of a criminal

12

violation of communication fraud in a civil action.

13
14

MR. DUFFIN:

Okay.

I will do that.

I will

prepare that.

15

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

16

So Mr. Duffin will prepare it. He will submit it

17

to you for your approval prior to submitting to the court

18

for my signature.

19

order, I don't know what Bear River wants to do; if they

20

take it up, they take it up.

21

to appeal.

22

they are going to do.

23

Mr. Duffin and his clients are going to take.

24

All right. Any questions?

25

MR. WALL:

Upon the signature and entry of the

They have 30 days in which

So that's entirely up to them to decide what
I don't know what position

No, not right now, sir.
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1

THE COURT:

2

Mr. Duffin, let me return to you your courtesy

3
4

Thank you.

copies.
(Proceedings concluded.)
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
County of Salt Lake )

SS.

I, Nora S. Worthen, do certify that I am a

5

Certified Shorthand Reporter and Official Court Reporter

6

in and for the State of Utah; that as such reporter, I

7

reported the occasion of the proceedings of the

8

above-entitled matter at the aforesaid time and place.

9

That the proceeding was reported by me in stenotype using
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computer-aided transcription consisting of pages 3 through
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8 inclusive.
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transcription of the bench ruling of said proceedings.
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That the same constitutes a true and correct

That I am not of kin or otherwise associated with
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any of the parties herein or their counsel, and that I am
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not interested in the events thereof.
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WITNESS my hand at Salt Lake City, Utah, this
15th day of September, 1995.
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THOMAS A. DUFFIN (927) of
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6600
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO FILE
AN AMENDED COMPLAINT

vs.
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH VALLEY
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body politic
of the State of Utah,

Civil No. 920905486PD
Judge Glen Iwacaki

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 4-501(1) of the Judicial Council Rules of Judicial
Administration, Plaintiff files its Memorandum in Support of its Motion to file an
Amended Complaint.

Defendant's Motion is based on the following facts and

argument:
1.

Defendant Utah Valley Community College, is a subdivision or

agency of the State of Utah, created by the Legislature of the State of Utah under the
provisions of the Utah State Constitution, Article XI, Section 1.
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This suit is brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title

63, Chapter 30, Sections 1 through 38.
3.

Jurisdiction is also conferred upon the above-entitled Court

pursuant to the provisions of the Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 7, (Due
Process), no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law.
4.

That on the 7th day of August, 1991, the Plaintiff, within the one-

year period, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §63-30-11 and 12, petitioned the
State of Utah for relief. Said petition was denied.
5.

The Plaintiff has previously filed an undertaking required by Utah

Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §63-30-19.
6.

That at all times herein the Plaintiff was an insurance company

duly organized and existing under the laws of the state of Utah and authorized to
engage in the insurance business who issued a policy of insurance to Larry J. Remm,
providing for personal injury protection coverage, Policy No. C127191.
7.

That at all times herein the Defendant, Utah Valley Community

College, was a body politic of the State of Utah, or an agency of the State of Utah.
8.

That at all times herein, Mike Jacobsen, was a resident of Utah

County, State of Utah, and was an agent of Utah Valley Community College and that
the State of Utah and was driving a vehicle during the performance of his duties
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-3within the scope of his employment and under color of authority of Utah Valley
Community College and the State of Utah.
9-

That at ail times herein, on January 4, 1991 # Larry J. Remm was

the owner of a 1978 Chevrolet automobile, which was being driven by himself and
insured with Bear River Mutual Insurance Company with personal injury protection
benefits,
10.

The event out of which this cause of action arose took place and

occurred on February 15, 1991, at approximately 1:00 p.m. at 4500 South and 320
West, Salt Lake County, Utah, when Defendant's Agent negligently ran his vehicle
into the vehicle owned and driven by Larry J. Remm, causing personal injuries in the
sum of $2,257.00.
11.

That at the time and place mentioned herein the defendant, by and

through its agent, employee, Mike Jacobsen, in the course of his employment and in
the performance of his duties, Larry J. Remm was operating his automobile in a
northbound direction exiting 1-15 and turned West onto 4500 South when Mike
Jacobsen struck the right rear of the Remm automobile.
12.

In the original Complaint the scribe inadvertently placed Salt Lake

County as the body politic on whom notice was given and the date of March 29,
1991, as the date of service, rather than the 7th day of August, 1991. This was in
error and Plaintiff should be allowed to amend its Complaint to correct the error.

-4ARGUMENT
POINT 1,
THAT PLAINTIFF. PURSUANT TO RULE 15(a) SHOULD BE FREELY
ALLOWED TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT.
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows:
" A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which
no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall
be freely given when justice so requires. . . . "
The said action of the Court in allowing Plaintiff to amend its Complaint
will not prejudice, or cause undue delay in the trial of the matter or in bringing the
matter to trial.
The case of Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045 (UT 1971), states:
"Ordinarily the allowance of an amendment by leave of court is a matter
which lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. This discretion,
however, is to be exercised in the furtherance of justice and must not be
exercised so as to defeat justice. The rule in this state has always been
to allow amendments freely where justice requires, and especially is this
true before trial.

The case of Hancock v. Luke gives the light on the question here before
us. There, no objections were made to the pleadings until the case was
called for trial, when the plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings.
The defendant's motion to amend was denied. In reversing that ruling
this court said:
'We can see no reason whatever why the defendants in
this case should be denied the right of amendment when
the exercise of that right is a matter of daily occurrence in
our courts of justice. True, motions for judgment on the

pirn

-5pleadings may be rare, but that is no reason why the right
of amendment should be denied when timely proposed, as
in the case at bar. Nor can we conceive how any one can
in any way in advance that in this case at least a partial
defense may not be set forth by a proper amendment to the
answer. Nor can we see how it can successfully be
contended that the emotion for leave to amend was not
timely made, or that prejudice or undue delay will result if
allowed/"
The case of Gillman v. Hansen, supra, states that the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action" and unless substantial abuse and prejudice can be
demonstrated, it is judicial error to deny the Plaintiff the right to amend its Complaint.
POINT 11.
THE PLAINTIFF TIMELY FILED ITS NOTICE AND ITS COMPLAINT IN THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER AND THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION.
The accident occurred on February 15, 1991. On the 7th day of August,
1991, Exhibit A, notice was sent to the State of Utah, through its agent, Risk
Management. No answer was received from Risk Management and, therefore, the
time for commencing an action, as more fully set forth in Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended §63-30-14, provides that if no answer to a claim is received, the
denial takes place 90 days thereafter.
Therefore, the notice being sent on August 7, 1991, the denial took
effect as of November 7, 1991.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §63-30-15 provides that the
action must be commenced within one year after the denial. Therefore, the time to

-6commence the action would be one year from November 7, 1991, or November 7,
1992.

The action was in fact commenced on October , 1992, and was timely.

Therefore, notice was properly sent, and the action was commenced properly within
one year after denial.
POINT III.
NO NOTICE IS NECESSARY PURSUANT TO THE GOVERNMENT ACT
ON PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION AND BENEFIT CLAIMS.
In 1985 the Utah Legislature passed Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended §31A-22-307 known as the Personal Injury Protection Coverages and
Benefits statute. The abbreviation for this statute is called "PIP."
Under PIP the driver of an automobile who is injured in an accident is paid
medical and loss of wage benefits by his own insurance carrier.

Then the

reimbursement between the insurance carriers is provided for by mandatory arbitration
as more fully set forth in AHstate v. I vie. 606 P.2d 1197. The jyje case makes it
unequivocally clear that the personal injury protection benefits do not become part of
the plaintiff's (claimant's) negligence claim against the tort feasor. They are distinct
and separate and they have nothing to do with the tort feasor's or claimant's cause
of action.
The statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31 A-22-309{5)
provides as follows:
(5)
Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall
be made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any
period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer
receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses i n c u r r e ^ *

'

-7during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire
claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid
within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer
fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear interest
at the rate of 1 !4% per month after the due date. The person entitled
to the benefits may bring an action in contract to recover the expenses
plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is required by the action to pay
any overdue benefits and interest, the insurer is also required to pay a
reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant.
As can be plainly seen, the insured contractually has a claim against his
insurance company for the payment of these benefits. Then the reimbursement is
covered by statute pursuant to arbitration.
The whole basis of the entire concept of the Personal Injury Protection
statute is contractual and statutory in nature.
This very matter was decided in the U.S. District Court in the matter of
United States Fidelity & Guaranty v. United States of America, 728 F.Supp. 651
{D.Utah 1989), in which the Federal District Court stated on page 655:
w

. . . The inter-company claim for reimbursement of PIP benefits is a
statutory and contractual remedy not based on personal tort liability.
The Utah Supreme Court in Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, 1202-03
(1980) denied a subrogation claim for recovery of PIP benefits . . . "
Therefore, this remedy is entirely statutory. American States Insurance
Company v. Utah Transit Authority, 699 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1985) points out:
" . . . It correctly points out that UTA is made subject to the
requirements of the No-Fault Act in section 31-41-4(3) and that
subsections 31-41-5(1 )(a) and (b) require owners of motor vehicles to
carry liability insurance that meets the qualifications imposed by the
Safety Responsibility Act, Allstate Insurance Co. v. USF&G, Utah, 619
P.2d 329 (1980), or to be self-insured."

-8Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §60-30-5 provides:
"Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any
contractual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights or
obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of Section 63-30-11,
63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15 or 63-30-19."
Defendant plainly has not read the statute. The basis for these claims
as more fully set forth in the Federal District Court of United States Fidelity &
Guaranty v. United States of America, supra, is contractual and statutory. Therefore,
no notice is required.
POINT IV.
THAT PROPER NOTICE WAS SENT TO THE STATE OF UTAH.
The notice requirement was sent to the Division of Risk Management for
the State of Utah, 355 West North Temple, Suite 330, Salt Lake City, Utah, as
pursuant to the Affidavit of Thomas A. Duffin, attached hereto, all claims from the
Salt Lake Community College are referred to the State of Utah, Division of Risk
Management. There was certainly substantial compliance with the statute.
The case of Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980)
stated:
"Moreover, there was substantial compliance with the 30-day notice
provision and defendant was in no way prejudiced by plaintiff's failure
to comply with the formality of filing a claim.
A statute is, of course, to be construed in light of its intended purpose.
Child v. City of Spanish Fork, Utah, 538 P.2d 184 (1975). It is
necessary to consider the policy of the notice requirement so that in any
particular case the facts can be evaluated to determine if the intent of
the statute has been accomplished by substantial compliance with the
statutory directive. Smith v. State,Ala. 364 So.2d 1 (1978). This county

-9has previously stated that the primary purpose of a notice of claim
requirement is to afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity
to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a claim and
to arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the
expenditure of puDlic revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation.
Sears v. Southworth, Utah 563 P.2d 192 (1977); Gallegos v. Midvale
City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972).
We view plaintiff's contention that the notice given to the insurance
adjuster in this case constituted compliance with the statute in light of
these policy considerations. First, we note that §63-30-14 of the
Governmental Immunity Act equates the authority of the insurance
carrier with that of the governmental entity concerning the notice to
claimant of the approval of denial of a claim for injury. Thus the
insurance agent is authorized by law to handle the approval or denial of
plaintiffs claim, representing the interests of the government. Rice v.
Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969)."
There has been substantial compliance in any event because the Division
of Risk Management handles all claims for the State of Utah and, therefore, the
provisions of the statute have been correctly complied with.
CONCLUSION
This Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, requests the aboveentitled Court to allow the amended Complaint to be filed and the Motion to Dismiss
be denied.
Dated this/—^ day of April, 1993.
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
I Cc^TIFYTHATTHIS IS A TRI
OF, ORIGINAL DOCUMEI
INTHL ^HIRO DISTRICT C
LAKEC NTY.8TATEOF

s^

DATE:

DEPL

homas A. Duffin
Attorney for Plaintiff
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-10MAILING CERTIFICATE
J certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support
of its Motion to File Amended Complaint to the following parties by placing a true
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Jan Graham
Attorney General
Barbara E. Ochoa
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
236 Si „e Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
postage prepaid, this / 3 d a y of April, 1993.
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John Wall and Nanc%- Wall

.BE IT REMEMBERED That

Address

1269 West California, Salt Lake City, Utah 84104

(hereinafter referred to as tne Claimant

s

) for and in consideration of the sum of S i x t e e n Thousanc
Dollars ($

the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do

we

and n o / 100s

)

16,000.00

hereby REMISE, RELEASE A N D F O R E V E R D I S C H A R G E

D a v i d Waters d / b / a D & L C o n s t r u c t i o n and Lana Waters
(Insert Here Full Name of Person*, Corporations or Partnersntps To Be R I I M M O )

agents and servants and all other persons, firms, and corporations whomsoever of and from any and all actions,

Their
(His, Her, Their, its)

claims, and demands whatsoever which claimant's

now have

or may have, whether known or unknown, developed or un-

( H a s , Hd^e)

developed, on account of or sri.-ing out of the accident, casualty u. evsni which happened or. c*

7+-V.

dav of

.<n>_22_-

August

As a further consideration for said Sum Claimant s
been made to Claimant s

warrant

that no promise or agreement not herein exoressed has

; that in executing this Release Claimant _s

are

not relying upon any statement or representation

i u . Are)

made by the party or parties hereby released or said party's or paaies' agents, servants or physicians concerning the nature,
extent, or duration of the injuries and/or damages, or concerning any other thing or matter, but

are

relying

solely

upon

(U, Are)

their

—

of all the aforesaid claims and demands whatsoever; that Claimants
fore signing and sealing this Release, Claimant g

h*vp

are
lts. Are)

have

legally competent to execute this Release; and that be-

fully informed

(Has, Have)

and

in full settlement and satisfaction

own judgment; that the above mentioned sum is received by Claimants

(His, ner. Their, its)

r hpmgpl

VPC

of its contents and meaning

(Himsett, HerseH, Tftemseives)

executed it with full knowledge thereof. It is further understood and agreed that the payment of said amount is

not to be construed as an admission of liability, but is a compromise of a disputed claim.

HAVE READ THE FQREBOIN& RELEASE AND FUU.T UNDERSTAND JT>'^.
Signed, sealed and delivered this
at

,*3^G

b.rb

^taL~s- *^&ZJLA-

*^f

dayof
C^^^^-^^yf

X

In the presence of
Witness:
Witness:
Witness:
C 381A 7/71 K

w2£.

-7/IOJCL^:^

(Claimants sign be.'ow)

ntf**zJL/ j.uJt'
N O T A R Y PUBLIC
M A M H t W J . WHITE
247 Hawthorne Dr.
Layton. UT 84041
My GooimHWon Ewp»K
December 13th. 1997
STATE OF UTAH

(Seal)
(Seal)
_
(OVfcR)

(Seal)
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an action in tort by either a provider of direct benefits under section 10-4-706
or by a person who has been injured or damaged as a result of an automobile
accident against an alleged tortfeasor where such alleged tortfeasor was
either:
(a) Using or operating a motor vehicle not required to be covered under
the provisions of this part 7, unless coverage equivalent to that required
under section 10-4-706 was, at the time of occurrence of the alleged tortious
conduct, actually provided for the benefit of persons for whom benefits are
provided under section 10-4-707; or
(b) Using or operating a motor vehicle which, although required to be
covered under the provisions of this part 7, was not, at the time of the occurrence of the alleged tortious conduct, actually covered under the provisions
ofthispart7;or
(c) Deliberately and intentionally committing a tort; or
(d) Subject as a manufacturer, distributor, supplier, or repairman to a
tort action arising out of product liability or product defect.
Source: L. 73: p. 341, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 13-25-15. L. 92: IP(1) amended,
p. 1787, § 10, effective May 14.
Am. Jur.2d. See 7 Am. Jur.2d, Automobile
Insurance, § 349.
Although plaintiff alleged willfull and
wanton conduct by the defendant to support a
claim for punitive damages, this allegation did
not transform plaintiffs negligence claim
against the defendant into an intentional tort

claim for the purposes of excusing plaintiff
from meeting the threshold requirements of
§ 10-4-714. Pulliam v. Dreiling, 839 P.2d 521
(Colo. App. 1992).
Applied in Cingoranelli v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 658 P.2d 863 (Colo. 1983).

10-4-716. Self-insurers. (1) Any person in whose name more than twentyfive motor vehicles are registered may qualify as a self-insurer by obtaining
a certificate of self-insurance issued by the director.
(2) The director may, in his discretion, upon the application of such
person, issue a certificate of self-insurance when he is satisfied that such
person is possessed and will continue to be possessed of ability to pay direct
benefits as required under section 10-4-706 and to pay any and all judgments
which may be obtained against such person. Upon not less than five days'
notice and a hearing pursuant to such notice, the director may, upon reasonable grounds, cancel a certificate of self-insurance. Failure to pay any benefits
under section 10-4-706 or failure to pay any judgment within thirty days
after such judgment shall have become final shall constitute a reasonable
ground for the cancellation of a certificate of self-insurance.
Source: L. 73: p. 342, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 13-25-16. L. 92: (2) amended,
p. 1787, § 11, effective May 14.
Provisions of act with regard to self-insurers
do not limit obligation that every owner of a
motor vehicle provide liability coverage for

bodily injury arising from the vehicle's
permissive use. Barnes v. Whitt, 852 P.2d
1322 (Colo. App. 1993).

10-4-717. Intercompany arbitration. (1) Every insurer licensed to write
motor vehicle insurance in this state shall be deemed to have agreed, as
a condition to maintaining such license after January 1, 1974:

nvz
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(a) That, where its insured is or would be held legally liable under the
provisions of section 10-4-713 (2) for the benefits paid by another insurer,
described in section 10-4-706, it will reimburse such other insurer to the
extent of such benefits but not in excess of the amount of damages so recoverable for the type of loss covered by such benefits and only to the extent
of the alleged tort-feasor's insurance coverage in excess of reasonable compensation paid to the injured person for such person's injury or damage by
the alleged tort-feasor's insurer; and
(b) That the issue of liability for such reimbursement and the amount
thereof shall be decided by mandatory, binding intercompany arbitration
procedures approved by the commissioner. If either insurer in such an arbitration proceeding also has provided coverage to the same policyholder for
collision or upset arising out of the same occurrence, such insurer shall also
submit the issue of recovery of any payments thereunder to the same mandatory and binding arbitration as provided in this section.
(2) The commissioner shall also approve procedures for arbitration of
the issue of liability for and reimbursement of benefits paid under additional
or supplementary coverages written pursuant to section 10-4-710, which
procedures shall be applicable to disputes between insurers agreeing to join
in such procedures. Such agreements shall be renewable annually and shall
apply to motor vehicle accidents occurring during the calendar year.
(3) Notwithstanding any statute of limitations to the contrary, any
demand for initial arbitration proceedings shall be brought within one year
of the first payment of any of the benefits described in section 10-4-706
by the insurer claiming for reimbursement. Arbitration proceedings need not
await final payment of benefits, and the award, if any, shall include provision
for reimbursement of subsequent benefits. Proceedings may be reopened to
challenge the propriety of payments subsequently made, but no question of
fact decided by a prior award shall be reconsidered in any such subsequent
hearing.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow an insurer to claim
and receive reimbursement, whether by arbitration, subrogation, litigation,
intracompany setoff, or any other means, from the liability insurance of the
tort-feasor in such a manner as to reduce the amount of liability insurance
available to reasonably compensate an injured victim having a claim or cause
of action under section 10-4-714.
Source: L. 73: p. 342, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 13-25-17. L, 79: p. 389, §2.
L. 80: p. 466, § 1. L, 92: (l)(a) and (3) amended, p. 1788, § 12, effective
May 14.
Am. Jur.2d. See 7 Am. Jur.2d, Automobile
Insurance, § 347.
Insured entitled to full tort recovery except
where the result is double recovery. The general
assembly intended to allow an insured full tort
recovery undiminished by the subrogation
and arbitration right of his insurer, except in
those cases where such a policy would result in
double recovery to the insured. Marquez v.
Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 620 P.2d
29 (Colo. 1980).

Subrogation and arbitration not concurrent
alternatives. Reading § 10-4-713 (1) and this
section together, it is clear that they were not
intended to provide concurrent, alternative
recovery rights to an insurer through subrogation or arbitration. Marquez v. Prudential
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 29 (Colo.
1980).
Section applies to actions by or between
insurance companies and has no applicability
where the injured party brings an action on her
own behalf against the tort-feasor.
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Hickenbottom v. Schmidt, 626 P.2d 726
(Colo. App. 1981).
When direct action for reimbursement available. Where an insurer licensed to do business
in Colorado has made personal injury protection payments and seeks reimbursement from
another insurer licensed in Colorado, the sole
and mandatory remedy for recovery of personal injury protection expenditures is arbitration, as provided by this section. Direct
action for reimbursement under § 10-4-713 is
available only where one of the parties is not
an insurer licensed to do business in Colorado.
Baumgart v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co., 199 Colo. 330,607 P.2d 1002(1980).
Section applicable. Because defendant taxicab company maintained a certificate of selfinsurance and qualified as a self-insurer under
§ 10-4-716, once a claim for legal liability
under § 10-4-713 (2) becomes established, the
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issue of reimbursement shall be addressed by
arbitration. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v.
Cabs, Inc., 751 P.2d61 (Colo. 1988).
When this section is read with § 10-4-713,
mandatory arbitration for determination of
liability for direct benefits is clearly not
required where two vehicles in accident were
both private. Shelter Gen. Ins. v. Progressive
Cas., 796 P.2d 18 (Colo. App. 1990).
Unlicensed motor vehicle insurers are not
subject to the mandatory arbitration provisions
of this section. Sakala v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
America, 833 P.2d 879 (Colo. App. 1992).
Uninsured private motor vehicle owner is not
subject to mandatory arbitration under this
section because only licensed insurers are subject to such mandatory arbitration. Sakala v.
Safeco Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 879 (Colo. App.
1992).

10-4-718. Quarterly premium payments. The commissioner shall issue
rules and regulations establishing quarterly, semiannual, and annual premium payments for persons who are required to purchase insurance under
this part 7.
Source: L. 73: p. 342, § 1. CR.S. 1963: § 13-25-18.
This section constitutes declaration of policy
that insurance payments can be paid in quarterly installments. Golting v. Hartford Acci-

dent & Indem. Co., 43 Colo. App. 337, 603
P.2d 972 (1979).

10-4-719. Prohibited reasons for nonrenewal or refusal to write a policy
of automobile insurance applicable to this part 7. (1) No insurer authorized
to transact or transacting business in this state shall refuse to write or refuse
to renew a policy of insurance affording the coverages required by operation
of sections 10-4-706 and 10-4-707 solely because of the age, color, sex,
national origin, residence, marital status, or lawful occupation, including the
military service, of anyone who is, or seeks to become insured, or solely
because another insurer has canceled a policy or refused to write or renew
such policy. The commissioner shall administer and enforce the provisions
of this subsection (1).
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any insurance
company authorized to transact or transacting business in this state from
issuing policies of insurance affording the coverages required by operation
of sections 10-4-706 and 10-4-707 solely to a specialty market authorized
by the commissioner.
Source: L. 73: p. 343, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 13-25-19.
Insurers failure to notify insureds clearly and
unequivocally of its cancellation of coverage
constituted a course of conduct which led
insureds, as ordinary laypersons, reasonably
to believe that by properly endorsing and

returning their premium payment their personal injury coverage would remain in effect
or be reinstated. Leland v. Travelers Indem.
Co. of Illinois, 712 P.2d 1060 (Colo. App.
1985).
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